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Abstract
EXAMINING THE UNITED KINGDOM’S SOFT LAW APPROACH FOR
WOMEN ON BOARDS WITH REGARD TO GENDER DIVERSITY AND THE
GENDER PAY GAP: A REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY DESIGN
Silvana Chambers
Dissertation Chair: Kim Nimon, Ph.D.
The University of Texas at Tyler
April 2019
In an effort to remove barriers that hinder women’s advancement in the workplace,
legislators have adopted gender quotas and targets to increase the numbers of women on
boards (WOB). In 2011, the Davies Review rolled out the guidelines of the United
Kingdom’s soft law approach for increasing the proportion of WOB in the largest
publicly listed organizations. Promoted by advocates and proponents of WOB initiatives,
the assumption that inequality is perpetuated by men and not women, has resulted in the
expectation that WOB initiatives are a top-down approach to achieve gender equality in
the workforce. This study examined the effects of the Davies Review, U.K.’s soft law for
increasing WOB, on changes in board composition, opportunities for other women in the
organization, and the gender pay gap. Using longitudinal data from 2008 to 2016, for
395 FTSE All Share firms, this study examined the effects of the Davies Review using a
rigorous research design and methodology. This study’s main analyses used a nonparametric regression discontinuity design and supplemental tests used growth models.
Findings of this study provided support for the causal effect of the Davies Review
on increasing the percentage of WOB in FTSE 350 organizations below the compliance
x

threshold established by the Davies Review. Additionally, ignoring differences in power
and status that favor men in leadership roles, increased numerical representation of WOB
has gone unchallenged as a measure of gender diversity performance. To test its effect,
this study used women’s board representation at 20%, 25%, and 30% to test critical mass
of WOB on organizational indicators of gender equality. Counter to the assumption that,
at some point of the representation spectrum, women reach critical mass and influence
organizational outcomes, this study found no evidence of critical mass of WOB on
opportunities for other women in the organization or the gender pay gap. At a
representation of 25% of WOB, a large negative effect was found on opportunities for
women on executive boards. In line with previous findings of the effects of WOB
initiatives on the gender pay gap, this study found that organizations that increased their
percentages of WOB more aggressively, had a much wider gender pay gap than
organizations that underwent small changes. Similarly, it was found that female CEOs
increase the gender pay gap by 4.33% for each year of tenure, which is consistent their
primary duty of maximizing profitability for the organization’s shareholders, and with
how their performance is assessed. Implications for policy and practice are discussed.

Key words: gender quotas, women on boards, corporate boards, Davies Review,
gender diversity, equality, regression discontinuity, Lord Davies initiative, Davies Report,
gender pay gap.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
Background to the Problem
The United Nations defines gender as the social attributes and opportunities
associated with being male and female and the relationships within and between women
and men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are
learned through socialization processes (UN Women, 2018). Gender determines what is
expected, allowed, and valued in women or men in a given context. In most societies
there are differences and inequalities between women and men in responsibilities
assigned, activities undertaken, access to and control over resources, as well as decisionmaking opportunities. Often used interchangeably, the terms gender diversity and gender
equality represent different concepts. Gender diversity represents the gender differences
between people and groups of people and places positive value on those differences.
Gender equality refers to the equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities for men and
women (UN Women, 2018). Gender equality is not only an inalienable basic human
right, but its achievement is part of the world’s commitment to universal ideals of human
dignity. Considering that gender equality is a very broad term that encompasses different
dimensions in life; for clarity, it should be noted that this study focused on indicators of
gender equality in the workplace. Indicators of gender equality are numerical indicators
that represent the progress toward achieving equal contribution of women and men in the
workplace, also referred to as gender parity.

1

In the developed western world, the first statutes to prohibit discrimination on the
basis of gender emerged in the U.S. with the Civil Rights Act of 1964. A decade later,
the U.K. Parliament passed the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 (superseded by the
Equality Act of 2010) formalizing protections for women in employment, training, and
education. Equality between men and women is a fundamental value of the European
Union (EU; European Institute for Gender Equality, 2018). As an EU member state, the
United Kingdom has a duty to promote its values, including equality.
According to the 2017 World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report, the
United Kingdom is ranked number 15 in relation to opportunities for women, which
include economic participation, educational attainment, health and survival, and political
empowerment (World Economic Forum, 2017). Compared with the rankings of other
countries with similar economies, such as the United States (49), Canada (16), and
Australia (35), the United Kingdom could be considered to be a more progressive country
in terms of gender equality. However, current statistics provide evidence of a massive
disparity in economic participation and opportunity.
Despite the considerable efforts over the past half a century to achieve gender
equality in the British workforce, gender disparities persist, and at a sustained rate of
change would result in gender parity in 61 years (World Economic Forum, 2017). These
disparities are measured in function to participation, remuneration, and advancement. In
the United Kingdom, women occupy only 15% of leadership positions (Credit Suisse,
2016) and 27% of corporate seats in publicly listed boards (World Economic Forum,
2017), despite representing 46% of the workforce (Office for National Statistics, 2018),
and 49.3% of the professional workforce. The gender gap in advancement starts at the
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first step of the hierarchy and widens progressively at every organizational level, with
senior leadership showing the greatest disparity (McKinsey, 2016). Additionally, the
existence of a gender pay gap that starts as graduates enter the workforce and widens
over time was identified in a longitudinal study by the U.K. Department for Education
(2018).
In recent years, gender diversity on corporate boards has become one of the
leading topics in corporate governance and the gender equality discourse (Terjesen, Sealy,
& Singh, 2009). In 2003, Norway was the first country to implement legislation that
regulates the gender composition of corporate boards (Engelstad & Teigen, 2012, p.116),
mandating that listed companies have a minimum 40% representation of each gender by
2008. The Norway quota law resulted in an increase in female representation on
corporate boards from 7% in 2003 to 40% in 2009 (Teigen, 2015). The apparent success
of the Norway approach gained considerable attention worldwide, highlighting the
existence of male dominance at the highest corporate decision-making levels (Bertrand,
Black, Jensen, & Lleras-Muney, 2018; Sweigart, 2012; Teigen, 2012). Driven by the
slow pace of change in the gender composition of corporate boards (Sweigart, 2012),
several countries have followed Norway’s lead. Researchers (Seierstad, WarnerSoderholm, Torchia, & Huse, 2017) argue that the increased attention to women on
boards (WOB) initiatives has resulted in their inclusion in political agendas.
Government bodies employ two competing approaches to increasing board
diversity, gender quotas and comply or explain approaches. The first one is the
legislative approach, which is also referred to as hard law approach, and the second one
is the voluntary comply or explain approach, also referred to as soft law approach. The
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legislative approach regulates the gender composition of corporate boards through the use
of mandatory quotas, and often have penalties for non-compliance. After the
implementation of the Norway (2003) quota law, the following countries implemented
hard law approaches for increasing the representation of WOB, among which are Spain
(2007), Iceland (2010), France (2011), the Netherlands (2011), Belgium (2011), Italy
(2013), Germany (2014). Comply or explain approaches encourage organizations to
promote gender diversity on their boards but do not impose penalties for non-compliance.
Sweden (2007), Australia (2010), the United States (2010) and the United Kingdom
(2011) are among the countries that have implemented soft law approaches.
The EU has played a major role in the inclusion of gender equality in the political
agendas of its member states (Fagan & Rubery, 2018). Gender equality is the area of
social policy where the EU law has had its most significant influence due to its inclusion
in the original Treaty of Rome (Hyman, 2008), with legal basis for any binding measures
that aim at enforcing the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment in the
Article 157(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2007). However,
scholars (Storvik & Teigen, 2010; Teigen, 2012) argue that it was the Norwegian quota
law that brought attention to the gender imbalance on corporate boards and inspired the
quota debate at top levels of the EU system. As the European Commission deliberated a
proposal to introduce gender quota legislation for its member states, the U.K. government
promptly acted to introduce an initiative to address women’s underrepresentation on
British corporate boards by rolling out the Davies Review (2011).
The Davies Review recommended a target of 25% female representation on the
boards of organizations trading in the London Stock Exchange and listed in the Financial
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Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) indices, FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 – collectively FTSE
350. The Davies Review recommended that FTSE 100 boards achieve the 25% target by
2015 and FTSE 250 boards aim for the 25% target in a longer timeframe, which was a
considerable increase from their starting points in 2011 of, 12.5% and 7.9%, respectively.
Researchers argue that legislation and mandatory regulations such as quota laws are not
highly regarded in the U.K., and voluntary targets for initiatives involving employers are
the preferred strategy (Fagan & Rubery, 2018; Goyal, Kakabadse, Morais, & Kakabadse,
2018; Teigen, 2012). Consequently, a fundamental difference between the U.K.’s
approach and the quota approach implemented in most other European nations was that
the Davies Review was deployed as a comply or explain voluntary effort, which unlike
mandatory quotas, did not carry sanctions for non-compliance. Nevertheless, the
initiative was delivered with the threat of much higher mandated quotas imposed by the
European Commission if the voluntary targets were not achieved (Davies, 2011).
The Davies Review (2011) was also the fulfillment of the U.K. coalition
government’s pledge to promote gender equality on boards in order to counter the many
barriers to equal opportunity in Britain and help build a fairer society. Consistent with
evidence that suggests that gender quotas and targets for WOB are an effective way for
helping women break into male-dominated positions (Hughes, Paxton, & Krook, 2017;
Terjesen, Aguilera, & Lorenz, 2015), by the end of 2015, the targets set in 2011 had been
exceeded. The boards of FTSE 350 organizations had collectively doubled their female
representation, with FTSE 100 boards at 26.1% and FTSE 250 boards at 19.6%, which
was reported in the 5 Year Summary (Davies, 2015).
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Lord Davies indicated that the United Kingdom was a leader and role model on
the international stage for having achieved such progress under a voluntary approach
rather than quota legislation (p. 10). In fact, it was reported that by the 2015 deadline of
the initiative, using performance indices comparable to the FTSE 100 index, the United
Kingdom ranked sixth in the world in terms of female membership on corporate boards,
and was the first one in the ranking that did not rely on mandatory quotas (Davies, 2015,
p. 11; Hampton & Alexander, 2016, p. 34). However, these results were presented as an
average of the aggregated percentages. Therefore, despite the seemingly obvious success
of the Davies Review in increasing gender parity on boards of FTSE organizations,
without proper analysis, negative effects even at the board level, cannot be ruled out.
Other than the increase in the collective percentage of WOB, very little is known about
effects of the initiative.
In the 5 Year Summary, Lord Davies not only celebrated the success of the
initiative, but he also asked that organizations keep their laser sharp focus on the WOB
agenda, as in doing so “there is the potential to banish gender inequality in British
business to the annals of history” (Davies, 2015, p. 27). By 2015, there were 682 director
positions filled by women on FTSE 350 boards (Davies, 2015), which suggests that the
initiative targets a very small number of women. Considering that the number of women
employed in British workforce reaches almost 19 million (Office for National Statistics,
2018), it is hard to reconcile how an initiative that targets such a small number of women
can banish gender inequality.
The theoretical link between women’s representation in decision-making roles
and the representation of women’s interests (Phillips, 1998) makes it plausible that there
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was an expectation that targeting WOB would have a positive effect on gender equality in
British business. Researchers (Ferreira, 2015; Skaggs, Stainback & Duncan, 2012) have
suggested that proponents of gender initiatives for corporate boards believe and expect
that women in high levels of leadership will reduce gender discrimination. One
assumption underlying the idea that a small number of women in senior positions will
help other women in junior positions is that inequality is perpetuated by men and not
women (cf. Derks Van Laar & Ellemers, 2016). However, research has provided
evidence that women in leadership roles may be unable to help other women, face special
challenges that hinder their ability to advocate for other women (Duguid, 2011; Ellemers,
Rink, Derks, & Ryan, 2012), or be unwilling to help other women (Bierema, 2005).
Targeting boards as a way to promote gender equality can be explained by
principles of representation. In Norway, the country that triggered the snowball effect of
WOB initiatives (Teigen, 2012), a central argument to government justification for the
introduction of the quota reform was that gender-balanced representation in the highest
economic decision-making levels was essential for the Norwegian democracy (Tiegen,
2015). Norway’s model of corporate governance relies on industrial democracy (Emery
& Thorsrud, 2013), requiring employees to be represented on their organization’s board.
The scope of employee representation was expanded by including gender representation,
as set forth in the Gender Equality Act of 1999, which was passed by Norwegian
Parliament in 2003 (Storvik, 2011).
Based on Norway’s employee board representation’s system, it makes logical
sense that there was an expectation that women who were appointed to boards would
look after the interests of the employees they represented. However, few countries have
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corporate governance systems that include employee representation. In the United
Kingdom, where employees do not have the right to board representation, the role of the
board is to collectively be responsible for the long-term success of the company, acting in
what they consider to be the best interests of the company, while ensuring that the
company’s obligations to its shareholders and others are understood and met (Financial
Reporting Council, 2016, p.7). Therefore, the expectation that WOB in the United
Kingdom will represent the interests of other women in the organization may not be as
reasonable in the U.K. context as it is in the Norway context, as their responsibility of
generating value for the shareholders is their primary duty.
The two principles of representation that are associated with gender quotas in the
literature are descriptive and substantive (Phillips, 1998; Young, 2002). Descriptive
representation indicates fair representation of women in numbers. Thus, initiatives to
promote the achievement of gender parity on corporate boards, such gender quotas and
targets aim to attain women’s descriptive representation. Substantive representation
implies that people’s interests are represented by those in decision-making positions.
Substantive representation of women is not related to their representative’s gender, but to
the tendency of their representative to advocate for women’s interests. The link between
descriptive and substantive representation was hypothesized using the theoretical
foundation of the politics of presence (Wangnerud, 2009), in which Phillips (1995)
argued that female representatives were better suited to represent the interests of other
women.
Studies have tested the assumption that women who are numerical minorities in
decision-making roles will advocate for other women, and found this is not always the
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case. The likelihood of women in high-level positions helping other women is highly
dependent on a number of contextual variables that influence the relationship (Duguid,
2011; Ellemers et al., 2012). Other studies that examined the effects of the Norway quota
law did not find evidence to support the hypothesis that the reform benefited the larger
set of women employed in the companies impacted by the quota (Bertrand et al., 2018).
A study of the Norway quota law found that the initiative created a small elite group of
women directors but did not have a positive effect on increasing opportunities for other
women (Seirstad & Opsahl, 2011). Further, the gender wage gap did not decrease, except
at the top of the labor market, which researchers argue could be the result of increased
demand for women created by the quota law (Bertrand et al., 2018).
Scholars (Cha & Weeden, 2014; Srivastava & Sherman, 2015) have suggested
that the gender pay gap is one of the most extensively studied indicators of inequality in
the workplace. In the United Kingdom, the Equality Act of 2010 (preceded by the Equal
Pay Act of 1970 and the Equal Pay Act of 1983) protects employees from employment
and pay discrimination based, among other categories, on gender. However, despite
legislation, the persistence of a pay gap between men and women suggests the existence
of discrimination. Diel and Dzubinski (2016) argued that discrimination is now subtle
and often invisible to both men and women. In fact, some scholars have argued that
gender pay gaps are likely to exist in developed societies because both men and women
consider lower earnings for women to be fair (Auspurg, Hinz, & Sauer, 2017).
As female representation in leadership roles increased, scholars (Cohen &
Huffman, 2007) addressed the question of how the increased female representation in
leadership impacts the gender pay gap. Thus, adding to the extensive research focused on
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the effects of organizational characteristics and practices on gender inequality in the
workplace (Kalev, Dobbin, & Kelly, 2006; Kalev, 2009), some researchers turned to
observing the role of leaders. While evidence for the relationship of women in leadership
and the gender pay gap exists on both sides of the argument. Consistent with the idea of
women helping women, and literature that suggests that managers influence
organizational policies, such as wage-setting (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003), some studies
have found that having women in leadership positions decreases the gender pay gap (Tate
& Yang, 2015). Conversely, other studies (Srivastava & Sherman, 2015) have provided
support for a positive relationship between women leaders and gender disparities in pay
for similar work at lower hierarchical levels.
Despite the extensive body of research that has focused on examining WOB
initiatives, few studies have examined the effects on the initiatives on gender equality
outcomes other than at the boardroom level. The Australian Institute of Management in
partnership with the Australian National Committee for UN Women (Australian Institute
of Management, 2012) suggested that despite limited evidence, a positive correlation
between the numbers of WOB and women at the top executive level had been identified.
However, while some empirical studies have provided some evidence of the relationship
between WOB and female executive representation (Bilimoria, 2006; Konrad, Kramer, &
Erkut, 2008; Skaggs et al., 2012); the endogenous nature of board composition suggests
that there may be other variables that may be influencing that relationship. While it is
possible WOB may be creating opportunities for women in management, it is also
possible that a higher supply of women in management is causing more women to rise to
corporate boards, or that organizations that have a good gender equality strategy promote
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more women to managerial and board positions. Therefore, a causal relationship cannot
be established.
Nonetheless, policy makers and equality advocates continue to promote
descriptive representation initiatives to promote gender equality. In fact, legislation and
initiatives for WOB are explicitly promoted as a way to improve opportunities for women
in the workplace (CA, Senate Bill, No. 826; Davies, 2011; German Bundestag, 2015).
Recently, the state of California passed legislation that requires publicly listed
organizations to meet minimum representation of WOB. Proponents of the bill claimed
that the quota law will not only substantially improve profitability, but that WOB would
open doors for other women, create a safer workplace, improve work-life balance, and
close the gender pay gap (National Association of Women Business Owners, 2018). The
expert testimony presented consisted of anecdotal evidence, and the studies used to
support their claim were not methodologically designed to address causal relationships.
Keeping in mind that the desired goal is to achieve gender equality, the way in
which gender diversity and equality initiatives are executed merits thoughtful
consideration, as research (Ahmed, 2012) has found that certain diversity practices can
contribute to the creation of a system that overlooks inequality. Scholars (Ellemers et al.,
2012) have argued that promoting women to senior positions simply to increase their
numbers, without addressing the underlying problem of gender bias and gendered
leadership beliefs, is a risky strategy that could have a negative impact on career
opportunities for women. Additionally, research (Labelle, Francoeur, & Lakhal, 2015) of
public policy aimed at increasing the number of WOB found that the way in which
equality initiatives are promoted can have an impact on their outcome. Furthermore, the
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theoretical grounding of the justification of the WOB initiative may impact its outcome
(van Dijk, van Engen, & Paauwe, 2012). Currently, initiatives for WOB are promoted
using two different arguments, which based on their theoretical grounding can be
categorized as: utilitarian, and social justice.
Utilitarian – or economic - argument. In the majority of countries where
legislation and policies for WOB have been implemented, the debate has mainly been
discussed and promoted through the utilitarian argument – also referred to as the business
case for WOB -, which relies on a causal claim of improved financial performance
resulting from the inclusion of WOB (Choudhury, 2014). The business case for WOB
was originally used as a rebuttal to the concerns of business leaders in Norway (Teigen,
2015) who feared that the quota reform would negatively impact financial performance.
However, today, the business case for WOB appears to be the most relied upon argument
to promote gender diversity on boards. Amending its initial pledge, in which the
underrepresentation of WOB was approached as an equality issue, when the Davies
Review was rolled out, it relied on the economic argument for promoting the WOB
initiative. The Davies Review justified equality of opportunity for women at the
corporate board level, on the basis of improved financial performance and improved
board performance (Davies, 2011, p.7).
Advocates of WOB initiatives have contributed to the diffusion of the economic
argument, which has flooded media outlets with the alleged benefits of WOB on the
bottom line, mainly supported by industry reports (e.g. 2020 Women on boards, 2016;
Catalyst, 2004, 2007, 2011; Dawson, Kersley, & Natella, 2014; Ernst & Young, 2014;
Kurth, 2015; McKinsey, 2007). Catalyst’s (2007) research is arguably the most well-
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publicized study that links WOB to increased financial performance (Dobbin & Jung,
2011). However, the basic nature of their data analyses – composed of only descriptive
statistics – does not provide compelling support for a causal relationship of WOB on
increased financial performance.
Additionally, mixed findings in peer-reviewed studies do not provide compelling
support for the claim either. In some studies the relationship was found to be positive
(Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 2003; Smith, Smith, &
Verner, 2006), in others, the relationship was negative (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Chapple
& Humphrey, 2014; Haslam, Ryan, Kulich, Trojanowski, & Atkins, 2010; Isidro &
Sobral, 2015; Matsa & Miller, 2013; Shehata, Salhin, & El-Helaly, 2017), and other
studies found that the relationship was not statistically significant (Carter, D’Souza,
Simkins, & Simpson, 2010; Hussein & Kiwia, 2009; McCann & Wheeler, 2011; Miller &
Triana, 2009; Rose, 2007; Zahra & Stanton, 1988).
Recently, Post and Byron (2015) published a meta-analysis of 144 published
studies in which the relationship of WOB and different measures of financial
performance was examined. Their findings indicated that, although positive, the
relationship of WOB and market performance was almost zero, and the effect size on
firm financial performance was also small, but positive. Findings from another metaanalysis recently published (Pletzer, Nikolova, Kedzior, & Voelpel, 2015), concluded
that the correlation between percentage of WOB and firm performance was small and
non-significant. Therefore, while their findings provided stronger evidence of a positive
relationship of WOB and financial outcomes, the effect sizes were small or nonstatistically significant, which may not compellingly establish a case for gender diversity
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as a tool to outperform other firms. Additionally, conflicting with claims of proponents of
WOB used for promoting policy, the effect of gender was not nearly as high as the 42%
higher returns on sales (Davies, 2011) or 45% higher earnings per share (CA, Senate Bill,
No. 862).
Some scholars have criticized that the business case perspective seems to
substitute the equality rationale (Zanoni, Janssens, Benschop, & Nkomo, 2010), as both
rationales are grounded on essentially oppositional moral perspectives (van Dijk, van
Engen, & Paauwe, 2012). Deontology, the theoretical grounding of the social justice and
equality argument, suggests that the morality of an action should not be based on its
consequences, but on whether the action itself is right or wrong. Conversely, the
business case, theoretically grounded in utilitarianism, represents a conditional argument
that sees women and minorities as a means to an end (Tomlinson & Schwabenland, 2010).
Consequently, as the business case does not promote gender diversity in itself but only
through the potential contributions of women to the bottom line (Noon, 2007), it could
result in the opposite desired outcome. A negative effect of WOB on financial
performance would provide moral justification for maintaining a homogeneous
workforce (van Dijk et al., 2012) and discriminating against women (Ferreira 2015).
In fact, Fondas (2000) indicated that one of the reasons contributing to the bias
against WOB is CEOs perceptions toward the value of WOB, in which they quote a CEO
from a Fortune 500 company indicating that “no study has proved that diversity makes a
board better” (p.171). This suggests that as proponents continue to push the business
case for WOB, evidence of negative or no effect of WOB on financial performance could
be used against women.
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Equality argument. The inclusion of the WOB initiative was part of the Equalities
agenda of the Coalition programme for government (HM Government, 2010), which also
included the promotion of equal pay and non-discrimination in the workplace. In the
United Kingdom, the Government Equalities Office (GEO) leads work on policy relating
to women’s rights and support the work and implementation of international equality
measures, including the UN Convention on the Elimination of all forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Part of the GEO’s commitment to CEDAW
is to protect women’s human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic,
social, cultural, civil, and any other field (CEDAW, 1979). Women in the British
workforce have multiple protections from discrimination, including the Human Rights
Act, which prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of gender; and the
Equality Act of 2010 that guarantees equal opportunity in employment and pay. The act
also includes a clause for its enforcement, which requires that public bodies have due
regard to the need to eliminate discrimination and advance equal opportunity.
However, legislation has failed to produce gender equality in the British
workforce. A recent study suggested that in British organizations, discrimination against
women is perceived to be the leading factor associated with the gender disparity on
corporate boards (Goyal et al., 2018). Furthermore, the pervasiveness of the gender pay
gap that starts at graduation (Department for Education, 2018), when no other factor such
as merit, experience, or education can be used as an explanation for pay differentials,
provides evidence of gender discrimination in the workplace that favors men.
Although the Davies Review was an effort to promote gender equality on the
boards of listed companies, which by definition is a social justice and human rights issue

15

(United Nations, 2015), the initiative was promoted using the business case. Scholars
(Ahmed, 2007) have suggested that the business case for equality reinforces the view that
basic human rights for women are something that still needs to be justified, and weakens
the case for gender equality. Furthermore, the incongruence of promoting an equality
initiative using the business case has contributed to the focus on the effects of WOB
initiatives on financial-related outcomes (Joecks, Pull, & Vetter, 2013; Lindstaedt, Woff,
& Fehre, 2011; Skaggs et al., 2012; Torchia, Calabro, & Huse, 2011; Zhang, Zhu, &
Ding, 2013), and the scarcity of research on the effects of WOB on gender equality.
The challenges that women appointed to high-profile positions experience as
leaders, particularly in organizations in which leadership expectations are gendered may
cause those women to distance themselves from other women (Ellemers et al., 2012;
Mavin, 2006, 2008), which is a factor that the expectation that WOB will help other
women does not take into account. Additionally, research has suggested that women who
rise to positions of power prefer to be recognized for their individual abilities as opposed
to being representatives of their gender (Mavin, 2008). Furthermore, making women
responsible for the advancement of other women would satisfy a utilitarian end; which
would be counter to promoting WOB as a gender equality cause.
Scholars have tried to reconcile the utilitarian and the social justice approach to
gender equality by proposing a utilitarian argument within an organizational commitment
to social justice (Barmes & Ashtiany, 2003; Maxwell, 2004; Tomlinson & Swabenland,
2010). However, the potentially conflicting expectations associated with each approach
make the two approaches particularly difficult to reconcile as equality cannot have
contingencies (Noon, 2007). Therefore, seeing WOB initiatives through a social justice
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and human rights lens, providing women with equal opportunity to positions of power is
the right thing to do. However, while initiatives to promote equality should not be
contingent on their effect on other outcomes, that does not imply that the effects of these
initiatives should be ignored.
While this study does not question the need to achieve gender parity on corporate
boards, it questions the effectiveness of the WOB initiatives as an approach to achieve
gender equality and improve opportunities for women in the workplace. Logically, only
under the most optimistic assumptions, one could expect that an increase of WOB would
improve opportunities for other women in the organization; specifically, if (a) women
who rise to those positions are willing to advocate on other women’s behalf, (b) that
WOB are able to influence the board in their advocacy of gender equality, and (c) that the
organizational structure and leaders acknowledge the gendered nature of organizations
and advocate change.
Under the assumption that women who are appointed to boards are willing to
advocate on women’s behalf, research about gender and power has demonstrated that
even in formal positions of power, stereotypes and gender beliefs play an important role
in the power and influence of women (Ellemers et al., 2012). The concept of critical mass
- the smallest number (or percentage) of a minority representation that will allow the
minority to have an impact to the group - (Kanter, 1977) has been identified as the way in
which women can overcome differences in power in board settings. In the WOB
literature, it has been suggested that minimum number women needed in order for
women to be able to have a significantly impact a board, is three (Konrad et al., 2008;
Torchia et al., 2011).
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Critical mass is widely used in the WOB debate and academic literature. In fact,
it is critical mass that has informed policy related to WOB by serving as support for
setting minimum targets (CA, Senate Bill, No. 826; Davies, 2011). Numerous studies
have examined critical mass of WOB on information sharing and perceived influence
(Elstad & Ladegard, 2010), firm innovation (Torchia et al., 2011), firm performance
(Joecks et al., 2013); firm reputation (Bear et al., 2010), sustainability (Galbreath, 2011);
and sustainability reporting (Fernandez-Feijoo, Romero, & Ruiz-Blanco, 2014), among
others. However, the concept of critical mass has not been explored in relation to
opportunities for other women in the organization or the gender pay gap, which seems to
be an oversight, as the promotion of WOB initiatives is expected to reduce gender
inequality in the workplace.
Statement of the Problem
Research suggests (Bierema, 2017) that the adding women and stirring strategy is
not an effective way to achieve gender equality in the workplace because power
structures in organizations remain intact. Scholars (Magee & Galinsky, 2008) have
indicated that existing self-reinforcing social mechanisms have prevented women from
achieving gender parity in the workforce. Gender disparities are only an indicator of a
structural problem rooted in society (Rhode, 2011). Therefore, legislation and policies,
however strong, do not tend to deliver equality unless they are supported by wellestablished social mechanisms (Ferner, Almond, & Colling, 2005). However, proponents
of WOB initiatives continue to successfully campaign for the implementation of policies
and enactment of legislation for addressing gender disparities in the workplace starting at
the top (CA, Senate Bill, No. 826; Davies, 2011; German Bundestag, 2015).
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Recently, gender quotas for corporate boards have made their way to the United
States. In September of 2018, the California government approved Senate Bill No. 826,
requiring publicly held corporations located in California to have a minimum number of
female directors depending on board size. In a similar approach to the Davies Review, the
California bill claimed that “more women directors serving on boards of directors of
publicly held corporations will boost the California economy, improve opportunities for
women in the workplace, and protect California taxpayers” (CA, Senate Bill, No. 826,
1a). Evidence cited for their claim included McKinsey (2007) and Credit Suisse (2007)
reports and other industry reports that used descriptive statistics and their study design
did not address causality. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence was presented to support the
claims that increasing the number of women on corporate boards would help other
women (California Senate, 2017).
While advocates of WOB initiatives insist that placing more WOB will be
significantly better for business’ finances, the most rigorous available evidence (i.e.
Pletzer et al., 2015; Post & Byron, 2015) does not support their claim. Additionally,
research (Noon, 2007; Sinclair, 2000) has suggested that the promotion of equality
initiatives through the business case undermines the legitimacy of the inherent social
justice and human rights nature of equality. Furthermore, using the example of the most
recent WOB initiative in California, while the initiative will likely benefit the members of
an elite group of proponents (i.e. NAWBO), evidence does not support their claim that it
will provide opportunities for other women and reduce the pay gap. This is a big cause of
concern, because legislation continues to be enacted under erroneous assumptions and
ignoring the limitations of existing academic research. More importantly, the belief that
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WOB regulations will result in improved opportunities for women in the workplace and
close the gender pay gap may obstruct the enactment of initiatives that could address
those issues.
Despite the multiple contexts in which quotas and targets for WOB have been
implemented, the majority of the literature has focused on examining their effects on
financial measures. Other than having an effect on the increase of WOB, very little is
known about the effects of increased female representation on corporate boards (Ferreira,
2015). The 5 Year Summary of the Davies Review presented figures of WOB as
collective percentages and indicated that the United Kingdom was a leader and a role
model due to the success of the initiative (Davies, 2015). However, while their claim may
be correct, further studies are needed to fully understand the effects the initiative had on
FTSE organizations. Although the Davies Review addressed the problem related to the
demand for WOB, Lord Davies indicated that part of the challenge of WOB was related
to supply, since fewer women than men were going up the corporate pipeline to top levels
in their organizations (Davies, 2011, p.3). Consequently, the lack of rigorous
examination of the effects the Davies Review on opportunities for other women in the
British workforce is a substantive oversight, because the effects of the initiative on the
supply of women eligible to succeed the women who are currently on boards (Kogut,
Colomer, & Belinky, 2014) will directly impact the long-term effects of the initiative.
Furthermore, Ferreira (2015) indicated that while it is believed that smashing the
glass ceiling at the board level will reduce discrimination at lower levels, empirical
research is needed on the issue. In different contexts, studies have evaluated the effects
of increased female board representation resulting from gender quotas on the gender pay
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gap (Reberioux & Roudaut, 2016). To date, the only study that has examined the link
between WOB and the gender pay gap is the Female FTSE Board Report 2018 (Cranfield
School of Management, 2018). However, methodological limitations of their study do
not contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the effect WOB had on the gender
pay gap, as their analyses consisted of listing the top 10 and bottom 10 companies with
respect to their percentages of WOB along with listing and averaging their mean gender
pay gap.
Taking into account that as board members, a major duty of WOB is to generate
value for shareholders, and that the promotion of the business case for WOB creates an
expectation of higher profitability from gender-diverse boards, it seems illogical to expect
that WOB will reduce gender pay inequality in the workplace. In order to fulfill their
board duties of distributing as much as possible to shareholders, the board, collectively,
makes decisions that keep costs down and increase profits. However, pay equality
involves raising wages, which raises costs (Acker, 2006). In the United Kingdom,
research (Bell & Machin, 2016; Draca, Machin, & Van Reenen, 2008) has found that
profitability is significantly reduced by the increase of wages. Consequently, suggesting
that WOB will reduce the gender pay gap would lead to the expectation of two opposing
tasks, increasing profits and promoting pay equity.
Considering that the implementation of WOB initiatives continues to be debated
by policy-makers across the globe, the lack of research related to the effects of the Davies
Review on opportunities for women and the gender pay gap does not contribute to
evidence-based policy. The Davies Review was a gender equality initiative and part of
the Equalities agenda of the British government; however, its effects on gender equality
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have not been examined. Despite the multiple contexts in which policy and legislation
for WOB have been implemented, the effects of these initiatives on reduced
discrimination for women at lower levels have not received much attention in the
literature. To that end, Ferreira (2015) suggested the need for more empirical and
theoretical research on the issue.
Purpose of the Study
The study aimed to contribute to the understanding of the effects of governmentsponsored initiatives for increasing the participation on WOB on gender equality in the
workplace. To that end, using the case of the Davies Review, the recent initiative for
WOB in the United Kingdom, this study examined its effects on changes in the board
composition of FTSE 350 boards. Additionally, using data from the FTSE All Share
population, which includes FTSE 350 firms and FTSE Small Cap firms, this study used
the 25% target set by the Davies Review to test the concept of critical mass of WOB on
opportunities for other women measured as gender diversity at different hierarchical
levels and as the gender pay gap. Using a regression discontinuity approach
(Thistlethwaite & Campbell, 1960), this study aimed to test the causal claims of its
findings to fill the gap in the literature for rigorous methodology.
Theoretical/Conceptual Underpinnings of the Study
The theories that underpinned the understanding of the elements of this study are
resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold,
2000), and critical mass theory (Granovetter, 1978; Kanter, 1977, 1987; Torchia et al.,
2011).
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Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Hillman, Cannella, &
Paetzold, 2000) underpinned this study’s understanding of the relationship of board
members to the board and the board to the organization. Originally, this theory was
conceptualized to help explain the external control of organizations. The theory was
expanded to apply to members of boards of directors (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold,
2000), and women and minorities (Hillman, Cannella, & Harris, 2002). Resource
dependence theory posits that boards link the organization to external resources of
organizations to address environmental dependencies. The principal connections board
members provide are advice and counsel, channels of communication, and monitoring,
and counsel and legitimacy. Theoretically, diverse boards will provide more valuable
resources which produce better firm performance.
Although empirical findings testing resource dependence theory have produced
inconsistent results, in comparison with other leading theories that explain the
relationship of the board and organizational outcomes, such as agency (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976) and institutional theory (Bilimoria, 2000, 2006; Fuller, Edelman, &
Matusik, 2000; Konrad & Linnehan, 1995), resource dependence theory is, perhaps, the
one that seems to provide a better explanation for contextual variables and is the most
used by diversity scholars (Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson, 2008). This theory
underpins the hypothetical link of gender as a resource that organizations seek in their
directors as a way to comply with the Davies Review. This theory also underpins the
hypothetical link of female directors as providers of advice and counsel that would
advocate for gender equality.
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Critical mass theory (Kanter, 1977) underpinned the study’s understanding of the
minimum number (or percentage) of WOB required for gender to be a significant
contributor to the relationship of board resources to organizational outcomes, which in
the context of this study is opportunities for other women in the organization and the
gender pay gap. The political and academic debate about the importance of gender
diversity to corporate boards, implementation of legislation and policy to increase the
number of WOB, and expectation of different organizational outcomes resulting from
women’s appointments to boards raise the question of whether the number of WOB plays
an important role. Current statistics of WOB worldwide (World Economic Forum, 2017)
suggest that women’s representation is far from achieving parity; therefore, critical mass
indicates the participation of women as a minority on their boards in which they are able
to influence other members (McInerney-Lacombe, Bilimoria, & Salipante, 2008);
however, a minimum of three women was needed for the effect to be significant.
Consistent with Kanter’s (1977) operationalization of balanced groups as a group with a
minimum 15% to 40% minority representation, empirical research has found similar
proportions are enough to reach the tipping point, which represents the point when groups
move from skewed to balanced. Research findings have suggested that a minimum of
three (or 30%) women on corporate boards is required to increase the likelihood of
women exerting influence on their boards (Arena, Cirilo, Mussolino, Pulcinelli, Saggese,
& Sarto, 2015; Joecks et al., 2013; Konrad et al. 2008; Kramer, Konrad, Erkut, & Hooper,
2006; Torchia et al., 2011). Seeing the underlying similarities in men and women’s mode
of behavior, Kanter (1977) theorized that what appeared to be gender differences were
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power differences (Witz & Savage, 1992); therefore, these differences could be
eliminated allowing women to advance to positions in power.
Research Hypotheses
The hypotheses have been developed to address shortcomings in the literature and
increase the understanding of initiatives that promote boardroom gender diversity through
exogenous events. There are three key predictions in this study: 1) at the micro level, the
Davies Review caused a change in the board composition of FTSE 350 organizations
using a comply or explain approach, 2) at the mezzo level, that increased female
representation on boards that resulted from the Lord Davies initiative would negatively
impact opportunities for other women within the FTSE 350 organizations, and 3) at the
macro level, compliance to 25% WOB would not have an effect on the gender pay gap.
The specific hypotheses are described below.
The first set of hypotheses, H1a, H1b, and H1c predicted that the Davies Review
targets would statistically (α =.05) and practically significantly increase the percentage of
WOB in FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 organizations below the compliance threshold. Taking
into account that the average growth rate of WOB for publicly listed firms in the United
Kingdom prior to the Davies Review was about one percentage point per year, a
cumulative effect size greater than 5% for the five-year duration of the Davies Review
was considered practically significant; however, for a discontinuous increase, a 3%
discontinuity would be considered practically significant. The model for estimating the
treatment effect is expected to have a medium to large practically significant effect. The
treatment effect for FTSE Small boards will not be statistically significant (α =.05).
Although this is assumed, as to date, no studies have assessed the impact of the initiative.
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The 2015 Davies Review evaluated the 5-year initiative and indicated that the program
had been a success and FTSE 350 boards had more than doubled their proportion of
WOB; however, despite the slow pace of change, corporate boards had already been
increasing their female representation; thus, it would be inaccurate to measure the effect
of the initiative as the aggregated difference between pre and post initiative measures.
The first set of hypotheses were grounded on resource dependence theory (Pfeffer
& Salancik, 1978) that posits that organizations seek linkages with the most beneficial
resources and structure their boards on that basis. Given that the Davies Review set
targets for WOB using a comply or explain approach, it is clear that compliance is not
required. However, the initiative was delivered with the threat that the EU was debating
imposing quotas; therefore, although comply or explain approaches had not produced
significant results in the past, the environment for the Davies Review initiative was more
conducive to compliance than to explaining. Other countries in the EU had gone through
the same process, and after comply or explain approaches failed, quotas were imposed
(Ahern & Dittmar, 2012).
Empirical research has suggested that the introduction of quotas has the most
explanatory power for women’s representation in political systems (Tripp & Kang, 2008).
Similarly, gender quotas for corporate boards have proven to be an effective tool for
increasing the proportion of WOB (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012); however, their effects
appear to be limited to the minimum compliance levels set by the quota. Therefore, it is
reasonable to expect an increase in the percentage of WOB for organizations below the
compliance threshold in the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 groups. Conversely, as
organizations in the FTSE Small Cap were not required to increase their percentages of

26

WOB, the Davies Review should not have an effect on the increase of WOB in FTSE
Small Cap boards. The first hypothesis predicts:
H1a:

The Davies Review initiative will increase the percentage of WOB of nonbalanced FTSE 100 organizations.

H1b: The Davies Review initiative will increase the percentage of WOB of nonbalanced FTSE 250 organizations.
H1c:

The Davies Review initiative will not impact the percentage of WOB of
non-compliant FTSE Small Cap organizations.

The second set of hypotheses, H2a, H2b, and H2c, also relate to board
composition, and predict that the Davies Review initiative disproportionally increases the
proportion of non-executive directors in FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 boards, but will have
no effect on FTSE Small boards. These hypotheses are grounded on the intersection of
resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and gender as status (Ridgeway
& Bourg, 2004). Despite a recent increase in female representation in FTSE boards, it has
been established that corporate boards in the U.K. are still male dominated (Davies,
2015). Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) posits that organizations
seek resources that can help the them deal with the environment. Therefore, it is
reasonable that organizations would hire more women; as their gender provides this
resource for the organization’s compliance.
However, as organizations are compelled to hiring more women to meet the
targets set by the Davies Review, male directors may feel threatened and try to defend the
status quo (Kray, Howland, Russell, & Jackman, 2017). The theoretical perspective of
gender as status (Ridgeway & Bourg, 2004) suggests that men’s gender is associated with
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higher status, and has allowed men access to resources and positions of power. The
motivation of maintaining a better place in a social hierarchy results in the rationalization
of status disparities (Croft, Schmader, & Block, 2015; Ridgeway & Correll, 2004).
System justification reflects a fundamental need to see the social system as just and fair
(Glick & Fiske, 2001; Jost & Banaji, 1994). In support of that notion, research has found
that managers’ perceptions of initiatives to promote WOB is that they bypass the merit
principle (Dahlerup, Friedenvall, Stolt, Bivald, & Persson-Weiss, 2008) and reduce the
quality, ability, and achievement of boardroom members (Singh, Terjesen, &
Vinnicombe, 2008).
Consequently, faced with the need of the female gender as a resource for the
organization’s compliance, and assuming that there is a belief that the Davies Review
unfairly favors women who are not as qualified as men, board members may want to
reserve the less influential board positions for women. Directors’ level of influence to
the organizational strategy depends on their position on the board as executive or nonexecutive directors (Hendry & Kiel, 2004). Evidence suggests that non-executive board
members rarely initiate the substantive content of strategy (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999).
In fact, executive directors are the ones that know the business best, understand the
challenges of delivering the organizational strategy, and are the strongest candidates for
chief executive succession (Odgers-Berndtson, 2018). Status creates the belief of
superiority and justifies the systems that perpetuate the inequality (Ridgeway, 2014).
People in positions of status and power try to hold on to those positions (Jost & Kay,
2005; Ridgeway & Bourg, 2004); therefore, it is reasonable to hypothesize that as men
dominate board membership, they may want to hold on to that advantage and hire female
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board members for non-executive positions, disproportionately increasing non-executive
female board appointments. Therefore:
H2a:

The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of nonexecutive directors compared to executive directors in FTSE 100 boards.

H2b: The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of nonexecutive directors compared to executive directors in FTSE 250 boards.
H2c:

The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of nonexecutive directors compared to executive directors in FTSE Small Cap
boards.

Continuing the study’s predictions related to changes in board composition
resulting from the Davies Review, the third set of hypotheses predict that the initiative
will not have an effect in the increase of women to CEO and chairperson positions.
These hypotheses have theoretical support in resource dependence theory (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978; Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000) and expectation states theory of
gender as status (Ridgeway & Bourg, 2004). Through a resource dependence theory lens,
the female gender is seen as a resource that helps organizations deal with compliance
with the Davies Review. However, the Davies Review indicated that women should be
appointed to boards without setting guidelines for anything other than the percentage of
the total board size. Based on the environmental need resulting from the Davies Review,
appointing women to boards satisfies that need without appointing them to CEO or
chairperson position. Expectation states theory of gender as status (Ridgeway & Bourg,
2004) posits that expectations of competence are associated with gender; thus, in order to
preserve their status, the dominant group perceives the lower-status group as less
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competent. Status beliefs intensify in-group bias (Lewis & Simpson, 2012) and create a
systematic incentive to associate with others who are well-positioned, possess good
connections, and are perceived as higher status members because this affects an
individual’s own situation (Sauder, Lynn, & Podolny, 2012; Thye, 2000).
Furthermore, the implementation of the Davies Review, an equal opportunity
initiative, through the business case for WOB made it evident that women’s equal rights
still need to be justified. In the absence of overt discrimination, systematic
discrimination is masked as with seemingly fair practices (Meyerson & Fletcher, 2000);
ignoring the effects of the systematic bias against women that lingers from a society
created on patriarchal values (Rao, 2017), organizations use merit to justify the
systematic discrimination against women (Castilla & Benard, 2010).
Throughout most of the FTSE organizations’ annual reports, the leaders of the
largest organizations in the United Kingdom, state their commitment to diversity by
means of their diversity statement and gender metrics for their corporate boards. Their
justification for the low representation of women in leadership roles often invoked merit.
Denial of gender discrimination is by definition sexism (Swim, Aiken, Hall, & Hunter,
1995), as it conceals the barriers women face, hinders their advancement (Stephens &
Levine, 2011) and places the burden on women to overcome those concealed barriers
(Kelan, 2009). Ahmed (2012) performed an analysis of the diversity policies of higher
education institutions, and argued that part of the problem was that diversity was seen as
an image problem rather than an institutional problem. Therefore, diversity is reduced to
compliance, as compliance to the 25% of WOB would suffice for the organizational
image, as that is the measure of good performance set by the Davies Review.
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Empirical evidence from examinations of government-led initiatives for WOB
also provide support for the third set of hypotheses. A study of the effects of the Norway
quota law on board composition found that, despite the significant increase of female
members on corporate boards, the quota law did not have an effect on increasing female
CEOs and chairpersons (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012). The authors of the study concluded
that the unaffected low percentages of female CEOs and chairpersons indicated that the
quota law had not changed the perceptions of business women in Norway. Peterson and
Philpot (2007) found that women were less likely to be assigned to executive committees
solely based on their gender. Other studies found that there was a relationship between
WOB and CEO gender because CEOs were inclined to select candidates who were
demographically similar to them (Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010; Westphal & Zajac, 1995).
Considering that the majority of CEOs are male, and that the Davies Review set the target
for WOB at 25%, it is likely that most women on FTSE boards are still the minority
group and still subject to systematic bias in selection to positions of influence such as
CEO and chairperson. Therefore, the third set of hypotheses predict that the Davies
Review will not have a significant effect on the increase of women to CEO and
chairperson positions. Therefore, the third set of hypotheses predicts:
H3a:

The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of female
executive directors compared to female CEOs in FTSE 350 boards.

H3b: The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of female
non-executive directors compared to female chairpersons in FTSE 350
boards.
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H3c:

The Davies Review will not impact the proportion of female executive
directors compared to female CEOs in FTSE Small Cap boards.

H3d: The Davies Review will not impact the proportion of female non-executive
directors compared to female chairpersons in FTSE Small Cap boards.
Shifting the focus of the predictions to the effects of increased female
participation on boards that resulted from the Davies Review on opportunities for women
at different organizational levels and on pay differentials attributed to gender. The fourth
set of hypotheses, H4a, H4b, and H4c, predict that the Davies Review initiative for WOB
will negatively impact women’s opportunities at other organizational levels. The Davies
Review (2015) 5 Year Summary indicated that the initiative had been successful and was
celebrated. At that time, there were 682 director positions filled by women on the boards
of FTSE 350 corporations (Davies, 2015), which suggests that the initiative increased
opportunities for a very small number of women in the British workforce.
Davies annual reviews reported the progress toward the goal for achieving gender
parity on boards. In these reviews, FTSE 350 organizations were ranked based on their
percentages of WOB. Organizations with the highest percentages of WOB were praised
and regarded as “leading the way” in gender equality (Hampton & Alexander, 2016, p.
33). Scholars have argued that diversity works as public relations (Ahmed, 2012), that is,
that it is only addressed in terms of its impact to the image and reputation of the
organization. Consequently, as the Davies Review put the gender inequalities of FTSE
boards under public scrutiny, organizations responded to the problem in a way that would
present the best image of the organization.
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Furthermore, existing literature has indicated that the belief of the existence of
gender-neutral practices can create an illusion of fairness (Meyerson & Fletcher, 2000)
and trump the development of other women in the organization (Bierema, 2017), which
could cloud the need for addressing inequality. Therefore, as these reviews categorized
organizations that reached the 25% target for WOB as gender-balanced and publicly
acknowledged their gender equality efforts, they may have created the belief of gender
equality. The numerical target associated with the Davies Review can be explained
through the concept of critical mass, which widely used in the WOB literature and WOB
policies (CA Senate, 2007; Davies, 2011).
Critical mass of WOB has been examined on a number of different outcomes;
however, in relation to gender equality outcomes, the relationship remains unexplored. It
should be noted that the hypothetical link between critical mass of WOB and their ability
to influence the board in a way that would result in improved opportunities for other
women would require the assumption that women who rise to corporate boards want to
represent the interests of other women. This assumption has been criticized by scholars
(Lewis & Simpson, 2012; Mavin, 2008), as it places emphasis in numerical
representation, ignoring gender bias and leadership beliefs that associate masculine
characteristics with competence and disadvantage women in leadership roles.
Furthermore, previous empirical research that examined how female leaders help
reduce discrimination for other women found that for a number of reasons women tend to
be less supportive of advancement of other women (Garcia-Retamero & Lopez-Zafra,
2006), and are less supportive of policies that promote equal opportunity (Ng & Chiu,
2001). Findings of a study (Bierema, 2005) that examined women’s networks that
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included the top female executives in a Fortune 500 organization suggested that, while
female executives were highly aware of gendered power relations, they were sometimes
unable or unwilling to take action to change them.
When the Davies Review was rolled out, Lord Davies indicated that research had
demonstrated the need of three women to change boardroom dynamics and that the
environment for women in senior roles improved once they reached one third or 30%
participation, according to the concept of critical mass (Davies, 2011, p. 8). However,
when the Davies Review set the target of WOB at 25% of representation, it provided the
opportunity to test the theory of critical mass of WOB at 25%. Although literature has
indicated that the tipping point for WOB is three women or 30% (Torchia et al., 2012),
the tipping point for WOB as it relates to their effect on reducing gender inequality in the
workplace remains unexplored.
Research suggests that the belief that current practices address discrimination
against women creates silence around gender-related issues (Korvajarvi, 2011), and
decreases opportunities for other women in organizations (Ellemers et al., 2012).
Gender-discrimination in organizations is now subtle and entrenched with cultural beliefs
and societal norms that linger from a patriarchal society. Therefore, discriminatory
practices are often invisible to both men and women (Diehl & Dzubinski, 2016). The
existing gender disparity on boards is only a symptom of a deep structural problem in
society (De Beaufort & Summers, 2014; Rhode, 2011). Scholars (Eagly & Karau, 2002)
have theorized that women’s underrepresentation in leadership roles is caused to
prejudice and discrimination against women. Hence, as the Davies Review focused on
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addressing the consequence (i.e. underrepresentation of WOB), it did not address the
cause of the problem.
Lord Davies suggested that the efforts for increasing the percentage of WOB
continue through 2020, that “in doing so, there is the potential to banish gender inequality
in British business” (p. 27). However, banishing gender inequality through the increase
of women’s participation on corporate boards lacks empirical support. Ahmed (2007)
argued that changes in equalities legislation in the United Kingdom have contributed to
equality work becoming another measure of organizational performance. As with any
measure of organizational performance, the framework and measurement of the
organizational performance are defined (Dess & Robinson, 1984), which in this case was
the target set by the Davies Review of 25% of WOB. As a measure of organizational
performance, it makes logical sense that achieving the target of 25% of WOB may appear
as gender equality.
Additionally, it may reinforce the belief that organizations with higher
proportions of WOB are gender neutral. Empirical studies (Seirstad & Opsahl, 2011;
Vernos, 2013) have found that targeting boards for gender diversity initiatives creates
opportunities only for a small group of women. Furthermore, research suggests that
promoting more women to top leadership positions without addressing the gender bias
and gendered leadership beliefs could have a negative impact on career opportunities for
women (Ellemers et al., 2012). Consequently, it is reasonable to question if compliance
to the targets set by the Davies Review (above the 25% target) could have unintended
consequences for women by creating blindness around existing issues that systematically
disadvantage women.
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Additionally, it is noteworthy to mention that the promotion of the business case
for WOB may threaten the achievement of equality-related outcomes. Research (Ahmed,
2007) has found that commitment to equality efforts depends on how diversity is
promoted to organizations. Therefore, the promotion of the business case to support equal
opportunity for women, rather than promoting the social justice argument may not be an
effective way to achieve gender equality, as it does not create awareness of the
disadvantages and discrimination that put women in a subordinate position. Instead,
inequality could become concealed by the same measure designated to represent diversity
(i.e. percentage of WOB), and function as a mechanism for reproducing inequality (Deem
& Morley, 2006).
Furthermore, without promoting awareness of the disadvantages women face,
equal opportunity initiatives could be perceived as unjust in favor women. Women could
be perceived as taking men’s jobs, which could result in high scrutiny of women’s
performance (Bierema, 2017), and cause women to distance themselves from other
women (Ellemers et al., 2012). Consequently, the fourth set of hypotheses predict that
being compliant to Davies Review target of 25% of WOB will have a negative impact on
leadership opportunities for the women working within those firms; however, it will not
impact women’s participation in employment.
H4a:

Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will
decrease the percentage of women in executive boards of FTSE All Share
organizations.
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H4b: Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will
decrease the percentage of women in senior management of FTSE All
Share organizations.
H4c:

Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will not
impact the percentage of women in the workforce of FTSE All Share
organizations.

A variation of the fourth set of hypotheses relates to the fact that, prior to the
announcement of the Davies Review initiative, several organizations were close to or
over the 25% threshold set by the Davies Review; therefore, the high percentages of
women on their boards may not be attributed to the Davies Review. This may indicate
that those organizations differ in some ways to those that achieved the 25% female board
representation to meet the targets set by the Davies Review. Previous research provided
evidence for the positive relationship of endogenous gender diversity on boards and
corporate social responsibility (Bear et al., 2010; Boulouta, 2013; Hafsi & Turgut, 2013;
Margaretha & Isnaini, 2014); which could indicate that those organizations have more
egalitarian practices than those that increased their percentage of WOB as a result of an
exogenous event – Davies Review. Therefore, these hypotheses will account for the
increase of WOB in the duration of the initiative. A contradictory finding would indicate
that a 25% of WOB constitutes critical mass.
Finally, the fifth hypothesis of this study follows the logic of the previous
hypotheses in examining the effect of gender-balanced boards as determined by the
Davies Review on equality of treatment, measured as the gender pay gap. Decades of
anti-discrimination legislation in the U.K. (Equal Pay Act of 1970; Equal Pay Act of
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1983; Equality Act of 2010; Sex Discrimination Act of 1975) have failed to produce
gender equality in the workforce, which is evidenced by current statistics that revealed
that women are underrepresented in managerial and leadership roles (McKinsey, 2016;
World Economic Forum, 2017), and by existing pay differentials explained by gender
(Else, 2018).
Empirical studies suggested that legislation is not likely to have an impact on the
gender pay gap (Chevalier, 2007). In fact, an examination of the effects of the quota law
on the gender pay gap in France, found that it increased the pay gap by 5% (Reberioux &
Roudaut, 2016). In Norway, the quota law increased the representation of WOB to almost
40%; however, it did not have an effect on the gender pay gap. According to the Work
Economic Forum (2017), in Norway – ranked 3 on the Global Gender Gap Index –, for
every $1 a woman earns, a man earns $1.27 in average. This evidence is contradictory
with the idea promoted by the U.K. coalition government, of targeting corporate boards
as a way to build a fairer society. It is also contradictory with Lord Davies’ claim that
increased numbers of WOB can potentially banish gender inequality in British business
(Davies, 2015). This evidence also contradicts previous studies that have found that
women in leadership positions behave differently than men and tend to be more
benevolent leaders (Adams & Funk, 2012), who are concerned with promoting the
interests of disadvantaged groups (Karpowitz & Mendelberg, 2014; Mendelberg &
Karpowitz, 2016).
Furthermore, evidence from the effects of WOB on the gender pay gap is also
inconsistent with critical mass theory, which posits that when women reach critical mass
– three women on a board –, despite being the minority group, they can overcome the
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effects of asymmetrical power and effect change (Kanter, 1977, 1987; Torchia et al.,
2011). Unless, despite having critical mass, WOB do not wish to advance the gender
equality cause, or are not aware of the discriminatory practices causing the disparity.
This could indicate that the logic behind targeting corporate boards as a way to promote
gender equality for other women in organizations is flawed. The assumption that WOB
represent other women’s interests ignores important differences among women (Childs &
Krook, 2006). Furthermore, the belief that inequality is perpetuated only by men and not
women ignores empirical evidence that has found that women who have raised to
leadership positions in gender-biased contexts tend to differentiate themselves from other
women and do not identify with them (Derks et al., 2011; Ely, 1994; Faniko, Ellemers,
Derks, & Lorenzi-Ciodi, 2017).
The Davies Review initiative did not address the systematic discrimination and
gender bias in organizations; therefore, it is unlikely that even after reaching critical mass,
WOB will have a negative effect on the gender pay gap. Further, despite massive gender
pay gaps, organizations have been regarded as “leading the way” in the gender equality
efforts (Hampton & Alexander, 2016, p. 33) due to their large percentages of women on
board. Prasad and Mills (1997) call this technique “the showcase of exemplars”, which
refers to the superficial level of treatment in the celebration of diversity efforts of some
organizations, without much regard to what lies beneath the surface. Therefore, this
study’s final hypothesis predicts that being compliant to 25% WOB targets will not
reduce the gender pay gap. Additionally, a large increase in the percentage of WOB will
increase the gender pay gap:

39

H5a:

Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will not
decrease the gender pay gap mean in FTSE All Share organizations.

H5b: Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will not
decrease the gender pay gap median in FTSE All Share organizations.
H5c:

A large increase (Increase>12%) in the percentage of WOB resulting
from the Davies Review will increase the gender pay gap median in FTSE
All Share organizations.
Design of the Study

The study was designed to examine the effects of the Davies Review in two
phases. Phase I tested the effect of the Davies Review on changes in board composition
of FTSE 350 boards. Phase II tested the effect 25% of WOB as critical mass on
opportunities for women in the workforce and the gender pay gap on FTSE All Share
organizations. The study applied a sharp regression discontinuity design (RD) approach
to test the existence of a causal relationship in the variables of phase I and phase II of the
study. The RD approach is a quasi-experimental design that relies on an assignment
variable and a cutoff score to assign participants to treatment and control groups to
determine the effects of a treatment and provide evidence of causality (Scochet, Cook,
Deke, Imbens, Lockwood, Porter, & Smith, 2010; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002).
The estimated treatment effect is calculated from observations within the limits on each
side of the cutoff score, also referred to as the non-parametric approach, which is the
preferred approach in regression discontinuity designs (Hahn, Todd, & Van der Klaauw,
2001; Imbens & Lemieux, 2008; Van der Klaauw, 2008).

40

Population and Participants
The population of this study was FTSE ranked organizations in the FTSE 100,
FTSE 250, and FTSE Small cap, collectively known as FTSE All Share. The sample for
this study consisted of FTSE All Share organizations in the years 2008 to 2016 that were
listed and indexed in the year the Davies Review was rolled out, 2011, excluding
investment trust institutions, which are subject to different rules and tend to not have
employees. To identify the available sample, this study started with the list of all
publicly listed companies trading in main market of the LSE in 2011 (N=1419). To
identify the FTSE All Share index constituents on the LSE list, historical data from the
FTSE Russell website was used. The FTSE All Share constituents in 2011 consisted of
612 organizations. Considering the relatively small number of observations, 11
additional organizations that were trading in the LSE but entered the FTSE index within a
few months of the initiative roll out and remained in the index through 2016 were
included in the analyses. Excluding investment trust institutions, and delisted institutions
for which reports were not available for 2011, 413 organizations were available for the
baseline sample. However, after attrition due to delisting, mergers, and acquisitions in
the 2011 to 2016 period, the final baseline sample for FTSE 100 (n=96), FTSE 250
(n=189), and FTSE Small Cap (n=110), collectively FTSE All Share, consisted of 395
organizations.
Significance of the Study
Bringing attention to the pervasiveness of gender stratification in society, the
#metoo movement and #timesup campaign have sparked a change of pace in the demand
for equality (Callahan, 2018). Accordingly, equality advocates continue to put pressure
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on policy-makers to implement regulations that promote equality (Seirstad et al., 2017;
Terjesen et al., 2015). However, proposed regulations to address inequality are being
blindly enacted due to the misinterpretation or disregard of existing research, and limited
examination of the effects of existing WOB regulations. The risk of these actions is in
that they threaten the achievement of equality. Overall, this study has implications and
significance for research, theory, policy, and practice.
This study contributed to research by filling one of the gaps in the literature of
rigorous research methodology that allows claims of causality. Responding to a call for
exploring quantitative methods to help enact critical HRD (Callahan & Connor, 2015)
and a call for scientific rigor for evidence-based policy (Eagly, 2016) and practice
(Gubbins & Russeau, 2015), this study used a quasi-experimental regression
discontinuity approach. Methodologies employed in most existing studies related to
gender diversity on corporate boards have produced simple descriptive statistics that
prohibit causal claims. Research has provided evidence for the inferential quality of
regression discontinuity designs (Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive 2010;
Chambers, 2016; Lee, 2005). Hence, findings of this study allow causal inferences about
the effects of WOB initiatives on opportunities for other women and the gender pay gap,
for evidence-based policy-decisions and practice.
Another contribution to research of this study was that it was designed to provide
the most accurate and robust findings possible. The study collected the most accurate data
from multiple sources, reconciled and standardized the measurement of the different
reported gender metrics of the organizations included in the sample. The database that
was produced from the rigorous data collection process allowed a fair comparison of
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variables across organizations. Also, the study’s analyses followed the strictest
recommendations in the literature by testing all the assumptions for internal validity.
Treatment effects were estimated using unconditional and conditional models at various
bandwidths. Additionally, multiple robustness tests provided additional evidence of the
causal claim of the findings. Finally, this study contributes to research by providing the
data set and syntax used in this study to allow replicability of the analyses.
Among the main theoretical implications of the study is its contribution to
resource dependence theory and critical mass theory. This study contributes to body of
literature of resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1977), which posits that
organizations seek valuable resources and those resources produce better outcomes for
the organization. Multiple studies testing the theory have produced conflicting findings
(e.g., Carter, D’Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010; Hussein & Kiwia, 2009; McCann &
Wheeler, 2011; Miller & Triana, 2009; Rose, 2007; Zahra & Stanton, 1988). This study
tested the theory hypothesizing that organizations below the Davies Review threshold
were more likely to seek gender as a resource.
This study contributes to the critical mass theory (Kanter, 1977). Critical mass
theory has been used to support the minimum number or percentage of WOB for the
different laws and policies that regulate the gender composition of corporate boards.
Although critical mass of WOB has been examined in a corporate governance context,
the majority of studies examine the duty of the board to its shareholders. However, there
are existing gaps in the literature concerning the duty of the board to one of its
stakeholders, employees. Consequently, this study contributed to the body of literature
related to critical mass by examining the effects of changes in board composition
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resulting from the Davies Review on opportunities for other women in the organization
and the gender pay gap.
The main contribution of this study is to policy and practice, as it provides
evidence of the effects of the Davies Review initiative in the United Kingdom that can
inform evidence-based policy. This study provides evidence that can inform the related to
the implementation of WOB regulations to promote gender equality. The global
proliferation of quotas and government-led initiatives for WOB has extended across the
globe (Choudhury, 2014). Recently, the California law 862 was passed, supported by
claims that increasing the number of WOB would have a highly significant economic
impact, improve opportunities for women, close the gender pay gap, and result in benefit
the population of women employed (California Senate, 2017). The evidence used to
promote a law that will impact the women of the 5th largest economy in the world was
suboptimal and partial to suit the goal of the proponents of the bill. Furthermore, only
anecdotal evidence was presented to support the claims that increasing the number of
women on corporate boards would help other women (California Senate, 2017).
Although evidence of the effects of WOB initiatives on gender-diversity-related
outcomes is not abundant, existing evidence suggests that addressing gender disparities
by simply increasing numbers in top layers can have negative effects for women
(Bierema, 2017; Ellemers et al., 2012). However, in pursuit of their goals, advocates
sometimes ignore scientific research (Eagly, 2016).
Therefore, to contribute to the discussion of the effects of WOB initiatives on
other women employed in the organization, this study presents causal evidence of effects
the Davies Review initiative had on the women employed in FTSE organizations.
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Additionally, the U.K.’s gender pay gap reporting requirement has provided an
unprecedented opportunity for measuring the effects of an initiative that addresses
gender-related issues in the workplace (Davies Review for WOB), on a gender-related
problem (gender pay gap). Increasing the understanding of such approach could help
inform policy and practice in countries with similar corporate governance and liberal
market economies, including the United States, Canada, and Australia (Hall & Gingerich,
2009).
The study has implications for practice as it provides evidence for practitioners of
the unintended effects of increasing WOB as a way to promote gender equality in the
workplace. This study aimed to bring awareness to HRD practitioners in organizations
that through different approaches – legislation, comply or explain, or organizational
strategy – focus on increasing leadership at the highest, most visible levels, of the
potential impact it could have on the women of the organization (Ellemers et al., 2012).
The appearance of success around gender diversity issues promoted by the multiple
organizations that target the increase of WOB (e.g., Catalyst, The 30% Club, 2020
Women on Boards) can create an illusion of fairness and gender-neutrality (Meyerson &
Fletcher, 2000), trump the development of other women in the organizations (Bierema,
2017), and cloud the need for addressing long-existing disparities like leadership
development and the gender pay gap.
Assumptions
The following assumptions were made for the present study. First, organizations
are accurately reporting their gender composition and gender pay gap metrics. Second,
considering that organizations report gender metrics in binary terms, this study assumed
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that the gender metrics reported reflect individuals’ self-identification as male or female,
without regard to the individual’s designated sex at birth. Third, as gender refers to the
social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female, this study
assumes that the gender individuals identify with is congruent with how others perceive
their gender. For example, individuals who self-identify as women, but are socially
categorized as men based on the socially constructed attributes associated with men and
women, would not have the same barriers as individuals who are socially categorized as
women. Fourth, an assumption that this study made in order to test critical mass of WOB
is that female directors are willing to advocate for gender equality in their organizations.
Finally, this study assumed that organizations publicly listed intend to continue trading in
the London Stock Exchange and operating in the United Kingdom.
Limitations
This study has several limitations that should be considered when considering the
contributions found in this study. First, the population of this study was only publicly
listed firms; therefore, their findings may not be generalizable to private firms. Also, the
threat of imposed quotas from the EU, may have resulted in a higher likelihood of
compliance; therefore, results of the initiative may be more similar to quotas than other
comply or explain approaches. Second, the study was not able to include organizational
characteristics related to diversity strategies and diversity policies that may have an
impact in future gender equality outcomes. The third limitation of this study is that it was
not able to examine the intersectionality of gender, race, and class (socio-economic
background), which may limit the understanding of the changes to board composition as
a result of the Davies Review and the impact of those changes. Furthermore, the sample
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was very racially homogenous, which may not be representative of other contexts. The
fourth limitation of this study was that political affiliation of directors in the sample was
not collected. The fifth limitation of the study was that it did not collect data related to
the organization’s merit policy for the full sample, which may provide a better
understanding of organizational practices that may contribute to gender inequality. The
sixth limitation of the study was that the findings rely on the quality and trustworthiness
of data supplied on annual reports by the organizations in the sample. The final
limitation of the study was related to missing data for the pay gap variables.
Definition of Terms
Agentic traits - Traits that are associated with the male gender role, such as decisive,
assertive, competitive, dominant (Eagly & Karau, 2002).
Business case for WOB – The business case for women on boards refers to the claims
used for promoting WOB initiatives, which focus primarily on recruiting women
into corporate boards as a way to increase financial performance.
Communal traits - Traits that are associated with the female gender role, such as,
friendly, emotionally expressive, nurturing, and supportive (Eagly & Karau,
2002).
Comply or explain – The comply or explain approach refers to business-led voluntary
efforts for gender achieving gender parity on corporate boards. This approach
usually includes the disclosure of policies and efforts for achieving an outcome.
Critical mass – Kanter’s (1977) concept of critical mass is widely used in the gender
literature. In the context of this study, it refers to the minimum female board
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representation required for women to be able to contribute to a board. Literature
indicates that critical mass on corporate boards is at least three women.
Descriptive representation – The concept of descriptive representation refers to the
numbers of women on corporate boards. Gender quota laws are an approach used
to achieve women’s descriptive representation.
Discrimination - The act of treating someone unfairly based on one’s prejudice (Colin,
2006).
Enacted ambition - The construct that captures the behavioral efforts associated with
attaining a leadership position. The construct is operationalized as the extent to
which an individual is engaged in behavioral attempts associated with gaining
management positions (Tharenou & Terry, 1998).
Equal opportunity – Equal opportunity is an approach to equality, which upholds the idea
that all workers within an organization should be entitled to and have access to all
of the organizations facilities at every stage of employment, including the preemployment phase. This includes equal opportunities for training, development,
and promotion while employed by the organization. The Equality Act of 2010
promotes equal opportunity and prohibits discrimination based on race, sex,
sexual orientation and gender, among others.
Equal treatment – Equality of treatment is a principle that requires that all persons are
treated in the same manner in comparable situations. Equal treatment is supported
by the concept of freedom from discrimination, which is a fundamental human
right (Equality and Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Act, 1998). Equal
treatment encompasses equal opportunity and equal outcome.
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Equal outcome – Equality of outcome is an approach to achieve equality in which
through legislation, equality is guaranteed. This approach aims to eliminate
systematic discrimination by ensuring that employers do not discriminate on the
basis of gender. Gender quota laws are an example of equal outcome.
Female – This study uses the term female not in the biological sense, but in the context
of gender. Female means an individual who self-identifies as a woman, without
regard to the individual’s designated sex at birth.
FTSE – The Financial Times Stock Exchange “FTSE” is an organization that ranks and
groups publicly listed companies in share indices based on market capitalization.
FTSE 100 - The FTSE 100 is a share index of the top 100 ranked organizations (large
cap).
FTSE 250 - The FTSE 250 is a share index of the organizations ranked 101 to 350
(medium cap).
FTSE 350 - The FTSE 350 is a share index of the top 350 ranked organizations, including
FTSE and FTSE 250.
FTSE Small Cap – Small capital organizations are ranked following the FTSE 350 index.
The FTSE Small Cap group do not have a set number like the FTSE 100 or FTSE
250, instead they are the remaining organizations of the total indexed
organizations, also known as FTSE All Share.
Gender – Unlike biological sex, gender refers to the attitudes, feelings, and behaviors that
a given culture associates with a person’s biological sex. Behaviors that are
compatible with cultural expectations are referred to as gender-normative;
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behaviors that are viewed as incompatible with these expectations constitute
gender non-conformity.
Gender diverse boards - The term gender diversity is very loosely used in the literature.
This study’s definition of gender diversity is consistent with critical mass theory,
which requires a minimum of 40% female representation in order to achieve a
gender balanced group, which represents three women considering an average
board of eight members.
Gender quotas – Also referred to as “quota laws” refer to legislation that regulates the
gender composition of corporate boards, usually by imposing a minimum
percentage of female participation.
Gender roles - The collection of both descriptive and injunctive expectations associated
with men and women (Eagly & Karau, 2002).
Glass ceiling - The invisible barriers to advancement of minorities and women within
corporate hierarchies, blocking career progressions before they reach the top
(Browne, 1995; Glass Ceiling Commission, 1995).
Index – Index is used throughout this study when referring to FTSE index.
Leadership - The ability to influence a group toward the achievement of a vision or a set
of goals. The source of this influence may be provided by a managerial rank in an
organization. Managerial rank; however, does not necessarily translate into
leadership qualities, performance, or identity (Robbins & Judge, 2012).
Davies Review –The Davies Review is the document authored by Lord Davies of
Abersoch containing the recommendations for increasing the percentage of
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women on FTSE 350 boards. The recommendations set a target of 25% FTSE
350 boards and a deadline of 2015 for FTSE 100.
Prejudice - An unfair negative attitude toward a social group or a person perceived to be
a member of that group (Jones, 1997).
Role incongruity - Characteristics associated with women are perceived to be
incompatible with those associated with leaders (Eagly & Karau, 2002).
Sex – The term sex refers to a person’s biological status and is typically categorized as
male or female. Sex is usually determined by biological indicators.
Substantive representation – In the context of this study, substantive representation refers
to women’s interests being represented by those in leadership positions.
Women on boards (WOB) – The term women on boards refers to the participation of
women on the corporate boards.
Summary of the Chapter and Organization of the Dissertation
Chapter 1 presented the background to the problem, a statement of the problem,
the purpose of the study, as well as the theoretical underpinnings of the study and
research hypotheses. It also presented the design of the study, significance to research,
theory, policy, and practice, and its limitations. The chapter concluded with a definition
of terms used throughout this paper.
Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature relevant to this study, which
consisted of the historical evolution of women in the workforce; the construction of
gender and theories that explain gender differences; the gender system in the United
Kingdom, corporate governance and theoretical perspectives that explain the relationship
of gender diversity to the board of directors and board of directors to organizational
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outcomes; gender diversity on corporate boards, the different arguments used to promote
WOB initiatives and the different approaches of WOB initiatives; a description of the
Davies Review initiative; as well as the relationship of WOB to different organizational
outcomes; including opportunities for other women and the gender pay gap; and support
for the hypotheses of the study. The chapter concludes with a summary highlighting
critical pieces of the literature related to this study.
Chapter 3 contains the following sections: introduction, purpose of the study,
research hypotheses, design of the study, description of the population and sample,
details about the data collection procedures, description of group comparisons, treatment
of missing data and data analysis procedures. The chapter also discusses the key
assumptions of the study for the internal validity of the regression discontinuity analyses,
and consequently, for the ability to make causal inferences. A discussion of the approach
for hypotheses testing and delimitations of the study are also included. The chapter
concludes with a summary.
Chapter 4 presents the results from the analyses prepared in support of this study.
The chapter presents the results of data collection and participants of the study, including
group comparisons and descriptive statistics. It continues with a discussion of the
treatment of missing data and data imputation process. It presents results of the statistical
assumptions tests and tests of the internal validity of the RD approach. It provides a
thorough description of the hypotheses test results and robustness tests. The chapter
concludes with a summary of the study’s hypotheses and a chapter summary.
Chapter 5 presents a discussion of the findings and conclusions from the study. It
begins with an introduction. It continues with a discussion of the results and their
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relationship to existing literature. Conclusions and implications for theory, research,
policy, and HRD practice are presented. The chapter discusses the study’s limitations
and provides a number of recommendations for future research. The chapter concludes
with a summary.
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review
Introduction
This chapter reviews the literature relevant to exploring the domains associated
with gender disparities on corporate boards, gender equality initiatives, and the Davies
Review initiative for WOB. Scholars in organizational and social sciences often use a
piecemeal approach to understanding women’s underrepresentation in leadership (Diehl
& Dzubinski, 2016). The artificial separation of the variables that contribute to the
disparity without considering the invisible processes that produce the underlying gender
structure (Diehl & Dzubinski, 2016; Huttges & Fay, 2015) does not contribute to the
understanding of the problem. Scholars suggest that what can contribute to the
understanding of structures that interact with gender is examining the influences of
context and history (Knapp, 2005). Therefore, to illuminate the understanding of gender
in today’s British society, this literature review includes a historical review of the events
that have impacted women’s standing in the workforce.
This literature review is organized into eight sections. The first section presents an
introduction. The second section describes the historical evolution of women in the
workforce. The third section presents the construction of gender and theories that explain
gender differences. The fourth section contains the gender system in the United Kingdom.
The fifth section contains a review of literature related to corporate governance,
theoretical perspectives that explain the relationship of gender diversity to the board of
directors and board of directors to organizational outcomes. The sixth section presents
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literature related to gender diversity on corporate boards, the different arguments used to
promote WOB initiatives and the different approaches of WOB initiatives. This section
also presents a description of the Davies Review initiative, as well as the relationship of
WOB to different organizational outcomes, including opportunities for other women and
the gender pay gap. The seventh section presents support for the hypotheses of the study.
The chapter concludes with a summary highlighting critical pieces of the literature related
to this study.
To conduct this literature review, The Robert R. Muntz Library and The
University of Texas at Tyler was used. The following databases were searched: Business
Source Complete, ScienceDirect, Education Source, British Library Document Supply
Center Inside Serials and Conference Proceedings, Psych Info, ProQuest, and ERIC.
Additionally, Googleâ Scholar was used to complete a more comprehensive review. The
following primary search terms were included: women in leadership, gender diversity,
glass ceiling, female leaders, WOB, gender quotas, Davies Report, Davies Review, Lord
Davies initiative, boards in the U.K., critical HRD, diversity, feminist theory and
leadership, social roles, boards of directors, women and discrimination, quota laws,
critical mass and boards.
Historical Evolution of Women in the British Workforce
In the United Kingdom, women’s role in society and their participation in the
workforce have significantly evolved. Women’s position in society and the workforce
today is a result of multiple changes that snowballed from the industrial revolution (17601840). The industrial revolution transformed the society and economy of Britain (Wells,
2015). Historians disagree on whether this time was beneficial for women, because while
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it increased the number of women in the paid workforce (Pinchbeck, 2013), it also
contributed to the gender wage gap (Burnette, 1997, 2004; Johnson, 2010; Verdon, 2002).
In pre-industrial times, women from lower and middle class families had traditionally
contributed to their families’ economies (Pinchbeck, 2013). However, their contributions
were not noted, as most of their work was done from home (Nicholas & Oxley, 1993).
Industrialization created a clear differentiation of work and home roles (Myrdal & Klein,
2003). The rise of Britain as the workshop of the world and the increase in the number of
factories, resulted in a significant demand for labor and opportunities for women entering
the paid-workforce. Records from 1833 indicate that women represented 57% of the total
factory workforce (British Parliamentary Papers, 1834). As heavy machinery replaced
hand dexterity for the making of goods, men’s greater physical strength made them more
valuable for some occupations. Women’s lower physical strength made them compete
with child laborers for factory positions. Consistently, a wage gap between men and
women started to appear (Burnette, 2004; Johnson, 2010; Verdon, 2002). Evidence of the
time demonstrates that work was segregated on the basis of gender (Hartmann, 1976),
women were grouped for certain factory functions like shirt making and shoe stitching,
while men were in charge of supervising. Although much of the factory work was not
segregated, the wage gap also existed in non-segregated occupations, which resulted from
the belief that men had family responsibilities; therefore, they needed “breadwinning”
wages (Humphries & Weisdorf, 2015; Walsh, 2017, p. 78).
Similarly, a major change of the industrial revolution’s movement of work into
factories for women was the difficulty of combining work and childcare responsibilities.
The rigidity of factory schedules forced women to accept 12 to 13 hour shifts.
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Consequently, factories preferred to hire young unmarried women (Atkinson, 2012). In
addition to women’s contribution to their families’ economies, they were also responsible
for childcare and household work, which is something that lingers in today’s world
(Karkoulian, Srour, & Sinan, 2016; Myrdal & Klein, 2003; Thebaud & Pedulla, 2016).
The division of household labor is so weaved into the British culture that it is still
considered one of the culture-related disadvantages of women in the workforce (Sullivan,
2015). However, 19th century women’s struggles with wage disparities and poor working
conditions contributed to women’s awareness of male dominance (Burnette, 2008; Walsh,
2017) and their exercise of agency by shaping their roles in the workforce and home
(Morgan, 2013). Despite bearing the domestic and childcare burden by themselves,
women continued their participation in the paid workforce, providing evidence of their
rejection of the centrality of domesticity associated with their gender (Schwarzkopf,
2018).
Despite the stereotype that portrays Victorian (1837-1901) women as fully
dedicated to their domestic family lives withdrawn from any economic activities;
evidence shows that that was hardly the case (Harrison, 2013; Gordon & Nair, 2003;
Vicinus, 2013). Although cultural Christian values of the time that promoted a view of
women as pillars of morality, motherhood, and domestic prowess, the majority of women
of Victorian Britain were not ladies of leisure (Gordon & Nair, 2003). Middle-class
women were active contributors to the economy of the time, involved in trades regarded
as suitable for women, such as governesses, inn-keeping, bookkeeping and were involved
in their family businesses (Humphries & Weisdorf, 2015). However, notwithstanding
their contribution to the British economy, laws of the time were not favorable to women
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(Walsh, 2017). Single women were under the protection of their fathers and married
women under the protection of their husbands (Braunstein & Folbre, 2001).
The belief that women needed the protection of men was linked to the belief of
men being more competent than women (Sultana, 2012). During the late 19th century, the
inquiry into women’s presumed inferior intellectual ability, made its way to the natural
sciences. Although moral philosophical arguments had justified women’s subordinate
position in society (Hegel, 1975; Kant, 2017), physicians of the time tested the
hypothetical inadequacies or imperfections of women’s brains and through different
scientific measurement methods (e.g., measuring the sizing of the brain), concluded that
women were, in fact, inferior to men (Shields, 1975), which provided support for the
scientific case for sexism. Women’s inferiority was believed to be universal and natural
(Sultana, 2012); therefore, laws that did not allow married women to own a business or
any kind of property in their own right (Braunstein & Folbre, 2001) were a reasonable
consequence. Moreover, they were thought to be a benevolent approach that reflected
women’s need for protection, which extended to the strong link between gender,
competence beliefs, and occupational roles.
Further, gender roles based on clearly distinct concepts of masculinity and
femininity were intrinsic of Victorian middle class, in which the separation between the
sexes was one of the fundamental features of society (Vickery, 1993). The belief that
women’s proper role was that of a wife or mother was so embedded in society, that
literature, art and records of that time paint a picture of women’s status in society
(Myrdal & Klein, 2003). The professionalization of certain occupations resulted in the
exclusion of women from services they had previously provided (Hakim, 2004). For
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example, the professionalization of medicine made it impossible for women to enter that
field, as the Royal College of Physicians only admitted graduates from male-only schools
(McCarthy, 2018). Teaching young children was reserved almost exclusively for women.
Women preachers were common in the Methodist church of England; however, the
professionalization of the clergy excluded women from those jobs. This time period was
critical for the association of gender with certain occupational roles (Hakim, 1994, 2004),
particularly jobs that were associated with status such as such as doctors, leadership such
as business owners, and influence, such as the clergy, were all associated with men.
An ambitious entrepreneurial middle class had superseded aristocracy as the most
powerful group in the country, dominating the economy, politics, and creating a new
structure in society, replacing the aristocratic social structure (Daunton, 1989; Miles &
Savage, 2013). In addition to the creating of distinctions between home and work,
starting the gender pay gap, and the association of gender with certain occupational roles,
the 19th century also confirmed a change in the social structure of the time. After
centuries of a concentration of wealth in the land-owning aristocracy, the creation of
wealth in cities through economic activities such as manufacturing and trading,
challenged the legitimacy of power through distinctions of birth (Daunton, 1989; Miles &
Savage, 2013).
By the end of the 19th century, in light of a changing society, empowered groups
of women advocated their rights. This period is known as first-wave feminism, which
refers to feminist activity that focused primarily on achieving women’s right to vote.
During this period, the London Society for Women’s Suffrage was formed, the Married
Women’s Property Act was passed allowing married women to own property and own
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businesses. Also, the first women’s guild was founded to spread the knowledge of the
benefits of collaboration to improve women’s working condition. It is also during this
period that women in Britain went on strike for the first time in protest of low wages and
hazardous working conditions. During the early 20th century, women continued to fight
for their rights, which resulted in small wins, achieving the Qualification of Women Act,
which gave women’s right to be elected into office (U.K. Parliament, 1918). The
National Federation of Women Workers was formed in 1906, which played a major role
in advocating for women’s wages. Despite the World War I (WWI) period (1914-1918),
women continued focused on their fight for voting rights and societal fairness, with
thousands of women gathering in rallies and marches (Crossley, Edwards, Harries, &
Stevenson, 2012). By 1918, women over 30 were granted the right to vote (U.K.
Parliament, 1918).
It should be noted that women were not alone in their fight. Many men supported
women in their fight for equal rights. The Men’s League for Women’s Suffrage, was a
group of men who were instrumental allies in helping women achieve the right to vote.
These men used their visibility and influence, without appropriating women’s cause. The
government was openly hostile toward men supporters of the suffragette movement;
however, they risked their lives, their wealth, their reputation, and their freedom to help
in the achievement of equal rights. One of the most notable allies was Frederick Pethick
Lawrence, as the government decided to make an example of him, by imprisoning him,
force-feeding, and causing him to end up bankrupt. Decades later, toward the end of his
life, then knighted, Lord Pethick Lawrence, on his essay titled The Men’s Share (John &
John, 2013), wrote:
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“All down history women have supported men in their fight for liberty. They have
toiled with them, suffered with them, died with them. There is nothing surprising,
therefore, in the fact that in the militant struggle of British women for their own
emancipation, some men stood with them in the fight.” (p.154).
With the support of allies, women continued to advocate for social justice causes.
Women’s advocacy for social fairness resulted in the Rent Restriction Act (U.K.
Parliament, 1928), which changed the housing system across the country, prohibiting
landlords from profiteering during war years in which housing demand was high (Wilson,
2017). During the 1920s several laws protecting women were passed, among them, in
1928, giving all women in Britain equal voting rights with men (U.K. Parliament, 1928).
During the following two decades, women accomplished several small victories
in the equality battle; however, World War II (WWII) (1941-1945) shifted the focus of
policy-makers toward other more immediate needs. After the war, the introduction of the
National Health Service (NHS) provided free access to healthcare to all citizens, which
was an effort that promoted an egalitarian society (National Health Service, 2018). In the
1950s, legal reforms promoted equal pay for teachers and civil servants. The 1960s were
essential for women, as they gained rights toward their reproductive health. Another
major milestone was the appointment of Barbara Castle, Minister of Transport, as First
Secretary of State, becoming the first woman to be appointed to a leadership position at
such high level (Perkins, 2003). Barbara Castle was instrumental in helping British
women advance their rights. In 1968, she intervened in a highly publicized strike.
Women working for Ford as sewing machinists went on strike demanding equal pay as
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their male counterparts. Her intervention resulted in a pay increase for women working
at the Ford factory to the equivalent of 92% of what their male counterparts received.
The 1970s decade brought forth major changes for women in Britain. Mrs. Castle
was instrumental in promoting equal pay for women and in 1970, she put through the
Equal Pay Act of 1970 (U.K. Parliament, 1970), which prohibited employers from paying
women lower wages than men for similar work. The Sex Discrimination Act of 1975
made it illegal to discriminate against women in work, education, and training. The
Employment Protection Act introduced maternity provisions that made it illegal for
employers to dismiss an employee on the basis of pregnancy. The Domestic Violence
and Matrimonial Proceedings Act offered protections from domestic violence for women
and children. In 1977, the UN Federal Assembly formalized International Women’s Day.
In 1978, the “Feminist Review” journal was founded, which played a significant role in
preserving women’s rights and feminism in the public discourse. In 1979, Margaret
Thatcher, the first woman Prime Minister took office, breaking the glass ceiling at the
highest political layer in Britain (Griffin, 2013). However, Prime Minister Thatcher did
not help advance women’s rights (Smith, 2000). Denying existing disadvantages for
women, Mrs. Thatcher did not promote women’s interests or advance women’s rights
(Smith, 2000). Providing some evidence that even at the highest decision-making roles,
inequality is not only perpetuated by men and but also by women (Derks et al., 2016).
Social role theory suggests that occupational roles may easily override gender roles;
therefore, it is possible that men and women in the same occupational role behave
similarly (Eagly, 1987, p. 34).
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Over the past few decades the U.K. government has passed multiple laws that
provide women equal rights as men. The advocacy efforts for equal rights have resulted
in legislation for equality of opportunity in education, access to health, economic and
political participation. However, despite achieving legislation and policy changes
through decades of hard-won battles, efforts have failed to produce gender equality (Rao,
2017). For example, protections contained in the Equal Pay Act of 1983 (previously
Equal Pay Act of 1970) (Department of Employment, 1983) ensure equal pay for the
same work; however, statistics reveal that women get paid 67% of what men earn for
equal work (World Economic Forum, 2017). The Equality Act of 2010 (previously, the
Sex Discrimination Act of 1975) protects women from discrimination on the basis of
gender; however, women are still underrepresented in decision-making roles.
Today, women are allowed to compete with men in political, corporate, and
academic arenas. However, their underrepresentation in decision-making roles raises
some questions. In fact, reflecting on the achievements of women in the British
workforce, Lord Davies raised the question about whether board recruitment was, in
practice, based on skills, experience and performance (Davies, 2011, p. 2).
The Division of Labor
The division of labor by sex has its origins in evolved physical differences
between males and females (men’s greater size and strength, reproductive roles), as they
are factors that interact with people’s social and economic environment. The interaction
of these physical differences and people’s social and economic environments indicates
that one sex performs certain tasks more efficiently and generates constrains for the other
sex. Men’s physical strength allows them to hunt, plow, and perform physically
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demanding tasks more efficiently than women. However, women’s reproductive role
(childbearing, lactation) acted as constraints that prevented them from fully participating
in similar activities (Huber, 2007).
Association with gender and occupational roles became salient during industrial
times, when the migration of work to factories created a clear separation of home and
work, which represented an additional struggle for women, who in addition to having the
responsibility of contributing to their families’ economies, were fully responsible for
childcare and domestic work at home (De Vries, 1994; Seccombe, 1995). Similarly, the
professionalization of certain occupations that were notorious for their power and status,
such as medicine, mathematics, natural sciences, accountancy, and the clergy, which
excluded women, created an association of gender with occupational roles. For example,
the Royal College of Medicine only admitted graduates from Cambridge and Oxford,
which did not admit women. The prestige and status associated with those professions,
which were occupied by men only, contributed to the belief that men were more
competent, superior or better suited for those positions.
Additionally, English’s common law, which was built on Anglo-Saxon and
Norman traditions, of patriarchal predominance, led to the creation of laws that were not
beneficial for women. Under English law, married women were subject to coverture,
which means that they did not have separate legal existence. They were covered under
their husband’s legal existence, which resulted in them not being able to obtain credits,
own property, or enter into economic contracts (Bailey, 2002). Before 1870, year in
which the Married Women’s Property Act was passed in the U.K., women’s property,
including their earnings, belonged to their husbands. This was a major step toward

64

women’s emancipation in a system in which women themselves were seen as their
husbands’ property (Dolin, 2016).
Patriarchy is the system of male oppression of women, which enable men to
control women using social hierarchical relations between men, and solidarity among
them (Hartmann, 1982). Some scholars suggest that patriarchy arose from increased
activity in the economic environment (Eagly & Wood, 2011; Miles, 2014), while others
propose that a patriarchal system in which men controlled the labor of women and
children in their families was already in place, and that is how men learned the techniques
of control and hierarchical organization (Hartmann, 1982). Despite the lack of consensus
regarding what factor influenced the other, existing literature consistently shows a
connection among the division of labor, patriarchy, and the economic environment
(Eagly & Wood, 2011; Hartmann, 1982; Mackintosh, 1981).
Research suggests that gender role beliefs contribute to the inequality of the
division of household labor (Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer, & Robinson, 2000; Coltrane & IshiiKuntz, 1992; Presser, 1994) and although the division of labor in today’s British society
is not as extreme as it used to be centuries ago (Ciccia & Bleijenbergh, 2014) women still
hold the weight of the majority of domestic labor (Bianchi, Robinson, & Milkie, 2006;
Chesley, 2011). The self-perpetuating nature of the division of labor is a critical
contributor to the scarcity of women in leadership and decision-making roles, as gender
role construction grows out of observations of the existing division of labor between men
and women, which develop normative or prescriptive attributes, become expectations,
and logically, reinforces the division of labor itself (Barker, 2016). Furthermore, these
expectations that result from the division of labor exist today in society and organizations
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that legitimize the inequality and reinforce subtle discriminatory practices. Informal
practices are modeled after patriarchal structures in which women are seen as wives and
mothers who are unable to perform at the same level as men in the workplace (Rao,
2017). For example, in many organizations, staying long hours is seen as a sign of
commitment and a determinant for promotions (Meyerson & Fletcher, 2000; Rao, 2017).
These informal practices run deep in organizational structures, which behind unbiased
formal policies and an illusion of fairness, reinforce discriminatory norms (Rao, 2017).
The Construction and Socialization of Gender
Unlike sex, which refers to biological differences, gender is a social construction
that aims to explain sex differences in behavior (Eagly, 2009; Wood & Eagly, 2012). To
that end, biologists, evolutionary psychologists, economists and sociologists have
contributed with numerous theories from their disciplinary perspectives. Sex differences
have been attributed to hormones, adaptive reproductive strategies, hierarchical structures,
contributions to the economy, and socialization experiences (Eagly & Wood, 2011).
Although there is no one discipline that provides an absolute answer that explains the
complexities of sex differences, this paper discusses the two most salient arguments in
the literature, evolutionary and social explanations.
Evolutionary psychologists Buss and Schmitt’s (1993) Sexual Strategies Theory
proposed that genes predispose behavior and suggest that gender differences are the result
of adaptive reproductive strategies. These strategies are sexually dimorphic adaptations
associated with sexual accessibility, fertility assessment, commitment seeking and
avoidance, resource procurement, assessment of mate value, and parental investment.
According to this perspective, men look for partners that are healthy and physically
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attractive, because attractiveness features in women are indicators of fertility. Women are
concerned with finding a partner who can provide resources. Therefore, women are more
likely to advertise physical attractiveness and men are more likely to perform behaviors
that will allow them to be better providers of resources (Buss & Schmitt, 1993).
Buss and Schmitt’s (1993) empirical study also explains the development of
agency and communion as survival mechanisms, which are explained to have evolved
from the need to compete for positions in the social hierarchy (agency) and to form
alliances for preservation (communion) (Buss, 1995; Buss & Schmitt, 1993). Although
the evolutionary psychology approach has had considerable support, it has also been
criticized. The conceptualization of the theory did not satisfactorily discount alternative
explanations for their predictions. For example, the study found that the marital system of
man who was a good provider with a younger woman who was a good domestic worker
was the result of sexual selection preferences on humans. However, their analysis failed
to consider the alternative explanation of the finding being the result the social structure
(Wood & Eagly, 2002). Another deficiency of the theory is that the theory is a post hoc
explanation of gender differences in social behavior; however, the theory does not have
predictive validity (Cornell, 1997). Furthermore, the theory did not address some types of
differentiated behavior that are important in society (leadership) (Eagly, 1997).
From a social perspective, two approaches are reviewed: structural and cultural.
Structural approaches explain that members of social groups experience common
situational constraints because they tend to have similar social positions within their
organizations or families (Eagly, 1997). Cultural approaches explain that members of
social groups acquire common beliefs and values because of the socialization pressures
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they experience. Eagly and Wood’s (2011) social role theory proposed a structural
approach to explaining sex differences, in which behavior reflects gender role beliefs that
in turn represent the people’s perceptions of men’s and women’s social roles in their
society. Ridgeway and Bourg’s (2004) expectation states theory used a cultural approach
to explaining gender as an institutionalized system of practices in which status beliefs and
gender stereotypes create inequality.
Originally, social role theory was conceptualized using a structural approach. It
suggested that sex differences that stem from differing social positions pertaining to work
or family life (Eagly, 1997). According to this theory, gender roles and stereotypes are
generated from people’s observations of the behaviors of men and women, particularly
from the division of labor at home and work (Eagly, 1997). A fundamental argument of
this theory was that influences arising from adult social roles are more directly relevant to
sex differences in adult social behavior than prior socialization or biology (Eagly, 1987).
Therefore, observations of the social position of men and women contribute more
strongly to sex differences than the beliefs that may be learned during childhood
socialization (Eagly, 1987).
Ridgeway (1981, 1984) demonstrated that based on men’s greater access to
societal resources and power, their gender itself is associated with status. Sex differences
have produced beliefs about men being superior to women, which have resulted in men’s
greater influence in groups. Therefore, gender is described as an institutionalized system
of social practices for establishing men and women as different in socially significant
ways; thus using those differences to systematize inequality (Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin,
1999).
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The Gender System in the U.K.
The gender system in society is knitted into the social hierarchy and leadership
because of gender roles, gender stereotypes, and gender status belief systems that
associate greater competence with men than women (Ridgeway, 2001). According to
correspondent inference principle (Gilbert & Malone, 1995), people infer traits from their
observations of behavior. Consequently, gender stereotypes and gender roles stem from
observations of women’s and men’s behavior in different settings, mainly from
observations of the division of labor (Hartmann, 1982; Holter, 1970). Gender beliefs are
deeply engrained in the societal structure. In fact, in a given society, gender determines
what is expected, allowed and valued in women or men (United Nations, 2018). A recent
publication of five different studies that sampled married male managers in the United
Kingdom and the United States, found that marriage structure of men, specifically men
who are married to women who are not in the workforce, is a strong predictor of
discrimination toward women in the workplace (Desai, Chugh, & Brief, 2014).
Consequently, it is important to understand the mechanisms in society that may be
contributing to women’s lower standing in the workplace, because organizational
practices mirror societal norms (Meyerson & Fletcher, 2000).
Gender Roles
Gender roles are defined as the collection of both descriptive and injunctive
expectations associated with men and women (Eagly & Karau, 2002). Early
conceptualizations of gender roles stemmed from the sociological and psychological
perspectives of role theories (e.g., Goffman, 1959; Parsons, 1951), which linked persons
to their social environment. One of the seminal studies in gender roles, Parsons and
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Bales’s (1955) theory of role differentiation in the family, provided a comprehensive
analysis of female and male roles on the basis of their group interactions. The study
reported that men demonstrated task-oriented behaviors (instrumental traits) and women
demonstrated socioemotional behaviors (expressive traits), and concluded that their
behaviors were complimentary and such role differentiation was functionally necessary
for a harmonious society (Parsons & Bales, 1955).
Several scholars have found deficiencies in Parson and Bales’s (1955) analysis,
some of which stem from the terminology used to describe gender role expectations
(expressive and instrumental) (Crano & Aronoff, 1978; Laws, 1979). Similarly, social
role theory questions Parsons and Bales’ (1955) interpretation of the need of role
differentiation and argues that observations of groups’ roles determine stereotype content.
For example, the stereotype of African Americans being more athletic stems from the
disproportionate representation of African Americans in sports (Koenig & Eagly, 2014).
Therefore, using observations of men and women in a traditional division of labor context,
with men being the breadwinners and women the homemakers, creates not a role
differentiation, but a gender stereotype (Eagly, Wood, & Diekman, 2000; Eagly & Wood,
2011). Further, Eagly and Wood (2011) pointed out that role structures are malleable;
hence, expectations of behavior from males and females could not be fixed in the
observations made in a particular society at a given time.
Social role theory’s malleability of expectations of behavior has been criticized
due to the fact that despite the significant changes in women’s roles in society and the
workforce, gender stereotypes have remained unchanged (Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Glick,
& Phelan, 2012). For the past three decades, women have represented about half of the
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British workforce (Office for National Statistics, 2018), and more than ever before,
women see themselves in more agentic terms (Derks, Ellemers, van Laar, & de Groot,
2011; Faniko et al., 2017; Lückerath-Rovers, de Bos, & de Vries, 2013; Spence &
Buckner, 2000). Therefore, as predicted by social role theory, a change in gender
stereotypes should have occurred. However, research findings suggest that gender
stereotypes about communal women and agentic men linger in Western societies
(Lueptow, Garovich, & Lueptow, 1995; Rudman et al., 2012; Spence & Buckner, 2000),
as does the stereotype of men being a better fit for leadership roles than women (Eagly &
Karau, 2002; Koenig & Eagly, 2014; Rudman et al., 2012).
In response to Rudman (2012) and her colleagues’ critique of social role theory,
Koenig and Eagly (2014) conducted four studies with the purpose of establishing the
validity of social role theory and correcting the misunderstanding that social role theory
predicts that all changes in groups’ roles would change their stereotypes. Their findings
confirmed the validity of social role theory, in that stereotypes stem from observations of
the typical social roles enacted by group members (Koenig & Eagly, 2014). Additionally,
an experimental study confirmed that perceivers who observed what the typical roles of a
group would be in the future, changed their projected stereotypes for that group (Koenig
& Eagly, 2014). Also, communal attributes are now associated with leadership (Dasgupta
& Asgari, 2004; Eagly & Wood, 2011; Koenig, Eagly, Mitchell, & Ristikari, 2011),
therefore, as leadership roles become more androgynous, the likelihood of perceiving
women as less qualified than men should decrease (Eagly & Karau, 2002).
Similarly, in support of social role theory, a growing number of studies have
found generational differences in attitudes toward women. Younger generations hold
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more favorable attitudes toward women in leadership (Mostafa, 2005) and more
egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles (Donelly, Twenge, Clark, Shaik, Beiler-May, &
Carter, 2016). Other studies found that having more women in leadership positions
increases the likelihood of other women competing for the positions and attaining them
(Beaman, Chattopadhyay, Duflo, Pande, & Topalova, 2009). Gender-role cognitions
about gender-stereotyped occupations play a role in individual’s occupational interests
(Liben, Bigler, & Krogh, 2002). An experimental study that used a sample of children,
adolescents and adults to examine the relationship of gender and occupational interests
demonstrated that the expectation of gendered occupations plays a causal role in shaping
job interests. Thus, observing who occupies a position influences an individual’s
likelihood of developing an interest for that position (Weisgram, Bigler, & Liben, 2010).
Furthermore, in relation to women in leadership, an experimental study used
random assignment of gender quotas in villages in India to examine the relationship of
exposure to female representation in power positions and leadership ambition in young
women. The study found that exposure to women in leadership positions caused a rise in
young women’s leadership ambition and increased the likelihood of women applying to
such positions (Beaman, Duflo, Pande, & Topalova, 2012). Thus, providing evidence of
that gender stereotypes at the social and individual levels are influenced by their
observations of roles of men and women (Koenig & Eagly, 2014). However, despite
women aspiring to those roles, the likelihood that they will achieve them is dependent on
the opportunities and experiences for leadership development (Reichard & Avolio, 2005).
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Agency, Communion and Gender Stereotypes
According to correspondent inference principle (Gilbert & Malone, 1995), people
infer traits from their observations of behavior. These observations represent the
descriptive attribute of gender roles, which are also called gender stereotypes. Therefore,
gender stereotypes are not necessarily arbitrary, neither are they completely inaccurate
(Eagly & Wood, 2011). They are simply the result of an unintentional, spontaneous,
cognitive process of social inference (Uleman, Saribay, & Gonzalez, 2008).
Consequently, stereotype-related literature identified that people’s beliefs about men and
women fit into two groups: agentic and communal. These terms were first introduced by
Bakan (1966) to characterize fundamental modalities in people’s existence. Agency, for
the existence of an individual as an individual and communion, for the participation of
the individual in some larger group of which the individual is a part of (Bakan, 1966).
Individualism (Tocqueville, 1946; Mead, 1967) and collectivism are terms that also been
used to refer to the same constructs (Triandis, Bontempo & Villareal, Asai, & Lucca,
1988).
Because agency reflects a concern for the self, it is associated with individualism
and separating self from others. It is described as instrumental, traditionally masculine
traits such as self-assertion, decisiveness, competitiveness, dominance, and selfenhancement. Despite an individual’s gender, agency has been found to be instrumental
in acquiring leadership status (Eagly & Karau, 2002). Also, in individualistic societies,
displaying agency is necessary for success (Dubois & Beauvois, 2005). Conversely,
communion reflects a concern for others; therefore, it is associated with forming
connections with others, and collectivism. Communion includes traditionally feminine
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traits such as group participation, expressiveness, cooperation, facilitating harmonious
relationships, and being emotionally expressive, friendly, and nurturing.
A considerable amount of research has been done on gender differences in agency
and communion since Bakan (1966) coined the terms over half a century ago. It is
irrefutable that women display more communal traits and men display more agentic traits
(Eagly & Wood, 2011); thus the gender stereotypes attributing communal traits to women
and agentic traits to men. Evidence indicates that gender stereotypes contribute to the
gender inequality in terms of associating greater competence with agentic than communal
traits (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Williams & Best,
1990). Consequently, irrespective of their level of competence, women are
disadvantaged by gender stereotypes that associate them with being less competent than
men.
In the 1970s, researchers became interested in exploring gender roles as an
explanation for gender-related differences in leadership (Coder & Spiller, 2013). To that
end, using samples of business students, researchers administered surveys in which
students were asked to rate the characteristics of what they imagined a good manager
would have. Results indicated that perceptions of good managers were not associated
with feminine or androgynous –possessing both masculine and feminine characteristicstraits. Their findings (Powell & Butterfield, 1979, 1984; Powell, Butterfield, & Parent,
2002) indicated that a good manager was described in masculine terms. Other studies
(Kent & Moss, 1994; Kolb, 1999) that examined the association of gender roles with
leadership emergence found that masculinity was associated with leadership emergence,
unlike femininity. Conversely, other studies have found that while the typical manager
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was perceived in masculine terms, the ideal manager was perceived as androgynous
(Maier, 1993), and that androgynous styles may be better for organizations (Park, 1997).
Taking into account that existing research (Helson & Moane, 1987) has found that
gender role perceptions change as people age, students’ perceptions of ideal leaders may
differ from the workforce’s perceptions of ideal leaders. Consequently, researchers
(Coder & Spiller, 2013) have questioned that the majority of research related to gender
roles and leadership has relied on convenience samples of students, which pose a concern
to the generalizability of the findings. Nonetheless, studies continue to produce mixed
findings; thus, scholars (Hoyt & Murphy, 2016; Seo & Huang, 2017) continue to explore
the relationship of gender roles and leadership.
The Internalization of Gender Roles
Research suggests that stereotypical expectations of societal gender roles become
internalized (Eagly, 2009). This suggests individuals’ attitudes and gender identities are
influenced by the cultural or societal connotation associated with their sex (Eagly, 2009).
Current research provides evidence for internalization of gender roles at two different
levels: a) at the social level as societal attitudes and b) at the individual level as selfconcepts.
Consistent with social role theory, society’s descriptive beliefs and normative
expectations are the essence of gender roles. Public opinion research regarding
agreement with different political attitudes found that at a societal level, the partition of
women’s communal and men’s agentic traits was evident. The study found that women
were more favorable than men on compassion issues such as helping the poor and
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disadvantaged, while men were more favorable than women on issues involving the use
of force (Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986).
Society’s behavioral expectations for each gender and the cultural conditioning
starts with gender stereotypes introduced from childhood (Lawson, Crouter, & McHale,
2015). Starting with how parents commonly dress their baby girls in pink and baby boys
in blue, evidence shows that this seemingly innocuous behavior conditions young girls to
have preference for the color pink and avoidance of the pink color by boys (LoBue &
DeLoache, 2011). Differences in communal and agentic traits are also reinforced at a
young age, for example, in children play, when boys display strong, violent behavior, the
typical reaction is “boys will be boys” (Bhana, 2009, p.327); conversely, girls are
expected to play in ways they show their nurturing, compassionate traits by playing with
dolls (Blaise, 2012).
Differences in self-reported traits and behaviors for men and women provide
evidence for the internalization of gender roles as self-concepts (Canter & Meyerowitz,
1984; Spence & Helmreich, 1979). Using some of the examples above, the effect of
society’s expectation on how women should dress, play with can become part of an
individual’s identity (Eagly & Wood, 2011). Numerous studies have demonstrated girls,
more than boys, are more aware of gender stereotypical expectations (Poulin-Dubois,
Serbin, & Derbyshire, 1998; Serbin, Poulin-Dubois, Colbourne, Sen, & Eichstedt, 2001;
Signorella, Bigler, & Liben, 1993), which are influenced by gendered marketing that
segregates children using stereotype-based toys that reinforce communal and agentic
expectations such as girls like princesses and boys like superheroes (Cahill & Adams,
1997; Freeman, 2007). By the age of five, girls are able to categorize “girl appropriate”
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and “boy appropriate” toys, games, and have rigid definitions of how they are expected to,
and should behave (Martin & Ruble, 2004; Freeman, 2007). Throughout people’s lives,
society reinforces these behavioral expectations, which become part of an individual’s
identity (Eagly & Wood, 2011). However, as occupational roles are more salient, studies
related to the behavior of leaders have indicated that in high-level roles, men and
women’s behavior were more similar than different (Keshet, Kark, Pomerantz-Zorin,
Koslowsky, & Schwarzwald, 2006), which could be related to the expectation of
masculine attributes associated with leadership (Eagly & Wood, 2011). Consistently,
previous studies have indicated that women in leadership roles see themselves as more
masculine than other women (Faniko, Ellemers, & Derks, 2016) and in some cases, more
masculine than men (Luckerath-Rovers, de Bos, & de Vries, 2013).
Corporate Governance
The growing complexities of businesses that resulted from the industrial
revolution, led to the development of corporate boards. As businesses grew, shareholders
increased in number, creating a separation of ownership and management. Boards of
directors are comprised of independent and non-independent members, whom as a
collective, have a responsibility to mitigate the risks inherent in the separation of
ownership from management, and to protect the wellbeing of the organization and its
shareholders. Boards of directors are at the highest organizational decision-making level
and their roles are regulated by corporate governance codes and laws. The U.K.
Corporate Governance Code (CGC), published by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC),
is the primary governance code in the United Kingdom, applying to companies with a
premium listing of equity shares on the London Stock Exchange, regardless of whether

77

they are incorporated in the United Kingdom or elsewhere. The importance of corporate
governance lies on the influence of corporations on society. Current statistics show that
69 of the world’s top 100 economies are corporations (Global Justice Now, 2016), and
the 500 largest corporations control 37.8% of the world’s economic output (Fortune 500,
2016); therefore, the impact of corporations on society cannot be ignored.
Over the past couple of decades, multiple developments have put corporate boards
under much scrutiny (Glass & Cook, 2016). Fairly recently, scandals in American
companies contributed to a corporate governance reform with the enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). In European countries, gender equality become part
of political agendas, partly as a result of pressures from the European Commission to put
an end to male-dominance on corporate boards. One of the founding principles of the EU
is equality between women and men. At the time of this study, the United Kingdom
remains part of the EU; therefore, the EUs principles signed in the Treaty of Rome apply
to the United Kingdom. However, it is noteworthy to mention that the U.K. system of
corporate governance is more similar to the U.S. system than those of other European
countries, particularly, in the context of placing the interests of the shareholders above
those of other stakeholders (i.e., employees) (Armour, Deakin, & Konzelmann, 2003).
Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that U.K. boards may behave differently than those
of other European countries.
A fundamental aspect of the corporate governance process in organizations is the
measurement and disclosure of important metrics and information (Ioannou & Serafeim,
2017). Recent updates to the U.K. CGC mandate transparency in the selection and
recruitment of board directors, through disclosure and reporting guidelines in which
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publicly listed organizations are required to provide gender statistics of their boards,
senior management, and total workforce (Financial Reporting Council, 2016). Voluntary
disclosure of corporate social responsibility and sustainability efforts started during the
1960s and 1970s, which were decades that created awareness of corporations’
responsibility to society and the environment. In the 1990s, following environmental
disasters produced by oil companies (Rezaee, Szendi, & Aggarwal, 1995), the United
Nations Environmental Program promoted the establishment of Global Reporting
Initiative (GRI).
The GRI sustainability reporting provides guidelines for the disclosure of
economic, environmental and social performance metrics. Worldwide GRI data from
2017 indicates that 37% of sustainability reports received were from European countries
(GRI, 2012). However, despite increased societal pressures, the U.K. CGC has adopted
reporting guidelines at a much slower pace than other European nations (Martin &
Hadley, 2008). Currently, publicly listed U.K. corporations are required to disclose
financial metrics, and very few social performance metrics, such as gender composition
at different organizational levels (Financial Reporting Council, 2016). Although several
FTSE ranked organizations voluntarily disclose environmental and social performance
metrics (Clark & Gibson-Sweet, 1999; Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 1995a; Habek & Wolniak,
2016), in addition to the mandatory disclosures, the lack of formal reporting guidelines
(Chen & Bouvain, 2009; Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 1995b) makes it impossible to examine
the data at an aggregated level. Therefore, with very few exceptions, the current
governance code is not conducive to the holistic understanding of the effects of board
membership characteristics on a number of non-financial outcomes.
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The Board of Directors
The board of directors is central to corporate governance. Directors of a corporate
board provide the linkage between the external environment to the board, and between
the board to the organization. The board is the link between shareholders and
management. The role of the board is to promote the long-term sustainable success of the
company, generating value for shareholders and contributing to wider society (CGC, p. 4).
The CGC states that board appointments and succession plans “should be based on merit
and objective criteria and, within this context, should promote diversity of gender, social
and ethnic backgrounds, cognitive and personal strengths” (p. 8). Additionally, a
provision of the CGC states that the annual report should describe the policy on diversity
and inclusion, how it has been implemented, and progress on achieving the objectives. To
that end, organizations are required to disclose gender balance of their board members,
those in senior management and their direct reports.
Theoretical Perspectives about Corporate Boards
Several theoretical perspectives link corporate boards to organizational outcomes
(Chambers, Harvey, Mannion, Bond, & Marshall, 2013). However, due to the historical
male dominance in leadership, including corporate boards, across the globe, these
theories have defined in function of observations of the occupants of those positions
(Coder & Spiller, 2013). Also, the masculine rationality used to associate good
leadership with male roles (Powell & Butterfield, 1979, 1989; Schein & Davidson, 1993,
Schein, Mueller, Lituchy, & Liu, 1996) has contributed to people’s preconceived notions
of leaders and implicit leadership theories. These implicit leadership theories influence
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leadership occupancy, as well as the evaluation and perception of leaders (Forsyth & Nye,
2008).
Additionally, theoretical perspectives that link the individuals to the board do not
take into account differences in power and status associated with gender. Consequently,
it is unclear whether they would apply in a context of gender balance or female
representation of any kind. Multiple studies have tried to fill the gap in the literature by
incorporating different theoretical perspectives in order to explain women’s contributions
to the organization. These theoretical perspectives can be grouped into two groups based
on their focus: individual and organizational.
Individual to Board
The following theories help the understanding of women and the board of
directors. Social role theory (Eagly & Wood, 2011), social identity theory (Tajfel &
Turner, 1986), gender as status (Ridgeway & Bourg, 2004), and critical mass theory
(Kanter, 1977).
Social role. Social Role Theory (Eagly & Wood, 2011) explains the relationship
of directors to boards on the basis of sex differences, in which behaviors reflect gender
role beliefs. Through social role’s theoretical lens, different outcomes from a board to the
organization stem from the different behaviors and expectations from men and women.
Traditionally, corporate board seats have been occupied by men. Consequently, it is not
surprising that people ascribe masculine attributes to their idea of someone such a
position of leadership (Heilman, 1995; Schein, 2001). Similarly, literature associates
leadership with agentic traits such as decisiveness, aggressiveness, risk-taking,
assertiveness, ambition, which are also associated with men (Croson & Gneezy, 2009;
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Heilman, 1995; Schein, 1975, 2001; Vinkenburg, Van Engen, Eagly, JohannesenSchmidt, 2011). Consequently, communal characteristics, commonly associated with the
female gender are perceived to be incongruent with those expected of leaders. This
suggests that women who exhibit communal traits may be less likely to be perceived as
having potential for a board position (McClelland & Boyatzis, 1982; Miner, 1977) which
may result in prejudiced executive selection (Oakley, 2000) and those who have
internalized gendered leadership beliefs may be less likely to pursue director positions
(Weisgram, Dinella, & Fulcher, 2011).
In the context of social influence (Schlenker & Leary, 1982), as would apply to
the micro level, social role theory (Eagly & Wood, 1999) posits the internalization of
gender roles at the individual level has an effect on individuals’ attitudes, beliefs and
behaviors at the implicit level (Danes, 1994). Women’s under-evaluation of their own
abilities, which is referred to as the psychological glass ceiling, is a gender-based
leadership barrier that has been found to contribute to gender differences in leadership
role occupancy (Diehl & Dzubinski, 2016; Ely & Rhode, 2010). A recent meta-analysis
of 95 studies that evaluated the impact of gender on perceived leadership effectiveness
found no overall differences in the perceived effectiveness of men and women (PaustianUnderdahl, Walker, & Woehr, 2014). However, there were differences with regard to
self-ratings or other-ratings. Others rated women as more effective leaders than men in
organizational settings. In contrast, for self-ratings men rated themselves significantly
higher than women in lower level and senior leadership positions.
Social identity. Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) posits that
individuals are drawn to others who are similar to themselves in function of social
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categories. Social identity theory proposes that role identification is a perception of
belonging to a group or social category that individuals self-classify into (Dovidio &
Gaertner, 2010; Tajfel, 2010). This self-categorization or social identity leads to
behaviors that are congruent with the identity of the group. It also enables the individual
to define herself in her social environment (Ashford & Mael, 1989). For example, a
woman in a corporate board position may define herself I am woman; I am a leader.
Under this theoretical framework, each social identity is a perception that stems from
self-categorization and categorization of others. Due to the different social groups an
individual may categorize into, it is expected that her social identity consists of a
combination of multiple identities, which if complementary could increase well-being
(Dixon & Baumeister, 1991), and if incongruent could create a role conflict (Brook,
Garcia, & Fleming, 2008; Downie, Koestner, ElGeledi, & Cree, 2004). Gender and race
are salient social categories. This theoretical framework has been used to explain
women’s inclusion and exclusion from different groups. It has been established that
corporate boards are overwhelmingly composed of men; therefore, when women enter a
board of directors composed primarily of white men (Parker, 2017), they are vulnerable
to categorization as members of an out-group (Eagly, 2016; Ridgeway, 2014).
Additionally, they are susceptible to prejudiced views toward women due to the lower
status associated with the female gender (Eagly & Wood, 2011).
Gender as status. Expectation States Theory (Ridgeway & Bourg, 2004) explains
the mechanisms behind social inequality in which gender is an attribute associated with
status. This theoretical perspective underpins the proposition that status stabilizes the
inequality of resources and power and creates a system justification that aims to preserve
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the status quo. Empirical studies provide evidence that status beliefs favor men in board
interactions (He & Huang, 2009) and shape the behavior and perception of leaders within
an organization (Cook & Glass, 2015; Ding, Murray, & Stuart, 2013). Individuals have
an essential need to view a social system positively; therefore, they tend to rationalize the
status quo (Glick & Fiske, 2001). When in the presence of a threat of disruption of the
status quo in which men enjoy more status and power than women (Ridgeway & Correll,
2004), men tend to show stronger identification with their high status group increasing
their defense of the gender system as fair and just. (Kray et al., 2017)
Critical mass. Critical Mass Theory (Kanter, 1977) was conceptualized
borrowing a concept of the field of physics, which defines critical mass as the smallest
amount of fissile material needed for a sustained nuclear chain reaction. From a liberal
feminist perspective, Kanter (1977)’s work brought light to hidden dimensions of
gendered power in organizations. Her seminal work Men and Women and the
Corporation provides the framework for the understanding of how numerical group
compositions have different effects on organizational group processes (Lewis & Simpson,
2012). Her focus on representation in numbers reflects her emphasis in the underlying
similarities between men and women. Therefore, women’s subordinate position in
organizations is not the product of a particular social or cultural context (Witz & Savage,
1992). Kanter described men as the dominant group and women as the minority group,
which depending on their numbers can be categorized as tokens. The heightened
visibility that springs from their difference (i.e., being a woman in a male-dominated
group) can make them the target of performance pressures causing them to over perform
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or could make them try to reduce their exposure and visibility causing them to eliminate
their impact on group processes (Lewis & Simpson, 2012).
Critical mass suggests that men’s numerical dominance in work groups has
allowed them access to power and status (Kanter, 1977). Kanter theorized that different
minority proportions have different levels of voice and influence (Van der Walt & Ingley,
2003). A balanced group is a group in which women have at least 15% to 40% minority
representation. Multiple studies have tested this theory in different contexts to identify
what critical mass is in those specific contexts. Empirical evidence suggests that the
number of women required to achieve critical mass is three (Arena, Cirilo, Mussolino,
Pulcinelli, Saggese, & Sarto, 2015; Joecks, Pull, & Vetter, 2013; Konrad et al., 2008;
Kramer, Konrad, Erkut, & Hooper, 2006; Torchia et al., 2011).
Some scholars have found that critical mass depends on the context. Elstad and
Ladegard (2010) could not assert that three board members were the minimum to achieve
critical mass, but concluded that women ratio is positively related to the perceptions of
women directors in relation to information sharing, social interaction and influence. De
Cabo and colleagues (2011) found that in Spain, the presence of female directors was
enough for women to have an effect on board performance. However, despite the
numerous studies that have tested this theory (Konrad et al., 2008; Torchia et al., 2011), it
has received much criticism (Celis, Cilds, Kantola, & Krook, 2008; Childs & Krook,
2006).
An essential argument of critical mass is that it assumes that women’s
disadvantages are not caused by gendered hierarchies, but from differences in
underrepresentation and differences in organizational structures. Thus, Kanter’s
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proposition that an increase in women’s numbers to make a group more gender balanced
can help women overcome their disadvantages. Critical mass overlooks the existence of
gender biases that favor agentic – masculine – traits for positions of leadership and power,
which according to role congruity theory of prejudice toward female leaders (Eagly &
Karau, 2002), are at the core of the problem of women’s underrepresentation in
leadership positions. This perspective also overlooks historically rooted social and
cultural constructions that privilege masculine and devalue feminine attributes, which
according to the theoretical perspective on gender beliefs and social relations (Ridgeway
& Correll, 2004), are a core component of the gender system. Moreover, the theory
focuses on the minimum number of women required in a group assuming it will allow
them to form alliances. However, that suggests an underlying assumption of women
helping women (Mavin, 2008), which has been challenged by researchers that suggest
that women who rise to positions of power in male-dominated cultures tend to assimilate
into the culture rather than challenge it (Derks et al., 2016).
Furthermore, in the context of women who are appointed to positions of power as
a result of initiatives that require minimum targets, such as quotas, research has suggested
that they may be seen as taking men’s jobs. Consequently, high scrutiny is placed on their
performance (Bierema, 2017). In those contexts, women tend to distance themselves
from other women (Ellemers et al., 2012; Mavin, 2008). Moreover, allowing some
women opportunities to positions that may not have been available to them otherwise,
may help those individual women; however, it only reinforces asymmetrical gender
relations as the basic structure of the organization remains unchanged (Bierema, 2017).
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Board to Organization
At the organizational level, theoretical perspectives explain the contribution of the
collective board to the organization. Among the most widely used theories in the study of
corporate governance are Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency theory and Pffefer and
Salancik’s (1978) resource dependence theory (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004).
Agency. Agency Theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) conceptualizes the link
between the board and the organization, highlighting the importance of conformance.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) emphasized the risks of poor management or self-serving
managerial decisions on organizational performance. The theory posits that the board’s
monitoring function coupled with corporate practices of reporting and external auditing,
is likely to reduce the risks that stem from poor management. Most of the empirical
literature related to corporate governance has attempted to understand the link between
the board of directors and organizational performance taking an agency theory approach
(Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson, 2008). However, this theory has received
considerable criticism due to its low predictive validity on financial performance (Carter
et al., 2013). Agency theory’s “closed system” (p. 475) approach posits a rigid link
between board practices and performance that disregard the environment in which
organizations function (Aguilera et al., 2008).
Empirical studies have found that expectations imposed by boards can intrude on
high level managers’ autonomy, and increase the likelihood negative organizational
outcomes, such as financial fraud (Shi, Connelly, & Hoskisson, 2017), suggesting that
agency theory ignores the complexity of individual motivations. Similarly, agency
theory fails to account for the role of diversity on boards. According to agency theory,
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monitoring increases performance; however, empirical evidence has demonstrated that
increasing the number of women on a corporate boards improves monitoring and has a
negative impact on financial performance (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Zhu, Small, &
Flaherty, 2010). Furthermore, multiple studies have failed to produce support for the
theory due to its failure to predict organizational outcomes in a context of board diversity
(Aguilera et al., 2008; Carter et al., 2013; Francoeur, Labelle, & Sinclair-Desgagne,
2008).
Resource dependence. Resource Dependence Theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978)
provides a framework for the understanding of the relationship between the board, as a
collective, and the organization. The theory posits that organizations are a combination
of tangible and intangible assets and capabilities that depend on strategic resources for
their survival. Boards are seen as strategic resources that add value to the organization
due to the resources they can provide, such as expertise, advise, and counsel. According
to resource dependence theory, in addition to providing counsel, the main role of the
board is to provide legitimacy and communication channels. This theory very
convincingly explains the relationship of external factors and the role of a governing
board (Hung, 1998). Expanding the work of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), scholars suggest
that directors’ different types of human and social capital provide different resources
beneficial to the firm, suggesting that a more diverse board results in better organizational
performance (Hillman et al., 2000).
Resource dependence theory was conceptualized with underpinnings from the
fields of economics and organizational sociology (Chambers, Harvey, Mannion, Bond, &
Marshall, 2013). The theory uses an “open-system” (p. 475) approach, in which
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organizational features, diversity, and environmental changes are interdependent
(Aguilera et al., 2008). In the diversity and corporate governance literature, this theory
has been used to underpin a number of studies on board diversity (Hillman, Withers, &
Collins, 2009; Terjesen et al., 2009). However, the theory has found support mainly
when used to identify characteristics of organizations that would most likely have more
WOB rather than organizational outcomes of having more WOB. For example, using
panel data of the largest 1,000 U.S. firms in terms of sales, organizational predictors of
WOB were examined on Hillman, Shropshire, and Canella (2007). Their findings
revealed that organizational size, industry, total number of directors, average female
employment in the industry, and connections to other boards with female directors were
statistically significant predictors of the presence of female directors on a corporate board.
Peterson and Philpot (2007) found evidence of a systematic bias in director
assignment to top board committees. Their study found that the female gender decreased
the likelihood of being assigned to executive committees; their findings also provided
evidence that boards evaluate their resource dependence differently for men than for
women. Also, some studies found a positive effect in the relationship between gender
and corporate social responsibility performance (Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010; Hafsi &
Turgut, 2013; Margaretha & Isnaini, 2014). Although this could indicate that
organizations with more WOB perform in a more socially responsible manner, it could
also indicate that socially responsible firms have more gender neutral selection practices.
A recent meta-analysis that examined the relationship between WOB and financial
performance combining the results of 140 studies found that the relationship was near
zero and the relationship was positive in countries with greater gender parity (Post &
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Byron, 2015). Another meta-analysis recently published (Pletzer, Nikolova, Kedzior, &
Voelpel, 2015) found similar, near-zero results.
However, in the context of gender diversity as a source of more valuable
resources to a board and its effect on organizational performance, empirical studies found
no support for the theory (Carter et al., 2003; Gregory-Smith, Main, & O-Reilly, 2014;
Mandala, Kaijage, Aduda, & Iraya, 2017; Ntim, 2015).
Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards
Given that globally, men occupy a disproportionally high number of corporate
seats, governments throughout the world have attempted different measures to address
the disparity. Achieving parity in corporate boardrooms derives from the principle of
equality of treatment. In this context, equality of treatment requires that individuals are
treated in the same manner irrespective of their gender and prohibits direct and indirect
discrimination. Throughout the world, governments and organizations have attempted to
address gender disparities on corporate boards using different approaches: hard law
(equal outcome) and soft law (equal opportunity).
However, it is noteworthy to reiterate that while gender diversity indicators
represent progress toward achieving equal contribution, they do not represent equality.
Consequently, gender diversity on corporate boards does not indicate equality between
men and women on boards, neither does it indicate gender equality in the observed
organizations or the workforce. Furthermore, research (Ahmed, 2007) has indicated that
in enacting policy and legislation for equality, it can be assumed that equality is achieved
in the act. However, policy and legislation cannot substitute action, as what they say
does not automatically bring them into existence. Additionally, research on diversity in
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organizations (Ahmed & Swan, 2006) has identified that diversity initiatives can be used
as a mechanism for perpetuating inequality in organizations.
Hard Law – Equal Outcome
Equal outcome strategies aim to guarantee gender parity by regulating the gender
composition on boards through the implementation of legislation mandating minimum
gender representation. This approach focuses on the end result rather than the means for
achieving it. In 2003, Norway was the first country to implement legislation to increase
women’s participation on corporate boards by regulating the gender composition through
quotas. Norway’s quota reform required a minimum 40% representation of each gender
on the boards of publicly listed companies, with sanctions for non-compliance. The
quota law gained considerable attention worldwide, bringing a spotlight to male
dominance at the highest level of corporate decision-making roles (Sweigart, 2012).
Several countries have followed Norway’s lead and implemented quota laws to increase
the percentage of women in corporate boards. Among the countries that have
implemented similar regulations are Spain (2007), Iceland (2010), France (2011), the
Netherlands (2011), Belgium (2011), Malaysia (2011), Italy (2013), and Germany (2015).
Quotas have proven to be an effective tool for increasing the proportion of WOB;
however, their effects are limited to the minimum compliance levels set by the quota.
Scholars argue that the diffusion of quotas on corporate boards was sparked by the
Norway quota law, which was unique at the time of its introduction (Teigen, 2012).
Therefore, to inform the understanding of the use of government initiatives for WOB as a
way to promote gender equality, the Norway case is discussed. Norway has a long history
of gender quotas and positive action arrangements to promote gender balance (Teigen,
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2011). In fact, the first gender quotas for political party representation were instituted in
1974, and multiple others have targeting different groups have been instituted since then
(See Appendix A). Paradoxically, despite Norway’s history of gender equality policies,
and balanced gender representation in other dimensions of society, prior to the quota law,
a vertically gender segregated business sector had resulted in a massive gender disparity
in top leadership and corporate boards (Niskanen, 2011). After failed attempts to increase
women’s representation on corporate boards of listed companies, addressing the disparity
became a pressing political issue (Teigen, 2015). After months of public debate on how
to remedy the lack of women in business leadership, in 2002, the Norway quota law was
imposed. Although gender quota policies had been used in Norway, there was much
resistance and opposition to their adoption in the business sector, mainly from business
leaders, and employer organizations, with claims of negative economic consequences
(Hoel, 2008).
Soft Law - Equal Opportunity
This approach is concerned with the means for achieving a result rather than the
outcome. In the United Kingdom, the Equality Act 2010 prohibits discrimination in
recruitment, selection, and employment for several protected characteristics, including
gender. Equal opportunity strategies for WOB, also referred to as comply or explain aim
to address disproportionate gender representation through recommended targets. Among
the countries have implemented this type of approach are Australia (2011), Canada
(2015), the U.S. (2010), and the U.K. (2010, 2012), all of which have liberal market
economies (Hall & Gingerich, 2009). Through regulation of the corporate governance
codes or disclosure regulation, these governments’ formal approach to achieving gender
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parity on corporate boards include mandating publicly listed organizations’ disclosure of
their board diversity policies and director selection practices. Equal opportunity
approaches rely on voluntary measures and do not have sanctions for non-compliance.
Until the United Kingdom announced that the Davies Review (2015) comply or explain
approach had been successful, such approaches had produced increases in participation of
WOB at a much slower pace than quotas. Several countries resorted to the imposition of
quotas after voluntary measures did not produce desired results.
Assumptions of WOB Initiatives
The underlying assumption behind targeting boards as a way to promote gender
equality was grounded on principles of representation. When the quota reform was
proposed in Norway, the government asserted that gender-balanced representation on
boards was essential for the Norwegian democracy (Tiegen, 2015). It makes logical
sense that the democratic principle was used in Norway to justify the quota reform
because Norway’s corporate governance code gives employees the right to representation.
Employee representation on corporate boards is grounded on adherence to workplace
democracy (Teigen, 2012) and protected by the Norwegian corporate governance code
(Oslo Stock Exchange, 2018: Private Limited Liability Companies Act of 1997; Public
Limited Liability Companies Act of 1997). The scope of employee representation was
expanded by including gender representation, as set forth in the Gender Equality Act of
1999, which was passed by Norwegian Parliament in 2003 (Storvik, 2011). One key
difference between Norway and several other countries, including the United Kingdom
and the United States (See Appendix A for a comprehensive list) is that Norway’s
corporate governance code is designed to include employee-elected board members who
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represent the employees’ collective interests (Engelstad & Teigen, 2012). Under the U.K.
CGC, employees do not have a right to board representation. Although board directors
have a duty to promote the success of the company, considering, among other matters,
the interests of the company’s employees (Companies Act 2006, section 172),
organizations do not report how that is done. Currently, there is a reform proposal to the
U.K. CGC intended to require all companies to explain how their directors comply with
that requirement.
The two principles of representation that are associated with gender quotas in the
literature are descriptive and substantive (Phillips, 1998). Descriptive representation
indicates fair representation of women in numbers. Thus, initiatives to promote the
achievement of gender parity on corporate boards, such gender quotas and targets aim to
attain women’s descriptive representation. Substantive representation implies that
people’s interests are represented by those in decision-making positions. Substantive
representation of women is not related to their representative’s gender, but to the
tendency of their representative to advocate for women’s interests. Several researchers
have indicated that there is an expectation that an increase of women’s numbers on
corporate boards (descriptive representation) will result in reduced discrimination for
women in lower levels (substantive representation) (Ferreira, 2015; Ellemers et al., 2012).
However, inconsistent findings of empirical studies demonstrate that the link between
descriptive and substantive representation of women in the workforce is not compellingly
established.
The link between descriptive and substantive representation was hypothesized
(Wangnerud, 2009) using theoretical foundation of the politics of presence, in which
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Phillips (1995) argued that female representatives were better suited to represent the
interests of other women. Scholars have indicated that there is an expectation that an
increase of women as minorities in high level groups – such as corporate boards – will
help other women (Duguid, 2011; Ferreira, 2015). This argument has been challenged by
scholars who suggest that ascribing interests to women in a top down manner ignores that
women’s interests are not universal or static, but rather contextual and changeable (Celis,
2007; Childs & Krook, 2006). In studies related to the substantive political representation
of women, scholars have argued that instead of a critical mass of women, both women
and men may seek to promote women’s concerns (Celis, 2009; Celis & Childs, 2008;
Chaney, 2006). Nonetheless, legislative action has resulted in the increase of WOB and
an expectation of reduced discrimination at lower levels.
Consequently, research has tested the link between their descriptive and
substantive representation. To that end, studies that examined the effects of the Norway
quota law did not find evidence to support the hypothesis that the reform benefited the
larger set of women employed in the companies impacted by the quota (Bertrand, Black,
Jansen, & Lleras-Muney, 2018). A study of the Norway quota law found that the
initiative created a small elite of women directors but did not have a positive effect on
opportunities for other women (Seirstad & Opsahl, 2011). Further, the gender wage gap
did not decrease, except at the top of the labor market, which researchers argue could be
the result of increased demand for women created by the quota law (Bertrand et al., 2018).
Scholars have suggested that despite the lack of evidence, most proponents of
quotas believe that breaking the glass ceiling at the board level will lessen discrimination
for other women at lower organizational layers (Ferreira, 2015). Policy makers and
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equality advocates continue to promote descriptive representation initiatives to promote
gender equality (Ferreira, 2015). The Australian Institute of Management in partnership
with the Australian National Committee for UN Women (AIM, 2012) suggested that
despite limited evidence, a positive correlation between the numbers of WOB and women
at the top executive level has been identified. Similarly, using data from Fortune 500 and
Fortune 1000 organizations, empirical studies have provided some evidence of the
relationship between WOB and female executive representation (Bilimoria, 2006; Konrad,
2008; Skaggs et al., 2012). Accordingly, proponents of quotas suggest that women at the
board level will have a trickle-down effect that will result in increased opportunities for
women (AIM, 2012). However, the link between WOB and increased opportunities for
women has resulted in mixed findings (Matsa & Miller, 2011; Seirstad & Opshal, 2011).
Furthermore, most of the evidence that links senior women to the creation of
opportunities for junior women does not address endogeneity (Blau & DeVaro, 2017;
Dezso et al., 2015; Giuliano et al., 2005). For example, according to Antonakis and
colleagues (2014), the effect on an outcome can be caused by an unobserved variable.
Not knowing the independent variables are exogenous and not instrumenting them with
truly exogenous variables poses a threat to understanding the direction of a relationship.
Consequently, while WOB may be creating opportunities for women in management, it is
also possible that a higher supply of women in management is causing more women to
rise to corporate boards, or that organizations that have a good gender equality strategy
promote more women to managerial and board positions.
Additionally, studies that provided evidence of a positive relationship used data
from boards that had increased their percentages of women endogenously (Carter et al.,
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2010; Erhardt et al., 2003), without the influence of government initiatives. Therefore,
those findings may not be generalizable to boards in which gender composition has
resulted from an exogenous event. Further, scholars have argued that promoting women
to senior positions simply to increase their numbers, without addressing the underlying
problem of gender bias and gendered leadership beliefs is a risky strategy that could have
a negative impact on career opportunities for women (Ellemers, Rink, Derks, & Ryan,
2012).
Utilitarian argument. In the majority of countries where legislation and policies
for WOB have been implemented, the debate has mainly been discussed and promoted
through the utilitarian argument – also referred to as the business case for WOB -, which
relies on a causal claim of improved financial performance resulting from the inclusion of
women on corporate boards (Eagly, 2016). Advocates of WOB initiatives have
contributed to the diffusion of the economic argument, which has flooded media outlets
with the alleged benefits of WOB on the bottom line (e.g. Catalyst, 2007; McKinsey,
2007). However, a wide-range of research findings (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; He &
Huang, 2011; Pletzer et al., 2015; Post & Byron, 2015) do not provide compelling
support for that claim.
Initially, when the Norway quota law was proposed, it faced opposition from
business leaders, who argued that reduced competency and lack of authority resulting
from the quota law would have severe financial consequences that would damage the
country’s economy (Hoel, 2008). The Norwegian government claimed that as public
sector boards had achieved a proportion of women at 40%, the quality of the boards had
increased (Ministry of Children and Family Affairs, consultation document, 1999, p. 58).
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Some scholars have suggested that the use of the business rhetoric made the quota reform
proposition appear more convincing (Teigen, 2015).
The business case for WOB was originally used as a rebuttal to the concerns of
business leaders in Norway (Teigen, 2015) who feared that the quota reform would
negatively impact financial performance. However, today, the business case for WOB
appears to be the most relied upon argument to promote gender equality on boards. In a
change from its initial pledge that approached the WOB initiative as an equality issue, the
Davies Review, relied on the economic argument for promoting the WOB initiative,
which justified equality of opportunity for women on corporate boards on the bases of
improved financial performance and improved board performance (Davies, 2011, p.7).
The promotion of the business case for WOB has resulted in research that focuses
almost exclusively on the effects of WOB on measures of financial performance.
McKinsey (2007) and Catalyst (2007) are two of the most popular studies that examine
the effect of WOB on financial performance. Their findings provided support for the
Davies Review initiative (Davies, 2011, p.4). Using a sample of 89 European listed
companies, McKinsey (2007) found that compared with industry averages, organizations
with more gender diverse management teams had higher return on equity, earnings before
interest and tax, and stock price growth (McKinsey, 2007, p. 14). The study included
organizations from different European countries, including Norway; however, it failed to
control endogenous variation. Similarly, using a sample of 520 Fortune 500 companies,
Catalyst (2007) found a positive relationship between WOB and financial performance.
In their study, Catalyst grouped organizations into quantiles based on their gender
diversity on boards and examined differences between the top quartile comprised of 132
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companies and the bottom quartile comprised of 129 companies and indicated that
companies in the top quartile have higher return on investment, return on sales, and return
on invested capital. However, the statistical analyses used in those reports are not
methodologically designed to observe correlations, much less to address causality
(Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2014). Although these findings provide some
evidence of a positive association between WOB and financial performance, the basic
nature of their data design and analyses – composed of only descriptive statistics – does
not provide compelling support for the business case.
Several peer-reviewed studies found a positive association between gender
diversity on boards and financial performance outcomes. Using US-based samples,
studies found a positive relationship between the presence of WOB and return on assets,
and Tobin’s Q –ratio of firm’s market value to its book value of assets– measures (Carter
et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003). Using a sample of 638 Fortune 1000 firms, Carter and
colleagues (2010) found that the presence of WOB had a statistically significant positive
effect, 1.68 (SE=.85; p<.05) on Tobin’s Q. Their model, which included a vector of
multiple explanatory variables, was practically significant (R2=.26). Erhardt and
colleagues (2003) also found a correlation of WOB and return on investment, (r=.21,
p<.05). Controlling for a number of explanatory variables, a positive effect of WOB on
return on investment was found, which was not statistically significant, -.32 (p>.05) but
was practically significant (R2=.09).
Similarly, other studies found a positive association between the percentage of
WOB and financial performance outcomes using samples in the EU (Arena et al., 2015),
Germany (Joecks, Pull, & Vetter, 2013; Lindstaedt, Woff, & Fehre, 2011), Norway
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(Torchia, 2011), The Netherlands (Luckerath-Rovers, 2010), Denmark (Smith et al.,
2006), and Mauritius (Mahadeo, Soobaroyem, & Hanuman, 2012). However, in many of
those studies, the positive link was only found when women’s board representation was
higher than 30% (Joecks et al., 2013; Lindstaedt et al., 2011; Skaggs et al., 2012; Torchia,
2011; Zhang et al., 2012), which provide evidence of critical mass of WOB and financial
outcomes.
Conversely, other studies found a negative relationship between WOB and
financial outcome variables using samples from the US (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; He &
Huang, 2011; Shrader, Blackburn, & Iles, 1997), and Norway (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012;
Bohren & Strom, 2010). Using a sample of 1290 non-financial Norwegian listed firms in
the 1989 to 2002 period, Bohren and Strom (2010) found that increasing the ratio of
gender diversity by one standard deviation (.08) from the sample mean (.049) decreased
the firm’s Tobin’s Q from 1.428 to 1.378 (3.5%). The effect was statistically (p<.05) and
practically significant (R2=.041).
Using a sample of U.S.-based manufacturing firms from 2001 to 2007, He and
Huang (2011) provided evidence of a negative effect of gender diversity on boards and
financial performance. Results for the seven models tested ranged from -.091 to -.103
(p<.10); however, they were not statistically significant at the .05 level and the effect size
was very small (r=.14). Miller and Triana (2007) examined the effect of board gender
diversity on firm innovation, and found a statistically significant .049 (p<.05); however,
the effect size was small (r=.09). Their study also examined the relationship of board
gender diversity and firm reputation (.39, p>.10, r=.003) and firm performance (.27,
p>.10, r=.007); however, the results were neither statistically nor practically significant.

100

Carter and colleagues (2010) examined a sample of S&P 500 firms over a five-year
period from 1998 to 2002. Their findings indicated that the effect of WOB on Tobin’s Q
was near zero and non-statistically significant (.01; p=.19). Additionally, they found the
relationship of WOB and firm financial performance appeared to be endogenous.
Although most of those studies did not provide evidence of a causal link, Adams
and Ferreira (2009) and Ahern and Dittmar (2012) provided evidence of a negative causal
effect. Adams and Ferreira (2009) used the connections of WOB to male directors of
other boards as the basis for an instrumental variable approach to identify the effect of
endogenous board gender diversity on different measures of board effectiveness and
performance. Using a sample of 1939 U.S.-based publicly-traded firms in the 1996 to
2003 period, Adams and Ferreira (2009) found that the effect of WOB on firm
performance was initially positive (.221, p<.10); however, when controlling for firmfixed effects, the relationship became negative (-.135, p<.10) and was practically
significant (R2=.11). Ahern and Dittmar (2012) took advantage of the exogenous
increase of WOB that resulted from the introduction of the quota law in Norway, as a
natural experiment, to identify causal effects of the board gender diversity on financial
outcomes.
Using a difference in differences approach, their study provided compelling
causal evidence of a drop in Tobin’s Q resulting from the exogenous increase WOB
resulting from the gender quota. Their estimates indicated that a 10% increase in the
population of WOB led to a decline in Tobin's Q of 0.19 (p<.001), which in relation to
the mean of 1.53 across all firms and years, represented a large effect. However, one of
the weaknesses of the study was that it did not control for board independence in their

101

analyses. Ferreira (2015) found it surprising that changes in the board independence were
not being mentioned in studies related to the effects of legislation and policies for WOB
on board performance. Another limitation in the Ahern and Dittmar’s (2012) study was
that there was no natural control group to compare their findings to. Under the
assumption that investors may anticipate quota laws in other countries, their placebo tests
included organizations from Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the United States, which
may not represent good counterfactuals for Norwegian firms (Ferreira, 2015). The
methodological limitations and conflicting findings of most existing studies supporting
the utilitarian argument indicate that the business case for WOB cannot be compellingly
established.
Further, other studies found that a higher percentage of WOB or inclusion of
WOB did not have an effect on financial outcomes using samples from the US (Carter et
al., 2010; Miller & Triana, 2009; Siciliano, 1996), Denmark (Rose, 2007), Sweden (Alm
& Winberg, 2016), Scandinavia (Radoy, Thomsen, & Oxelheim, 2006), Spain (Campbell
& Minguez-Vera, 2008), the United Kingdom (Haslam et al., 2010; Gregory-Smith et al.,
2013; Pasaribu, 2017), and Norway (Vob, 2015). Gregory and colleagues (2014)
examined the relationship of WOB, shareholder returns, and the gender pay gap for board
members, using data from FTSE 350 boards in the United Kingdom in the 1996 through
2011 period. Their study found no evidence of significant effect of WOB on shareholder
return, -.079 (p>.10). Additionally, their study revealed a gender pay gap for executive
directors, however, they found evidence of a pay gap in remuneration of non-executive
directors. The estimated discriminatory pay gap was around 7%-8%. The study reported
a practical significance of R2=.54. Furthermore, they found evidence of discrimination in
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the appointment of board members, which indicated that women were more likely to be
appointed to a board after the exit of another woman, .179, (p<.001).
The mixed findings found in the literature have compelled researchers to perform
meta-analyses to try to reconcile the findings. To that end, Post and Byron (2015)
recently published a meta-analysis in which they analyzed 144 published studies. Their
findings provided support of a positive relationship of WOB on firm performance, r=.03,
CI (.022, .045), p<.01; market performance, r=.014, CI (.002, .031), p<.001; and
accounting returns, r=.047, CI (.033, 061), p<.001; however, the effect sizes were very
small. Similarly, Pletzer and colleagues (2015) performed a meta-analysis using data
from 20 published studies. Their findings indicated that the relationship of WOB on firm
performance was small and non-statistically significant r=.01, CI =-.04, .07, p=.77.
The risk in using the utilitarian argument is that it could be argued for and against.
This means that the promotion of the initiative through the business case provides moral
justification for discrimination against women if the outcome contradicts the business
case claim. Some scholars have criticized that the business case perspective seems to
substitute the equality rationale (Zanoni et al., 2010), as both rationales are grounded on
different moral perspectives that oppose each other (van Dijk, van Engen, & Paauwe,
2012). Others have raised their concerns about the business case not promoting diversity
in itself but only through its potential contributions to the bottom line (Noon, 2007). Thus,
the business case represents a conditional argument that sees women and minorities as a
means to an end (Tomlinson & Schwabenland, 2010). Consequently, the promotion of
the business case could have the opposite effect, as a negative outcome would provide
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moral justification for maintaining a homogeneous workforce (van Dijk et al., 2012) and
discriminating against women (Ferreira 2015).
Scholars have argued that promoting equality initiatives through the business case
undermines the legitimacy of the social justice argument (Noon, 2007; Sinclair, 2007).
Furthermore, the promotion of the business case ignores that the case for nondiscrimination does not need to be argued, but defended and enforced. Women, as a
group, have historically been oppressed, disadvantaged, and discriminated against.
Therefore, legislation has been put in place to discourage discrimination against women,
and promote equality (Equality Act, 2010). However, ignoring that gender disparities on
corporate boards are the result of a history of oppression and covert discrimination that
exists today; contributes to the reproduction of discriminatory practices. Consequently, as
the business case for WOB reinforces the view that basic human rights for women are
something that still needs to be justified (Ahmed, 2007), it weakens the case for gender
equality.
Social justice argument. The social justice argument is grounded in deontology –
sometimes described as duty or obligation ethics -, which is an ethical theory that posits
that the morality of an action should be based on whether that action itself is right or
wrong (Manners, 2008). The nine normative principles of the EU are sustainable peace,
freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, equality, social solidarity, sustainable
development and good governance (Official Journal of the EU, 2012). Therefore,
equality is not only a basic human right, but also one of the normative principles of the
EU. As a member state, the United Kingdom has a duty to promote these principles.
Consequently, equality initiatives are by definition issues of social justice, and their
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justification is that they are the right thing to do. The promotion of equality initiatives –
such as the Davies Review – using a contingent argument of financial gain is not only
unethical (Zanoni et al., 2010), but incongruent with the expected outcome (cf. Lorbiecki
& Jack, 2000).
By promoting the WOB initiative through the business case, the Davies Review
disregarded that gender equality is an issue of social justice, and like several policies that
aim to promote gender equality, it was instrumentally subordinated to another agenda.
Losing the focus of equality to an economic agenda poses a risk to the achievement of
equality. This is particularly risky when the contingency is not compellingly established.
To that end, scholars have argued that several policies are implemented with no analysis
of contradictions with other policies that aim to reduce the gender pay gap or gender
segregation (Fagan & Rubery, 2018).
Despite the multiple protections against discrimination for women in the British
workforce, including the Human Rights Act, which prohibits employers from
discriminating on the basis of gender; and the Equality Act of 2010, women in the British
workforce still experience discrimination, as evidenced by indicators on the Global
Gender Gap Report. Scholars suggest that discrimination runs so deep in society that its
subtlety has created blindness around the issue (Meyerson & Fletcher, 2000). In fact,
evidence suggests that in British organizations, discrimination against women is the
leading factor associated with the gender disparity on corporate boards (Goyal et al.,
2018). Thus, it is fair to question whether supporting the Davies Review initiative for
WOB with the business case is an indicative that in British society women’s basic human
right to equality needs to be justified. After all, non-discrimination is an inherent right to
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all persons. Therefore, the business case for equality reinforces the view that basic human
rights for women are something that still needs to be justified (Ahmed, 2007), and
weakens the case for gender equality.
The Davies Review
In the United Kingdom, the CGC contains a comply or explain measure that was
amended following a recommendation of the Davies Review (2011). The U.K.’s CGC
allows organizations to design and implement their own gender diversity policies to
address disproportionate gender representation. It also requires organizations to provide
explanations for failure to achieve diversity targets. The targets provided by the Davies
Review recommended a minimum 25% of women on corporate boards of the FTSE 100
and FTSE 250 company and included a deadline of 2015 for FTSE 100 companies, and
indicated that FTSE 250 boards were expected to reach the target in a longer timeframe.
The Davies Review 5 Year Summary (Davies, 2015) revealed that collectively,
FTSE 100 companies had exceeded the target and had an average of 26.1% WOB, and
FTSE 250 companies were well on their way to achieving their target at 19.6% WOB at
the time of the evaluation. It can be argued that what differentiated the U.K.’s successful
approach from other countries that used similar comply or explain approaches (Australia,
Canada, United States) and were not successful was the U.K.’s political environment of
the time. Specifically, in addition to government mandated disclosure and minimum
targets for WOB, the U.K.’s comply or explain approach was introduced with a “threat”
of much higher gender quotas imposed by the EU – which the United Kingdom was a
member of, at the time – if the voluntary targets were not reached.
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The success of the Davies Review initiative and progress toward gender parity on
corporate boards increased confidence in the comply or explain approach as a way to
achieve gender parity targets; therefore, after the Davies Review, another initiative was
rolled out. In 2016, the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills tasked Sir Philip
Hampton and Dame Helen Alexander with building on the success of the Davies Review.
The Hampton-Alexander Review raised the target of WOB in FTSE 350 organizations to
33% to be achieved by 2020. Furthermore, it extended the scope of the initiative beyond
corporate boards by including minimum targets for executive committees and direct
reports to executive committees to 33% (Hampton & Alexander, 2016).
Providing evidence that the approach for achieving gender equality continues to
reflect a preference for a top-down style. The Hampton-Alexander Review is tasked with
measuring and reporting the progress of the initiative during its duration, from 2016
through 2020. However, the Financial Reporting Council amended the U.K. CGC to
mandate disclosure of gender composition of executive committees and direct reports
metrics in 2018, which posed a challenge to the monitoring and evaluation of the
Hampton-Alexander Review in the 2016-2018 period.
The Davies Review and the Hampton-Alexander Review are examples of the new
equality regime in the United Kingdom, which Ahmed (2006) argued was part of a
broader cultural shift, where diversity and equality were becoming performance measures.
In her research of institutions of higher education, Ahmed identified that institutions that
had received an exemplar ranking by the Equality Challenge Unit (ECU) in their
evaluation of their written diversity policies made reference, with pride, to their exemplar
rank in diversity reports. In that sense, being perceived as good at diversity can take the
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form of organizational pride and block the recognition of inequalities in organizations. In
a similar way, the Davies Review ranked organizations in function to their percentage of
WOB. Organizations with higher percentages of WOB were praised and categorized as
“leading the way”. However, if organizations appear to be good at diversity through a
measure of performance (i.e. percentage of WOB), that same measure can become the
mechanism for concealment and reproduction of inequality (Deem & Morley, 2006).
Consequently, an examination of the effects of the Davies Review on other measures of
gender equality in the workplace may uncover unintended effects of the equality initiative.
The reasoning for testing the effects of the Davies Review on the increase of
WOB, despite the seemingly obvious effect lies in the identified need for scientific rigor.
It is known that FTSE 350 boards doubled their female representation in the five-year
duration of the initiative, with FTSE 100 boards from 12.6% to 26.1% and FTSE 250
boards from 7.9% to 19.7%. However, in the same period, FTSE Small Cap boards also
doubled their female representation from 6.4% to 13.8%. Similarly, in the US, Fortune
500 boards increased their female representation from 15.7% to 27.3%. Consequently, it
is reasonable to question the extent to which the Davies Review initiative contributed to
the increase of women on FTSE 350 boards.
Few studies have examined the effects of WOB in a U.K. context. The extant
literature predominantly examines financial outcomes. Studies that have examined the
effects of WOB on financial outcomes of FTSE indexed firms, before and after the
Davies Review initiative, found that the presence of WOB did not have an effect on
financial outcomes (Gregory-Smith et al., 2013; Pasaribu, 2017). Mathew, Ibrahim and
Archbold (2016) found that the presence of WOB of FTSE 350 organizations was
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negatively related to firm risk, -.0009 (p>.10). Their findings indicated that the presence
of WOB had a non-statistical, near-zero effect size on growth opportunities (r=-.014;
p>.10). Their findings were similar to those of a previous study in New Zealand (Van der
Walt, Ingley, Shergill, & Townsend, 2006) that did not find support for the effect of
board gender diversity on corporate decision quality. Conversely, a recent study
examined the effects of WOB in FTSE 350 resulting from the Davies Review on firm’s
risk and found a statistically significant effect between board gender diversity and firm
risk measured as stock volatility. For each percentage point of WOB, stock volatility
decreased by -.23 (p<.01), and the effect was practically significant (R2=.45). Similarly,
using a dummy variable to indicate the presence of two or more WOB, the effect on stock
volatility was statistically -4.77 (p<.01), and practically significant (R2=.44). The authors
suggested that their findings provided support for the positive effect of WOB on reducing
firm risk (Jizi & Nehme, 2017).
Additionally, research that studied the effects of WOB in a U.K. context
examined the influence of WOB of the National Health Service (NHS) Foundation Trusts
on social performance outcomes and found that there were no discernible benefits on
board performance resulting from higher female representation of female executive
directors (β=.018, p=.624), or non-executive directors (β=-.021, p=.538); however,
female chairs (β=-.065, p=.064) and chief executives (β=-.098, p=.007) resulted in
significant reductions in negative social outcomes (Ellwood & Garcia-Lacalle, 2015),
providing evidence of existing differences among leaders in decision-making roles.
Qualitative research has aimed to addressed questions of whether board members have
different experiences and perceptions of their contributions to board effectiveness and
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found that current models and theoretical perspectives that explain the relationship of
directors to the board do not explain the lived experiences of non-executive directors on
corporate boards (Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles, 2005). At the time of this literature review,
there were no existing studies that examined the effects of the Davies Review initiative
on changes in board composition on the basis of directorship type.
Relationship of Quotas and Targets on Board Composition
Theoretical support for the effects of government-sponsored initiatives, such as
quotas or targets on increased participation of women on corporate boards is provided by
resource dependence theory. Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978)
posits that organizations seek linkages with the most beneficial resources and structure
their boards on that basis. In the case of mandatory quotas, sanctions associated with
non-compliance make gender a highly valuable resource for corporate boards. Unlike
quotas, comply or explain approaches do not have sanctions associated with them;
however, the Davies Review was delivered in conjunction with the threat that the EU was
debating imposing quotas, which could be seen as a form of a sanction for noncompliance; therefore, although comply or explain approaches had not produced
significant results, the environment for the Davies Review initiative was more conducive
to compliance than to explaining. It is noteworthy to mention that 59% of FTSE 350
boards were below 25% female membership, and 37% of FTSE 350 boards were below
20%. As these organizations were not in compliance, per the U.K. CGC, they needed to
explain the reasons they were not in compliance. The recurrent theme in the FTSE 350
annual reports of organizations that were below the compliance threshold was that board
appointments were made on the basis of merit. Despite not achieving a homogenous
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increase across FTSE 350 boards, the Davies Review (2015) used the collective average
percentages to declare the initiative a success. The U.K. was the only country in which a
comply or explain approach had delivered positive results (Davies, 2015).
One of the issues with attributing the Davies Review initiative with doubling
women’s participation on corporate boards of FTSE 350 organizations is that a simple
calculation of mean differences between the percentages of WOB pre and post the Davies
Review, does not address endogeneity bias, which can cause incorrect estimates
(Ketokivi & McIntosh, 2017). Ignoring endogenous variation potentially leads to
erroneous inferences (Antonakis et al., 2010), which sometimes can cause so much bias
that “we may not even get the sign of the coefficient right” (Ketokivi & McIntosh, 2017,
p.1).
A study of the gender composition of FTSE 100 boards prior to the Davies
Review, indicated that in the 1999 to 2005 period, FTSE 100 boards increased their
percentage of WOB from 4.9% to 10.5% (Grosvold, Brammer, & Rayton, 2007). Notably,
a negative correlation in the year-on-year changes in proportion of WOB and board size
was found -157 (p<.01), which indicated that boards were not increasing their board size
to add women, but that women were replacing male directors. The proportion of women
on corporate boards and at different levels of leadership has consistently been increasing,
therefore, as the Davies Review initiative had a duration of five years, it is likely that that
the percentage of WOB in FTSE 350 organizations would have continued to rise
endogenously in that time period had the Davies Review not been rolled out. Similarly,
Adams and Kirchmaier (2013) found an upward trend in the appointments of women to
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FTSE 100 boards in the 2004 to 2010 period, in which the proportion of unique female
directors increased from 5.1% in 2004 to 6.5% in 2010.
Furthermore, while changes in the percentages of WOB in FTSE 350 firms are
being monitored, neither the Davies Review (Davies, 2015) nor the Hampton-Alexander
Review (Hampton & Alexander, 2016) have reported how those changes compare to
other publicly listed organizations that were not impacted by the comply or explain
approach. Additionally, research has suggested that the number of WOB has been
increasing due to pressure from investors and society (Huse, Nielsen, & Hagen, 2009). A
study that compared variation in the gender composition of corporate boards found that
after the Norway quota law was announced in Norway, the threat of similar legislation
introduced in other European countries may have had a placebo effect on other countries.
In fact, an accelerated growth in female board representation of the largest publicly listed
firms in the United Kingdom in the 2001 to 2005 was reported, increasing from 6.4% in
2001 to 10.5% in 2005 (Grosvold et al., 2007). Similar findings were discovered for
boards in Finland, where the percentage of WOB increased from 12.8% in 2003 to 23.8%
in 2005; and in Sweden, where the percentage of WOB increased from 10.8% in 2001 to
20% in 2005 (Adams & Kirchmaier, 2013). Placebo effects are usually present in natural
experiments on natural control groups, to which treated organizations should be
compared to (Dunning, 2011). Consequently, while the Davies Review and Cranfield
Female FTSE Board Reports have reported the growth in female representation on FTSE
350 boards, spillover effects to other FTSE firms or any other comparison groups have
not been reported.
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Countries that have relied on quota initiatives to increase the participation of
WOB have been successful to the degree in which they meet minimum compliance. To
that end, it can be seen that only minimum targets are being met, which may indicate an
adherence to compliance rather than a commitment to creating a diverse workforce.
Additionally, changes have only occurred at the board level, which is the only level
directly targeted by the initiatives. To that end, different studies have provided evidence
of the different legislation and policies have only impacted the director gender
proportions, but have not had an effect on changes to positions of power in those
organizations, such as CEOs or chairpersons, which continue to be male dominated
(Ahern & Dittmar, 2012). Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that despite the
increase in the appointment of WOB, they are not getting appointed to influential
positions within a board (Bozhinov et al., 2017). Theoretically, those changes to board
composition can be explained through the lens of gender as status (Ridgeway & Bourg,
2004). The type of position that women are being appointed to may be related to the
association of their gender with lower status.
As organizations appoint more female directors to meet the targets set by the
Davies Review, male directors may feel threatened and try to defend the status quo (Kray
et al., 2017). Gender as status (Ridgeway & Bourg, 2004) suggests that men’s gender is
associated with higher status, which has allowed them access to more resources than
women. Therefore, their motivation for keeping their position in the social hierarchy
may result in the disproportionate appointments of women directors to positions of lower
influence. Consistent with social role theory (Eagly & Wood, 2012) and gender as status
(Ridgeway & Bourg, 2004), empirical evidence has suggested that women’s perceived
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lower value in leadership roles compared to men (Brescoll, 2016). A recent study
examined differences in tenure of board members of FTSE organizations and found
statistically significant gender differences in tenure, indicating that female directors face
a higher risk of dismissal from their positions than their male counterparts (Main &
Gregory-Smith, 2018).
Research has demonstrated that women and minorities are perceived as less
competent, capable and worthy of leadership positions compared to white men (Eagly &
Karau, 2002; Carton & Rosette, 2011; Rosette, Leonardelli, & Phillips, 2008). Compared
to men in leadership roles, women tend to have their performance more highly
scrutinized than men and experience more negative evaluations (Thompson &
Sekaquaptewa, 2002). Consistently, with regard to career progression, scholars have
argued that women executives may accept more challenging or even precarious
leadership positions out of fear that other opportunities may not be available in the future
(Ryan & Haslam, 2007). Consequently, there is a lower supply of women for the most
influential board roles, executive director roles.
One of the reasons for the slow change may be attributed to gender matching
(Tinsley, Wade, Main, & O’Reilly). Empirical evidence suggests the existence of gender
matching effects in director selection, which represent the strong likelihood that board
members are replaced with new members of the same gender (Tinsley et al., 2017).
Tinsley and colleagues (2017) found that although the probability of women being
appointed to a board are related to women exiting a board (.69, p<.001), when firm fixed
effects are included, the probability of appointing a female director increases sharply
after another woman exits (1.22 p<.01), providing evidence of gender matching.
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Previous studies have found that CEOs tend to recommend the appointment of
people who are demographically similar to them (Tinsley et al., 2017; Westphal & Zajac,
1995). Thus, group dynamics in the composition of a board that has occurred
endogenously are different to those where the composition has been influenced by an
external event, such as quotas or targets. In a board of directors, the level of influence of
each member to the organizational strategy depends on their position on the board as
executive (operational) or (independent) non-executive directors (Hendry & Kiel, 2004).
Empirical evidence (Adams & Kirchmaier, 2013) suggests that quotas have an effect on
increasing non-executive directors, .046 (p<.001); however, they have a negative, nonsignificant effect on increasing executive directors, -.039 (p>.10). Similarly, the effect of
comply or explain approaches had on increasing non-executive populations was .033
(p<.001); however, the effect on non-executive directors was almost negligible and nonsignificant, .01 (p>.10). Non-executive directors are thought to be better monitors of
management, often bring unique perspectives to the board, and provide connections to the
external environment (Financial Reporting Council, 2016, p. 9). However, they are not
knowledgeable of the day-to-day challenges of delivering the corporate strategy.
Evidence suggests that non-executive board members rarely initiate the substantive
content of strategy (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999).
Empirical evidence had suggested the existence of systematic bias in director
assignment that disadvantages women as they do not get assigned to executive
committees. However, Peterson and Philpot (2007) analyzed a sample of Fortune 500
firms and a wide range of organizational, director-personal, and environmental
characteristics to find if such gender bias in director appointment existed. Their study
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found no evidence of bias, which was consistent with resource dependence theory,
organizations seek the linkages they need for their desired outcomes. Research has
indicated that CEO appointment is strongly linked to the relationship of candidates with
the existing CEO and their organizational tenure (Wiersema, Nishimura, & Suzuki, 2018).
In fact, according to a leading international executive search organization, members of
executive boards who get appointed to the executive committee of a board are the
strongest candidates for a chief executive succession (Odgers-Berndtson, 2018). A study
(Elsaid & Ursel, 2011) that analyzed CEO successions of 679 American firms, and found
that the likelihood of appointment a female CEO increased with a greater percentage of
women on the board, .099 (p<.05). Furthermore, literature has found that different roles
within boards, such as chairperson, executive director, and non-executive director impact
within group dynamics (Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles, 2005) and have different effects on
organizational outcomes irrespective of the total percentage of women on the board
(Ellwood & Garcia-Lacalle, 2015).
The reform in the U.K. CGC has resulted in a need for balanced boards in relation
to their independence; therefore, the number of executive directors has considerably
decreased in the past decade (Alkalbani, 2017). However, the introduction of the Davies
Review may also impact the proportion of executive and non-executive directors.
Evidence from the Norway quota law suggests that the initiative had an impact on the
disproportionate appointments of independent non-executive directors. In the time period
between the announcement of the Norway quota law (2003) and the time of its
enforcement (2008), board independence on Norwegian boards increased from 46% to
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67%, which was directly related to the fact that 84% of female directors are independent,
compared with 50% of male independent directors (Bohren & Staubo, 2013).
Research that evaluated the effectiveness of quotas and comply and explain
approaches using data from 40 countries, 29 of which were OECD, including the United
Kingdom, found a statistically significant (p<.001) and practically significant (R2=.27 for
full sample, R2=.36 for OECD-only sample) positive effect of quotas and comply or
explain initiatives on the increase of women’s representation on corporate boards.
Quotas resulted in a 5.22 (p<.01) percentage points increase (5.48 percentage points for
the OECD-only sample) and comply or explain measures resulted in 2.15 (p<.01)
percentage points increase (2.31 percentage points for OECD-only sample). However,
findings could not confirm any trickle down effects of either initiative on other levels of
management and suggested that more detailed analyses of those effects were needed
(Fortin, Bell, & Bohm, 2017).
Board Homogeneity and Critical Mass
In order to hypothesize the effect of WOB on any organizational outcomes, one
must assume that there are differences between women and men in those positions. In
fact, much of the literature reviewed in this study focuses on differences based on gender.
Some empirical studies have found that differences do exist between men and women at
the board level. Adams and Funk (2012) found that women tend to be more benevolent
and universalistic than men, which is consistent with social role theory (Eagly & Wood,
2012), as those are communal characteristics. Similarly, studies found that women are
more likely to be compassionate for vulnerable groups (Huddy, Cassese, & Lizotte, 2008).
Women have also been found to be more supportive of addressing economic inequalities
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that favor disadvantaged groups (Crowder-Meyer, 2007). Conversely, some studies
found that women in top positions of leadership are more agentic behaviors even than
men (Luckerath-Rovers et al., 2013). However, their agentic behavior was suggested to
be the response to discrimination that women may experience in male-dominated
organizations (Derks et al., 2016).
Consistent with role incongruity theory of female leaders (Eagly & Karau, 2002),
the association of gender to leadership roles disadvantages women as they are perceived
as being less deserving of positions of power, which are associated with men. Research
suggests that there are negative effects associated with being a member of a perceived
lower status out-group, such as lower support, lower evaluations (Hoyt & Simon, 2016;
Rice & Barth, 2016), and being excluded and marginalized (Karpowitz & Mendelberg,
2014), which can impede women’s contributions (Spencer, Steele, & Quinn,1999). To
that end, empirical evidence has suggested that despite higher numerical representation,
at any percentage of representation, women speak substantially less than men in
deliberative groups. An experimental study (Karpowitz, Mendelberg, & Shaker, 2012)
that examined the effects of women’s descriptive representation on their voice and power
found that at different levels of representation, in deliberative groups, women spoke
significantly less than men. Using a sample of 470 participants, divided into groups in
which women were represented in numbers from 0 to 5, where participants, in average
deliberated for 25 minutes, the average participant’s proportion of speech was .207
(p<.001). In most mixed-gender group combinations, women’s proportion of speech was
significantly lower than men’s (.084, p<.001), except when they were a large majority in
a group with several women (.011, p<.10), or in an all-female group (.051, p<.10). The
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gender gap in speech was directly linked to the gender gap in influence and authority.
Group participants who held the floor for a greater percentage of time in the deliberation,
were perceived as more influential. The gender gap in speech participation was
statistically, 1.443 (p<.01) and practically significantly (R2=.15) related to the gender gap
in influence (Karpowitz, Mendelberg, & Shaker, 2012). Consequently, it is unclear how
women’s increased minority representation would help them overcome biases and
expectations associated to their gender.
Researchers have evaluated the conditions in which women can overcome the
social identity threat that women experience in a male-dominated environment.
Acknowledging that the factors that enable WOB to impact their organizations are not
well known, scholars have examined the influence of token women and critical mass of
WOB to evaluate if the effects of WOB stem from numerical differences. To that end,
theoretically grounded on critical mass theory, empirical studies have examined board
dynamics when one, two, and three or more women served on boards and found that it
takes three women on a corporate board for women to not be seen as outsiders and be
able to influence board processes and discussions more substantially (Konrad, Kramer &
Erkut, 2008; Kramer, Konrad, Erkut, & Hooper, 2006; Torchia et al., 2011). Empirical
evidence of a positive relationship between critical mass of WOB and different financial
(Joecks et al., 2013) and non-financial outcomes (Skaggs et al., 2012; Torchia et al.,
2011; Zhang et al., 2012) provide some evidence that supports the premise that three
WOB constitute critical mass.
Konrad and colleagues (2008) interviewed 50 Fortune 1000 female directors to
understand the experiences and inquire whether representation in numbers made a
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difference. The authors concluded that from the directors’ perspective, three or more
women constituted critical mass. Their findings indicated that with two women on a
board, women tend to keep their distance from each other due to concerns of being
perceived as conspirators. However, those concerns disappeared with three or more
women, as women felt more comfortable being associated with one another and felt more
comfortable raising issues. Analyzing a sample of 838 German firms grouped in
function of their percentage of WOB, Joecks and colleagues (2013) found support for a
non-linear relationship of WOB and return on equity. Their findings showed that the
group of 394 firms with all-male boards had an average 9.6 return on equity. The group
of 360 firms with female representation up to 20%, had a statistically significantly lower
return on equality, 7.7 (p<.05) compared to the all-male group. Conversely, groups with
WOB in the range of 20% to 40% (n=79) and greater than 40% (n=5), had average
returns of 12.3 and 12.4, respectively. Controlling for a vector of covariates, the authors
concluded that the statistically significant effect of the quadratic regression coefficient
(21.14, p<.10), which was a different sign from the linear term (-18.21, p<.10), provided
support for a curved relationship of the variables. The turning point of the curve was at
around 10% of WOB and the increase in return on equity started at around 30% of WOB,
indicating that 30% was critical mass.
Torchia and colleagues (2011) conducted tests on a sample of 317 Norwegian
firms, to identify the effects of one, two, and three women on organizational innovation
and board strategic tasks. Their findings provided support for the effect of three women
as critical mass of WOB on organizational innovation, which was found to be statistically
(.50, p<.05) and practically (R2=.09) significant. Their study also provided support for
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the relationship of WOB and board strategic tasks, which was statistically (.72, p<.01)
and practically (R2=.15) significant. However, the effects on organizational innovation of
one (.28; p>.10, r=-.03) and two (.31; p>.10; r=.03) WOB were neither statistical, nor
practically significant. Similarly, the effects on board strategic tasks of one (.28; p>.10;
r=.01), and two (.17; p>.10; r=.09) WOB were neither statistical, nor practically
significant.
Cook and Glass (2017) examined the relationship of gender composition on
boards and corporate social responsibility indicators (i.e., community strengths, corporate
governance strengths, product strengths, and environmental strengths) using a sample of
Fortune 500 firms over the 2001 through 2010 period. Results of their study indicated a
statistically significant linear relationship of WOB on three measures of CSR examined,
community (.54, p<.05), corporate governance (.86, p<.01), and environment (.72,
p<.001). The relationship of WOB and product (.42, p>.05) was not statistically
significant. However, Pearson correlations for the four measures of CSR, community
(r=.30, p<.01), corporate governance, (r=.23, p<.01), product (r=.16, p<.01), and
environmental (r=22, p<.01), indicated that the relationships were practically significant.
The authors compared the findings of effect of boards with one or two women to all-male
boards on the four CSR measures, and found that boards with one or two women
performed significantly better than all male boards on community (.47, p<.05), corporate
governance (.84, p<.01), and environment (.76, p<.001). Furthermore, the authors tested
differences between the effects of one and two to the effect of critical mass (i.e., three
women) on the four CSR measures, and found that greater number of women enhanced
the effect on community (.30, p<.05) and corporate governance (.30, p<.05) indicators;
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however, it did not enhance the effect on the environmental indicator (.02, p>.05). Their
findings underscored the importance of female representation on boards to CSR, and
challenged the assumption that token women are unable to influence their organizations
differently than in critical mass representation.
Similarly, Luckerath-Rovers (2013) examined the financial performance of 99
listed Dutch organizations with and without women on their boards in the 2005 to 2007
period. Their findings indicated that the presence (i.e., dummy variable) of WOB had a
positive effect on return on equity (10.2, p<.01), and a large effect size (r=.34). The
percentage of WOB was also found to be statistically (50.6, p<.05) and practically
significant (r=.33). The study also tested return on sales, return on invested capital and
earnings before interest and tax; however, p-values greater than .10 indicated that WOB
did not have a statistically significant effect on any of them. Additionally, bivariate
correlations ranging from .05 to .17 were not statistically significant, suggesting weak
relationships of the variables. Although their findings provided some evidence of the
linear relationship of WOB and return on equity, which suggests that the effect increases
in relation to the proportion of WOB, the statistical significance of the dummy variable
for WOB indicated that even token women had an effect on the outcome. However, a
weakness of their study is that it did not control for board independence, organizational
characteristics, or any director characteristics other than gender.
Relationship of WOB and Opportunities for Other Women
Scholars have suggested that there is a belief that women in top leadership
positions will reduce gender inequality in lower levels (Ferreira, 2015; Skaggs et al.,
2012). This belief is founded on the assumption that inequality is perpetuated by men but
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not women; thus, the expectation that women in leadership will help their juniors (Derks
et al., 2016). However, existing literature has produced mixed findings. Some studies
found support for a positive relationship between women’s representation among
corporate boards and executive leadership, and employees’ perceptions of lower
workplace gender segregation (Stainback, Kleiner, & Skaggs, 2016). Similarly, in a
South Korean context (N=1596), Stainback and Kown (2012) found support for the
relationship of women in management and lower levels of gender segregation (b=-.187,
p<.01), suggesting that as women’s managerial representation increases, gender
segregation declines. However, the opposite effect was found in the relationship of
women in lower management and segregation at lower levels (b=.066, p<.10).
Controlling for a number of organizational and environmental control variables, their
model was practically significant (R2=.33). Overall, their findings provided some support
for the assumption that women’s representation in managerial may help reduce gender
inequality in lower levels. Other studies have suggested a positive influence of WOB on
managerial representation. Using a sample of 81 Texas-headquartered Fortune 1000 firms,
with 5679 establishments, Skaggs and colleagues (2012) found that WOB were positively
associated with women’s managerial opportunities, particularly when representation
exceeds 15%. At the mean representation of WOB (i.e., 10%), compared to men, women
were .11 times likely to have a managerial job; however, at the maximum value of WOB
(i.e., 35%), the likelihood of women getting managerial jobs increased to .386 (p<.01).
Multiple studies have found a positive relationship between women in leadership
and increased opportunities for other women in lower ranks. Using data for 744,531
individual observations from over 4000 private sector firms in Norway, a study found
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that greater female representation in top layers of leadership narrowed the gender gap in
promotions at lower ranks (Kunze & Miller, 2015). Kunze and Miller’s (2015) study
tested the effects the proportion of women at the next higher rank and the proportion
female peers on the likelihood of promotions for women. Their findings suggested that a
higher proportion of women in the next higher rank had a statistically and practically
significant effect on increasing the likelihood of external, .015, p<.001, R2=.088, and
internal, .016 (p<.001), R2=.75, promotions for women. However, the proportion of
female peers had a negative effect in the likelihood of internal, -.067 (p<.01), and
external, .060 (p<.001), promotions for women.
Similarly, using data from publicly traded S&P 1500 firms from 1997 to 2009,
Matsa and Miller (2011) examined the relationship of WOB and the gender of the top
five executives for the firms in the sample. Their findings indicated that for each 10
percentage-point increase of non-executive female directors, the likelihood of having any
women in top-five executives of the firm increased by .86 (p<.01), and for each 10
percentage-point increase of WOB, including executive and non-executive directors, the
likelihood of having women in the top five executives increased by 1.5 (p<.01). Both
relationships were practically significant (R2=.65). Similarly, the likelihood of
appointing a female CEO increased by .16 (p<.05) percentage points for each 10
percentage-point increase of non-executive WOB, and by .40 (p<.001) percentage points
for each 10-percentage point increase of WOB. The effect size for both relationships was
large (R2=.76). Their findings suggested a positive effect from WOB on opportunities for
women at the executive level, their findings also revealed differences in the influence of
non-executive and executive directors. Kurtulus and Tomaskovic-Devey (2012) reported

124

in an analysis of over 20,000 large private sector firms from 1990 to 2003 that an
increase in the percentage of female top managers was associated with subsequent
increases in the percentage of women in midlevel management. The cumulative effect in
the six-year period was .088 (p<.001), and the effect was small (R2=.021).
Conversely, Blau and DeVaro’s (2007) study found a negative relationship
between women’s representation in higher organizational levels and the advancement of
women in lower positions. Using cross-sectional survey data from 1826 individuals in
U.S. organizations, their findings revealed that women had lower promotion rates than
men (.-22 - .31, ps<.05). Compared with the mean 9% promotion rate, an effect of 2.2%
to 3.1% was found to be practically significant. Additionally, the probability was not
significantly affected by the interaction of the employee’s and supervisor’s genders (Blau
& DeVaro, 2007). Similarly, using data from a large retail organization in the United
States, a study (Giuliano, Levine, & Leonard, 2005) found the managers’ gender did not
have an effect on promotion opportunities for women in the organization (.976, p>.10).
Moreover, some studies have found that when women are in a context in which
they are underrepresented, they do not only refrain from supporting policies that benefit
women, but actively impede the upwards advancement of other women (Derks et al.,
2011; Kaiser & Spalding, 2015). Derks and colleagues (2011) examined a sample of 94
female executives in The Netherlands. Their findings indicated that female executives
reported their perception of other women’s career commitment as compared to their own
career commitment to be much lower, B = −0.31, SE = .11, (p=.005), the effect was
practically significant (r2=.07). Notably, women who reported large differences between
them other women also reported a larger degree that they had experienced discrimination
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due to their gender, B = 0.60, SE = .16, (p<.001). Kaiser and Spalding (2015) used a
sample of 42 individuals in U.S.-based educational institution to conduct an experimental
study about the role of gender identification in women’s support for other women. Their
findings indicated that gender identification predicted whether women were more likely
to kick or to lift their fellow women, b=.26, t(39)=2.08, p=.044. In a context in which
women were underrepresented, relative to strongly identified women, weakly identified
women were more likely to hinder the advancement of other women. Gender
identification also positively predicted greater helpfulness toward female relative to
subordinates, b=.25, t(91) = 2.02, p=.046.
Additionally, when it comes to women’s issues, including attitudes toward equal
roles in business, government, and industry, women and men’s opinions were found to be
quite similar (Clawson & Oxley, 2012, p. 205). Furthermore, it has been suggested that
gender differences depend on the social context (Moskowitz, Suh, & Desaulniers, 1994).
An experimental study that examined similarities and differences of gender and status on
the use of power strategies and demonstrated in high status positions men and women
used similar power strategies (Keshet et al., 2006), which indicates that in senior
leadership, men and women are more similar than different. Keshet and colleagues
(2006) examined differences in between men and women in high and low status roles in
relation to a number of power strategies (i.e., coercion, reward, reciprocity, information,
expertise, and dependence). Their findings revealed that gender difference in power
usage was significant for low status, t(72) = 2.49, p<0.05, but not for high status t(72) =
0.38, p>.10. The authors concluded that gender differences and similarities were
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situationally contingent, which is consistent with social role theory that suggests that
occupational roles override gender roles (Eagly & Wood, 2000).
One of the reasons women may not help other women advance is that both
women and men are sometimes in denial of the existence of discrimination against
women (Stephens & Levine, 2011). Research has demonstrated that not all women
acknowledge the existence of discrimination (Crosby, 2017), as women who have
achieved success in their career may not have had the same experiences most women
have had (Radke, Hornsey, & Barlow, 2016). Furthermore, scholars have suggested that
to a great degree, directors are not representative of the population (Ferreira, 2015).
Consequently, their personal experiences make it more difficult for them to understand
the barriers faced by other women (Stroebe, Ellemers, Barreto, & Mummendey, 2009).
Stroebe and colleagues (2009) conducted two studies using a population of
students in The Netherlands. Their study found that participants who had experienced
rejection (M=4.18, SD=1.27) admitted significantly more personal threat than those who
experienced acceptance (M=3.40, SD =1.09), F(1, 73)=8.07, p<.01, h2= .10. Also, t-tests
indicated that when personal and group-level treatment were incongruent (i.e.,
acceptance/group disadvantage), participants attributed personal acceptance to their
personal characteristics rather than their group, t(18)=4.94, p< .001. Moreover, their
gender differentiation tests indicated that participants in the acceptance condition
(M=4.57, SD =1.27) differentiated themselves more from the in-group than rejected (M
=3.13, SD=1.42) participants, F(1, 73)=25.45, p<.001, h2=.26. Furthermore, participants
in the acceptance/group advantage condition, differentiated themselves more from the ingroup than those in the rejection/group disadvantage condition, t(73)= 4.32, p< .001.
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Their findings provided evidence in support that people differentiate themselves more
from their group when there is a positive personal outcome for them.
Moreover, interaction with people from different social groups has been
associated with reducing prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006); however, it also reduces
group identification of members of the historically disadvantaged group, as well as their
perceptions of injustice and hinder their collective action (Dixon, Levine, Reicher, &
Durrheim, 2012; Wright & Lubensky, 2009). Consequently, it is plausible that WOB
interaction with other board members may reduce their perception of discrimination
against women and cause them to not advocate on their behalf. Studies have found that
while some women are not aware of gendered structures, the majority of women are
aware; however, they are either unable or unwilling to act on them (Bierema, 2015).
The belief that status in society is the result of merit causes individuals to find
differences with others so that they can justify the status inequalities (McCoy & Major,
2005). In positions of high power, women tend to look at the differences between them
and other women and perceive themselves as non-prototypical (Faniko et al., 2016).
Compared to men, women leaders tend to have more gender-biased perceptions of other
women’s commitment to their careers, which causes them to distance themselves from
other women (Ellemers, Van Den Heuvel, Gilder, Maass, & Bonvini, 2004; Mavin, 2008).
A recent publication of two studies performed in Switzerland found that women leaders
did not identify with women who prioritized their families. Additionally, they perceived
themselves as being more masculine than them, and were unwilling to promote measures
to support them (Faniko et al., 2016). Women leaders’ belief that the system is fair, and
that other women have not achieved the success they have achieved because other
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women are less committed can cause them to be less supportive of programs that promote
gender equality (Ng & Chiu, 2001).
Studies that examined the effects of WOB that were the result of a quota or target
have provided mixed findings for the link of higher female representation and lower
gender inequality for other women (Matsa & Miller, 2011; Seirstad & Opsahl, 2011).
Evaluations of the Norway quota law did not find robust evidence that the quota reform
benefited other women in organizations subject to the quota. Bertrand and colleagues
(2018) found that the reform did not introduce a systematic improvement in female
representation in the C-suites of corporations, and that any improvements for women
were concentrated among the women directly affected by the reform, that is female board
directors. Similarly, a study that evaluated the effects of different quotas and comply or
explain approaches that targeted corporate boards, found that they had a significant effect
on the increase of WOB, but did not have an effect on the increase of other women in
management (Fortin et al., 2017). Furthermore, using data from S&P 1500 organizations,
a recent study found evidence of the existence of implicit quotas for women in top
management (Dezso, Gaddis-Ross, & Uribe, 2015). Dezso and colleagues (2015) found
that the presence of a woman in top management was negatively associated with the
contemporaneous presence of another woman in top management in that organization (51%, p<.05). Additionally, their findings indicated that women in top management had
negative spillover effects for women in top professional positions (52.29%, p<.05).
Consequently, the authors concluded that it appeared that organizations made an effort to
keep a small number of women in top, visible, positions; however, their efforts were
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significantly smaller or there was even resistance to improve women’s representation in
lower levels.
Relationship of WOB and the Gender Pay Gap
The gender pay gap is one of the areas in which the EU has had the most
legislative influence (Fagan & Rubery, 2018). Fulfilling the Coalition Government’s
pledge of promoting equal pay (HM Government, 2010, p. 18), and facing pressures from
the EU to improve transparency of the gender pay gap, in 2015, the British Prime
Minister set out his objective to “end the gender pay gap in a generation” by announcing
compulsory gender pay gap reporting for all employers with more than 250 employees,
effective April 2017. Part of the reasoning behind the initiative was that making the
gender pay gap reports public would create pressure on employers and drive women’s
wages up (Prime Minister, July 11, 2015). Research has suggested that accountability
can help reduce gender bias (Foschi, 1996). Moreover, when people are aware that their
actions are being monitored, it can help reduce discriminatory behavior (Castilla, 2008).
The increased representation of WOB, through the intervention of the
government-backed Davies Review, was an effort to help build a fairer society, and
“banish gender inequality” (Davies, 2015, p. 27). However, after almost half a century of
legislation that prohibits discrimination in wages on the basis of sex (Equal Pay Act,
1970), the gender pay gap still exists today. Using a sample of publicly listed firms in
France over the 2006 to 2014 period, Reberioux and Roudaut (2016) examined the effects
of the gender quota on the gender pay gap for directors. Their findings revealed that the
gender quota resulted in an increase in the gender pay gap from 3.5% (p<.001) before the
quota to 5.7% (p<.001) after the quota. Additionally, in Norway, the quota law increased
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the representation of WOB to almost 40%; however, it did not have an effect on reducing
the gender pay gap. According to the Work Economic Forum (2017), in Norway –
ranked third on the Global Gender Gap Index –, for every $1 a woman earns, a man earns
$1.27 in average. Those statistics indicate that since the enforcement of the quota law,
women are now more disadvantaged in terms of pay, than they were almost ten years ago.
These studies raise some questions related to the legitimacy of women’s representation at
the board level as a way to address gender inequality beyond descriptive representation
for women in the workforce.
Similarly, other studies have examined the boards of FTSE indexed organizations
in the 2001 to 2012 period in the United Kingdom found strong evidence of a gender pay
gap in the remuneration of non-executive directors (Goh & Gupta, 2016), which supports
the argument of a perceived lower value of women on the basis of gender. Goh and
Gupta (2016) found that within firm variation in the pay of non-executive directors
explained by gender. Female non-executive directors earned 5% (p<.001) less than their
male counterparts, which was a practically significant effect size. A similar effect was
found between firms, .05 (p<.001). Similar findings were reported using a sample from
111 German publicly listed firms in the 2009 to 2016 period (Bozhinov, Koch, & Schank,
2017). Bozhinov and colleagues (2017) examined pay differentials of employee board
representatives by gender, and found evidence of a 16% (p<.001) gap. The effect of the
unconditional model for the gender pay gap explained only by gender was practically
significant (R2=.136). After controlling for committee membership and organizational
characteristics, findings revealed that men were more likely than women to be appointed
to presidential (.139, p<.001), audit (.276, p<.001), compensation (.207, p<.001), strategy
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(.111, p<.001) and mediation (.162, p<.001) committees. Women were only more likely
to be appointed to the nomination committee (-.018, p>.05), however the effect was small
(i.e., less than 2%) and not statistically significant. Including the different committees to
the model explained only by gender, the variance explained by the model increased
(R2=.795). The study provided evidence that in addition to a gender pay gap, women
were being appointed to less important board positions. Examining the effects of women
in leadership on the gender wage gap in U.S. organizations, Srivastava and Sherman
(2015) found evidence that the female gender explained a variance of 16% (p<.05) in
salary, and that reporting to a female manager decreased wages by an additional 4.4%
(p<.05) for men and women. Women who reported to women earned 1.4% (p<.05) less
than other employees. Additionally, relative to men who switched from working for a
female manager to a male manager, women who made the same switch were predicted to
earn 1.4% (p<.05) less than men. The authors attributed this finding to competitive or
collective threat women in leadership may experience from other women’s career
ascension.
Some studies have found support for the relationship of women in management
and the reduction of the gender pay gap. In U.S.-based firms, greater representation of
women in management was associated with a reduction of the gender pay gap, moderated
by rank, where the presence of women in higher ranks strengthen the reduction of the
gender pay gap (Cohen & Huffman, 2007). Using a U.S. data, Cohen and Huffman
(2007) examined differences in the gender pay gap in function of female representation in
higher ranks in the restaurant industry. Their findings indicated a higher proportion of
female managers in high status positions increased gender wage equality (r=.42, p<.05);
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however, female managers in low status positions decreased gender wage equality (r=.11, p>.10). Additionally, their study found that the effect of gender on the pay gap was 12% (p<.001), indicating that women made approximately 88% of men’s wages. Their
study found that the percentage of female managers had a negative effect on the wage
gap (.02, p>.05). However, differences between low (-.27, p<.001) and high (.327,
p<.001) status of female managers indicated that status had a moderating role in the
relationship of the percentage of women in management and wage parity, indicating that
higher representation of women in high status management changed the direction of the
relationship.
Other studies have also suggested that women in management may help reduce
the gender pay gap. Matsa and Miller (2011) found that women in top leadership earned
significantly higher salaries in organizations with a female CEO in large U.S.-based
organizations (.016, p<.05), and the female share of pay for executives increased at a
higher rate than the increase in the share of female board members. The rate of increase
of women non-executives was .022 (p<.001) and the rate of increase in female executives’
pay was .025 (p<.001), which indicated that a higher proportion of non-executive WOB
may be contributing to closing the pay gap at the executive level. Similar findings for all
WOB indicated that the total increase of WOB, .039 (p<.001) was lower than the increase
in pay for female executives explained by the total percentage of WOB, .059, (p<.001).
The authors suggested that the convergence in the pay gap for top executives may be
attributable to the increase of WOB. Similarly, using data from the Italian workforce, a
study (Flabbi, Macis, Moro, & Schivardi, 2014) found a positive influence of female
CEOs on reducing the gender pay gap for female employees in the upper quartile of a
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distribution, 7.2% (p=.027) and increased the gender pay gap for employees in the bottom
quartile, -3.6% (p=.10). The percentage of women in top leadership resulted in an
increase on wages for employees the higher ranks but a decrease in wags for employees
in lower ranks. The sample was divided in deciles based on wages. Findings indicated
that for each 10% of female representation in the executive level, an increase of 7.9% in
wages was found, which indicated that for the mean of 26.2% of female representation in
executive leadership, an increase of 20.7% (p<.001) in wages for the upper decile could
be expected. However, a decrease of 3% (p=.10) was found for the lowest decile. The
impact of female CEOs or female executives was only positive in the upper part of the
wage spectrum. The mixed findings with regard to the effects of women in management
roles on the gender pay indicate that the relationship is not well-understood.
Hypotheses Support
Natural Experiments
Natural experiments are observational studies in which the experiment and control
conditions happen either by nature or other factors outside the researcher’s control. They
represent an opportunity for improving causal inferences in the social sciences,
particularly as research design innovations, such as RD, create situations that are as good
as random true experiments (Dunning, 2011). In natural experiments it is the research
design, rather than the statistical modelling that makes them compelling (Dunning, 2011).
In natural experiments, quantitative analysis can be simple and transparent. Such is the
case of the regression discontinuity (RD) design, in which to estimate the causal effect, a
comparison of the average outcomes of the treatment and comparison group suffices.
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However, detailed qualitative information on the circumstances that created the natural
experiment is essential for natural experiments to be fully compelling.
Regression Discontinuity Design
Regression discontinuity (Thistlethwaite & Campbell, 1960) designs are a type of
natural experiment in which individuals – or any other type of unit – are assigned to
treatment and comparison groups based on whether they are above or below a given
threshold on an assignment variable, also known as forcing variable. Although group
assignment in RD designs is not random, there is an expectation that around the threshold,
assignment is as good as random. As good as random assumptions require that
observations around the threshold are equal in their expectation of potential confounders.
In practice, researches may seek to control for potential confounders in research-design
choices, or with statistical controls.
For example, a study that used an RD design to estimate the effects of extended
benefits on unemployment duration. Lalive (2006) hypothesized that the Austrian
government’s initiative to increase unemployment benefits, in certain regions, from 30
weeks to 209 weeks for job seekers aged 50 or older would increase the duration the
individuals remained unemployed. To test their hypothesis, using a population of
individuals who were entering unemployment, Lalive (2006) used age as the assignment
variable with age 50 being the threshold to compare differences in unemployment
duration between individuals above and below the threshold. However, one cannot
simply assume that differences between groups were caused by extended benefits for
unemployment duration.
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Regression discontinuity designs must control for potential confounders in the
design and through statistical controls (Dunning, 2011). Differences between the
treatment and comparison groups could be caused by confounding factors – such as
industry, the economic environment of the time. For example, in the design of the study,
the authors focused on the non-steel industry because the industry was going through
restructuring at the time; thus, it had different unemployment insurance regime.
Additionally, employees that had been laid off from a steel plant and lived close to the
plant but away from another city may not have the same opportunities to find
employment as individuals who live close to a border with another city. Similarly,
individuals may not be equal in their expectation of receiving benefits as extended
benefits were only available for individuals who had not exhausted their unemployment
benefits prior to that. Consequently, all those factors were controlled in the design by
excluding unemployed individuals who were laid off form the steel industry, cities that
were isolated that not close to another city were also excluded. Additionally, statistical
controls were used in the study by including gender, family situation, education, skill
level, and previous industry experience.
Consequently, differences at the threshold can compellingly establish a causal
relationship, as the design controls for potential confounders and statistical controls are
included. Multiple studies have successfully used RD designs to establish causal effects
of a treatment in similar manners, in education (Angrist & Lavy, 1999; Papay, Murnane,
& Willett, 2014), corporate governance (Black, Hang, & Kim, 2006; Flammer, 2015;
Mullins, 2014; Francis, Hasan, & Wu, 2014). The equivalence across potential
confounders or baseline covariates indicates that at the threshold differences between
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outcomes for individuals in the treatment and comparison groups can be attributed to the
treatment. This is particularly the case in non-parametric designs, in which the estimated
treatment effect is calculated from observations within the limits to each side of the
threshold or cutoff score, which is the preferred approach in regression discontinuity
designs (Hahn, Todd, & Van der Klaauw, 2001; Imbens & Lemieux, 2008; Van der
Klaauw, 2008).
Effects of Davies Review on Board Composition Hypotheses
The first set of hypotheses are theoretically underpinned by Resource Dependence
Theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) that posits that organizations seek the best resources
for the organization. Therefore, as the Davies Review created a need for women to reach
the 25% target, gender became a valuable resource for organizations. Empirical studies
in different contexts have provided support for the positive effects of quotas and targets
in increasing the proportion of WOB (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Bertrand et al., 2018;
Ellwood & Garcia-Lacalle, 2018; Fortin et al., 2017). Previous research evaluated the
effectiveness of quotas and comply and explain approaches using data several countries,
including the United Kingdom. Their findings indicated that from 2006 to 2009, comply
or explain approaches resulted in a 2.31% increase of WOB, and quotas resulted in a
5.48% increase higher than countries that did not have any type of initiatives for
increasing WOB (Fortin et al., 2017).
Although the Davies Review only targeted FTSE 350 organizations, previous
studies found evidence of placebo effects from quotas on groups that were not directly
targeted by WOB initiatives (Adams & Kirchmaier, 2013; Ahern & Dittmar, 2012;
Grosvold et al., 2007). This was attributed to the expectation or assumption that quotas or
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targets may target other groups. After the quota law was introduced in Norway, a
dramatic increase in the percentage of WOB was identified in Sweden and Finland prior
to 2007, where boards doubled percentage of WOB without the introduction of
legislation (Adams & Kirchmaier, 2013). Similarly, in the United Kingdom, an
acceleration in the increase of female appointments to FTSE 100 boards was identified in
the 2001 to 2005 period (Grosvold et al., 2007). However, placebo effects were not
found across other European countries. In fact, those were exceptions to the slow increase
of female representation experienced in other countries. Furthermore, empirical evidence
suggests the existence of gender matching effects in director selection, which indicate
that board members are likely to be replaced with new members of the same gender
(Tinsley et al., 2017). Therefore, as the FTSE Small Cap group is the natural control
group for the initiative, it is plausible that the introduction of the Davies Review on FTSE
350 boards had a placebo effect on FTSE Small Cap boards. However, empirical
evidence indicates that board male board members are likely to be replaced with other
male directors.
Accordingly, the first set of hypotheses predicted that the Davies Review would
increase the percentage of WOB for FTSE 350 boards. Additionally, to test for the
presence of a placebo effect from the Davies Review, the FTSE Small Cap group was
tested.
H1a:

The Davies Review initiative will increase the percentage of WOB of nonbalanced FTSE 100 organizations.

H1b: The Davies Review initiative will increase the percentage of WOB of nonbalanced FTSE 250 organizations.
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H1c:

The Davies Review initiative will not impact the percentage of WOB of
non-compliant FTSE Small Cap organizations.

The second set of hypotheses predicted a disproportionate increase of nonexecutive directors compared to executive directors. Grounded on expectation states
theory (Ridgeway & Correll, 2004), gender as status explains that inequalities are
perpetuated through those in power who seek to hold on to their advantage by keeping
women in lower status roles. Therefore, this theoretical perspective underpins the study’s
predictions for the appointment of women to positions of less power. Empirical findings
of an examination of the effects of the Norway quota law found that board independence
on Norwegian boards increased from 46% to 67% in the quota law period, which was
directly related to the fact that 84% of female directors are independent, compared with
50% of male independent directors (Bohren & Staubo, 2013). Similarly, other studies
found that female directors were less likely to be appointed to less important positions on
corporate boards (Bozhinov et al., 2017). The Norwegian quota resulted in a considerable
increase of board independence that was directly related to the appointment of women to
non-executive roles to meet the quota (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012).
H2a:

The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of nonexecutive directors compared to executive directors in FTSE 100 boards.

H2b: The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of nonexecutive directors compared to executive directors in FTSE 250 boards.
H2c:

The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of nonexecutive directors compared to executive directors in FTSE Small Cap
boards.
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Empirical studies have found support for disproportionate increases of WOB less
influential positions (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Bozhinov et al., 2017; Steirstad & Opshal,
2011). Seirstad and Opshal (2011) found that despite the dramatic increase (i.e., more
than 30 percentage points) in the percentage of WOB resulting from the Norwegian quota
law, the percentage of female chair persons increased by less than one percentage point.
Similarly, Ahern and Dittmar (2012) found that the Norwegian quota law decreased the
proportion of women executive-directors and did not produced changes in appointments
of women to CEO positions. Similarly, other studies have found that CEO appointments
are strongly linked to tenure (Wiersema et al., 2018) and the strongest candidates for
those appointments are executive directors (Odgers-Berndtson, 2018).
Accordingly, considering the limited supply of executive directors and empirical
evidence that demonstrate that, in other contexts, the introduction of quotas has not
increased the appointments of female CEO or chairpersons, this study hypothesized that
FTSE 350 boards would increase their proportions of female directors disproportionately
to the appointment of female CEOs and chairpersons. The hypothesis was also tested in
FTSE Small Cap boards; however, the prediction for that group was not expected to be
significant, as they were not required to increase their number of female directors.
H3a:

The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of female
executive directors compared to female CEOs in FTSE 350 boards.

H3b: The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of female
non-executive directors compared to female chairpersons in FTSE 350
boards.
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H3c:

The Davies Review will not impact the proportion of female executive
directors compared to female CEOs in FTSE Small Cap boards.

H3d: The Davies Review will not impact the proportion of female non-executive
directors compared to female chairpersons in FTSE Small Cap boards.
Effects of Davies Review on Opportunities for Women Hypotheses
The fourth and fifth sets of hypotheses are theoretically underpinned by critical
mass theory (Kanter, 1977), which refers to the minimum amount of a women needed in
a group for them to be able to overcome their minority status. The hypotheses predict
that critical mass of WOB will improve opportunities for other women in the
organization and will reduce the gender pay gap. These hypotheses rest on two
assumptions; the first assumption is that women’s numerical representation is linked to
their ability to influence organizational outcomes. Theoretically, in organizations and
work groups, critical posits that heightened visibility from numerical minority status –
women- can produce a reaction.
Empirical studies have provided evidence of a link between higher numerical and
proportional representation of women in a group and their ability to influence a group
(Karpowitz et al., 2012). Multiple research findings in the gender and corporate
governance literature indicate that the minimum number of women needed for women to
have influence on a board is about three women or 30% share (Joecks et al., 2013;
Konrad et al., 2008; Torchia et al., 2011). However, other studies have found that
women’s influence on a board is not dependent on their numerical proportions; thus, even
as tokens, women can and do influence boards (Cooks & Glass, 2017; Luckerath-Rovers,
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2013). The Davies Review provided the context for exploring if 25% constitutes critical
mass in FTSE 350 boards.
The second assumption for testing critical mass of WOB on opportunities for
other women is that WOB intend to advocate on other women’s behalf. Empirical
evidence linking female representation on boards with opportunities for women at lower
levels has produced mixed findings. Several studies have found support for a positive
link between WOB and managerial opportunities for women (Matsa & Miller, 2011;
Skaggs et al., 2012). Other studies have provided evidence for a positive association of
women in leadership roles and increased opportunities for women at lower levels (Kunze
& Miller, 2015; Kurtulus & Tomasovic-Devey, 2012).
Conversely, findings of a study that examined the effects of the Norway quota law
indicated that the quota law created a small elite of women directors but did not have a
positive effect on opportunities for other women (Seirstad & Opsahl, 2011). Existing
literature has found that women in high status positions may not identify with other
women (Faniko et al., 2016). Particularly, in situations in which women see their group
as disadvantaged, they tend to differentiate more from their group if their differentiation
has a positive outcome for them (Stroebe et al., 2017). Additionally, some women in
positions of power tend to have gender-biased perceptions about the career commitment
of other women, and justify status differences on their perceived higher commitment to
their career than other women’s. Consistently, some studies (Blau & DeVaro, 2007,
Dezso et al., 2015; Giuliano et al., 2005) have found a negative relationship link between
women’s representation in higher organizational levels and the advancement of women in
lower positions. Furthermore, studies have provided evidence that in some instances
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women actively impede the advancement of other women (Derks et al., 2011; Kaiser &
Spalding, 2015).
The mixed findings related to what number or percentage of WOB constitutes
critical mass indicate that there is not one definitive answer. The Davies Review has
provided the opportunity to explore critical mass of WOB at 25% representation.
However, as empirical evidence has not provided strong relationship of the positive effect
of women helping women, it is unlikely that at low levels of minority representation
women may advocate for other women. The prediction was tested on the pooled FTSE
All Share sample.
H4a:

Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will
decrease the percentage of women in executive boards of FTSE All Share
organizations.

H4b: Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will
decrease the percentage of women in senior management of FTSE All
Share organizations.
H4c:

Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will not
impact the percentage of women in the workforce of FTSE All Share
organizations.

Effects of Davies Review on Gender Pay Gap Hypotheses
Literature has demonstrated that British society values the labor of women lower
than men by providing evidence of a longitudinal study in which a gender pay gap was
identified at the time graduates entered the workforce, and increased as the careers
progressed (Department for Education, 2008). One of the reasons that contributes to
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existence of this kind of discrimination is that it is tolerated by women (Auspurg et al.,
2017). Empirical findings of a large study in U.S. organizations found that in addition to
the existence of a pay gap explained by gender, reporting to a female manager increased
the gender pay gap even more, the pay gap grew even more when women reported to
women (Srivastava & Sherman, 2015). Existing literature related to the effects of WOB
on the gender pay gap has yielded mixed findings. Evidence from the quota law in France
indicated that the quota law increased the gender pay gap for directors (Reberioux &
Roudaut, 2016). Additionally, despite a decade after achieving 40% of female
representation in Norwegian corporate boards, the gender pay gap in Norway has
increased (World Economic Forum, 2017).
Studies have found that female CEOs and female executives were associated with
reducing the gender pay gap only for employees in high ranks (i.e., top 10%); however,
they were associated with increasing the gender pay gap for employees in low ranks (i.e.,
bottom 10%) (Flabbi et al., 2014). Similarly, in Norway, empirical studies have indicated
that the introduction of legislation for increasing WOB in Norway did not decrease
gender wage gap, except at the top of the labor market, which researchers argue could be
the result of increased demand for women created by the quota law (Bertrand et al., 2018).
Therefore, the predictions in the fifth set of hypotheses reflect the findings in
existing literature that revealed a negative effect from WOB initiatives on the gender pay
gap, and despite the gender gap narrowed in higher ranks, at lower ranks, the gap
increased. The fifth set of hypotheses tested the effect of 25% of WOB on the gender pay
gap on the pooled FTSE All Share sample. Additionally, it tested the effect of a large
increase of WOB on the gender pay gap.
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H5a:

Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will not
decrease the gender pay gap mean in FTSE All Share organizations.

H5b: Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will not
decrease the gender pay gap median in FTSE All Share organizations.
H5c:

A large increase (Increase>12%) in the percentage of WOB resulting
from the Davies Review will increase the gender pay gap median in FTSE
All Share organizations.
Summary of the Chapter

The literature reviewed in this chapter provided a historical background of several
events that have contributed to the current standing of women in British society.
Theoretical perspectives related to gender systems were reviewed. Additionally, theories
related to corporate governance and gender diversity in corporate boards were reviewed.
The literature review included different types of initiatives for increasing gender diversity
on corporate boards and the rationales behind it. This chapter also reviewed literature
related to hypothesized relationships in this study and provided support for them. The
chapter also included a review of literature that provided support for the methodology
used in this study. An effort was made to provide a comprehensive review in terms of
theoretical backgrounds, prior empirical research and issues associated with existing
literature.
The literature review revealed that women’s lower standing in the British
workforce is the product of a long history built on patriarchal values, which have shaped
their society. It should be emphasized that several of the events and actions that
produced the inequality were the result of what was believed to be just and right.
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The fight for women’s rights and equality in the United Kingdom was not fought
by women alone. The literature review identified that some men have also fought for the
achievement of equality. Conversely, while some women in decision-making roles have
used their power and influence to help other women; other women have rejected the
existence of discrimination, for example Ms. Barbara Castle and Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher, respectively. Additionally, despite their awareness of gendered structures,
while some women are unable to advocate for other women, some women are unwilling
to advocate for other women (Bierema, 2005). Furthermore, empirical evidence has
suggested that compared to men, women in leadership tend to have more gender-biased
perceptions of other women’s commitment to their careers (Ellemers et al., 2004; Faniko
et al., 2016). However, researchers have challenged the expectation that women should
help other women, and the responsibility placed on women leaders to help junior women,
as it undermines women in leadership and perpetuates the status quo (Mavin, 2008).
Several decades of legislation and advocacy for gender equality in society and the
workplace have not resulted in gender parity. Therefore, policy-makers have targeted
corporate boards to achieve gender equality using a top-down approach. The assumption
behind it is that inequality is perpetuated by men; therefore, adding more women to top
positions will decrease discrimination for women in lower levels. However, despite the
multiple countries that have enacted legislation, the assumption does not appear to be
challenged. Although blatant discrimination has been almost eradicated through
legislation that protects women from such cases, systematic discrimination, though subtle,
continues to exist, and is masked with seemingly benevolent practices (Meyerson &
Fletcher, 2000).
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The lack of awareness of the effects of systematic bias in the workplace has
contributed to discriminatory practices in which men are promoted more than women on
the basis of merit. Multiple annual reports reviewed justified their low numbers of
women claiming their selection process was based on merit (See Appendix B for excerpts
from annual reports). It is likely that they believe that because of the association of men
with leadership, which makes men appear as better candidates for positions of power
(Eagly & Karau, 2011). The fact that the Davies Review used the business case for WOB
to argue the case for equal opportunity for women, which had already been won in the
United Kingdom with the Sex Discrimination Act (1975) and internationally with the
United Nations Human Rights Commission (1979), provides a snapshot of women’s
lower standing in British society. Particularly, in a society in which traditionally, and
historically, status and asymmetric power disadvantage women.
Advocates promote WOB initiatives with support of the business case claiming
that WOB will increase profitability and improve opportunities for other women
(California Senate, 2017; Davies, 2011). However, their claims distort or ignore
scientific findings, thus they pose a risk to the achievement of the gender equality. Claims
of increased financial performance resulting from the different measures of board
diversity (percentage of women, number of women, presence of women) have
inconsistent results, with some studies showing a positive relationship. However, the
most rigorous studies have found that the relationship of WOB on financial performance
is near zero (Pletzer et al., 2015; Post & Byron, 2015). The risk of promoting an equality
case through a contingent economic argument is contradictory to the theoretical
grounding of social justice and may undermine the case for equality (Noon, 2007;
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Sinclair, 2000). Additionally, it provides moral justification for discrimination against
women. Furthermore, it does not promote awareness of the discriminatory factors that
have created the inequality.
The targets for minimum representation of WOB can be explained by critimal
mass theory (Kanter, 1977). Critical mass has been extensively explored in the corporate
governance literature; however, numerical representation ignores asymetrical power and
lower status associated with the female gender (Eagly & Karau, 2002), and it ignores
differences in the positions within a board (Odgers-Oberton, 2018). However, despite
achieving critical mass of WOB, it is plausible, that consistent with literature, women at
the highest leadership roles may conform to the masculine expectation of leadership
(Ellemers et al., 2012; Luckerath-Rovers et al., 2013; Derks et al., 2011) and not
represent the interests of other women (Derks et al., 2016). It is also plausible that,
consistent with social role theory (Eagly & Wood, 2011), women have the same biases
and attitudes toward women.
Currently, the U.K. Government (Hampton-Alexander, 2016), organizations (30%
Club, 2016), and the media are praising organizations for their diversity efforts by
looking at gender composition at corporate boards level. However, despite the
importance of gender parity at boardroom level, directors of corporate boards represent a
very small percentage of the population. Measuring diversity in organizations looking at
the top, most privileged layer ignores the existing disparities that affect the lives of
millions of people in the workforce. Evidence is not consistent with the expectation that
a higher proportion of WOB will improve gender diversity efforts in the organization.
Research has suggested that legislative efforts do not deliver equality unless they are
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supported by well-established social mechanisms (Ferner, Almond, & Colling, 2005).
Changing social mechanisms would require a major transformation, which is uncommon,
and requires activism. Nonetheless, social transformation has been seen in the past (Equal
Franchise Act, 1928; Sexual Offences Act, 1967; Slavery Abolition Act, 1833). What
can be done organizationally, to move closer towards achieving gender equality would
require restructuring, which requires acknowledging the gendered nature of the
organization (Bierema, 2017). Human resource development (HRD) is an applied field
(Passmore, 1997; Turnbull, 2002), therefore its responsiveness to human and
organizational needs should not be overlooked.
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Chapter 3 – Methodology
Introduction
This chapter outlines the design of the study. It contains the following sections:
introduction, purpose of the study, research hypotheses, design of the study, description
of the population and sample, details about the data collection procedures, description of
group comparisons, treatment of missing data, data analysis procedures, statistical
assumptions, description of internal validity of the RD approach, hypotheses testing, and
limitations. The chapter concludes with a summary.
Purpose of the Study
The study aimed to contribute to the understanding of the effects of governmentsponsored initiatives for increasing the participation on WOB on gender equality in the
workplace. To that end, using the case of the Davies Review, the recent initiative for
WOB in the United Kingdom, this study examined its effects on changes in the board
composition of FTSE 350 boards. Additionally, using data from the FTSE All Share
population, which includes FTSE 350 firms and FTSE Small Cap firms, this study used
the 25% target set by the Davies Review to test the concept of critical mass of WOB on
opportunities for other women measured as gender diversity at different hierarchical
levels and as the gender pay gap. Using a regression discontinuity approach
(Thistlethwaite & Campbell, 1960), this study aimed to provide causal claims of its
findings to fill the gap in the literature for rigorous methodology.
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Research Hypotheses
The hypotheses have been developed to address shortcomings in the literature and
increase the understanding of the effects of initiatives that promote boardroom gender
diversity through exogenous events. There are three key predictions in this study: 1) at
the micro level, the Davies Review increased female participation and changed the
composition of FTSE 350 boards using a comply or explain approach, 2) at the mezzo
level, that the Davies Review negatively impacted opportunities for other women within
the FTSE 350 organizations, and 3) at the macro level, compliance to the Davies Review
target for WOB has not had an effect on the gender pay gap. The specific hypotheses to
be tested are listed below.
H1a:

The Davies Review initiative will increase the percentage of WOB of nonbalanced FTSE 100 organizations.

H1b: The Davies Review initiative will increase the percentage of WOB of nonbalanced FTSE 250 organizations.
H1c:

The Davies Review initiative will not impact the percentage of WOB of
non-compliant FTSE Small Cap organizations.

H2a:

The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of nonexecutive directors compared to executive directors in FTSE 100 boards.

H2b: The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of nonexecutive directors compared to executive directors in FTSE 250 boards.
H2c:

The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of nonexecutive directors compared to executive directors in FTSE Small Cap
boards.
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H3a:

The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of female
executive directors compared to female CEOs in FTSE 350 boards.

H3b: The Davies Review will result in a disproportionate increase of female
non-executive directors compared to female chairpersons in FTSE 350
boards.
H3c:

The Davies Review will not impact the proportion of female executive
directors compared to female CEOs in FTSE Small Cap boards.

H3d: The Davies Review will not impact the proportion of female non-executive
directors compared to female chairpersons in FTSE Small Cap boards.
H4a:

Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will
decrease the percentage of women in executive boards of FTSE All Share
organizations.

H4b: Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will
decrease the percentage of women in senior management of FTSE All
Share organizations.
H4c:

Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will not
impact the percentage of women in the workforce of FTSE All Share
organizations.

H5a:

Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will not
decrease the gender pay gap mean in FTSE All Share organizations.

H5b: Compliance to the 25% WOB targets set by the Davies Review will not
decrease the gender pay gap median in FTSE All Share organizations.
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H5c:

A large increase (Increase>12%) in the percentage of WOB resulting
from the Davies Review will increase the gender pay gap median in FTSE
All Share organizations.
Design of the Study

The study applied a sharp regression discontinuity (RD) design (Thistlethwaite &
Campbell, 1960) to test the existence of a causal relationship between the Davies Review
and increased female representation in FTSE 350 boards, and to estimate treatment
effects of the initiative on opportunities for women at other organizational levels and on
the gender pay gap. To that end, the study was implemented in two phases. The first
phase tested the effect of the targets set by the Davies Review on changes in board
composition for FTSE 350 organizations. The second phase tested the effects of
compliance to the Davies Review on increased opportunities for other women in the
organization and on the gender pay gap. The main analyses of both phases used RD
designs.
The RD approach is a quasi-experimental design that simulates experimental
conditions and provides evidence of causality (Shadish et al., 2002). Unlike experimental
designs, RD does not rely on random assignment, but on the use of an assignment
variable to identify a cutoff point, which is used to determine subject placement into
treatment and control groups (Murnane & Willet, 2010). Suppose that X is the
assignment variable, with the cutoff score of X=0, so that observations with X ³ 0 are
assigned to the treatment group denoted by T=1 and observations with X<0 are assigned
to the control group denoted by T=0. Each observation i has two individual potential
outcomes, one resulting from the observation being assigned to the treatment group (Yi1)
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and one resulting from the observation being assigned to the control group (Yi0). Under
the assumption that Ȳ1(x) and Ȳ0(x) are continuous functions of X, at X=0, the average
effect of treatment can be estimated as:
! " | " = 0 = lim, -. " − lim0 - + "
)→+

)→+

(1)

The estimated treatment effect that results from the equation above is calculated
from observations within the limits to each side of cutoff score, also referred to as the
non-parametric approach, which is the preferred approach in regression discontinuity
designs (Hahn, Todd, & Van der Klaauw, 2001; Imbens & Lemieux, 2008). However, a
parametric version of the model can also be estimated using the entire sample:
-1 = 3("1 ) + !(71 ) + 8

(2)

Regression discontinuity was originally used in Thistlethwaite and Campbell
(1960)’ study of two groups of students, one of which received certificates of merit and
one that did not. The scores used for awarding the certificates of merit were used to
estimate the effect of receiving the certificate on the students’ likelihood to receive
scholarships. Their study provided the initial evidence for using a single treatment that
divides two similar groups and observe treatment effects, which at the cutoff point can
produce effects that are as good as random.
Similarly, RD has been used to evaluate educational interventions such as the
effect of class size on student achievement (Angrist & Lavy, 1999); the effect of financial
aid on college enrollment (Van der Klaauw, 2002); the effect of remedial education on
student achievement (Jacob & Lefgren, 2004; Martorell & McFarlin, 2011) among many.
In the gender literature, RD has been used to estimate the effect of electoral gender
quotas on the election of female politicians (Casas-Arce & Saiz, 2015); the effect of
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gender quotas on women empowerment (Campa & Bagues, 2017); the effect of gender
quota on public expenditure (Campa, 2011), among others.
Potential Confounders
To ensure that this study’s analyses capture the changes in board composition as
an effect of the Davies Review targets, an investigation of other variables, including
legislative, policy changes, government-backed recommendations, and political
environment in the United Kingdom around the time of the initiative was performed.
Potential confounders associated with the forcing variable were also examined.
Brexit. In a referendum on June of 2016, the British electorate voted to leave the
EU (Brexit), and on March of 2017, in an unprecedented event, the U.K. Government
invoked Article 50 of the Treaty of the EU, starting the formal and legal process for the
U.K.’s separation from the union. The potential impact of Brexit on FTSE 350 board
composition lies in the comply or explain format of the initiative, which does not require
compliance. However, when the Davies Review initiative was rolled out, it was
introduced with a threat of consequences if target organizations failed to comply. Lord
Davies indicated that “These targets are considerably lower than those currently being
deliberated by the European Commission and lower than those set by countries that have
opted for legislation and quotas” (Davies, 2011, p. 19); and “European Commission
Vice-President Viviane Reding is expected to publish a Green Paper on boardroom
diversity in 2011. She has made it clear that she would prefer companies to take action
themselves but, if there was no progress over a certain period of time, then she is
prepared to introduce targeted measures to improve the representation of women in senior
positions.” (Davies, 2011, p. 23).
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The U.K.’s exit from the EU removes the potential of imposed legislation by the
European Commission. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that Brexit may have an
impact on the long-term effects of the Davies Review initiative, which are now monitored
by the Alexander-Hampton Review. To that end, to avoid the potential confounding
effect of Brexit on the study’s outcomes, the analyses of this study was restricted to
observations prior to the announcement of Brexit, June 2016.
FTSE index. The FTSE index rank was used by the Davies Review to determine
the organizations that were subject to meeting minimum targets of WOB. The FTSE U.K.
index is designed to represent the performance of British companies and serves as a
gauge of the health of the country’s economy. Publicly listed organizations with
premium listings of equity shares on the LSE are eligible for inclusion into the FTSE
index based on how their rank by full market capitalization, which is determined by
market share value. The FTSE 100 includes the 100 largest publicly listed organizations,
representing about 81% of the entire market capitalization of the LSE. Organizations in
the FTSE 250 index are the next 250 largest organizations trading in the LSE. Periodic
quarterly and annual reviews are performed in order to add or delete organizations from
the index. However, some flexibility is allowed, in order to maintain the index stability.
For example, an organization that is in the FTSE 100 must fall to the 111th position or
below to be moved from the FTSE 100 to FTSE 250. Similarly, organizations in the
FTSE 250 index must fall below the 376th position to be moved from the FTSE 250 to the
FTSE Small Cap.
FTSE indices of 100, 250 and 350, Small Cap, and All-share use cutoff scores
that allow the index to capture certain percentages of the full total value of British
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companies that trade in the LSE and are eligible for inclusion in the FTSE index. The
indices have historically been used for tracking funds, as a performance benchmark, and
as a measure of investability. The nature of the FTSE index, which ranks firms and
determines inclusion of constituents on the basis of market capitalization, indicates that
group assignment is not under the participants’ control.
At the time the Davies Review was rolled out, mean differences in the percentage
of WOB between FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 already existed. As mentioned previously,
organizations are ranked based on their market capitalization, which suggests that there
may be a relationship between the size of the organization and the percentage of WOB, or
perhaps because the FTSE 100 index is a measure of the U.K.’s financial health, FTSE
100 boards are constantly in the public eye and under much scrutiny (Ryan & Haslam,
2005). Therefore, it is plausible that FTSE index may be a confounder in the increase of
WOB, as larger organizations may be more likely to hire more women.
FTSE index would likely be a problem in an RD design using the entire sample
and looking at discontinuities between groups. Discontinuities at the threshold using
parametric design would not produce credible estimates of causal effects as significant
differences existed prior to treatment. The assumption of continuity in baseline
covariates would be violated, invalidating the results of the RD estimates. Therefore, as
recommended in existing literature, potential confounders can be controlled for in design
choices or statistical controls (Dunning, 2011). The design of this study controlled for
the influence of FTSE index by not using the FTSE rank of organizations as the forcing
variable. Statistically, the sample was be tested to detect if observations around the
threshold are equal in their expectation of being in a particular FTSE group.
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Additionally, the variable identifying the Index of each organization was included
in the tests to control for any potential effect on the outcome. Additionally, groups were
compared to see if organization’s size, which is the variable that would most likely be
related to FTSE Index, influenced the likelihood of being in the treatment or comparison
groups.
Assignment Variables and Cutoff Scores
Phase I. Although the FTSE index uses ranking and cutoff scores for their indices,
the determination of the cutoff score for the Davies Review initiative was done arbitrarily.
The Davies Review recommendations were rolled out in 2011, the report indicated that
the FTSE 350 organizations had been chosen because they were considered a good
starting point for gender diversity initiatives on British corporate boards. The report
could have targeted the FTSE 100 or the FTSE All-Share organizations. It is plausible
that the driver for targeting the top 350 public organizations was that the Davies Review
was developed, monitored, and evaluated with the support of a team from Cranfield
University School of Management. The Cranfield team issues the annual Female FTSE
Board Reports, a benchmarking report of women’s participation on FTSE 100 boards
(since 1998), and FTSE 250 boards (since 2006). The cutoff scores for the Davies
Review initiative were set at two different points, at the 100 (FTSE 100) and 350 (FTSE
250) marks on the ranking of the FTSE index.
However, the finite nature of the FTSE indices allows only a set number of
organizations in each group, which indicates that FTSE rank is a discrete, non-continuous
variable. When the variable determining treatment X is discrete, conditions for the
estimation of treatment effects using non-parametric models are not satisfied (Lee & Card,
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2008); therefore, a parametric regression would have to be estimated. However, one
cannot simply assume that the parametric form is the correct approach. In fact, literature
indicates that non-parametric RD designs yield more precise estimates (Jacob, Zhu,
Sommers, & Bloom, 2012; Hahn et al., 2001; Lee & Lemieux, 2010). Although there are
techniques that can be used to improve the inferential quality of parametric designs, like
computing clustered standard errors (Lee & Card, 2008), non-parametric models are still
preferred. Additionally, while FTSE rank may appear to be the most obvious assignment
variable, it is not the most appropriate to estimate the effect of the Lord Davies initiative
on increased representation of WOB, which was the intended outcome of the initiative.
The Davies Review used a comply or explain approach for targets for WOB. This
suggests that the initiative is about compliance with the targets established for minimum
female representation on boards. At the time the initiative was rolled out, there were
organizations that were already compliant with the minimum targets, which indicates that
they were not required to increase their percentage of female directors. Therefore, from a
compliance perspective, the effects of the Lord Davies initiative can be measured by
using the percentages of WOB at the time the initiative was rolled out (WOBPC2011).
It is noteworthy to reiterate that there were mean differences in the percentage of
WOB by Index when the Davies Review initiative was rolled out; therefore, groups
(FTSE 100, FTSE 250, and FTSE Small Cap) were examined separately. Previous studies
have run separate regressions to isolate the effects of a treatment on separate groups, such
as ethnicity (Gormley, Gayer, Phillips, & Dawson, 2005), race (Ludwig & Miller, 2007),
school grade (Jacob & Lefgren, 2005), year (Ludwig & Miller, 2007), gender and
education level (Lemieux & Milligan, 2008) among others. Therefore, the variable
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WOBPC2011 was used as the forcing variable to estimate the effect of the Davies Review
on the variable Increase, which indicates the Increase in the percentage of WOB in the
2011 to 2016 period.
The first phase of this study split each sample into a group already Genderbalanced and a Non-balanced group in which organizations need to increase their WOB
percentage to meet the minimum targets set by the Davies Review. The diagram shown
in Figure 1 represents phase I’s study design for that will be applied to the FTSE 350 and
FTSE Small Cap groups separately:
Group Assignment
Forcing variable = WOBPC2011
C = FTSE 100=25%,
FTSE 250=22%
FTSE Small Cap=19%

FTSE 350
n=285
FTSE Small Cap
n=110

Treatment = Needs to
Increase WOBPC

WOBPC2011 < C
n=251 (FTSE 350)
n=16 (FTSE Small Cap)

Compare results
Post-Davies Review 2016

Treatment = Yes
Non-balanced boards

Treatment = No

WOBPC2011 > C
n=36 (FTSE 350)
n=16 (FTSE Small Cap)

Changes in board
composition
H1. Increase WOBPC
H2. WED vs. WNED
H3. Female CEOs
and Chairpersons

Gender-balanced
boards

Figure 1. Design of the Study for Phase I - FTSE 350 and FTSE Small Cap.
Note. WOBPC2011=percentage of women on boards in 2011; WED=women executive directors;
WNED=women non-executive directors.

where the assignment or forcing variable is WOBPC measured in December 2011, the
cutoff is the target set by the Davies Review, which is set at 25% for FTSE 100 boards,
22% for FTSE 250 boards, and 19% for FTSE Small Cap boards. Organizations above
the cutoff were assigned to the Gender-balanced (comparison) group, indicating that they
do not need to increase their percentage of WOB. Organizations below the cutoff were
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assigned to the Non-balanced (treatment) group, which is the group that needs to increase
their percentage of WOB to achieve the targets set by the Davies Review. The outcomes
for this phase of the study were changes in board composition measured on June of 2016.
Although the same 25% target was provided to all FTSE 350 organizations, only
the FTSE 100 firms were expected to reach a minimum of 25% by 2015. The deadline for
the target was calculated assuming an annual 14% board turnover, and implementing a
one third female new appointments rule. The Davies Review indicates that FTSE 250
organizations should apply the same one third female new appointments rule. Using a
similar calculation, it was reasonable to conclude that FTSE 250 organizations were
expected to achieve a 22% female representation on their boards by 2015. A cutoff of
19% was estimated for the FTSE Small Cap group using the same calculation used for
the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 groups; however, since the initiative was not targeted
towards FTSE Small Cap firms, this group was tested separately.
Phase II. For the second phase of the study, the focus shifted to examining the
effects of the new board composition that resulted from the Davies Review. To that end,
this study used the percentage of WOB post-Davies Review, June of 2016. The cutoff
point was the target set by the Davies Review, 25% WOBPC, which was used to separate
the total sample into two groups; one group categorized as Compliant, and the other one
as Non-compliant. The reasoning behind this is that the percentage determined by the
Davies Review (25%) did not have any theoretical or empirical support in the literature
reviewed; therefore, it was unclear if female representation on boards at that threshold
would have any effect on organizational outcomes.
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Existing literature related to gender in corporate governance provided support for
the concept of critical mass (Karpowitz & Melderberg, 2014; Mendelberg, Karpotwitz, &
Goedert, 2014). The number of women needed for achieving critical mass in a corporate
board is three (Torchia et al., 2011). However, it is intriguing whether the percentage of
WOB set by the Davies Review has any significance. Further, when the Lord Davies
initiative was rolled out, the report indicated that a critical mass of 30% or more women
at the board level produces the best results (Davies, 2011, p. 8). The report also indicated
that a study of FTSE-listed boards had found that at the threshold of at least 20% of
female board members (cf. Bhogaita, 2011), organizations had significantly increased
share price performance. However, when targets were recommended, the threshold was
set at 25%, which provided an opportunity for testing whether 25% of female
representation on boards constitutes critical mass.
Consequently, this study used the variable WOBPC2016, which is the June of 2016
WOBPC value as the forcing variable for Phase II of this study. The cutoff point that
separated the sample into treatment and comparison groups was the percentage set by the
Davies Review (c=25), which determined if boards were Complaint (WOBPC2016>25), or
Non-compliant (WOBPC2016<25) to the initiative. The diagram shown in Figure 2
explains the quasi-experimental design of the study.
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Treatment =
Compliance to Davies
Review 25% target

Group Assignment
Forcing variable = WOBPC2016
C = 25%

Treatment = Yes

WOBPC2016 > C
n=153

Compliant

FTSE All Share
N=395
Treatment = No

WOBPC2016 < C
n=242

Non-Compliant

Compare results
Post-Davies Review,
2016 and 2017

Opportunities for
Women
Gender Pay Gap
H4. WExecPC,
WSMPC,
WEmpPC
H5. Gender Pay
Gap

Figure 2. Design of the Study for Phase II - FTSE All Share
Note. WOBPC2016=percentage of women on boards in 2016; WExecPC=percentage of women
executives; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management; WEmpPC=percentage of
women employed.

The forcing variable WOBPC2016, determined group assignment to the Compliant
(treatment), or Non-compliant (comparison) groups. To examine whether the 25% WOB
target set by the Davies Review constitutes critical mass, the treatment was the
achievement of the 25% WOB. The outcomes observed were opportunities for women in
the organization measured as the percentage of female population of the total executive
board (WExecPC), senior management (WSMPC), and company-wide (WEmpPC). A
finding that at the 25% of female representation on boards, the Compliant group has a
statistically and practically significantly higher population of women on executive boards
and in senior management than the Non-compliant group, would provide evidence of
critical mass at 25%.
Gender pay gap figures for 2017 reported to the British government prior to April
of 2018 were another outcome tested in this phase of the study. The gender pay gap
variables were reported as the mean and median percentages of pay differentials that
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favor men; therefore, a positive value indicated that men earned more than women. A
statistically significant negative value in the difference between the gender pay for the
Compliant and Non-compliant groups would provide that 25% constitutes critical mass.

Treatment = Large
increase of WOBPC

Group Assignment
Forcing variable = IncreaseWOBPC
C = 12%

Treatment = Yes

Increase > C
n=186

Large

FTSE All Share
N=395
Treatment = No

Increase < C
n=209

Small

Compare results
Post-Davies review,
2016 and 2017

Opportunities for
Women
Gender Pay Gap
H4. WExecPC,
WSMPC,
WEmpPC
H5. Gender Pay
Gap

Figure 3. Design of the Study for Phase II – FTSE All Share
Note. Increase=increase in the percentage of women on boards in the 2011 to 2016 period;
WExecPC=percentage of women executives; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior
management; WEmpPC=percentage of women employed

Alternatively, as shown in Figure 3, the variable Increase, which represents the
increase in the percentage of WOB from 2016 to 2011 was used to determine group
assignment. This design was hypothesized based on existing literature that examined the
effect of the Norway quota law. Ahern and Dittmar (2011) found that organizations that
were closer to the target when the quota laws were announced were required to make
smaller changes than those that were a long distance from compliance. Large increases
of female representation on boards could represent a massive reorganization, as any
changes in board composition are substantial (Ahern & Dittmar, 2011). Therefore, the
difference between organizations that had to undergo a Large increase in their percentage

164

of WOB to achieve compliance and organizations that had a Small increase in their
WOBPC, cannot be ignored. Consequently, using the median Increase as the cutoff point
(c=12%), organizations over the cutoff were assigned to the Large increase (treatment)
group and organizations below the cutoff were assigned to the Small increase
(comparison) group.
Treatment
Phase I. The Davies Review initiative provided minimum targets, which
represent the basis for treatment (T) given to the study’s participants. Organizations in
the treatment group must increase their percentage of WOB to comply with the minimum
targets set by the Davies Review. The treatment variable is represented by a dummy T Î
{0,1}. Therefore, T=1 if WOBPC2011<c, and T=0 if WOBPC2011>c.
Phase II. The Davies Review published annual reviews of the progress that FTSE
350 boards were making towards achieving the targets for WOB. Each report ranked
organizations based on their percentages of WOB, praised the progress of some
organizations, and labeled organizations with the highest percentages as “leading the way”
in gender equality (Hampton & Alexander, 2016, p. 33). Therefore, the treatment is the
public acknowledgement of being Compliant to the Davies Review targets. The
treatment variable is represented by a dummy T Î {0,1}. Therefore, T=1 if
WOBPC2016>c, and T=0 if WOBPC2016<c. Additionally, to explore if having a Large
increase in the percentage of WOB has an effect on opportunities for other women and
the gender pay gap, the variable Increase is used to split the FTSE All Share sample into
Large increase and Small increase groups. The treatment variable is represented by a
dummy T Î {0,1}. Therefore, T=1 if Increase>c, and T=0 if Increase<c.
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Outcome Variables
Phase I. For the first phase of the study that examines the effects of the Davies
Review as a comply or explain initiative on changes in gender composition of FTSE
boards. The first outcome variable is Increase, which represents the increase of WOB
calculated as the difference between the percentage of WOB in June 2016 and the
percentage of WOB in 2011. Another outcome variable of this phase of the study is the
type of directorship women occupy, executive (WED) vs. non-executive (WNED). Finally,
the final outcome for this phase of the study are CEO gender (CEOGnd), and chairperson
gender (ChairGnd), measured as of June 2016.
Phase II. The outcome variables for the second phase of the study, which
examines the effects of being categorized as having a gender-balanced board on
opportunities for other women in the organization, are: percentage of women in executive
leadership (WExecPC), percentage of women in senior management (WSMPC),
percentage of women in the organization (WEmpPC), measured as of June 2016.
Additionally, the outcome variables gender pay gap mean (PayGapMean), gender pay
gap median (PayGapMedian) as of 2017 were also be examined as outcome variables.
Covariates
In order to rule out alternative explanations of the effects of the Davies Review on
the outcome variables of this study, a number of covariates were examined. Table 1
shows the complete list of the organizational variables of this study, and Table 2 shows
the individual female director variables that were used for this study, including all
identified covariates. These covariates have been selected because existing literature has
indicated that they have an effect on the study’s outcome variables. For example, in
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studies in which WOB was the outcome variable, the organizational variables of firm size,
board size, and industry were found to have a significant effect (Hillman et al., 2007).
Studies that examined different organizational outcomes associated with WOB
found that director age and experience had an effect on the relationship of the observed
variables (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012). When examining women’s influence on boards,
literature suggests that critical mass (three women or more) is essential for them to be
able to have a voice and effect change (Arena, Cirilo, Mussolino, Pulcinelli, Saggese, &
Sarto, 2015; Joecks, Pull, & Vetter, 2013; Konrad et al., 2008; Kramer, Konrad, Erkut, &
Hooper, 2006; Torchia et al., 2011). Bilimoria (2006) that the proportion of WOB was
positively related to the proportion of women in senior management. Research linked the
inclusion of WOB to CEO gender, as CEOs were found to select candidates who were
demographically similar to them (Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010; Westphal & Zajac, 1995).
Additionally, one important covariate that included in the second phase of the
study is Increase. Several organizations were above the threshold or very close to it at the
start of the initiative, therefore, the percentage of WOB may not be related to the Lord
Davies initiative. Similarly, organizations that were close to the threshold set by the
Davies Review faced smaller constraints than those organizations that had to double or
triple female representation on their boards to meet the target. Therefore, the covariate
Increase is expected to be a significant covariate. Existing literature indicated that
government-interventions for the increase of WOB resulted in high demand of women
directors creating a small group of women on several boards (Seirstad & Opsahl, 2011;
Vernos, 2013). Similarly, annual reports of the organizations included in this study’s
sample indicated that competition for women directors created by the Davies Review
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initiative made it difficult for them to recruit women directors for their boards.
Consequently, it is reasonable to foresee that high demand for women directors may also
have an impact on some demographics of female directors newly appointed to boards.
Ahern and Dittmar (2012) found that the gender quota for WOB in Norway impacted the
average age and experience of female board members; therefore, those covariates were
examined to understand their significance to the study’s outcomes.
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Table 1
Organizational variables collected for every year in the 2008-20161 period
Variable name Description
Numeric value from 1 to 395 assigned to each
Firm
company
Code representing the LSE standard abbreviation of a
EPIC
security’s name
Name
Company name
Company
Number
Industry
Sector
MCap
Index

Company registration number
Industry group according to the LSE
Industry sector group according to LSE
Market capitalization according to LSE
FTSE index (FTSE 100, FTSE 250 or FTSE Small
Cap).

Source
Generated value
FTSE Russell
FTSE Russell
Annual reports,
gender pay gap
service
FTSE Russell
FTSE Russell
FTSE Russell
FTSE Russell

Rank

FTSE index ranking based on All Share ranking.

Board

Total number of board directors

WOB

Total number of women on the board

WOBPC

Percentage of women on boards

WED
WEDPC
WNED
WNEDPC

Number of women executive directors
Percentage of women executive directors
Number of women non-executive directors
Percentage of women non-executive directors

Generated value
based on MCap
Davies annual reviews,
annual reports
Annual reports
Davies Reviews,
Generated values
Annual reports
Generated value
Annual reports
Generated value

ChairGnd

Chairperson gender. Dummy {0=Male, 1=Female}

Annual reports

CEOGnd

CEO gender. Dummy {0=Male, 1=Female}

Annual reports

Total number of executives on the executive board
Annual reports
(operational board/c-suite)
WExec
Number of women on executive board
Annual reports
WExecPC
Percentage of women on the executive board
Generated value
SM
Total number of senior managers
Annual reports
WSM
Number of women in senior management
Annual reports
WSMPC
Percentage of women in senior management
Generated value
Emp
Total number of employees in the organization
Annual reports
WEmp
Number of women employees in the organization
Annual reports
WEmpPC
Percentage of women of the total employee population Generated value
GPGMean2
Gender pay gap mean
Pay gap service
2
GPGMedian Gender pay gap median
Pay gap service
1
Note. All figures are year-end figures with the exception of 2016, which represents data as of
June 2016. 2The gender pay gap mean and medium metrics are only available for one year, 2017.
Exec
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Table 2
Individual characteristics of female directors within the firm-years 2008-2016*
Variable name

Description

Name

Director name
Type of directorship ED for executive director, NED for nonPosition
executive director
CEO
Occupies CEO position. Dummy variable. 1=Yes, 0=No
Chair
Occupies chair position. Dummy variable. 1=Yes, 0=No
Age
Age
Appointment year
Year appointed to board
White (European), Black, Asian (including Indian, Pakistani,
Race/Ethnicity
Bangladeshi), Middle Eastern (including Jewish), Hispanic (including
Spaniards).
Race
Dummy variable for race/ethnicity. 0=White, 1=Non-white
Tenure
Generated value. Number of years in current position.
Highest level of education attained. 0=High school, 1=Bachelor’s
Education
degree, 2=Master’s degree, 3=Professional degree (MD/JD),
4=Doctoral degree.
Education major (accounting, business, engineering, medicine,
Education major
physics, etc.)
CEOExperience
Dummy variable. 1=Yes, 0=No
Industry Experience
Previous industry experience
Area of expertise (finance, HR, marketing, IT, strategy,
Expertise
communications)
Note. *These variables were collected from annual reports for each female board member for
each year in the 2008-2016 period.

Population and Sample
The population of this study is publicly listed organizations trading in the London
Stock Exchange. The Davies Review initiative for WOB applied to the FTSE 100 and
FTSE 250 organizations during the years of 2011 to 2015. However, to identify the
effect of the initiative on gender diversity in organizations, this study collected data from
the FTSE All Share constituents, which includes FTSE 100, FTSE 250 and FTSE Small
Cap organizations. Ranked right after the FTSE 350 organizations, the FTSE Small Cap
index constituents served as a comparison group for the study’s phase I analyses, as the
Davies Review targets did not apply to them.
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Although the Davies Review targets for FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 boards was
rolled out in 2011, the U.K. coalition government pledged to promote gender equality on
corporate boards in 2010. Therefore, this study assumes that the pledge was an informal
announcement of forthcoming government intervention targeting gender composition of
corporate boards. Consequently, to provide a comprehensive picture of the transformation
of FTSE 350 boards, names of all organizations that traded in the LSE and were indexed
in the FTSE All Share anytime from 2008 to 2016 were collected, which covered three
years prior to the formal announcement of the initiative and the year after the deadline for
achieving the target. However, for the main tests, this study restricts its inquiry to the
organizations that were listed in 2011, which is the year that the Davies Review was
rolled out, and the year used for participant assignment to control and treatment groups
for the first phase of the study.
The sample for this study consisted of FTSE All Share organizations in the years
2008 to 2016 that were listed and indexed in 2011, excluding investment trust institutions,
which are subject to different rules and tend to not have employees. To identify the
available sample, this study started with the list of full set of publicly listed companies
trading in main market of the LSE in 2011 (N=1419). To identify the FTSE All Share
index constituents on the LSE list, historical data from the FTSE Russell website was
used. The FTSE All Share constituents in 2011 consisted of 612 organizations.
Considering the relatively small number of observations, 11 additional organizations that
were trading in the LSE but entered the FTSE index within a few months of the initiative
roll out and remained in the index through 2016 were also included. After excluding
investment trust institutions, and delisted institutions for which reports were not available
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for 2011, the 2011 sample for FTSE 100 (n=96), FTSE 250 (n=189), and FTSE Small
Cap (n=110) consisted of 395 organizations. Table 3 reports the annual breakdown of the
full sample for this study by FTSE index, which consists of a total of 3541 firm yearobservations over 2008 to 2016 for 395 unique organizations. Within the firm-year
observations, the total number of female-director-year observations is 4207.
Table 3
Sample Observations by Year and Index
Index

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016*

FTSE 100 - Firms
Female directors
FTSE 250 - Firms
Female directors
FTSE Small - Firms
Female directors

94
122
181
88
110
42

95
125
186
103
110
45

96
137
189
120
110
49

96
160
189
151
110
62

96
192
189
204
110
69

96
207
189
247
110
78

96
247
189
289
110
86

96
269
189
320
110
98

96
266
189
323
110
108

Firms (n)
Female directors (n)

385
252

391
273

395
306

395
373

395
465

395
532

395
622

395
687

395
697

Note. n=sample size. *All figures represent year-end metrics, except 2016. The 2016 sample
represents metrics as of June 2016.

The data pay gap reporting requirement was implemented in 2017. Organizations
with more than 250 employees were required to disclose their gender pay gap data for
2017 by April of 2018. Although, an attempt was made to collect gender pay gap data for
each of the 395 firms in the baseline sample, only 318 of them were available. Table 4
provides a breakdown of sample available for the gender pay gap analyses.
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Table 4
Gender Pay Gap Data Sample
Index

n

Gender Pay Gap
Mean*

FTSE 100
90
FTSE 250
152
FTSE Small Cap
76
Pooled sample
318
Note. n=sample size; *mean percentages for each group.

23.39
20.22
18.74
20.76

Gender Pay Gap
Median*
20.89
15.56
17.11
17.44

Data Collection Procedures
The Companies Act 2006, the main piece of legislation that governs company law
in the United Kingdom, mandates that all companies registered in the United Kingdom
provide annual reports, which are publicly available. In 2012, as a result of the Davies
Review, the U.K. CGC was amended to include provisions for FTSE 350 to include a
separate section in their annual reports describing the board’s diversity policy and
including gender metrics. Although most companies complied with this guideline, not all
of them included a full disclosure of their gender metrics at different organizational
levels; therefore, some missing data were expected.
To identify the effect of the Davies Review initiative in relation to this study’s
hypotheses, a database was built using several sources. To build the database containing
all the variables that were used in the study’s analyses (Table 1 and Table 2), data from
the FTSE Russell website, annual Davies Reviews, company annual reports, and the
gender pay gap service from the national archives were collected. First spreadsheets
containing the names of FTSE All Share constituents for each year of the 2008 to 2016
period were be downloaded from the FTSE Russell website. Next, data for FTSE 350
organizations, at the aggregate director-level by organization were collected from the
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reported Lord Davies annual reviews. Specifically, for every year in the 2011 to 2015
period, available data for the variables: company name, sector, percentage of WOB,
number of women board members, and total board size were collected from the Lord
Davies annual reviews.
Annual reports for the years in the 2008 to 2016 period for the organizations
identified as the study’s sample were downloaded from the FTSE Russell website,
corporate websites and Companies House database. Next, corporate governance and
gender diversity sections from each annual report were printed and data from printouts
were used for validating data collected from the annual Davies Reviews. Annual reports
were used to populate the database for FTSE Small Cap organizations for the years 2011
through 2015, and for the entire sample organizations for the years 2008 through 2010,
which were prior to the announcement of the Davies Review. Annual reports were also
used to collect data for 2016.
Similarly, annual reports were used to collect information for each female board
member, female CEO, and, where available, executive committee members. For each
female board member, executive committee members, CEO, and chairperson, names,
gender, ethnicity, age, title (executive vs non-executive), education, prior experience, and
year first elected to the board were collected. Initially, this study had planned to follow
the method used in Ahern and Dittmar (2012) for gathering gender information about
board members, which consisted in using the photo of the director in the annual report to
identify their gender. However, as a result of the gender metrics reporting requirement
published in the 2012 amendment to the U.K. CGC, organizations disclose the gender of
each board director and in most cases, gender of the members of their executive boards.
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Therefore, the gender of each board member and executive board member was collected
from annual reports.
Data for the gender pay gap were downloaded from the gender pay gap service
website. The gender pay gap data is delivered by the National Archives and is subject to
open government license (Appendix C), which allows the public to copy, publish,
distribute and transmit the information contained in document. This study collected the
variables company number (used as matching field), gender pay gap median and gender
pay gap mean for all available organizations identified in the sample. Disclosure of
gender pay gap data was mandatory for organizations that have 250 or more employees in
the United Kingdom, therefore, there are organizations in the sample for which gender
pay gap data was not available because they were not required to disclose it; however, not
all organizations that were subject to this requirement complied; therefore, there were
missing values for the pay gap variables.
Records for each organization were examined for missing values. For missing
data, the Companies House database was used to populate the study’s database. When
discrepancies were found between two data sources, data from the Companies House
database prevailed. In cases in which data were not reported on annual reports and were
not available on the Companies House database, they were left blank in the study’s
database.
Data Validation
The need for using every annual report in the study (n=3541) (See Table 3 for
detailed breakdown) for validating data collected from the Lord Davies Reviews, and regenerating the figures collected from their reviews arose from finding several mistakes on
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the numbers reported in the Davies Reviews and inconsistencies in reporting on annual
reviews (See Appendix D). The data used by the Lord Davies Reviews is sourced by
Boardex and Cranfield School of Management (Davies, 2011). Although Boardex data is
used in multiple academic publications, they do not make any warranty with respect to
the accuracy or reliability of their data (Boardex, 2017). The multiple inaccuracies
found in the Lord Davies Reviews compelled the study’s researcher to validate the data
more thoroughly in order to obtain accurate estimates for the study’s analyses. The
review of annual reports revealed mistakes and inconsistencies in reporting gender
metrics. Additionally, multiple organizations reported their board diversity percentages
including the company secretary to the number of board members; however, when
reading individual director profiles, they disclosed that company secretary was not a
director appointed to the board. Therefore, for consistency, percentages had to be recomputed based on the actual number of directors on the board. The same procedure was
followed for generating the gender split of executive committees. For senior
management and company-wide gender metrics, the total number of female employees at
each level was divided by the total number of employees at their respective level in order
to generate gender split metrics for senior management and company-wide.
To ensure accuracy of the study’s collected data, each year were validated
separately and changes in gender composition of each board were accounted for by
matching the data that contained the total number of WOB by organization, with the
names collected for each year. For example, if in 2011, a board had 2 women, and 2012,
it had 4 women, the database containing the individual names of board members had to
contain two additional names in 2012 than it did in 2011. Every discrepancy with the
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Davies Review data was double checked to ensure that the most accurate data was kept
for analyses. As a result of the data validation process, the most accurate database on
FTSE boards was developed and used for the study’s analyses.
Sample Representativeness
The universe of organizations trading in the main market of the LSE includes over
1400 firms in any given year, about half of which are ranked in the FTSE indices. In
2011, 631 firms were included in the FTSE All Share index. After excluding investment
trust firms, and removing organizations that have merged, been acquired, or delisted, and
adding 11 organizations that were added to the FTSE index within months of the
initiative rollout, the total the baseline sample is 395 organizations. The pre-test post-test
design of the analyses do not make it feasible for analyses to include organizations that
entered the index in subsequent years; hence, the sample includes organizations that were
included in the 395 baseline sample, 285 of which were FTSE 350 constituents. This
means that despite data availability, there are organizations excluded from the analyses
because they were not part of the baseline sample.
Group Comparisons
The FTSE 100, FTSE 250, and FTSE Small Cap samples were split into treatment
and comparison groups based on the three forcing variables and cutoff scores described
previously. To ensure that any treatment effects resulting from the RDD analyses were
attributed to the treatment, first the samples on treatment and comparison groups were
tested on their equivalence across several variables. Additionally, a comparison of
industries was performed to identify industries that were more likely to have WOB.
Fisher’s exact tests of the differences in the distribution of industries by treatment
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assignment were performed to identify if there were statistically significant differences in
the likelihood of any organizations to be in any particular industry based on their
treatment assignment.
Chi-square tests were performed to compare the distribution of the sample in
relation to the number of board members, number of employees, FTSE index, market
capitalization, number of female CEOs, and number of female chairpersons, as applicable
for the phase of the study. However, considering the small sample size, Fisher’s exact
tests were performed as well, as literature indicates that Fisher’s exact test is more
sensitive to small samples and provides more precise estimates than the chi-square test
(Kim, 2017; McHugh, 2013). Practical significance tests were computed as well,
Cramer’s V statistics were reported to indicate the effect size, and odds ratios were
reported to indicate the odds of an organization to be in a particular group based on the
examined variable.
Correlations. As mentioned previously, when the Davies Review initiative was
rolled out, there were differences among organizations in the FTSE 100, FTSE 250, and
FTSE Small Cap groups. Therefore, taking into account the nested nature of the data,
correlations were computed using a multilevel analysis by Index to identify within group
and between group correlations. These correlations were analyzed to identify correlations
within groups that may indicate a risk of collinearity, and correlations between groups
that may suggest the need for clustering standard errors (Thompson, 2011).
Treatment of Missing Data
Although every effort has been made to obtain annual reports for the 395
organizations in sample for every year in the 2008 to 2016 period, for multiple reasons,
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data for each variable was not available for every observation in the dataset. The most
frequently used treatment of missing data in RD designs in the current literature seems to
be removing observations with missing values from the analyses (Chen & Shapiro, 2007;
Dong, 2015); which is also the most widely used method for dealing with missing data in
the social sciences (Schlomer & Bauman, 2010). Scholars have pointed out that dealing
with missing data using listwise, pairwise, or mean substitution can produce biased
estimates, distort statistical power, and result in erroneous conclusions (Acock, 2005;
Honaker & King, 2010). When missing values are present, deleting the row of data,
under the most optimistic assumptions causes estimates that are a standard error farther
from the truth (King, Honaker & Joseph, & Scheve, 2001).
Considering the loss of power that would result from a smaller sample (McKight,
McKight, Sidani, & Figueredo, 2007), loss of precision of the estimates that would result
from removing rows with missing values (King et al., 2001), and following the
dissertation committee’s recommendation, a method for missing data imputation was
implemented. The Multiple Imputation by Chained Equations (MICE) R package was
used to generate missing values. Literature supports the multiple imputation method, as
it uses a predictive model to generating data and improves precision of estimates
compared to listwise deletion (Honaker & King, 2010).
Phase I variables had virtually a full dataset. The FTSE 350 sample (n=285) had
full sets of values every variable in the years 2010 to 2016. Values for ten organizations
in 2008 and four organizations in 2009 were unavailable due to those organizations not
being listed in those years. However, the baseline year for phase I was 2011, therefore
data imputation for phase I was not necessary.
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The baseline year for phase II of the study was 2016. Four variables used in the
hypotheses tests of this phase of the study contained missing values. The variable
indicating the percentage of women on executive boards (WExecPC) had 107 missing
values (27%). The variable indicating the percentage of women in senior management
(WSMPC) had 63 missing values (16%). Variables that represented the mean and median
gender pay gap values ( PayGapMean, PayGapMedian) had 77 missing values each
(20%). Therefore, the following data imputation process was followed to generate
imputed data for the missing values for those variables.
Identification of Missing Data Mechanism
Prior to engaging in the process of data imputation, an evaluation of the feasibility
of data imputation was performed. The amount of missing values to be imputed seemed
to be high; however existing literature indicates that in quantitative research missing data
are a rule rather than an exception (Dong & Peng, 2013). In the social sciences, it is not
uncommon to see missing rates of 20% (Enders, 2003); however, in about 97% of studies
that report missing data, listwise or pairwise deletion is used, which are associated with
biased estimates (Dong & Peng, 2013; King et al., 2001; Schafer, 1997). Studies have
compared estimates of imputed data at different rates of missingness (i.e., 20%, 40% and
60%) indicated that identifying the missing data mechanism and using the right
imputation method is more important than the amount of missing data (Dong & Peng,
2013).
Newgard and Haukoos (2007) examined the effect of sample size on multiple
imputation estimates. Their analyses contrasted the results of a small sample (n=110); a
large sample (n=1015) and a very large sample (n=38354) for which imputed values had
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been generated in 10% increments up to 70%. Their results suggested that estimates
using the imputed values for the large datasets were stable throughout the spectrum (i.e.,
up to 70% of imputed values). However, the small data set started to show bias for
imputed values at above the 30% missingness rate. Therefore, considering that, a)
missingness rates for the variables to be imputed were reasonable, and b) that evidence
has not indicated that at those missing rates the sample size would pose a problem, data
for those values were imputed.
Scholars suggest that identifying the process that created the missing data impacts
the way in which data should be examined. Tests for identifying data patterns of missing
values can help in the process. However, often, the cause of missing values in a dataset is
unknown; therefore, assumptions must be made in order to help determine the reasons for
missingness (Van Buuren & Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2010). Multiple tests for identifying
the pattern of missing data for each variable were performed.
Prior to the amendment of the U.K. CGC in 2012, organizations were not required
to disclose their gender metrics; therefore, there is a considerable amount of missing data
in several variables. After the amendment, the lack of a clear definition of senior
management resulted in the disclosure of only executive board membership by some
organizations, only senior management by others, and disclosure of all levels of
management membership by others. Therefore, the missing values for WExec and
WSMPC are due to the lack of clarity in reporting, rather than omission. Conversely, the
gender pay gap reporting requirement was mandatory for all organizations with 250 or
more employees. In the study’s sample, 77 organizations did not disclose their gender
pay gap; however, only 26 of them had fewer than 250 employees.
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Following the recommendations in the literature, assumptions were made in order
to understand the underlying reasons for the missing data. It was reasonable to assume
that data for the WExecPC and WSMPC variables were missing at random. However,
considering the nature of the PayGap data, it was likely that the missing values did not
happen randomly. Previous studies have found that the most problematic type of missing
data are missing not at random (MNAR), for which non-response or missingness is
related to the value that would have been observed (Sinharay, Stern, & Russell, 2001). A
common example of missing values on survey data is income, because individuals with
high or low income tend to not disclose that information. The PayGap data may present
a similar problem. The disclosure requirement mandated by the U.K. Government may
have acted as a deterrent for organizations that would not have reported their gender pay
gaps voluntarily. However, the 77 missing values for the PayGap variables represent a
20% non-response rate, which appeared to not be missing at random.
When missing data are MNAR, there is not a universal method of handling the
missing values (Donders, Van Der heijden, Stijnen, & Moons, 2006). Existing literature
provides multiple techniques for imputation of MNAR models (Albert & Follmann,
2009; Little, 2009). Under MNAR, the model fitted to the observed cases is only correct
for the observed cases and incorrect for the missing cases, thus, it cannot be used for the
imputation. Additionally, estimating the amount of error would be impossible without
the use of external data.
Although it is possible to use the predictive information in the observed data to
impute missing values and perform post-processing imputations, it is not possible to test
MNAR data because data needed for such tests are, by definition, missing (Van Buuren
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& Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2010). Therefore, data for all missing values were imputed;
however, imputed values for the PayGap variables were only available for use had the
non-parametric RDD analyses required more observations.
Data Imputation Process
Scholars have argued that in existing research in the social sciences, an often
neglected requirement in data imputation approaches is that the imputation model for
generating imputed values must be as rigorous as the analysis model (Ludtke, Robitzsch,
& Grund, 2017). Others have suggested that electing a fixed effects imputation model to
a mixed effects multilevel imputation model is the tradeoff of rigor for simplicity, which
can produce substantial bias (Drechsler, 2015). Therefore, in an effort to ensure a
rigorous data imputation process, and taking into account the clustered nature of the data,
a multilevel imputation method was used to generate data for missing values. Following
the recommendations in Van Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn (2010) for data MAR and
MNAR imputation, the variables WExecPC and WSMPC were imputed using two
different methods. The two-level Bayesian linear regression, with heterogeneous withingroup variances method (2l.norm), and the predictive mean matching method (2l.pmm).
The variables PayGapMean and PayGapMedian were imputed using a two-level
Bayesian linear regression, with heterogeneous within-group variances, with postprocessing adjustment increasing imputations for the PayGap variables.
While it is recommended to include as many predictors as possible in order to
have minimal bias in the imputation, Van Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn (1999)
suggest that for imputation purposes, no more than 15 to 25 variables be used. Therefore,
predictor variables for data imputation were used based on their predictive relation to the
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selected outcomes. Regressions and correlations were performed on the outcome
variables to identify the most significant predictors. Predictor selection for generating
missing values was initially done using the covariates identified in existing literature;
therefore, non-statistically significant covariates that were included in the equations for
hypothesis tests were not removed from the predictor matrix. The predictor matrix
indicated the dependent variable, class variable, and predictors for fixed and random
effects for each variable to be imputed.
Five sets of data were generated, pooled and tested. Multiple diagnostics tests
were used to identify problems in the imputation process or with the imputed datasets.
After obtaining satisfactory results from all diagnostic tests, the pooled data were
extracted and appended to the study’s database.
Data Analysis Procedures
The first announcement of the U.K. coalition government in 2010 indicating that
it would target corporate boards was an unexpected pledge that resulted by a change in
government from the Labour to the Conservative-Democratic Liberal parties; therefore,
the exogeneity of the Davies Review initiative is assumed. The increase in female board
representation on FTSE 350 boards from a 3.1% in the six years prior to the initiative
compared to a 12.5% increase in the five-year duration of the intervention (Davies, 2015)
provides some evidence of the exogenous event. However, it would be misleading to
attribute the Lord Davies initiative with causing FTSE 350 boards to more than double
their female participation without first properly assessing if there is a causal relationship
and measuring its impact. After all, women’s representation at different levels of
leadership has been slowly but consistently increasing over the past few decades.
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Therefore, endogenous variation was measured by observing annual variation from 2008
to 2011 and comparing it with the variation after the announcement of the Davies Review
(i.e., 2011 – 2016). Data from FTSE 100, FTSE 250, and FTSE Small Cap organizations
were used to measure variation by index.
When using different thresholds in RD designs, the most common approach is to
normalize and pool scores from all groups into one sample (Cattaneo, Keele, Titiunik, &
Vazquez-Bare, 2016). Studies that estimated the effect of state-sponsored prekindergarten programs for which admission was determined based on a cutoff date
pooled data from different states by transforming the assignment variable by centering it
at the cutoff point (Barnett, Lamy, & Jung, 2005; Dickert-Conlin & Elder, 2010;
McCrary & Royer, 2011; McEwan & Shapiro, 2008; Skibbe, Connor, Morrison, &
Jewkes, 2011). For example, if state A has a cutoff date of July 31, and state B’s cutoff
date is August 31, applicants whose date of birth is August 15, in state A would be
admitted and placed in the treatment group with a score of 15; however, in state B that
date of birth would place an applicant in the control group with a score of -16. Centering
the samples in this way allows pooling the data into one sample for a single cutoff RD
analysis, which can provide unbiased estimates of an average effect of the treatment
across samples (Wong, Steiner, & Cook, 2013).
Statistical Assumptions
The centering and pooling data approach into one single treatment and single
control group assumes that the samples being pooled are similar in terms of their shape.
That is, the relationship of X and Y must be similar across groups. Therefore, to satisfy
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that assumption, data were evaluated for linearity. Additionally, in order to test if the data
was suited for parametric tests, normality, and homoscedasticity were also tested.
As mentioned previously, this study uses three different assignment variables,
WOBPC2011, WOBPC2016, and Increase. The outcomes tested in the RD analyses were
Increase, WExecPC2016, WSMPC2016, WEmpPC2016, PayGapMean, and PayGapMedian.
In order to satisfy the assumption of a similar relationship between X and Y for pooling
the data into one sample, the study’s forcing variables and outcomes were regressed
according to the hypothesized relationships. Distributions of the forcing variable were
plotted to identify discontinuous patterns around the cutoffs and relationships of X and Y
were plotted to help in the determination that across groups the predictor and outcome
had similar relationships.
Additionally, taking into account that the data included several dummy variables
that were important to the observed relationships, a test of multivariate normality was not
used. Instead, the assumptions were tested using the gvlma package, Global Validation
of Linear Model Assumptions (Pena & Slate, 2014). Diagnostic plots were generated to
help evaluate the assumptions. The residuals vs. fitted plots were examined to ensure that
residuals were linearly distributed across the 0 line with no other discernable pattern.
Outliers were identified and their influence to the regression line was assessed on the
residuals vs. leverage plot based on their distance from the Cook’s line.
Although, literature recommends the removal of outliers (Barnett & Lewis, 1994;
Judd & McClelland, 1989); the removal of legitimate outliers has arguments for and
against (Osborne & Overbay, 2004). Therefore, to ensure accuracy, identified outliers
were examined against the original source of the data, and legitimate outliers were kept in
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the dataset and not removed from the sample. However, it is noteworthy to mention that
in non-parametric regression discontinuity designs, the extreme parts of the range of the
forcing variable are not used in the effect estimation, therefore, the impact of outliers is
minimized (Visser & de Leeuw, 1984).
Internal Validity of the RD approach
To test exogenous variation in women’s board participation that resulted from the
Davies Review and to verify that gender composition of FTSE 350 boards was not
impacted at the time of the Davies Review announcement, the full dataset from 2008 to
2016 was examined. A panel study was performed to identify the effects of time on the
outcome variable WOBPC and to identify if there were differences in the interaction of
time and FTSE Index. As noted previously, although slow, women’s participation on
corporate boards followed an upwards trend. Therefore, to ensure that the increase in the
percentage of WOB was not simply the effect of time, the pooled FTSE All Share sample
was used. Since the Davies Review targeted only FTSE 350 boards, differences between
FTSE 350 and FTSE Small Cap boards after the announcement of the Davies Review
were expected. Longitudinal data from 2008 to 2016 were analyzed in a mixed effects
regression model for repeated measures data.
Furthermore, there are conditions under which causal inferences from an RD
analysis can be as credible as those from a randomized experiment, and under which the
validity of the RD design can be tested by detecting a discontinuity in any outcome
variable at the assignment variable’s threshold (Lee, 2008). As mentioned previously, a
critical assumption underlying causality through RD is that the group of participants
around the cutoff point are equal in expectation on all dimensions, other than exposure to
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treatment in the participants of the treatment group. However, there are two threats to the
validity of this assumption. The first threat relates to the impact of any underlying
relationship between the outcome and the forcing variable on estimated treatment effects
and the second one relates to the actions of the participants themselves that may impact
group assignment. This study addressed both threats to the validity of causal inferences
of this study as explained below.
Relationship Between the Outcome and Forcing Variable
If such a relationship exists, the treatment observed effect or the discontinuity
may stem from the forcing variable rather than from the impact of the treatment that was
available on one side of the cut-off and not on the other. Several tests were conducted to
examine the relationship of the forcing variable and outcomes.
First, an investigation of any potential incentives or programs that may be
available for organizations based on their percentage of WOB that may influence the
outcome was performed. In the timeframe of the initiative (2011- 2016), there were
organizations that promoted the increase of WOB, the most popular being the 30% club.
Although the 30% club may influence some boards to increase their percentage of
women, the participation is voluntary and only a small percentage of FTSE boards have
pledged to reach that target. In fact, the Davies Review may have influenced boards to
join the 30% club rather than the other way around, as the Davies Review was rolled out
prior to the 30% club started recruiting organization members.
Additionally, at the time of this study (2018), UBS announced that it would
launch a fund that would only invest in organizations with good gender diversity indices.
Similarly, in the U.S., the SHE index, a gender diversity ETF, only invests in
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organizations that have a good gender diversity index, meaning that they have a greater
gender diversity within senior leadership than other organizations in their sector.
Although those funds were launched outside of the time window of this study, they
represent a potential confounder for future evaluations of gender diversity increases on
corporate boards.
To rule out the assignment variable as the source for the discontinuous jump in
the outcome, Ludwig and Miller (2007) proposed that one way to strengthen the claim
that their RD design provides an unbiased estimate of the causal effect of the treatment.
In their study, they examined the causal impact of the Head Start program on improved
health and educational outcomes for children. To strengthen their causal claim, they
examined a pseudo-outcome, per-capita social spending (Ludwig & Miller, 2007). Had a
discontinuity in their pseudo-outcome been identified, then their claim of causal effects
from the head start program would have been jeopardized.
Therefore, for every causal claim of this study, that is when the treatment effect is
statistically significant, this study tested other variables that should not have been
impacted by the treatment such as board size, pseudo-outcomes. If the increase in the
percentage of WOB is due to an adjustment in board size rather than a real increase in
women’s participation, then a discontinuity would be present at the threshold and the
increase of gender diversity on boards as a result of the Davies Review would have to be
ruled out. Additionally, pseudo-cutoffs were also tested. Pseudo-cutoffs are one of the
most widely used robustness or falsification tests used in RD studies (Ludwig & Miller,
2007).
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Integrity of the Forcing Variable
The second threat concerns actions by participants themselves that may threaten
the integrity of the forcing variable. If organizations are aware that the forcing variable is
used for assignment to treatment and control groups, they may be able to transfer
themselves from one side of the cut-off to the other, jeopardizing the exogeneity of the
assignment process and undermines the assumption of equality of expectation for those of
the assignment process and undermines the assumption of equality of expectation for
those in the treatment and control groups. However, assignment to participants to the
FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE, 350, FTSE Small, and FTSE All Share is done strictly
based on market capitalization of publicly listed companies that trade in the LSE, which
is something controlled by the market, not the organization. Additionally, when the U.K.
coalition government pledged to promote gender equality on corporate boards, they did
not announce what organizations they would focus on. In the same way they could have
focused only on FTSE 100 organizations, they could have rolled out the initiative for the
FTSE All Share boards.
Phase I. The targets set by the Davies Review were arbitrary and constructed in a
way that would make it an achievable goal. The calculation used to arrive at those targets
used aggregated data for each FTSE index. Organizations below the target were required
to increase their participation of WOB to reach the minimum target. Prior to the Lord
Davies initiative, gender composition on FTSE boards is assumed to be endogenous. The
nature of board appointment in publicly listed organizations makes it highly unlikely that
FTSE boards manipulated their percentage of WOB prior to the intervention. For
publicly listed companies, the U.K. CGC recommends that a nomination committee,
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which usually consist of independent non-executive directors, should lead the process for
board appointments and make recommendations to the board. If the board supports the
appointment, it has to be confirmed by shareholders by way of ordinary resolution at the
next annual general meeting following the appointment (Financial Reporting Council,
2016). Therefore, observed differences between treatment and control groups are not
likely to be impacted by participants’ actions related to group assignment.
Phase II. The Davies Review evaluated the outcome of the initiative on October
2015. As indicated previously, the forcing variable WOBPC2016 was used to assign
organizations to the treatment and comparison groups. Using the target set by the Davies
Review as the cutoff point (c=25%) organizations over the threshold were placed into the
Compliant (treatment) and Non-compliant (comparison) groups. The public
acknowledgement through the Davies Review provided to organizations that were
progressing toward the 25% goal or achieved it represents the treatment. Organizations
that reached or exceeded the goal were recognized as being compliant with the initiative.
However, organizations had knowledge that they were expected to reach their targets by
the end of 2015. Although it is unlikely that organizations manipulated their percentages
of WOB to receive recognition in their gender diversity efforts, there are a couple of
situations in which some manipulation may have occurred. For example, organizations
that had a higher proportion of male directors throughout the year, delayed the
replacement of a male director to the beginning of 2016, thus appeared to have a higher
WOBPC at the end of 2015, and female directors that were leaving the organization may
have stayed through the end of 2015. In an examination of the annual reports of 2015, a
total of 15 organizations that fit the cases aforementioned were identified, which
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represents 10% of the group. Furthermore, as these observations are so close to the
threshold, they would have a direct impact on the non-parametric estimates. Therefore,
to minimize the potential impact to the internal validity of the study, the forcing variable
used for testing these hypotheses was measured as of June of 2016, WOBPC2016.
Organizations over the 25% threshold were placed in the Compliant (treatment) group,
and organizations below the threshold were placed in the Non-compliant (comparison)
group.
Regression discontinuity designs do not require a pre-test and post-test
measurement, but only that the assignment variable is independent of the outcome. For
example, using cross-sectional data, Angrist and Lavy (1999) used data from a natural
experiment to examine whether being in a large class size (c=40) had an effect on student
achievement. Carpenter and Dobkin (2009) examined the effects of the minimum
drinking age (c=21) on mortality rates. Therefore, using the effect of the minimum target
set by the Davies Review as critical mass (c=25%) on opportunities for women in the
organization and the gender pay gap seems reasonable as the cutoff was determined
independently from the outcomes being observed.
Similarly, the second assignment variable of phase II, Increase, was used tested as
alternative explanation to the previous tests. In the case of this assignment variable,
organizations had no control over it. Although the Davies Review set a target that
organizations adopted, all organizations had different starting points. Therefore, the
levels of increase of WOBPC were different across the sample. Additionally, the cutoff
point used for splitting the sample is completely exogenous, as it is the median Increase
achieved by the pooled sample. Furthermore, organizations that were not included in the
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treatment group in the previous tests may be included in the treatment group in these tests.
For example, organizations that had no women on their boards at the start of the initiative
and strived to achieve 25% of WOB but only reached 20%, would be included in the
Large (treatment) group. Organizations that had more than 25% at the start of the
initiative and did not increase their percentage of WOB would be placed in the Small
(comparison) group.
To test this assumption and rule out manipulation of the assignment variable, the
McCrary density test (McCrary, 2006, 2008) were performed for each group for every
assignment variable. Results for every group demonstrated that there was no
manipulation of the assignment variables WOBPC2011, WOBPC2016 and Increase.
Continuity Assumption and Local Randomization
In the RD literature, researchers often invoke local randomization to justify the
validity of their designs (Dunning, 2008, p. 289). However, local randomization is
neither required, nor sufficient for the interpretation of causal effects in RD designs
(Cattaneo et al., 2015). Local randomization occurs when participants have imprecise
control over X, thus the probability of treatment status is randomized around the threshold,
which can produce “as good as random” group assignment (Lee & Lemieux, 2010, p.
282). However, it is possible that the forcing variable can appear to be randomized
around the threshold and yet influence the outcome variable in such a way that it violates
the continuity assumption (De la Cuesta & Imai, 2016). An example of the continuity
assumption violation despite apparent randomization of the forcing variable around the
threshold was observed with the data for this study. Initially, this study intended to use
FTSE Rank as the forcing variable; however, tests revealed that despite the seemingly
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random assignment of organizations to FTSE indices around the cutoff, the influence that
FTSE rank has on the outcome variable of this study violated the continuity assumption
despite local randomization. Unlike the continuity assumption, local randomization is
not required for RD designs (Cattaneo et al., 2015; Skovron & Titiunik, 2015).
The most important condition for identification in RD design is the continuity
assumption of the conditional expectation of counterfactual outcomes in the forcing
variable. This means that for observation i, there are two potential outcomes, which are
conditional to what side of the threshold i falls onto based on its score on the assignment
variable. The continuity assumption for the entire sample is required for parametric
designs, which assumes that there is continuity on all covariates, except for the treatment;
therefore, in the presence of treatment, a jump in the regression line represents the
treatment effect. McEwan and Shapiro (2007) suggest that for causal interpretation of
RD estimates, at the very least, we must satisfy the assumption that the score on the
forcing variable, near the cutoff line does not introduce sharp differences in unobserved
variables that affect the observed outcome. To test this assumption, the smoothness of
baseline covariates across cutoffs must be examined (McEwan & Shapiro, 2006). When
available, pre-test scores of the outcome variable must be regressed on the forcing
variable to observe if discontinuities were present prior to the treatment (Moss & Yeaton,
2006; McCrary, 2006, 2008).
Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw (2001) established minimal continuity
assumptions for identifying treatment effects in the RD using non-parametric designs by
estimating the average outcome for observations slightly below the cutoff score as a valid
counterfactual for the observations slightly above the cutoff score (Lee, 2007). Therefore,
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to test if the data available for this study can yield valid estimates using non-parametric
RD, this study tested the smoothness of covariates for pooled sample and by each
individual group for each assignment variable.
Although the smoothness of covariates at the cutoff satisfied the continuity
assumption for a non-parametric RD approach, data were tested for normality, linearity,
and homoscedasticity, which are required for valid parametric estimates (Lee & Card,
2006). The study anticipated that the relationship between the predictor and the outcome
variables: percentage of WOB, percentage of non-executive directors, percentage of
executive directors, women in executive leadership, women CEOs, women in senior
management, and female representation company-wide, was not perfectly linear;
therefore, to estimate effects, a non-parametric design was used. Bandwidth selection
was calculated using the Imbens-Kalyanaraman (2012) optimal bandwidth calculation,
and several alternative bandwidths were estimated as well.
Hypotheses Testing
The study tested five set of hypotheses that were nested within two phases of the
study. The two-phase design was done in function of the baseline observations. The first
phase used 2011 observations as the baseline sample, as that was the year that the Davies
Review was rolled out. Phase I of the study tests three set of hypotheses that predict an
effect of the Davies Review on changes to the board composition of FTSE 350 boards
(n=295). Although the Davies Review targeted only FTSE 350 boards, the first phase
also tests FTSE Small Cap (n=110) boards to identify if placebo effects of the Davies
Review spilled over to that sample.
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The second phase of the study uses 2016 observations as the baseline sample.
The Davies Review initiative targets were officially reached in 2015 (Davies, 2015).
Therefore, the baseline sample captured the changes to board composition resulting from
the Davies Review and, as previously discussed, it reduced the risk of manipulation of the
assignment variable that may have been present in 2015. Hypotheses in this phase of the
study tested the effects of 25% of WOB on opportunities for other women in the
organization and on the gender pay gap. This phase of the study used the pooled FTSE
All Share (n=385) sample to examine if 25% of WOB constitutes critical mass. To that
end, the pooled sample was split into two groups in function of their percentage of WOB
on the baseline sample. Organizations with more than 25% of WOB were placed into the
treatment group (n=153) and those below the threshold into the comparison group
(n=242). Additionally, as a competing explanation to critical mass of WOB, the
percentage of increase of WOB was used to split the sample into organizations with a
large increase (n=186) and small increase (n=209). Detailed explanations for each
hypothesis are provided below.
Effects of Davies Review on Board Composition
To test the first set of hypotheses, a sharp RD approach was used. The Davies
Review initiative was delivered as a comply or explain approach with the objective of
increasing the proportion of women on corporate boards. The initiative was rolled out
targeting FTSE 350 boards and providing minimum targets of female representation. The
compliance component of the initiative suggested that organizations that were over the
minimum target set by the Davies Review at the time it was announced, were already
compliant; therefore, they were not required to increase their proportion of WOB. Using
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that logic to separate the sample into treatment and comparison groups, this study’s first
hypothesis predicted that organizations over the threshold established by the Davies
Review would not increase their percentage of WOB as much as the treatment group,
which was below the threshold. The effect of the Davies Review initiative on increasing
the percentage of the non-compliant group was predicted to be statistically significant at
the alpha level of 0.05 (a=0.05). However, due to the limitations of sample size, findings
at the alpha level 0.10 (a=0.10) may be suggestive of a significant effect that warrants
further study (Sullivan & Feinn, 2012).
Taking into account that the Davies Review set targets that were outside of the
participants’ control, the threshold should not have any significance to organizations.
Without the intervention of the Davies Review, there were no identified reasons for the
upwards trend in the increase of WOB to come to a stop at the 25% mark for FTSE 100
or at the 22% mark for FTSE 250 boards. However, when the Lord Davies Review
established its targets, it created an artificial vision of what gender-balanced boards were.
Consequently, boards that were already above the target that may have continued their
upwards trend had no need to continue to increase their female membership. The lack a
valid reason for discontinuous increase of WOB in organizations that were below the
threshold set by the Davies Review would make any discontinuity practically significant,
as it would provide evidence that the transformation of boards was not the result of
commitment to gender equality, but compliance to the targets. However, the practical
significance for this hypothesis was set at an effect greater than 3%, which was consistent
with the rate of growth for five years for comply or explain approaches identified by
previous research (Fortin et al., 2017). The unprecedented increase provides the
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expectation of a practically significant result for the full sample; however, a finding at the
threshold would indicate the effect of the Davies Review as compliance.
The equation used to estimate the treatment effect of the Davies Review on the
increase of WOB included covariates that were identified in the literature as having a
potential impact on the increase of WOB. Bilimoria (2006) found a positive relationship
between higher proportion of WOB and women’s representation in management;
therefore, the covariates representing the mean percentages of women in executive
leadership are included in the equation. Consistent with social categorization theory
(Tajfel & Turner, 1986), previous research suggested that CEOs attempt to select
candidates who are demographically similar to them (Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010;
Westphal & Zajac, 1995); thus, CEO gender and chairperson gender are included in the
equation. Additionally, board size has been used as control variable in studies that
examine gender in the corporate governance literature (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Carter et
al., 2003; Luckerath-Rovers, 2010); therefore, that variable is also included as a control
in the estimation of the effects of the Davies Review on the increase of WOB on the noncompliant group. Equation 4 was used to predict the increase in female board
representation as a result of the Davies Review.
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where Increase is the increase in the percentage of female board representation
calculated as the difference between WOBPC2016 and WOBPC2011 scores, b0 is the
intercept, b1 is the coefficient for the forcing variable, WOBPC2011 is the transformed
percentage of WOBPC2011 in 2011 centered at the cutoff, b2 is the coefficient for the
treatment effect and T is the dummy variable that indicates whether an organization was
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in the non-balanced (T=1) or gender-balanced (T=0) group based on the cutoff score for
its group, b3 is the coefficient for the variable Board, Board is the total number of
directors in a board, b4 is the coefficient for female CEO, CEOGnd is the binary indicator
of CEO gender (F=1, M=0), b5 is the coefficient is the coefficient for female chairperson,
ChairGnd is the binary indicator of the chairperson gender (F=1, M=0), b6 is the
coefficient for the variable Sector, Sector is the industry sector for the organization, b7 is
the coefficient for FTSE index, Index indicates the FTSE index the organization is listed
under, and e is the residual error.
Following recommendations in the literature, the unconditional model was first
tested (Frolich & Huber, 2017). To identify the correct functional form of the regression,
quadratic, and cubic functions were tested (Jacob et al., 2012; Shadish, Cook, &
Campbell, 2002). After the functional form was identified, covariates were added and the
optimal bandwidth was calculated using the Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth
test. As research indicates that keeping non statistically significant terms in the model
would yield unbiased coefficients, non-significant terms were kept in the RD models
used in this study. In addition to the optimal bandwidth estimates, alternative
bandwidths were tested. The optimal bandwidth was narrowed and widened and
estimates were compared with the optimal bandwidth estimates. Coefficients for all the
variables in the best model were provided and results were interpreted.
The effect of the Davies Review on the increase of the percentage of WOB for
FTSE 350 boards was estimated using a non-parametric approach. A similar estimation
method was used for estimating the placebo effect on the FTSE Small Cap group. The
local average treatment effect (LATE) was estimated as the difference in the mean
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Increase of organizations within the bandwidth to the right and left of the cutoff point.
Equation 5 describes the calculation used for obtaining the effect of the Davies Review:
K33=;RVWX1YZ = lim 9:;<=>?= + | ABCDEF+.. − lim 9:;<=>?= . | ABCDEF+..
[\Y↑^

[\Y↓^

(4)

As mentioned previously, any causal claim resulting from a statistically
significant treatment effect in the RD analyses was followed by robustness tests that
consisted of pseudo-outcomes and pseudo cutoffs. Additionally, as one of the advantages
of RD analyses is their transparent way of graphically showing how the treatment effect
is identified (Lee & Lemieux, 2010), plots of the regression lines were provided for each
test.
The second and third set of hypotheses of this study also relate to changes in
board composition resulting from the Davies Review. Specifically, changes in the
appointment of non-executive directors as compared to executive directors, and the
appointment of women to CEO and chairperson positions. A regression discontinuity
approach was not feasible for testing the variation in the proportion of women executive
directors and non-executive due to the small variation of women executive directors in
the 2011 (n=59) to 2016 (n=63) period, compared to the women non-executive directors
in the same period, 2011 (n=314) to 2016 (n=634). Therefore, observations for the pooled
sample (FTSE All Share) from 2011 to 2016 were used in panel study to model the
growth of the proportion of female executive directors and female non-executive
directors in relation to the total number of female directors in the Davies Review period.
The variation of female CEOs in the 2011 (n=14) to 2016 (n=14) period, and
women chairpersons from 2011 (n=7) to 2016 (n=16) has been limited. Therefore, the
RD analysis was not feasible. In an attempt to test the third set of hypotheses, t-tests
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were performed to compare mean differences in the populations of CEOs and
chairpersons compared to the populations of WED and WNED for each FTSE index
group. Additionally, women’s representation on corporate boards was very limited prior
to the Davies Review initiative, averaging less than a woman per board. Therefore,
following Ahern and Dittmar’s (2012) example, the annual mean of each variable was
reported to show the trend in their variation pre and post-Davies Review. Additionally,
growth models of the proportion of female CEOs in relation to the total number of
executive directors in the 2011 to 2016 period were computed. Similarly, growth models
of the proportion of female chairpersons in relationship to the total number of nonexecutive directors in the 2011 to 2016 period were performed. The statistical
significance of these hypotheses tests were set at an at alpha level of .05 due to the large
sample that results from including firm-year observations. The practical significance was
set above 5% for the cumulative effect of change in the Davies Review period.
Although the design of this study relied on RD designs for the main analyses of
the study, fitting the data to the wrong model may yield wrong estimates or wrong
interpretations. The purpose of running different analyses using longitudinal data was to
show changes in non-executive/executive director characteristics during the sample
period of this study. The importance of changes in the proportion of non-executive and
executive director to this study lies in the link of director type to power and status, which
are fundamental to the expectation that WOB will help other women in the organization.
Effects of Davies Review on Opportunities for Women
The fourth and fifth set of hypotheses examined the effects of compliant boards –
defined as being above the 25% WOB target set by the Davies Review – on opportunities
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for other women and on the gender pay gap. To test fourth set of hypotheses, gender split
metrics reported on annual reports for executive leadership, senior leadership, and
company-wide were used. However, the Davies Review (2011) acknowledged that part
of the challenge in increasing women’s participation on corporate boards was around
supply, specifying that fewer women than men rise to top levels of their organizations
(Davies, 2011, p. 3). Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that the lower supply of
women rising to corporate boards may be a related to the low representation of WOB.
Although the Davies Review set a minimum target of WOB, resource dependence theory
posits that organizations seek resources they need; therefore, it is reasonable to suggest
that for the long-term success of the initiative, organizations should be preparing their
senior leaders in order to take on board roles. Therefore, finding support for the fourth set
of hypotheses, could indicate that the scarcity in the supply of women for director roles
will persist, which could threaten the achievement of true gender parity at the highest
decision-making levels.
Tests of the effects of the WOB on opportunities for women were performed on
the pooled sample. Although the non-parametric tests reduced the sample size for the
different tests, statistically significance set at the alpha level of 0.05 (a=0.05). However,
for narrower bandwidths, sample size may pose a limitation; therefore, findings at the
0.10 alpha level (a=0.10) may be indicative of a significant effect that warrants further
study (Sullivan & Feinn, 2012). Predictions related to critical mass at 25% and
opportunities for other women lack empirical support. Furthermore, in the RD design,
what is being hypothesized is the discontinuous jump in the regression line at the
threshold. Therefore, practical significance is set based on the average rate of increase
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women in executive and senior management roles of less than 1% per year. Therefore, a
cumulative effect of 3% would indicate a practically significant effect.
As indicated previously, the forcing variable WOBPC2016 was used to assign
organizations to the treatment and comparison groups. Using the target set by the Davies
Review as the cutoff point (c=25%) organizations over the threshold were placed into the
Compliant (treatment) and Non-compliant (comparison) groups. The following equations
predicted opportunities for women at other levels of the organization, measured as the
women’s percentage of the total population of executive board, senior management, and
company-wide.
AK"=;DEF+.P = @+ + @. ABCDE + @F 7 + @G 9:;<=>?= + @J E<ORO;>` + @M AKa

(5)
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+ @.+ AQdDE + @.. AKefDE + @.F Q=;RH<.ST + @.G 9:I=".SF + 8

where, WExecPC2016 is the percentage of women in executive leadership,
measured as the proportion of women in relation to the total number of people in
executive leadership as of June 2016, b0 is the intercept, b1 is the coefficient for the
assignment variable, WOBPC is the percentage of WOB in 2016, where the cutoff (c=25),

b2 is the coefficient for the treatment effect and T is the dummy variable that indicates
whether an organization was in the treatment (T=1) or control (T=0) group based on the
cutoff score for its group, b3 is the coefficient for the variable Increase, Increase is the
increase in the percentage of WOB measured as the difference between 2016 and 2011
measures, b4 is the coefficient for variable Critical, Critical is the binary indicator that
indicates that a board has three or more women (Critical=1) or less than three women
(Critical=0), b5 is the coefficient for variable WED, WED is the number of women
executive directors in the board, b6 is the estimate for CEO gender, CEOGnd is the
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binary indicator of CEO gender (F=1, M=0), b7 is the coefficient for CEO tenure,
CEOTenure is the number of years a female CEO has been in her position, b8 is the
coefficient is the gender of the chairperson, ChairGnd is the binary indicator of the
chairperson gender (F=1, M=0), b9 is the coefficient for Chair tenure, ChairTenure is the
number of years a female chairperson has been in her position, b10 is the coefficient for
WSMPC, WSMPC is the percentage of women in senior management, b11 is the
coefficient for WEmpPC, WEmpPC is the percentage of women employed in the
organization, b12 are the coefficients for the industry sector, Sector is the industry sector
of a given organization, b13 are coefficient for FTSE Index, Index is the index of the
organization, and e is the residual error.
AQdDEF+.P = @+ + @. ABCDE + @F 7 + @G 9:;<=>?= + @J E<ORO;>` + @M AKa

(6)
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where, WSMPC2016 is the percentage of women in senior management, measured
as the proportion of women in relation to the total number of people in senior
management as of June 2016, b0 is the intercept, b1 is the coefficient for the assignment
variable, WOBPC is the percentage of WOB in 2016, where the cutoff (c=25), b2 is the
coefficient for the treatment effect and T is the dummy variable that indicates whether an
organization was in the treatment (T=1) or control (T=0) group based on the cutoff score
for its group, b3 is the coefficient for the variable Increase, Increase is the increase in the
percentage of WOB measured as the difference between 2016 and 2011 measures, b4 is
the coefficient for variable Critical, Critical is the binary indicator that indicates that a

204

board has three or more women (Critical=1) or less than three women (Critical=0), b5 is
the coefficient for variable WED, WED is the number of women executive directors in
the board, b6 is the estimate for CEO gender, CEOGnd is the binary indicator of CEO
gender (F=1, M=0), b7 is the coefficient for CEO tenure, CEOTenure is the number of
years a female CEO has been in her position, b8 is the coefficient is the gender of the
chairperson, ChairGnd is the binary indicator of the chairperson gender (F=1, M=0), b9 is
the coefficient for Chair tenure, ChairTenure is the number of years a female chairperson
has been in her position, b10 is the coefficient for WExePC, WExecPC is the percentage
of women in executive boards, b11 is the coefficient for WEmpPC, WEmpPC is the
percentage of women employed in the organization, b12 are the coefficients for the
industry sector, Sector is the industry sector of a given organization, b13 are coefficient
for FTSE Index, Index is the index of the organization, and e is the residual error.
AKefDEF+.P = @+ + @. ABCDE + @F 7 + @G 9:;<=>?= + @J E<ORO;>`

(7)
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where, WEmpPC2016 is the percentage of women employed in the organization,
measured as the proportion of women in relation to the total number employees as of
June 2016, b0 is the intercept, b1 is the coefficient for the assignment variable, WOBPC is
the percentage of WOB in 2016, where the cutoff (c=25), b2 is the coefficient for the
treatment effect and T is the dummy variable that indicates whether an organization was
in the treatment (T=1) or control (T=0) group based on the cutoff score for its group, b3 is
the coefficient for the variable Increase, Increase is the increase in the percentage of

205

WOB measured as the difference between 2016 and 2011 measures, b4 is the coefficient
for variable Critical, Critical is the binary indicator that indicates that a board has three or
more women (Critical=1) or less than three women (Critical=0), b5 is the estimate for
CEO gender, CEOGnd is the binary indicator of CEO gender (F=1, M=0), b6 is the
coefficient for CEO tenure, CEOTenure is the number of years a female CEO has been in
her position, b7 is the coefficient is the gender of the chairperson, ChairGnd is the binary
indicator of the chairperson gender (F=1, M=0), b8 is the coefficient for Chair tenure,
ChairTenure is the number of years a female chairperson has been in her position, b9 is
the coefficient for WExePC, WExecPC is the percentage of women in executive boards,

b10 is the coefficient for WSMPC, WSMPC is the percentage of women in senior
management, b11 are the coefficients for the industry sector, Sector is the industry sector
of a given organization, b12 are coefficient for FTSE Index, Index is the index of the
organization, and e is the residual error.
To estimate the treatment effect of compliance to the Davies Review targets on
opportunities for other women in the organization, the following equations were used:
K33=;RFM% =

lim

hij[k↓FM

K33=;RFM% =
K33=;RFM% =

lim

AK"=;DE + | ABCDE −

hij[k↓FM
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AQdDE + | ABCDE −

AKefDE + | ABCDE −

lim

AK"=;DE . | ABCDE

(8)

lim

AQdDE . | ABCDE

(9)

lim

AKefDE . | ABCDE
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hij[k↑FM

where the effect of compliance to the 25% WOB target set by Davies Review on
the participation of women at the executive leadership, senior management, and
company-wide levels, is calculated as the difference between the average estimates of the
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regressions to the left and right of the 25% compliance cutoff. The estimate is limited to
a number of observations that lie close to the cutoff point and within the selected
bandwidth. As in previous hypotheses, the Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth (Imbens &
Kalyanaraman, 2012) estimation method was used to identify the optimal bandwidth for
the data. Additionally, the optimal bandwidth was increased and decreased to compare
estimates at different bandwidths. Results for the multiple bandwidth tests were reported.
Effects of Davies Review on Gender Pay Gap
To test the final hypothesis of this study, gender pay gap data from the U.K.
Government gender pay gap service was used. According to the U.K. coalition
government, the objective of increasing female representation at the highest decisionmaking levels was to build a fairer society and help promote equal opportunity for
women. Therefore, after achieving the targets set by the Lord Davies initiative; it is
reasonable to test the effects of increased female participation on the gender pay gap.
Theory and multiple empirical studies suggest that to effect change, a lower status group
needs critical mass, which is the equivalent of three women. Previous studies found that
in France, the quota law for WOB increased the gender pay gap (Reberioux & Roudaut,
2016), other studies found that legislation did not have an effect on the gender pay gap
(Chevalier, 2017), and recent statistics from the Global Gender Gap report, revealed that
in Norway, the gender pay gap in Norway has increased since the introduction of the
quota law for WOB. In 2008, when the quota law was officially enforced in Norway,
women earned 85% of what men earned for similar work (Ministry of Children and
Equality, 2008). In 2017, almost ten years after achieving 40% representation on
corporate boards, the gender pay gap has increased and women now earn 79% (World
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Economic Forum, 2017) of what men earn for similar work. Therefore, the fifth set of
hypotheses predicted that Compliant boards did not decrease the gender pay gap.
To test those predictions, assignment variables were used in the same way as in
the analyses for the previous set of hypotheses. The study design for these analyses is
shown on Figure 2. The sample size for the last hypothesis is reduced due to the rules for
the gender pay gap reporting that only mandates organizations with 250 employees or
more to disclose their pay differentials by gender. Currently, of the 2016 sample of 395
organizations, gender pay gap data was available for 302 organizations. The effect of
25% female representation on FTSE All Share boards on the gender pay gap was not
predicted to be statistically significant at the alpha level of 0.05 (a=0.05). The prediction
was supported based on empirical evidence that did not find evidence that WOB had an
effect on decreasing the pay gap at lower levels (Bertrand et al., 2018; Reberioux &
Roudaut, 2016). A significant finding would indicate that 25% of WOB constitutes
critical mass. The practical significance for this hypotheses was set at 3 percentage points
as that is the difference explained by gender that starts at graduation (Department for
Education, 2018).
Predictions related to the gender pay gap in this study relate to the gender pay gap
median. Because it is known that leadership is male-dominated, the salaries of high
earners – usually men – may skew the mean and result in misleading results; therefore,
although the PayGapMean estimates are reported, PayGapMedian estimates may provide
a more accurate representation of the gender pay gap that is more representative of
general workforce in the United Kingdom. The significance of these results lies in the
fact that organizations in the sample used for this study employed 7.7 million people in
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the year 2016, which represents about 23% of the total workforce in the United Kingdom.
Therefore, effects on gender pay gap are consequential to the British society. The
following equation represents the predictive model for the impact of the gender-balanced
boards on the gender pay gap median in FTSE All Share organizations.
D>lL>fd=>: = @+ + @. ABCDE + @F 7 + @G E<ORO;>` + @J 9:;<=>?=
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where, PayGapMean and PayGapMedian are the 2017 gender pay gap mean and
median for women in the observed organization, a positive number indicates that the
median earnings for men are higher than for women, b0 is the intercept, b1 is the
coefficient for the assignment variable, WOBPC is the percentage of WOBPC2016, where
the cutoff is set 25 (c=25), , b2 is the coefficient for the treatment effect and T is the
dummy variable that indicates whether an organization was in the treatment (T=1) or
control (T=0) group based on the cutoff score for its group, b3 is the coefficient for the
variable Critical, Critical is the binary indicator that indicates that a board has three or
more women (Critical=1) or less than three women (Critical=0), b4 is the coefficient for
Increase, Increase is the increase in the percentage of WOB measured as the difference
between WOBPC2016 and WOBPC2011 measures, b5 is the estimate for CEO gender,
CEOGnd is the binary indicator of CEO gender (F=1, M=0), b6 is the coefficient is the
gender of the chairperson, ChairGnd is the binary indicator of the chairperson gender
(F=1, M=0), b5 is the coefficient for industry sector, Sector is the industry sector of the
209

observed organization, b7 is the coefficient for percentage of WExecPC, WExecPC is the
percentage of female employees in the organization with relation to the total number of
employees, b8 is the coefficient the percentage of women in senior management and
WSMPC is the percentage of women in senior management in relation to the total number
of people in senior management, b9 is the coefficient for the mean value of variable Race,
Race is the mean of the binary indicator for Race for each female board member, which
is 0 for white female board members and 1 for minority, b10 is the coefficient for mean
Tenure, Tenure is the number of years a female board member has been on the
organization’s board, b11 is the coefficient the mean for variable Age, Age is the mean age
of female board members in the organization’s board, b12 are the coefficients for Sector,
Sector is the industry sector group for the organization, and e is the residual error. To
estimate the treatment effect compliance to the 25% WOB targets on the gender pay gap,
the following equations were used:
K33=;RFM% =

lim

hij[k↓FM

−
K33=;RFM% =

lim

hij[k↑FM

`Oe

hij[k↓FM

−

D>lL>fd=>:+ |ABCDE
D>lL>fd=>:. |ABCDE

D>lL>fd=Ip>:+ |ABCDE

`Oe
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(13)

(14)
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where the effect of Compliance with the 25% target set by the Davies Review on
the participation of women at the executive leadership, senior management, and
company-wide levels, is calculated as the difference of the average estimates of the
regressions to the left and right of the cutoff point determined by the Davies Review
(c=25). The estimate is limited to a number of observations that lie close to the cutoff

210

point. As in previous hypotheses, the Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth (Imbens and
Kalyanaraman, 2012) estimation method was used to identify the optimal bandwidth for
the data. Additionally, bandwidth was increased and decreased and estimates for
multiple bandwidths were reported.
Previous studies found positive link between organizations with socially
responsible policies and the presence of WOB (Bear et al., 2010; Hafsi & Turgut, 2013;
Margaretha & Isnaini, 2014), which could impact the proportion of women at other
leadership levels; however, this study has not collected data related to social
responsibility policies of the organizations in the sample; therefore, it cannot control for it.
Additionally, it is reasonable to expect that organizations that had to increase the
percentage of WOB by doubling or tripling their pre-initiative numbers experienced more
constrain than those that were close to or over the threshold.
Therefore, as an alternative explanation to the critical mass at 25% of WOB, the
variable Increase was used as predictor of differences on the gender pay gap. The
reasoning for this is that if the Davies Review caused a statistically significant increase in
the proportion of WOBPC, the variable Increase must be ruled out as the cause of
changes that are related to the variable WOBPC. Ruling out rival explanations for the
statistical relationship between the observed a treatment and an outcome is essential for
the internal validity of a quasi-experimental design (Murnane & Willet, 2011). To that
end, using a cutoff score of 12 (c=12), which is the median increase in the percentage of
WOB for the total sample, the variable Increase was used to split the sample into two
groups, one group that had a Large increase of WOBPC and one that had a Small increase
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of WOBPC. Equation 15 describes the model for predicting the gender pay gap median
for the pooled sample.
D>lL>fd=IO>:
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As in previous hypotheses, the treatment effect was estimated as a local average
treatment effect (LATE) using observations that lie within the selected bandwidth as
shown on Equation 16. Therefore, the estimate of the effect of a Large increase in the
percentage of WOB in the 2011 to 2016 period the PayGapMedian was estimated as
follows:
K33=;RqW\rY = lim D>lL>fd=Ip>:+ | 9:;<=>?=
st^.↓.F

(16)
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Delimitations
Two delimitations existed for the present study. First, data were limited to
publicly listed organizations constituents of the FTSE All Share index; therefore, findings
may not be generalizable to privately owned organizations. Second, potential
confounding effect of Brexit was taken into account. It was determined that Brexit may
have an impact on changes to board composition and may impact the long term effects of
the initiative; therefore, observations were limited to the 2008 – June 2016 period (prior
to the Brexit announcement).
Summary of the Chapter
Chapter 3 provided an outline for the design and methodology of the proposed
study. The chapter discussed the purpose of the study, the research hypotheses, the
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population and sample, the design of the study, a review of regression discontinuity
design, data collection procedures, data analysis procedures, an identification of threats to
validity and hypotheses testing. The chapter concluded with a discussion of the
delimitations of the proposed study.
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Chapter 4 - Results
Introduction
This chapter presents the results for the study, which are divided into five
different sections. The first section provides a description of the collected data,
participants of the study, group comparisons, and correlations. The second section
presents a description of the treatment of missing data, identification of the missing data
mechanism and data imputation process. The third section reports the results of the tests
of statistical assumptions and internal validity. The fourth section reports the hypotheses
test results and robustness tests for the validity of causal claims. The fifth section
provides a hypotheses summary and a summary of the chapter.
Data Collection and Participants
Initially, this study intended to analyze the data published in the Davies Reviews,
which consists of gender metrics for organizations in the FTSE 350 index. However,
inconsistencies were found, which were compelling enough to warrant re-collection and
validation of the data. Similarly, it was noted that the Davies Reviews reported metrics
of FTSE 350 organizations irrespective of their year of entry into the index. For example,
within 18 months (September 2014 to February 2016), four organizations with female
CEOs entered the FTSE 250 index; however, their appointment took place when those
organizations were private; therefore, the increase of female CEOs could not be attributed
to the Davies Review. Realizing that including those organizations in the analyses would
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impact the findings, this study used a baseline sample of organizations indexed in the
FTSE All Share in 2011 and remained listed through 2016.
A database containing annual data for the organizations of the baseline sample
was built using a spreadsheet. To populate the database, annual reports for each year in
the observation period were downloaded from the London Stock Exchange website and
the corporate websites of the organizations in the baseline sample. Each report was used
to populate the database built for this study. Initially, this study had planned to follow the
method used in Ahern and Dittmar (2012) for gathering gender information about board
members, which consisted in using the photo of the director in the annual report to
identify their gender. However, as a result of the gender metrics reporting requirement
published in the 2012 amendment to the U.K. CGC, organizations disclose the gender of
each board director and in most cases, gender of the members of their executive boards.
Therefore, the gender of each board member and executive board member was collected
from annual reports. When discrepancies were found between two sources, data from the
Companies House database prevailed. In cases in which data were not reported on
annual reports and were not available on the Companies House database, they were left
blank in the study’s database.
The baseline sample consisted of 395 unique organizations listed in the FTSE All
Share index in 2011 and remained in the index through 2016. Data from 2008 through
2010 were also collected to identify the effects of time on changes in gender composition
on boards. Although every effort was made to obtain annual reports for each organization
for every year observed in this study, 2008 reports for ten organizations included in the
baseline sample were not available, and 2009 reports for four organizations were not
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available. A total of 3541 annual reports were collected, which comprised 2551 reports
from FTSE 350 firms, which were subject to the Davies Review targets, and 990 reports
from FTSE Small Cap firms.
Table 5 presents cross-sectional mean values of organizational and board
characteristics between 2008 and 2016. The average size of FTSE 100 boards was
around 11, which was relatively constant for the observed years. The average board size
of FTSE 250 boards was around 8.5 members in the observed years. The average board
size of FTSE Small Cap was around 7 members. The mean percentage of WOB in the
FTSE 100 sample increased from 11.57 in 2008 to 25.58 in 2016. The FTSE 250 sample
increased their mean percentage of WOB from 5.36 in 2008 to 20.65 in 2016. The
collective increase in the share of WOB for FTSE Small Cap boards was from 5.16 in
2008 to 13.88 in 2016. The relatively constant board size suggests that over the course
of the observed period, organizations replaced male directors with female directors,
rather than adding female directors to their existing boards to comply with the targets set
by the Davies Review. However, despite the increase in the percentage of WOB, the
number of female CEOs across organizations in all FTSE indices remained relatively
stable in the observed period. The total number of female CEOs in FTSE 350 firms rose
from 10 (3.6%) in 2008 to 13 (4.6%) in 2016. Conversely, the number of female
chairpersons in FTSE 350 boards had an increase from 4 (1.4%) in 2008 to 12 (4.2%) in
2016.
Table 6 reports individual characteristics of the 4207 observations for female
directors in the 2008 to 2016 period. Across the three FTSE indices, individual
characteristics were similar. The average age of female directors on FTSE 100 boards
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increased from 55.06 in 2011 to 57.18 in 2016. Similarly, the average age of female
directors on FTSE 250 boards increased from 51.87 in 2011 to 55.22 in 2016, and from
51.65 in 2011 to 54.39 for FTSE Small Cap boards. The average tenure of FTSE 100
female board members in 2016 was 3.49 compared to 3.27 in 2011. Female directors of
FTSE 250 boards had an average tenure of 3.37 years in 2016 compared to 2.65 in 2011.
Tenure for female directors in FTSE Small Cap boards decreased from 3.40 in 2011 to
3.01 in 2016. The lowest average tenure for FTSE 250 and FTSE Small Cap boards was
in 2013, and the lowest average tenure for FTSE 100 boards was 2014, which consistent
with the increasing numbers of directors indicates that those in those years, there was an
increase in the recruiting female board directors.
Educational attainment levels decreased for FTSE 100 boards, from 59.63% of
directors with a Master’s degree or above in 2011 to 53.39% in 2016. Conversely, the
educational attainment of female directors of FTSE 250 boards increased from 38.41% of
directors with a Master’s degree or above in 2011 to 45.20% in 2016. Educational
attainment for the FTSE Small Cap group remained stable for directors with Master’s
degrees or above from 43.55% in 2011 to 45.38% in 2016. The most noticeable change
for the FTSE Small Cap group was the population of directors with high school education,
which decreased from 22.58% in 2011 to 9.26% in 2016. Across the sample, the majority
of the population was identified as white. In 2016, the FTSE 100 group had the most
racial/ethnic diversity of all year-group observations, with 89.47% of white female
directors. The second most represented racial/ethnic group was Asian, representing
6.02% of the FTSE 100 female directors and 5.56% of the FTSE Small Cap female
director population.
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Table 5
Board Characteristics Parameter Means for the Sample by Index
Index

2008

2009

2010
2011 2012 2013
2014 2015 2016
FTSE 100
Board
11.19 11.09 10.95 11.24 11.25 11.04 11.24 10.96 10.67
WOBPC
11.57 11.94 12.94 14.66 17.74 19.34 22.79 25.20 25.58
WED
0.18
0.16
0.19
0.21
0.22
0.19
0.21
0.24
0.26
WNED
1.12
1.16
1.24
1.46
1.78
1.96
2.36
2.56
2.51
CEOGnd1
3
3
4
4
4
2
3
4
4
1
ChairGnd
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
WExecPC
11.24 11.17 14.68 13.74 12.56 14.76 14.81 17.59 17.88
WSMPC
16.26 15.82 20.11 21.88 23.47 20.56 21.57 21.91 22.99
WEmpPC
37.57 35.97 38.16 34.28 36.71 36.36 36.89 36.01 35.87
FTSE 250
Board
8.51
8.49
8.43
8.57
8.66
8.58
8.61
8.45
8.27
WOBPC
5.36
6.22
7.39
9.10 12.37 15.22 17.77 19.97 20.65
WED
0.12
0.12
0.13
0.13
0.15
0.15
0.16
0.16
0.14
WNED
0.37
0.43
0.51
0.67
0.93
1.16
1.37
1.53
1.57
CEOGnd1
7
6
8
8
8
8
8
8
9
1
ChairGnd
2
1
1
2
4
5
6
9
10
WExecPC
8.79
9.06 11.54 11.63 12.07 15.32 14.29 15.87 14.65
WSMPC
9.26
6.98 27.25 27.97 22.60 19.82 19.81 21.00 22.84
WEmpPC
55.39 49.56 38.71 38.38 35.01 35.54 35.96 35.60 36.11
FTSE Small Cap
Board
7.31
7.29
7.24
7.33
7.16
7.02
7.06
7.05
6.96
WOBPC
5.16
5.56
6.06
7.41
8.83 10.08 11.01 12.46 13.88
WED
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.14
0.12
0.10
0.10
0.11
0.10
WNED
0.27
0.29
0.34
0.43
0.51
0.61
0.68
0.78
0.88
CEOGnd1
3
3
2
2
0
1
1
1
1
1
ChairGnd
0
0
1
4
4
5
4
4
4
WExecPC
8.40
8.53
7.76
7.99
7.31 11.93 13.06 14.94 15.60
WSMPC
- 16.67 17.56 17.80 27.58 20.54 19.24 20.78 21.02
WEmpPC
35.00 38.23 36.71 35.88 38.67 33.63 35.31 35.95 36.10
Firms (n)
385
391
395
395
395
395
395
395
395
Board (n)
3397 3436 3441
3505 3504 3453
3484 3424 3353
WOB (n)
252
273
306
373
465
532
622
687
697
WED (n)
50
50
54
59
62
57
61
66
63
WNED (n)
202
222
252
314
403
474
561
621
634
Note. 1Represents the total number of women for the variable. n=sample size; Board=board size;
WOBPC=percentage of women on boards; WED=women executive directors; WNED=women
non-executive directors; CEOGnd=female CEOs; ChairGnd=female chairpersons;
WExecPC=percentage of women executives; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior
management; WEmpPC=percentage of women employed in the firm.
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Table 6
Female Director Characteristics by Index
Variable

2008

2009

WOB (n)
Avg. age
Avg. tenure
Education
HS
Bachelor
Master
Professional
Doctoral
Race
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian/ME

122
54.10
3.15

WOB (n)
Avg. age
Avg. tenure
Education
HS
Bachelor
Master
Professional
Doctoral
Race
White
Black
Asian/ME

2010

2013

2014

2015

2016

125
55.30
3.66

2011
2012
FTSE 100
137
160
192
55.20
55.06
55.30
3.64
3.27
3.14

207
55.59
3.11

247
55.90
2.84

269
56.71
3.12

266
57.18
3.49

6.56
36.89
40.16
6.56
9.84

6.40
33.60
42.40
6.40
11.20

5.84
32.85
44.53
5.11
11.68

3.13
39.06
45.83
4.69
7.29

3.38
41.55
43.00
5.80
6.28

3.64
42.51
41.30
6.07
6.48

3.35
43.87
40.15
5.20
7.43

4.14
42.48
40.98
4.14
8.27

90.16
4.10
1.64
4.10

89.60
4.80
0.80
4.80

90.51
4.38
0.73
4.38

92.71
2.60
1.04
3.65

91.79
3.86
0.48
3.86

89.88
4.05
1.21
4.86

89.59
3.72
1.12
5.58

89.47
3.38
1.13
6.02

88
50.61
3.00

103
51.15
3.03

90.00
3.75
0.63
5.63
FTSE 250
120
151
51.76
51.87
3.00
2.65

204
52.29
2.38

247
52.96
2.29

289
53.35
2.45

320
54.47
2.77

323
55.22
3.37

7.95
46.59
34.09
1.14
10.23

11.65
50.49
28.16
0.97
8.74

10.00
51.67
27.50
1.67
9.17

12.25
48.04
30.39
1.96
7.35

10.12
47.37
33.20
3.24
6.07

9.34
48.44
33.22
2.42
6.57

8.13
48.13
34.69
2.81
6.25

7.74
47.06
36.22
2.48
6.50

95.45
1.14
3.41

96.12
0.97
2.91

95.83
94.70
95.59
0.83
0.66
0.98
3.33
4.64
3.43
FTSE Small Cap
49
62
69
51.49
51.65
52.22
4.00
3.40
2.74

95.95
1.21
2.83

94.81
1.73
3.46

95.00
1.25
3.75

95.05
1.24
3.72

WOB (n)
42
45
78
86
98
Avg. age
49.64
50.56
52.67 53.15
53.97
Avg. tenure
3.40
4.02
2.38
2.59
2.50
Education
HS
21.43
22.22
24.49
22.58
17.39
16.67 13.95
12.24
Bachelor
35.71
33.33
30.61
33.87
40.58
38.46 43.02
43.88
Master
30.95
33.33
32.65
32.26
26.09
32.05 33.72
34.69
Professional
4.76
4.44
6.12
4.84
5.80
2.56
1.16
1.02
Doctoral
7.14
6.67
6.12
6.45
10.14
10.26
8.14
8.16
Race
White
92.86
93.33
93.88
93.55
94.20
93.59 94.19
93.88
Asian/ME
7.14
6.67
6.12
6.45
5.80
6.41
5.81
6.12
WOB (n)
252
273
306
373
465
532
622
687
Unique names
210
224
248
304
377
430
501
552
Note. n=sample size; WOB=women on boards; HS= high school; ME=middle eastern.

108
54.39
3.01

4.38
36.25
46.25
5.00
8.13

9.27
52.32
29.80
0.66
7.95
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9.26
45.37
37.04
0.93
7.41
94.44
5.56
697
562

As Table 7 shows, organizations in the baseline sample had a similar distribution
across all FTSE indices. The three sectors with the highest concentration of observations
were finance, consumer services, and industrial, representing 56.4%, 62.4%, and 80.4%
of organizations in the FTSE 100, FTSE 250, and FTSE Small Cap groups, respectively.
Table 7
Sample Distribution by Sector by Index
FTSE 100
Sector

n

FTSE 250
%

n

Consumer Goods
9
9.4%
17
Consumer Services
17
17.7%
45
Energy
9
9.4%
8
Financials
22
22.9%
36
Health Care
4
4.2%
6
Industrials
14
14.6%
47
Materials
11
11.5%
15
Technology
2
2.1%
10
Telecommunications
3
3.1%
3
Utilities
5
5.2%
2
Total by Sector
96 100.0%
189
Note. n=Sample size. Percentages based upon group totals.

FTSE Small Cap
%

9.0%
23.8%
4.2%
19.0%
3.2%
24.9%
7.9%
5.3%
1.6%
1.1%
100.0%

n

%
11
23
3
16
4
45
3
4
1
0
110

10.0%
20.9%
2.7%
14.5%
3.6%
40.9%
2.7%
3.6%
0.9%
0.0%
100.0%

Group Comparison
Phase I. Using the targets set by the Davies Review, organizations were split into
two groups (i.e., treatment and comparison) based on their percentage of WOB in 2011
(baseline). The threshold used for FTSE 100 boards was 25%, for FTSE 250 boards, the
threshold used was 22%, and for FTSE Small Cap, the threshold used was 19%. These
thresholds are in line with the targets recommended by the Davies Review (2011, p. 19).
Organizations that had a percentage of WOB higher than the threshold set by the Davies
Review were placed in the gender balanced (comparison) group, and organizations below
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the threshold were placed in the non-balanced (treatment) group. Although the Davies
Review targeted only FTSE 350 boards, tests were performed on the FTSE Small Cap
boards in order to identify differences between organizations that were subject to
minimum targets and organizations that were not. Table 8 reports the distribution of the
treatment and comparison groups across different demographic variables.
Table 8
Distribution of Treatment and Comparison Groups for Phase I
Variable

Non-balanced
n
%

Gender-balanced
n
%

Index
FTSE 100
81
23.48
15
30.00
FTSE 250
170
49.28
19
38.00
FTSE Small Cap
94
27.25
16
32.00
Sector
Consumer Goods
30
8.70
7
14.00
Consumer Services
70
20.29
15
30.00
Energy
20
5.80
0
0.00
Financials
67
19.42
7
14.00
Health Care
10
2.90
4
8.00
Industrials
97
28.12
9
18.00
Materials
27
7.83
2
4.00
Technology
13
3.77
3
6.00
Telecommunications
5
1.45
2
4.00
Utilities
6
1.74
1
2.00
Board
Large (>9)
171
49.57
24
48.00
Small (<9)
174
50.43
26
52.00
Emp
Small (<1000)
88
25.51
13
26.00
Medium (>1000, <10000)
154
44.64
20
40.00
Large (>10000)
103
29.86
17
34.00
MCap
1st quartile
83
24.06
16
32.00
2nd quartile
89
25.80
10
20.00
3rd quartile
89
25.80
9
18.00
4th quartile
84
24.35
15
30.00
Note. n=Sample size; Forcing variable = WOBPC2011. Cutoff point [FTSE100=25%, FTSE
250=22%, FTSE Small Cap=19%].
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Subsequently, the baseline sample was analyzed to identify if there were industry
sectors that were more likely to be in the gender-balanced group. Table 9 reports the
distribution of the baseline sample’s treatment and comparison group by FTSE index.
The total number of observations in the treatment group was 345 and the total number of
observations in the comparison group was 50. Fisher’s exact different test found that
across indices, groups were not statistically significantly different from the rest of the
sample (p>.05).

Similarly, the odds ratio statistic ranged from 0.72 to 1.58, which

suggested that the odds for the observations to fall into treatment or comparison group
were similar across all indices.
Table 9
Fisher’s Exact Test of the Probability of Group Distribution by Index – Phase I

Index

Non-balanced
n
%

Gender-balanced
n
%

Diff.

FTSE 100
81 23.36
15
30.00
-6.52
FTSE 250
170 49.28
19
38.00
11.28
FTSE Small Cap
94 27.25
16
32.00
-4.75
Note. n=sample size; CI=confidence interval; V=Cramer’s V

p-value
0.377
0.173
0.501

95% CI

V

0.36, 1.49
0.83, 3.09
0.41, 1.62

0.04
0.07
0.03

To further examine differences between the treatment and control group in the
pooled sample, an analysis of the likelihood of the study’s observations to fall within any
particular industry sectors was performed. Table 10 reports the results of the Fisher’s
exact test of the difference in the distribution of industry sectors, which yielded nonstatistically significant p-values that ranged from .09 to 1. The Cramer’s V values ranged
from <.001 to .070, which indicated that differences between the treatment and
comparison groups across industry sectors were not practically significant. Furthermore,
p-values ranging from .29 to .94 on Fisher’s exact test indicated non statistically
222

significant differences between groups across the variables board size, number of
employees, FTSE index and market capitalization, reported on Table 11. The Cramer’s V
values ranged from <.001 to .09, indicating that differences were not practically
significant. After establishing that the treatment and control groups were comparable, the
data were deemed adequate to proceed with the analyses of phase I of the study.
Table 10
Fisher’s Exact Test of the Probability of Group Distribution by Sector – Phase I

Industry Sector

Non-balanced
n
%

Gender-balanced
n
%

p-value

95% CI

Cramer's V

Consumer Goods
30
8.70%
7 14.00%
0.29
0.23, 1.68
Consumer Services
70 20.29%
15 30.00%
0.14
0.30, 1.24
Energy
20
5.80%
0
0.00%
0.09
0.73, Inf
Financials
67 19.42%
7 14.00%
0.44
0.62, 4.07
Health Care
10
2.90%
4
8.00%
0.09
0.09, 1.57
Industrials
97 28.12%
9 18.00%
0.17
0.81, 4.33
Materials
27
7.83%
2
4.00%
0.56
0.48, 18.21
Technology
13
3.77%
3
6.00%
0.44
0.16, 3.48
Telecommunications
5
1.45%
2
4.00%
0.22
0.06, 3.82
Utilities
6
1.74%
1
2.00%
1.00
0.10, 40.69
Observations
345
50
Note. n=sample size; CI=confidence interval; Forcing variable=WOBPC2011.

0.047
0.069
0.070
0.030
0.070
0.067
0.034
0.018
0.035
0.000

Table 11
Fisher’s Exact Test of the Probability of Group Distribution by Organizational
Characteristics – Phase I
Variable

χ2

df

p-value

Fisher's p-value

Cramer's V

Board size
0.003
1
0.96
0.94
0.00
Employees
0.464
2
0.79
0.79
0.03
Index
2.279
2
0.32
0.29
0.08
Market capitalization
3.311
3
0.35
0.35
0.09
Note. Board size was split into above average and below average. Number of employees was
split into three groups, small (<1,000), medium (>1,000, <10,000), and large (>10,000). Market
capitalization split the sample into quartiles.
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Correlations for phase I variables. Table 12 reports the within group
correlations that were computed grouped by Index. As expected, multiple variables were
correlated. The variable that indicated the number for women directors, WOB, was
highly correlated with the variable that indicated the percentage of women directors
WOBPC (r=.93) due to the latter one being a generated value computed using the
variable WOB divided by the total number of board members. The variable WOBPC was
highly correlated with the variable Increase due to the fact that the for the entire sample
the variable Increase represented the increase in the percentage of female directors in the
duration of the Davies Review. The variable that represented the percentage of female
non-executive directors, WNED, was highly correlated with the variable WOB because
the majority of female directors were non-executives. The objective of performing
correlations of the variables was to identify relationships that were not expected.
However, all correlations appeared to be reasonable.
The between group correlations and their probability, reported in Table 13 and
Table 14, indicated that there were statistically significant differences among groups in
the relationship of variable WNED with WOB (p<.001). Another notable statistically
significant difference among groups was in the correlation of ChairGnd and CEOGnd
(p=.02).
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Table 12
Within Group Correlations for Phase I Variables for the Pooled Sample
Variable
1. Sector
2. Increase
3. Board
4. WOBPC
5. WOB
6. WED
7. WNED
8. Emp
9. CEOGnd
10. ChairGnd
11. Treatment2

1
1.00
0.05
-0.12
-0.17
-0.18
-0.12
-0.14
-0.08
-0.01
-0.01
0.05

2

3

4

5

1.00
-0.04
-0.51
-0.46
-0.25
-0.37
-0.04
-0.13
-0.09
0.39

6

7

8

9

10

11

1.00
0.09 1.00
0.35 0.93 1.00
0.07 0.44 0.42 1.00
0.35 0.79 0.88 -0.06 1.00
0.12 0.09 0.16 0.00 0.17
1.00
-0.01 0.28 0.28 0.55 0.02
0.00 1.00
-0.05 0.17 0.10 0.05 0.09 -0.02 0.08 1.00
0.05 -0.68 -0.60 -0.37 -0.47
0.00 -0.26 -0.12 1.00
FTSE 100 (n=96)
M
4.50 10.92 11.24 14.66 1.67 0.21 1.46 58287 0.04 0.01 0.84
SD
2.47
9.20
2.75 8.36 1.00 0.48 0.95 99516 0.20 0.10 0.36
FTSE 250 (n=189)
M
4.33 11.55
8.57 9.10 0.80 0.13 0.67
8788 0.04 0.01 0.90
SD
2.26 10.77
2.09 8.93 0.79 0.38 0.71 15804 0.20 0.10 0.30
FTSE Small Cap (n=110)
M
4.38
6.47
7.33 7.41 0.56 0.14 0.43
2734 0.02 0.04 0.85
SD
2.09 11.79
1.48 9.66 0.76 0.34 0.64
4355 0.13 0.19 0.35
Note. Unless noted, all variables are from the 2011 year-end cross-section. Sample was grouped
by FTSE Index. Increase = increase in percentage of women on boards; n=sample size; M=mean;
SD=standard deviation; WOBPC=percentage of women on boards; WOB=women on boards;
WED=women executive directors; WNED=women non-executive directors; Emp=number of
employees; CEOGnd=female CEO; ChairGnd=female chairperson; Treatment=dummy variable
[1=non-balanced; 0=gender-balanced}.
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Table 13
Between Group Correlations for Phase I Variables for the Pooled Sample
Variable
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
1. Sector
1.00
2. Increase
-0.06 1.00
3. Board
0.78 0.58 1.00
4. WOBPC
0.84 0.48 0.99 1.00
5. WOB
0.86 0.46 0.99 1.00 1.00
6. WED
0.98 0.13 0.88 0.93 0.94 1.00
7. WNED
0.84 0.49 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.93 1.00
8. Emp
0.91 0.35 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.99 1.00
9. CEOGnd
0.03 1.00 0.65 0.56 0.54 0.22 0.57 0.43 1.00
10. ChairGnd -0.06 -0.99 -0.67 -0.59 -0.57 -0.25 -0.59 -0.46 -1.00 1.00
11. Treatment -0.86 0.56 -0.35 -0.45 -0.47 -0.75 -0.45 -0.58 0.49 -0.46 1.00
Note. Unless noted, all variables are from the 2011 year-end cross-section. Sample was grouped
by FTSE Index. WOBPC=percentage of women on boards; WOB=women on boards;
WED=women executive directors; WNED=women non-executive directors; Emp=number of
employees; CEOGnd=female CEO; ChairGnd=female chairperson; Treatment=dummy variable
[1=non-balanced; 0=gender-balanced}.

Table 14
Probability of Between Group Correlations for Phase I Variables
Variable
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
1. Sector
0.00
2. Increase
0.96 0.00
3. Board
0.43 0.61 0.00
4. WOBPC
0.36 0.68 0.07 0.00
5. WOB
0.35 0.69 0.09 0.02 0.00
6. WED
0.12 0.92 0.31 0.24 0.23 0.00
7. WNED
0.37 0.67 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.24 0.00
8. Emp
0.27 0.77 0.16 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.10 0.00
9. CEOGnd
0.98 0.06 0.55 0.62 0.64 0.86 0.62 0.71 0.00
10. ChairGnd 0.96 0.08 0.53 0.60 0.62 0.84 0.60 0.69 0.02 0.00
11. Treatment 0.34 0.62 0.77 0.70 0.69 0.46 0.71 0.61 0.68 0.70 0.00
Note. Unless noted, all variables are from the 2011 year-end cross-section. Sample was grouped
by FTSE Index. Increase = increase in percentage of women on boards; WOBPC=percentage of
women on boards; WOB=women on boards; WED=women executive directors; WNED=women
non-executive directors; Emp=number of employees; CEOGnd=female CEO; ChairGnd=female
chairperson; Treatment=dummy variable [1=non-balanced; 0=gender-balanced}.
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Phase II. Using the percentages of WOB in 2016, the pooled sample was split
into two groups (i.e., treatment and comparison). The threshold used for determining
group allocation was 25%, which was the recommended percentage of WOB set by the
Davies Review (Davies, 2011). Organizations that had a percentage of WOB higher than
the 25% threshold were placed in the gender-balanced (treatment) group, and
organizations below the threshold were placed in the non-gender balanced (comparison)
group. The analyses in this phase of the study aimed to identify if 25% of female board
membership constitutes critical mass and improves opportunities for other women in the
target organizations. The total number of observations in the gender-balanced group was
153, while organizations in the non-balanced group totaled 242.
Table 15 reports the distribution of the Compliant and Non-compliant groups for
phase II of the study, across different demographic variables. Results of Fisher’s exact
difference tests that were performed to compare the Compliant and Non-compliant
groups across multiple variables are reported on Table 16. The p-values for the variable
Index suggested statistically significant differences, which stemmed from the majority of
organizations in the FTSE 100 being in the Compliant group, the majority of the FTSE
Small Cap firms being in the Non-compliant group, and the FTSE 250 group being more
evenly distributed and representing about 48% of the Compliant and 48% of the Noncompliant group. However, those differences should not have an impact on the outcome
as the literature review did not find that Index has been theoretically or empirically linked
to opportunities for women in the workplace. There were statistically significant
differences in the female CEO and female Chair differences; however, the populations
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were so small that one person would make a difference; therefore, those findings were
not a cause of concern; however, they were included as controls.
Table 15
Distribution of Non-compliant (Comparison) and Compliant (Treatment) Groups for
Phase II

Variable

Non-compliant
n
%

Compliant
n

%

Index
FTSE 100
39
16.12
57
37.25
FTSE 250
116
47.93
73
47.71
FTSE Small Cap
87
35.95
23
15.03
Sector
Consumer Goods
25
10.33
12
7.84
Consumer Services
43
17.77
42
27.45
Energy
18
7.44
2
1.31
Financials
40
16.53
34
22.22
Health Care
7
2.89
7
4.58
Industrials
68
28.10
38
24.84
Materials
22
9.09
7
4.58
Technology
12
4.96
4
2.61
Telecommunications
5
2.07
2
1.31
Utilities
2
0.83
5
3.27
Board
Large (>9)
103
42.56
71
46.41
Small (<9)
139
57.44
82
53.59
Emp
Small (<1000)
56
23.14
21
13.73
Medium (>1000, <5000)
28
11.57
25
16.34
Large (>5000, <10000)
95
39.26
39
25.49
Large (>10000)
63
26.03
68
44.44
CEOGnd
Male
238
98.35
143
93.46
Female
4
1.65
10
6.54
ChairGnd
Male
238
98.35
141
92.16
Female
4
1.65
12
7.84
Note. Forcing variable = WOBPC2016. Cutoff point = 25%. n=[Non-compliant=242,
Compliant=153]
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Table 16
Fisher’s Exact Test of the Probability of Group Distribution – Phase II
Variable

Non-compliant Compliant
%
%

Diff.

Fisher’s
p-value

95% CI

Cramer's
V

Index
FTSE 100
16.12
37.25 -21.14
0.00
0.20, 0.53
0.23
FTSE 250
47.93
47.71
0.22
1.00
0.66, 1.54
0.00
FTSE Small Cap
35.95
15.03 20.92
0.00
1.85, 5.56
0.22
Board
Large (>9)
42.56
46.41
-3.84
0.47
0.56, 1.31
0.03
Small (<9)
57.44
53.59
3.84
0.47
0.76, 1.79
0.03
Emp
Small (<1000)
23.14
13.73
9.42
0.03
1.07, 3.45
0.11
Medium (<5000)
11.57
16.34
-4.77
0.18
0.36, 1.26
0.06
Large (<10000)
39.26
25.49 13.77
0.01
1.18, 3.03
0.14
Very large (>10000)
26.03
44.44 -18.41
<.001
0.28, 0.69
0.18
CEOGnd
Female
1.65
6.54
-4.88
0.02 1.17, 18.44
0.11
Male
98.35
93.46
4.88
0.02
0.05, 0.86
0.11
ChairGnd
Female
1.65
7.84
-6.19
0.00 1.49, 21.87
0.14
Male
98.35
92.16
6.19
0.00
0.05, 0.67
0.14
Note. n=sample size; CI=confidence interval. Forcing variable = WOBPC2016. Cutoff point = 25%.
n [Non-compliant=242, Compliant=153], Board=board size, Emp=number of employees,
CEOGnd=CEO gender, ChairGnd=chairperson gender.

The sample distribution was analyzed to identify if there were industry sectors
that were more likely to be in the compliant group. Table 17 reports the distribution of
the sample’s treatment and comparison group by sector. Fisher’s exact difference test
found that organizations in the consumer services sector increased the likelihood of
organizations being above the threshold, -9.68, CI 95%(.34, .96), p=.03. The Cramer’s V
value (V=.11) indicated a low level of practical significance. Conversely, the energy
sector decreased the likelihood of organizations being in the non-compliant group, 6.16,
CI 95% (1.41, 54.46), p=.01. The difference had a low level of practical significance
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(V=.12) Despite the low practical significance, the potential bias that those group
differences could introduce to the study compelled further investigation.
As
Table 18 reports, an examination of the total proportion of women employed in
the consumer services and energy sectors revealed that compared to the total sample,
consumer services consistently employed more women in the 2010 to 2016 period.
Conversely, the energy sector consistently had lower rates of female employment.
Similarly, as reported on Table 19 the percentage of WOB, which is the variable used for
placing observations into treatment and comparison groups, has consistently been higher
for the consumer services sector and lower for energy sector than the rest of observations
in the sample. Therefore, t-tests were performed to analyze if the mean differences in the
female employment rates for the consumer services and energy sectors to the rest of the
sample during the 2008 to 2016 period were statistically or practically significant.
Table 17
Fisher’s Exact Test of the Probability of Group Distribution by Sector – Phase II

Sector

Non-compliant
%

Compliant
%

Diff.

p-value

95% CI

Consumer Goods
10.33
7.84
2.49
0.48
0.63, 3.06
Consumer Services
17.77
27.45
-9.68
0.03
0.34, 0.96
Energy
7.44
1.31
6.13
0.01
1.41, 54.46
Financials
16.53
22.22
-5.69
0.19
0.40, 1.20
Health Care
2.89
4.58
-1.68
0.41
0.18, 2.12
Industrials
28.10
24.84
3.26
0.49
0.73, 1.94
Materials
9.09
4.58
4.52
0.11
0.83, 5.92
Technology
4.96
2.61
2.34
0.30
0.57, 8.41
Telecommunications
2.07
1.31
0.76
0.71
0.26, 16.92
Utilities
0.83
3.27
-2.44
0.11
0.02, 1.54
n
242
153
Note. n=sample size; CI=confidence interval; forcing variable=WOBPC2016
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Cramer's
V
0.03
0.11
0.12
0.01
0.03
0.03
0.07
0.04
0.01
0.07

Table 18
Female Employment Percentage Rates in the Consumer Services and Energy Sectors for
the Pooled Sample
Sector

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

All industry sectors 38.11 36.61 36.12
35.27
Consumer Services 48.70 47.74 46.29
47.25
Energy
22.08 20.98 28.86
27.02
Note. Percentages shown are based on observed values.

36.01
49.57
24.88

35.79
48.51
24.90

36.05
49.21
25.56

Table 19
Percentage of WOB in the Consumer Services and Energy Sectors for the Pooled Sample
Sector

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

All industry sectors 6.82
7.42
8.37
9.98 12.69
Consumer Services
9.13 10.42 11.20 13.32 15.22
Energy
5.92
5.45
5.26
6.82
9.70
Note. Percentages shown are based on observed values.

14.79
17.89
11.44

17.11
20.33
12.28

19.15
21.73
15.88

19.97
22.54
14.88

Results of the t-tests, reported on Table 20, revealed that the consumer services
sector consistently employed a statistically significant larger proportion of women,
t(582.22) = 18.21, p<.001, than other sectors. Conversely, during the same period, the
energy sector had a lower rate of female employment, t(100.55) = -8.15, p<.001, than
other sectors. Results for both tests indicated large levels of practical significance
(dConsumer services=-1.06, dEnergy=.91). Results of the t-tests for the percentages of WOB in
the 2008 to 2016 periods produced similar results. The consumer services sector had a
higher proportion of WOB, t(1157.3) = 7.91, p<.001, than the rest of the sample, while
the energy sector had a lower proportion of WOB, t(205.12) = -4.86, p<.001, than other
sectors. Results for both tests indicated small levels of practical significance (dConsumer
services=.32,

dEnergy=.37). Therefore, differences in the proportions of WOB in the
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consumer services and energy organizations may be related to the proportion of women
working in those industry sectors. Consequently, the variable Sector was included as a
covariate in the hypotheses of phase II.
Table 20
Results of t-tests Comparing Female Employment by Sector
Sector

n

M
t-statistic
df
95% CI
Cohen’s d
Women on Boards
Consumer Services
765
15.75
7.91*** 1157.30
2.69, 4.47
0.32
All others
2790
12.17
Energy
180
9.83
-4.86***
205.12
-4.61, -1.95
0.37
All others
3375
13.11
Women Employees
Consumer Services
379
48.62
18.21***
582.22 14.38, 17.85
-1.06
All others
1335
32.50
Energy
85
25.50
-8.15***
100.55 -13.81, -8.40
0.91
All others
1629
36.61
Note. *** p<.001; n=sample size; M=mean; df=degrees of freedom; CI=confidence interval.

The study also explored if the effect of a large increase of WOBPC compared to a
small increase. To that end, the sample was split using the variable Increase as the
forcing variable and the 12% as the cutoff point. Organizations over the cutoff were
placed in the Large (treatment) group, and organizations below the cutoff were placed in
the Small (comparison) group. Table 21 reports the results of the distribution of the
sample between treatment and comparison groups across several variables.
Groups were compared on their equivalence across variables FTSE index, board
size, number of employees, CEO gender, chair gender (Table 22). Fisher’s exact test
indicated the only variables that were statistically significant were Index, specifically
FTSE 250 (p=.02), and Board size. Because most of the organizations that increased
their percentage of WOB are in the FTSE 250 group, it is expected to find statistical
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significance. Board size was an identified covariate, therefore is included as a control in
the hypotheses tests and to ensure that it did not impact the non-parametric tests, it was
tested for smoothness at the cutoff. Index was included as a covariate and standard errors
were clustered by Index in the tests that used Increase as the forcing variable.
Table 21
Distribution of Large (Treatment) and Small (Comparison) Increase Groups for Phase II
Small
Variable
FTSE Index
FTSE 100
FTSE 250
FTSE Small Cap
Sector
Consumer Goods
Consumer Services
Energy
Financials
Health Care
Industrials
Materials
Technology
Telecommunications
Utilities
Board size
Large (>9)
Small (<9)
Employer size
Small (<1000)
Medium (>1000, <5000)
Large (>5000, <10000)
Very large (>10000)
CEOGnd
Male
Female
ChairGnd
Male
Female
Note. Forcing variable = Increase.

n

Large
%

n

%

57
88
64

27.27
42.11
30.62

39
101
46

20.97
54.30
24.73

26
50
10
37
10
41
17
8
6
4

12.44
23.92
4.78
17.70
4.78
19.62
8.13
3.83
2.87
1.91

11
35
10
37
4
65
12
8
1
3

5.91
18.82
5.38
19.89
2.15
34.95
6.45
4.30
0.54
1.61

112
97

53.59
46.41

62
124

33.33
66.67

46
22
67
74

22.01
10.53
32.06
35.41

31
31
67
57

16.67
16.67
36.02
30.65

203
6

97.13
2.87

178
8

95.70
4.30

205
4

98.09
1.91

174
12

93.55
6.45
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Table 22
Fisher’s Exact Test of the Probability of Group Distribution Forcing Variable Increase
Variable

Small
(%)

Index
FTSE 100
27.27
FTSE 250
42.11
FTSE Small Cap
30.62
Board
Large (>9)
53.59
Small (<9)
46.41
Emp
Small (<1000)
22.01
Medium (>1000,<5000)
10.53
Large (>5000, <10000)
32.06
Very large (>10000)
35.41
CEOGnd
Female
2.87
Male
97.13
ChairGnd
Female
1.91
Male
98.09
Note. CI=confidence interval; V=Cramer’s V.

Large
(%)

Diff.

p-value

95% CI

V

20.97
54.30
24.73

6.30
-12.20
5.89

0.16
0.02
0.22

0.86 , 2.32
0.40, 0.93
0.84, 2.15

0.07
0.12
0.06

33.33
66.67

20.26
-20.26

<.001
<.001

1.50, 3.55
0.28, 0.66

0.20

16.67
16.67
36.02
30.65

5.34
-6.14
-3.96
4.76

0.20
0.08
0.46
0.34

0.83, 2.43
0,31, 1.10
0.54, 1.30
0.80, 1.93

0.06
0.08
0.03
0.05

4.30
95.70

-1.43
1.43

0.59
0.59

0.45, 5.42
0.18, 2.21

0.02

6.45
93.55

-4.54
4.54

0.04
0.04

1.04, 15.26
0.06, 0.96

0.10

The sample distribution was analyzed to identify if there were industry sectors
that were more likely to be in the Large group. Table 23 reports the distribution of the
sample’s groups by industry sector. Fisher’s exact different test found that the consumer
goods sector statistically (p<.04) and practically (V=.10) significantly different than other
sectors in relation to other industries. Conversely, the Industrials sector was statistically
(p<.01) and practically (V=.16) significantly different than other sectors. Despite the low
practical significance, the potential bias that those group differences could introduce to
the study compelled further investigation.
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Table 23
Fisher’s Exact Test of the Probability of Group Distribution by Sector for Forcing
Variable Increase

Sector

Small
%

Large
%

Consumer Goods
12.44
5.91
Consumer Svcs.
23.92
18.82
Energy
4.78
5.38
Financials
17.70
19.89
Health Care
4.78
2.15
Industrials
19.62
34.95
Materials
8.13
6.45
Technology
3.83
4.30
Telecommunications
2.87
0.54
Utilities
1.91
1.61
n
209
186
Note. n=sample size; CI=confidence interval.

Diff.
12.40
23.70
3.96
17.10
4.60
19.62
7.57
2.83
2.74
0.91

Fisher's
p-value

CI

0.04
1.04, 5.22
0.22
0.81, 2.28
0.82
0.32, 2.43
0.61
0.51, 1.48
0.18 0.64, 10.14
0.00
0.28, 0.73
0.56
0.56, 3.03
1.00
0.28, 2.77
0.13 0.65, 252.55
1.00
0.20, 8.23

Cramer's
V
0.100
0.055
0.002
0.021
0.070
0.160
0.022
0.000
0.060
0.000

Table 24 reports an examination of the annual progression of the female board
representation by sector, which revealed that in 2011, the industrials sector was the
second industry sector with the lowest percentage of WOB, suggesting that organizations
in that sector needed to considerably increase their WOBPC in order to achieve
compliance. The industrials sector was the one with the highest mean increase.
Conversely, the consumer goods group had the third lowest mean increase, but since it
was the largest group of the sectors with a low increase, the difference was statistically
(p=04) and practically (V=.10) significant. To account for differences related to industry
sector, the variable sector was used as a covariate in all phase II analyses.
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Table 24
Annual Percentage of WOB by Industry Sector
Sector

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Consumer Goods
8.86 11.02
Consumer Services
9.13 10.42
Energy
5.92
5.45
Financials
7.01
7.10
Health Care
8.11
8.34
Industrials
4.17
4.39
Materials
4.48
4.11
Technology
6.81
7.57
Telecommunications 10.16 12.39
Utilities
12.75 12.84
Note. Mean percentages for full sample

10.98
11.20
5.26
9.01
10.49
5.40
4.58
8.25
13.24
13.97

11.97
13.32
6.82
10.67
13.86
6.59
6.06
10.01
14.16
16.20

13.47
15.22
9.70
13.62
15.87
10.61
7.11
14.44
14.07
19.52

15.16
17.89
11.44
15.42
17.22
12.86
9.15
16.90
13.57
22.31

18.12
20.33
12.28
17.51
19.90
15.53
12.60
17.19
14.09
22.13

19.55
21.73
15.88
20.69
19.55
17.58
14.41
18.47
17.08
24.86

19.94
22.54
14.88
21.68
20.97
18.70
15.06
19.71
16.87
26.39

Correlations for phase II variables. Table 25 reports the within group
correlations that were computed grouped by Index. As expected, multiple variables were
correlated. The variable WOBPC was highly correlated with the variable Increase (r=.62)
due to the latter one being a generated value computed using the variable WOB. The
variable Sector had a moderate correlation with the variables WEmpPC (r=-.38), which
made logical sense as female employment vary depending on the industry sector. The
variable Sector was also correlated with WSMPC (r=-.31), and had very weak
correlations with WExecPC (r=-.14) and WOBPC (r=-.11), which may be associated with
a widening gender gap at every step of the organizational hierarchy. There were no other
noteworthy within group correlations. The between group correlations and their
probability, reported in Table 26 and Table 27, indicated that there were statistically
significant differences among groups in the relationship of variable PayGapMedian and
Sector (p<.001).

236

Table 25
Within Group Correlations of Phase II Variables for the Pooled Sample
Variable
1. Sector
2. Increase
3. Board
4. WOBPC
5. WExecPC
6. WSMPC
7. WEmpPC
8. CEOGnd
9. CEOTenure
10. ChairGnd
11. ChairTenure
12. Critical
13. Treatment
14. PayGapMean
15. PayGapMedian
FTSE 100 - n
M
SD
FTSE 250 - n
M
SD
FTSE Small Cap - n
M
SD

1
1.00
0.05
-0.10
-0.11
-0.14
-0.31
-0.38
0.00
0.05
-0.05
-0.04
-0.16
-0.06
0.02
0.11
96
4.50
2.47
189
4.33
2.26
110
4.38
2.09

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1.00
0.01
0.62
0.08
0.02
0.06
0.07
-0.06
0.12
0.08
0.31
0.49
-0.01
-0.01
96
10.92
9.20
189
11.55
10.77
110
6.47
11.79

1.00
0.08
0.03
0.12
0.19
-0.07
-0.02
-0.05
-0.06
0.35
0.01
0.12
0.07
96
10.67
2.55
189
8.27
1.65
110
6.96
1.46

1.00
0.27
0.16
0.28
0.23
0.07
0.21
0.16
0.55
0.76
-0.10
-0.11
96
25.58
8.44
189
20.65
10.10
110
13.88
10.61

1.00
0.43
0.37
0.30
0.19
0.09
0.09
0.23
0.24
-0.15
-0.12
96
17.97
12.70
189
14.27
11.77
110
16.49
14.34

1.00
0.63
0.11
0.11
0.02
0.01
0.20
0.14
-0.10
-0.14
96
22.75
8.73
189
22.50
10.82
110
22.09
11.87

1.00
0.09
0.04
0.09
0.06
0.28
0.25
0.20
0.06
96
35.87
16.40
189
36.11
15.44
110
36.10
17.56

1.00
0.76
0.03
-0.01
0.12
0.12
-0.09
-0.03
96
0.04
0.20
189
0.05
0.21
110
0.01
0.10

1.00
-0.02
-0.02
0.01
0.01
-0.05
-0.01
96
0.11
0.68
189
0.25
1.46
110
0.03
0.29
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10

11

1.00
0.82
0.11
0.17
0.03
0.04
96
0.02
0.14
189
0.05
0.22
110
0.04
0.19

1.00
0.07
0.12
0.07
0.08
96
0.18
1.32
189
0.28
1.52
110
0.18
0.98

12

13

14

15

1.00
0.53
-0.02
-0.04
96
1.59
0.49
189
1.16
0.37
110
1.03
0.16

1.00
-0.03
-0.07
96
0.59
0.49
189
0.39
0.49
110
0.21
0.41

1.00
0.84
90
23.41
14.06
152
20.22
13.27
76
18.74
13.50

1.00
90
20.96
13.29
152
15.56
13.84
76
17.11
14.15

Table 26
Between Group Correlations of Phase II Variables for the Pooled Sample
Variable
1. Sector
2. Increase
3. Board
4. WOBPC
5. WExecPC
6. WSMPC
7. WEmpPC
8. CEOGnd
9. CEOTenure
10. ChairGnd
11. ChairTenure
12. Critical
13. Treatment
14. PayGapMean
15. PayGapMedian

1
1.00
-0.06
0.75
0.51
0.94
0.45
-0.96
-0.09
-0.53
-0.97
-0.79
0.84
0.64
0.78
1.00

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

1.00
0.61
0.83
-0.39
0.86
-0.20
1.00
0.88
0.31
0.66
0.49
0.72
0.58
-0.06

1.00
0.95
0.49
0.93
-0.90
0.59
0.17
-0.56
-0.19
0.99
0.99
1.00
0.75

1.00
0.20
1.00
-0.72
0.81
0.46
-0.28
0.12
0.90
0.99
0.94
0.51

1.00
0.13
-0.82
-0.42
-0.78
-1.00
-0.95
0.61
0.35
0.53
0.94

1.00
-0.67
0.85
0.52
-0.21
0.19
0.86
0.97
0.91
0.45

1.00
-0.17
0.28
0.87
0.60
-0.95
-0.82
-0.92
-0.97

1.00
0.90
0.34
0.68
0.47
0.70
0.55
-0.09

1.00
0.72
0.94
0.02
0.31
0.12
-0.52

1.00
0.92
-0.68
-0.43
-0.60
-0.97

1.00
-0.33
-0.04
-0.24
-0.79
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12

13

14

15

1.00
0.96
1.00
0.84

1.00
0.98
0.65

1.00
0.78

1.00

Table 27
Probability of Between Group Correlations of Phase II Variables
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
1. Sector
0.00
2. Increase
0.96
0.00
3. Board
0.46
0.58
0.00
4. WOBPC
0.66
0.38
0.20
0.00
5. WExecPC
0.21
0.74
0.68
0.88
0.00
6. WSMPC
0.70
0.34
0.24
0.04
0.92
0.00
7. WEmpPC
0.17
0.87
0.29
0.49
0.39
0.53
0.00
8. CEOGnd
0.94
0.02
0.60
0.40
0.73
0.35
0.89
0.00
9. CEOTenure
0.65
0.31
0.89
0.69
0.43
0.65
0.82
0.29
0.00
10. ChairGnd
0.16
0.80
0.62
0.82
0.06
0.86
0.33
0.78
0.49
0.00
11. ChairTenure
0.42
0.54
0.88
0.92
0.20
0.88
0.59
0.52
0.23
0.26
0.00
12. Critical
0.37
0.67
0.09
0.29
0.58
0.34
0.20
0.69
0.98
0.53
0.79
0.00
13. Treatment
0.56
0.48
0.09
0.10
0.77
0.15
0.39
0.50
0.80
0.71
0.97
0.19
0.00
14. PayGapMean
0.43
0.61
0.03
0.23
0.65
0.27
0.26
0.63
0.92
0.59
0.85
0.06
0.12 0.00
15. PayGapMedian
0.00
0.96
0.46
0.66
0.22
0.70
0.17
0.94
0.65
0.16
0.42
0.37
0.55 0.43 0.00
Note. Sector=industry sector; Increase=increase in the percentage of WOB; Board=board size; WOBPC=percentage of women on boards;
WED=women executive directors; ChairGnd=female chairperson; CEOGnd=female CEO; WExecPC=percentage of female executives;
WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management; Emp=total number of employees; WEmpPC=percentage of female employees in the firm;
PayGapMean=gender pay gap mean; PayGapMedian=gender pay gap median.
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Treatment of Missing Data
Prior to the amendment of the U.K. CGC, organizations were not required to
disclose their gender metrics; therefore, there is a considerable amount of missing data in
several variables. Table 28 reports the percentage of data available for each variable for
every year. However, as indicated, WExecPC and WSMPC were the only variables with
missing values needed for the study’s analyses. The percentage of women on executive
boards (WExecPC) had 107 (27%) missing values, and the variable for the percentage of
women in senior management (WSMPC) had 63 (16%) missing values. Variables that
represented the mean and median gender pay gap values (PayGapMean, PayGapMedian)
had 77 (20%) missing values each. Therefore, the following data imputation process was
followed to generate imputed data for the missing values for those variables.
Despite the mandatory pay gap data reporting requirement, 77 organizations in the
sample did not comply with this requirement, which represents about 20% of missing
data for the pay gap variable. Some of these organizations did not comply with the
requirement because they were below the 250-employee threshold, and others did not
provide a reason for not reporting. In the FTSE 350 group, 242 out of 285 firms reported
their gender pay gap. Their average median pay gap was 17.57%, which indicates that in
average, in those organizations, men earn 17.57% more than women. In the FTSE Small
Cap group, 76 out of 110 firms reported their gender pay gap, which had an average
median pay gap of 17.10%. Considering the relatively small sample size for a regression
discontinuity analysis, a data imputation method was suggested by the dissertation
committee; therefore, the Multiple Imputation by Chained Equations (MICE) R package
was used to generate missing values.
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Table 28
Data Collected by Variable by Year as a Percentage of the Total
Variable

2008

2009

2010

Board

98.0

99.0

100.0

WOB

98.0

99.0

WOBPC

98.0

WED
ChairGnd

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

99.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

98.0

99.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

98.0

99.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

CEOGnd

98.0

99.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

WExecPC

49.0

57.3

88.6

88.6

62.5

59.4

77.1

82.3

83.4

FTSE 100

WSMPC
Emp
WEmpPC

9.4

14.6

20.9

23.0

33.4

78.2

92.8

80.3

91.7

98.0

98.0

99.0

98.0

96.9

100.0

100.0

64.6

100.0

7.3

9.4

19.8

21.9

32.3

83.4

95.9

59.4

100.0

FTSE 250
Board

95.8

98.5

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

WOB

95.8

98.5

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

WOBPC

95.8

98.5

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

WED

95.8

98.5

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

ChairGnd

95.8

98.5

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

CEOGnd

95.8

98.5

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

WExecPC

26.5

26.5

39.7

38.1

35.5

35.0

62.0

35.5

75.7

WSMPC

2.7

3.8

10.6

10.1

13.3

56.7

75.2

41.8

84.7

94.8

97.4

99.0

99.5

97.4

99.0

99.0

58.8

100.0

2.2

4.3

16.5

17.0

23.3

77.3

94.8

55.6

100.0

Board

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

WOB

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

WOBPC

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

WED

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

ChairGnd

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

CEOGnd

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

WExecPC

30.0

35.5

40.0

39.1

31.9

27.3

61.9

50.0

56.4

Emp
WEmpPC

FTSE Small Cap

WSMPC
Emp
WEmpPC

1.0

1.9

12.8

11.9

11.0

70.0

92.8

81.9

100.0

96.4

98.2

95.5

97.3

98.2

100.0

100.0

91.0

100.0

1.0

1.9

12.8

11.9

11.0

70.0

92.8

81.9

100.0

Note. Percentages of total population for each year; Board=board size; WOB=women on boards;
WOBPC=percentage of women on boards; WED=women executive directors; ChairGnd=female
chairperson; CEOGnd=female CEO; WExecPC=percentage of female executives;
WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management; Emp=total number of employees;
WEmpPC=percentage of female employees in the firm.
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Identification of Missing Data Mechanism
Scholars (Van Buuren & Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2010) suggest that identifying the
process that created the missing data impacts the way in which data should be examined.
Often, the cause of missing values in a dataset is unknown; therefore, assumptions must
be made in order to help determine the reasons for missingness. Additionally, tests for
identifying data patterns of missing values can help in the process (Van Buuren, 2018).
First, to identify if data appeared to be missing at random, and select the
appropriate method of data imputation, first, a function for identifying the missing data
pattern was used. Figure 4 shows the pattern of missing data for the WExecPC variable,
and Figure 5 shows the pattern for the WSMPC variable. The blue boxplots represent the
marginal distribution of the variable on the axis. The red boxplots represent the
distribution of missing data compared across the variable on the axis. For data missing
completely at random (MCAR) both boxplots must be equal. However, for data missing
at random (MAR), distributions on both boxplots should be similar.
The variable WExecPC contained 107 missing values. Although missing values
for the variable were concentrated in the lower end of the variable WOBPC, missing
values were distributed across the range of values; therefore, it is plausible that data were
missing at random. Missing values for the WExecPC variable were distributed in a
similar way to the observed values for the variable across the variables WSMPC,
WEmpPC and the PayGap variables. Similar results were obtained for the variable
WSMPC. The 63 missing values of WSMPC showed a comparable distribution to its
observed values across the variables WOBPC, WExecPC, WEmpPC and the PayGap
variables.
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The distribution of missing values for the PayGap variable appeared to be similar
to the distribution of observed values across the variables WExecPC, WEmpPC, and
WSMPC (Figure 6). However, the distribution of missing values across the variable was
on the right side of the distribution, with the majority of missing values below the mean
of the WOBPC variable. This pattern suggests that missing values for the gender pay gap
variables may not be missing at random, as the missingness pattern concentrates on the
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Taking into account the nature of the gender pay gap data, it is likely that the
missing values did not happen randomly. Previous studies have found that the most
problematic type of missing data are missing not at random (MNAR), for which nonresponse or missingness is related to the value that would have been observed (Sinharay,
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Stern, & Russell, 2001). A common example of missing values is income, because
individuals with high or low income choose tend to not disclose their income on surveys.
The gender pay gap data may present a similar problem. The disclosure requirement
mandated by the U.K. Government may have acted as a deterrent for organizations that
would not have reported their gender pay gaps voluntarily. However, the 77 missing
values for the PayGap variables represent a 20% non-response rate, which appears to not
be missing at random.
When missing data are MNAR, there is no universal method of handling the
missing values (Donders, Van Der Heijden, Stijnen, & Moons, 2006). Existing literature
provides multiple techniques for imputation of MNAR models (Albert & Follmann,
2009; Little, 2009). Under MNAR, the model fitted to the observed cases is only correct
for the observed cases and incorrect for the missing cases, thus, it cannot be used for the
imputation. Additionally, estimating the amount of error would be impossible without
the use of external data. Although it is possible to use the predictive information in the
observed data to impute missing values and perform post-processing imputations, it is not
possible to test MNAR data because data needed for such tests are, by definition, missing
(Van Buuren & Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2010). Snijders and Bosker (2012) stated that in
the case of MNAR data, assumptions are not completely testable; thus researchers need to
make assumptions that go beyond the available data. They also indicated that any data
analysis using MNAR imputed data leaves bigger questions than when data are missing
at random and are testable (p. 133). Therefore, while data for all missing values were
imputed; imputed values for the pay gap variables, which were found to be MNAR, were
not used in the RD tests to avoid the uncertainty of the conclusions drawn from the data.
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Data Imputation
The key variables for the study’s analyses that contained missing values were
WExecPC2016, WSMPC2016, PayGapMean and PayGapMedian. The two latter ones had
the same missing pattern. The study’s database containing all observations for the pooled
sample with values for organizational variables included in Table 4 were uploaded into R.
Following the recommendations in Van Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn (2010) for
data MAR and MNAR imputation, and taking into account the clustered nature of the
data, a multilevel imputation method was used to generate data for missing values. The
variables WExecPC and WSMPC were imputed using two different methods. The twolevel Bayesian linear regression, with heterogeneous within-group variances, method
(2l.norm), and the predictive mean matching method (2l.pmm). The variables
PayGapMean and PayGapMedian were imputed using a two-level Bayesian linear
regression, with heterogeneous within-group variances, with post-processing adjustment.
While it is recommended to include as many predictors as possible in order to
have minimal bias in the imputation, Van Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn (1999)
suggest that for imputation purposes, no more than 15 to 25 variables be used. Therefore,
predictor variables for data imputation were used based on their predictive relation to the
selected outcomes. Regressions and correlations were performed on the outcome
variables to identify the most significant predictors. Predictor selection was initially done
using the covariates identified in existing literature; therefore, non-statistically significant
covariates that were included in the equations for hypothesis tests were not removed from
the predictor matrix. The predictor matrix indicated the dependent variable, class
variable, and predictors for fixed and random effects for each variable to be imputed.

246

Five datasets were generated and each one was tested to compare the fit of the
original data set to the generated data sets using the same regression model. The
Bayesian regression imputation method generated values for the WExecPC variable
(percentage of female executives) that included negative numbers; therefore, postprocessing imputations were performed to add boundaries to the data to not exceed the 0
to 100 range. After post-processing imputations, each of the five data sets were tested.
No large deviations from the original data set were noted. The predictive mean matching
imputation method is a partially parametric method that combines the linear regression
method and the nearest neighbor imputation approaches. One of the advantages of this
method is that it imputes missing values from the observed data preserving the
distribution of the observed values in the missing values; therefore, it does not require
post-processing.
However, the Bayesian imputation results were kept because they were more
appropriate for the data. The 2l.norm allows the imputation of data that fit a multivariate
mixed effects model. The inclusion of random effects provided more precise estimates,
which are essential for the non-parametric RD analyses. Figure 7 shows box and whisker
plots of results of the data imputation process. The subset of variables included in the
imputation of values for the variables WExecPC, WSMPC, PayGapMean and
PayGapMedian are shown in the figure. The blue boxes represent the distribution of
observed values and the red boxes represent the five imputed data sets. The test indicated
that the imputed values did not significantly change the mean or distribution of the
variables.
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Convergence of the imputation algorithm was assessed by plotting the imputed
parameters against the iteration number (Figure 8). Inspection of the streams were used
to identify problems with the imputation model. The plot showed that the different
streams were freely intermingled with each other without showing any specific trends.
The variance between the different sequences were no larger than the variance with each
individual sequence; therefore, healthy convergence was supported. The next step in
diagnosing problems with the data imputation was to plot the densities of the observed
and imputed values to assess if the imputations were reasonable. Figure 9 shows that,
with a few explainable deviations, the imputed values have similar densities than the
observed values. Deviations can be explained by the missingness pattern. For example,
the imputed percentages of women in senior management at around the 25% axis, which
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is due to the fact that the missingness pattern for that variable suggests that missing
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The final test for assessing the imputation results was to examine the probability
that WExecPC, WSMPC, PayGapMean and PayGapMedian were missing by plotting
observed and imputed values against the propensity score, where the propensity score
was equal to the average over the imputations. Raghunathan and Bondarenko (2007)
suggest that conditional distributions should be similar if the assumed model for creating
the multiple imputations is a good fit; therefore, comparing the distributions of the
observed and imputed values to their propensity scores is a good diagnostic tool. As
shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11, observed data (blue) and imputed values (red) had
similar patterns, providing evidence that the imputations were reasonable.
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Figure 10. Conditional distributions of WExecPC against their propensity scores
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Imputed results were pooled using the pooling function of the MICE package.
The pooling function uses the set of rules for combining separate estimates and standard
errors from each imputed dataset into an overall estimate with standard errors and pvalues (Rubin, 1987) based on asymptotic – large sample – theory. The pooled dataset
was used for model testing and comparison. Results of the regression tests with the
imputed pooled data set were similar to those with observed data. The pooled dataset
was extracted and values for the four imputed variables were merged with the study’s
main dataset. The reason for adding them as additional variables was to be able to run
tests with observed values (listwise deletion) and imputed values separately.
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Statistical Assumptions Results
This section presents the results of statistical assumptions tests for both phases of
the study. Phase I tests will test assumptions for the full sample (parametric) and nonparametric tests (i.e. at different bandwidths) using variable WOBPC2011 as the forcing
variable. Tests for phase II use forcing variables WOBPC2016 and Increase. Parametric
tests for the full sample used the pooled FTSE All Share sample, and non-parametric tests
are performed at optimal bandwidths for each forcing variable.
Phase I
The sample of 3541 year-firm observations representing nine years of 345
treatment group subjects and 50 comparison group subjects, representing the 395 total
baseline sample subjects were formatted as a csv file for input as panel data into R. The
formatted csv file was examined for consistency by comparing each year with the
previous year to identify deviations and by comparing the total numbers of WOB by
organization with the number of individual names on the database containing information
about each female board member. No discrepancies were noted.
The data were evaluated for statistical assumptions of normality, linearity and
homoscedasticity. Analyses were performed on the pooled data and for each group, FTSE
350, FTSE 100, FTSE 250, and FTSE Small Cap, and results are presented on Table 29.
The assessment of the linear model assumptions for the FTSE 350, FTSE 100, FTSE 250,
and FTSE Small Cap groups were non-significant at the alpha level .05. The p-values for
global statistics ranged from .20 to .54, suggesting that the relationships among variables
were linear. Values for skewness ranged from .02 to .88 and their p-values ranged
from .35 to .88 indicating an acceptable distribution of the data. Kurtosis values ranged
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from .36 to 1.60, and their respective p-values ranged from .19 to .55, suggesting an
acceptable distribution of the data. The p-values for heteroscedasticity tests ranged
from .06 to .55, suggesting that the model residuals were constant across the range of the
forcing variable. Therefore, the data satisfied all statistical assumptions for Phase I.
Table 29
Results of Normality Tests by Index for Phase I
FTSE 350
FTSE 100
FTSE 250
FTSE Small Cap
Statistic
Estimate
p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Global statistic
5.95
0.20
4.23
0.38
3.13
0.54
4.19
0.38
Skewness
0.46
0.50
0.02
0.88
0.86
0.35
0.62
0.43
Kurtosis
1.67
0.20
1.69
0.19
0.36
0.55
1.27
0.26
Heteroscedasticity
3.54
0.06
1.14
0.28
0.43
0.51
0.35
0.55
Note. Parametric test for the full sample for each index. Forcing variable=WOBPC2011

Although, literature recommends the removal of outliers (Barnett & Lewis, 1994;
Judd & McClelland, 1989); the removal of legitimate outliers has arguments for and
against (Osborne & Overbay, 2004). As shown on Figure 12 and Figure 13, data for the
FTSE 350 and FTSE Small Cap were linear, homoscedastic, and despite the presence of
outliers, their distance from the Cook’s line indicated that outliers were not influential to
the regression line. However, to ensure accuracy, identified outliers were examined
against the original source of the data, and it was determined that those were legitimate
outliers; therefore, they were not removed from the sample. It is noteworthy to mention
that in non-parametric regression discontinuity designs, the extreme parts of the range of
the forcing variable are not used in the effect estimation, therefore, the impact of outliers
is minimized (Visser & de Leeuw, 1984).
Subsequently, a graphical representation of the distribution of the of the
assignment variable (Figure 14) and linear regressions of the data were performed to
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observe if the relationship of the forcing and outcome variables followed the same
direction. Figure 15 shows how the regression lines for all groups follow the same
pattern. Literature indicates that when the regression lines have the same shape, pooling
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Linear Regressions of Pre and Post WOB % by FTSE Group

FTSE All Share

FTSE 100
FTSE 100

40

20

30

Increase

Increase

FTSE 250

20
10

0
0
-10

-20
0

10

20

30

0

10

WOB2011

20

30

WOB2011

FTSE 250

FTSE Small Cap

40

20

Increase

Increase

20

0

0
-20
-20
0

10

20

30

0

WOB2011

10

20

30

40

WOB2011

Figure 15. Linear regressions of outcome and forcing variable by Index
Note. Parametric test for the full sample by index; forcing variable=WOBPC2011, percentage of
women on boards.

Phase II
For the second phase of the study, post-Davies Review measures were used. The
baseline sample of 395 observations was split into treatment and comparison groups
using two different forcing variables. Using the WOBPC in 2016 and a threshold of 25
(c=25), the sample was divided into a Compliant (WOBPC2016>c) and Non-compliant
(WOBPC2016<25) groups. Similarly, for alternative explanations, phase II used the
variable Increase to split the data into treatment and comparison group. Using a
threshold of 12 (c=12), the sample was split into a Large increase group (Increase>c) and
a Small increase group (Increase<c).
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Using the regression models for the outcomes WExecPC, WSMPC and WSMPC
of phase II of the study, data were evaluated the global and directional tests for assessing
modeling assumptions of normality, linearity and homoscedasticity. Analyses were
performed using the gvlma package in R (Pena & Slate, 2014) on the pooled data and for
each group, FTSE All Share, FTSE 100, FTSE 250, and FTSE Small Cap. Results are
presented on Table 30.
Global statistics p-values for the FTSE 100, FTSE 250, and FTSE Small Cap
ranged from .053 to .908, suggesting that the relationship of the covariates with the
outcome for each group were linear. However, p-values for the global statistic for the
pooled sample for the outcomes WExecPC (p=.01) and WSMPC (p=.03) indicated that
there were deviations from linearity. The p-values for skewness were not statistically
significant for any particular group, except for the pooled sample, indicating that the data
were not normally distributed. Kurtosis values ranged from .07 to 1.22, and their
respective p-values ranged from .26 to .79, suggesting an acceptable distribution of the
data. The p-values for heteroscedasticity tests ranged from .06 to .96, suggesting that the
model residuals were constant across the range of X.
Although not all statistical assumptions were satisfied, as shown on Figure 16 to
18, the residuals vs. fitted plots indicated that with the exception of couple of outliers,
residuals are spread around the horizontal line without a distinct pattern, which is a good
indication of a linear relationship. The norm Q-Q plot shows that, with the exception of
two outliers, standardized residuals follow the diagonal line. The scale-location plot
shows a horizontal line with most residuals randomly spread, suggesting
homoscedasticity. The residuals vs. leverage plot shows that no observations were
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beyond the Cook’s distance line, which indicated that despite the presence of outliers,
they were not influential to the regression line. The data were considered sufficiently
normal, linear, and homoscedastic to continue the analyses with a pooled sample.
Table 30
Results of Normality Tests by Index for Phase II
FTSE All Share

FTSE 100

FTSE 250

FTSE Small Cap

Statistic
Estimate
p-value Estimate p-value Estimate
p-value Estimate
WExecPC
14.60
0.01
9.36
0.05
6.14
0.19
1.01
Global statistic
9.42 <0.01
2.34
0.13
2.52
0.11
0.01
Skewness
0.07
0.79
0.52
0.47
0.26
0.61
0.93
Kurtosis
3.70
0.06
0.74
0.39
0.95
0.33
0.00
Heteroscedasticity
WSMPC
10.83
0.03
4.12
0.39
6.19
0.19
5.74
Global statistic
9.07 <0.01
3.57
0.06
2.06
0.15
0.43
Skewness
0.84
0.36
0.28
0.60
0.38
0.54
1.22
Kurtosis
0.87
0.35
0.11
0.74
0.63
0.43
3.20
Heteroscedasticity
WEmpPC
Global statistic
8.60
0.07
4.10
0.40
1.64
0.80
49.54
1.92
0.17
2.72
0.10
0.02
0.90
26.94
Skewness
6.46
0.01
0.39
0.53
1.05
0.31
22.48
Kurtosis
0.16
0.69
0.19
0.66
0.00
0.99
0.04
Heteroscedasticity
Note. Parametric tests for the full sample by index; forcing variable=WOBPC2016.
WExecPC=percentage of women executives; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior
management; WEmpPC=percentage of women employed in the firm.
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p-value

0.91
0.91
0.33
0.96
0.22
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Figure 16. Residual plots for WExecPC for the Pooled Sample - Phase II
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Figure 17. Residual plots for WSMPC for the Pooled Sample – Phase II
Note. n=395; WSMPC=women in senior management; forcing variable=WOBPC2016
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Figure 18. Residual plots for WEmpPC for the Pooled Sample - Phase II
Note. n=395; WEmpPC=women employed in the firm; forcing variable=WOBPC2016

Next, a graphical representation of the distribution of the of the assignment
variable WOBPC (Figure 19) and linear regressions of the data were performed to
observe if the relationship of the forcing and outcome variables followed the same
direction. Figure 20 to 22 show how the regression lines for all groups follow the same
pattern. Literature indicates that when the regression lines have the same shape, pooling
observations into one sample is an appropriate approach for RD (Lee & Munk, 2008).
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Assignment Variable Distribution
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Figure 19. Density of Forcing Variable WOBPC2016 by Index
Note. Parametric test for the full sample by index; WOBPC2016=percentage of women on boards.
Linear Regressions of WExecPC by WOBPC
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Figure 20. Linear Regressions of WExecPC and Forcing Variable by Index
Note. Parametric test for the full sample by index; WOBPC2016=percentage of women on boards;
WExecPC=percentage of women executives
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Linear Regressions of WSMPC by WOBPC
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Figure 21. Linear regressions of WSMPC and forcing variable by Index
Note. Parametric test for the full sample by index; WOBPC2016=percentage of women on boards;
WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management.
Linear Regressions of WEmpPC by WOBPC
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Figure 22. Linear regressions of WEmpPC and forcing variable by Index
Note. Parametric test for the full sample by index; WOBPC2016=percentage of women on boards;
WEmpPC=percentage of women employed in the firm.
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As mentioned previously, the forcing variable Increase was used to split the
sample into treatment and comparison groups. The relationship between the forcing
variable, covariates and PayGap outcome was also tested for linearity, normality and
homoscedasticity. Table 31 reports the results of the tests, which suggested that the
pooled sample (FTSE All Share) (p=.07), FTSE 100 (p=.76), and FTSE Small Cap
(p=.06) groups satisfied the assumption of linearity. The p–values for skewness for the
pooled sample (p=.01) and the FTSE 250 (p=.001) groups indicated that the data were
not normally distributed. The p-values for the skewness statistics for FTSE 100 (p=.30)
and FTSE Small (p=.59) groups indicated that data for those groups were normally
distributed. The p-values for kurtosis ranged from .21 to .36, indicating that along the
vertical axis, data were normally distributed across all groups. The p-values for
heteroscedasticity ranged from .30 to .59, which suggested that data were homoscedastic.
Diagnostic plots were generated to help evaluate the assumptions. As shown in
Figure 23, the residuals vs. fitted plot indicated that residuals were linearly distributed
across the zero line with no other discernable pattern. Although outliers were identified,
the residuals vs. leverage plot suggested that they were not influential to the regression
line. Therefore, the data were considered sufficiently normal, linear, and homoscedastic
for further testing.
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Table 31
Results of Normality Tests by Index for Phase II
FTSE All Share

FTSE 100

FTSE 250

FTSE Small Cap
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2
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112

0.5

0

1.0

160

Cook's distance

0.5

160

-4

67

Standardized residuals

Scale-Location

5

-1

Theoretical Quantiles

0.0

Standardized residuals

Fitted values

275

0.06
0.59
0.21
0.59

0

0

160

p-value

-2

40

67

275

-40

Residuals

Residuals vs Fitted

Standardized residuals

Statistic
Estimate
p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate
8.65
0.07
1.85
0.76
14.68
0.01
9.22
Global statistic
6.60
0.01
1.06
0.30
10.11
0.00
0.29
Skewness
0.85
0.36
0.31
0.58
0.93
0.34
1.55
Kurtosis
Heteroscedasticity
1.07
0.30
0.47
0.49
0.94
0.33
0.29
Note. Parametric test for the full sample for each index. Forcing variable=Increase
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Figure 23. Residual plots for PayGapMedian for the Pooled Sample - Phase II
Note. n=395; PayGapMedian=gender pay gap median; forcing variable=Increase

Graphical representations of the distribution of the of the assignment variable
Increase (Figure 24) and linear regressions of the data were performed to observe if the
relationship of the forcing and outcome variables followed the same direction. Figure 25
shows how the regression lines for all groups follow the same pattern, which provided
evidence that supported a pooling approach for the RD tests.
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Assignment Variable Distribution
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Figure 24. Density of Forcing Variable Increase by Index
Note. Parametric test for the full sample by index; Increase= increase in percentage of women on
boards from 2011 to 2016.
Linear Regressions of PayGapMedian by Increase
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Figure 25. Linear Regression of PayGapMedian and forcing variable Increase
Note. Parametric test for the full sample by index; PayGapMedian=gender pay gap median;
Increase= increase in percentage of women on boards from 2011 to 2016.
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Internal Validity of the RD Approach
First, to test exogenous variation in the percentage of WOB in relationship with
the Davies Review, a panel study was done to identify the effects of time the outcome
variable and to identify if there were differences in the interaction of time and FTSE
Index. As noted previously, although slow, women’s participation on corporate boards
followed an upwards trend. Therefore, to ensure that the increase in the percentage of
WOB was not simply the effect of time, the pooled FTSE All Share sample was used.
Since the Davies Review targeted only FTSE 350 boards, differences between FTSE 350
and FTSE Small Cap boards after the announcement of the Davies Review were expected.
Longitudinal data from 2008 to 2016 were analyzed in a mixed effects regression model
for repeated measures data. Results were reported Table 32. To identify the effect of
each year on the percentage of WOB of observed organizations, the regression used the
variable Year as a factor rather than a numeric variable. Equation 17 was used to
estimate the effects of time for each FTSE group.
!"#$% = () + (+ ,-./0))120)+3 + (0 456-7+20 + (8 9-:;</+21 + (= #<./6

(17)

+ (> ,-./0))120)+3 ∗ 456-7+20 + @

where WOBPC is the percentage of WOB in an organization, b0 is the intercept,
which uses as reference the Index group FTSE 100, and Year 2008. b1 is the coefficient
for each year from 2009 to 2016. Year is the coefficient for each year {Yes=1, No=0}, as
the coefficient for each year was estimated as a factor. b2 is the coefficient for FTSE
Index. Index indicates FTSE Index, which should be entered into the equation as a
dummy {Yes=1, No=2} as Index coefficients were estimated as factors. b3 is the
coefficient for each industry sector. Sector represents coefficients for the 10 sectors, for
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which 0, the reference group is consumer goods. b4 is the coefficient for board size,
Board is the board size, which is represented by the total number of members on a board.

b5 is the coefficient for the interaction of Year and Index, Year and Index indicate the
index of a given organization for the year in the observed period.
The coefficients reported in the model indicated that an average board size in the
reference group had an estimated 10.66% of female representation on their board, t(3121)
= 6.643, p < .001; 95% CI(7.32, 13.40). Results revealed that with the exception of year
2009 (p=.396), time had a statistically significant positive effect on the percentage of
WOB. The p-values ranged from less than .001 to .034 for every observation year, with
coefficients ranging from 1.65 for year 2010 to 14.35 for year 2016. The effects of FTSE
Index were statistically significant (p<.001) for FTSE 250 and FTSE Small Cap groups,
with coefficients of -5.86 and -5.90, respectively. In the 2008 to 2011 period, the
interaction of the effects of time and FTSE index were not statistically significant, with pvalues ranging from .378 to .899, which suggested that prior to the Davies Review there
were no distinctions in the annual increase of WOB that could be attributed to FTSE
index. However, in the 2012 to 2016 period, the interaction of time and FTSE index
indicated statistically significant differences for FTSE Small Cap boards, with
coefficients ranging between -2.69 (p=.042) and -5.57 (p<.001). The interaction effect
of time and FTSE index was not statistically significant for FTSE 250 boards in any year
in the 2008 to 2016 year-observations, with p-values ranging from .151 to .699. The pvalues for the interaction effect of time and FTSE Small Cap firms through Year 2011
ranged from .386 to .909, indicating that there were not statistically significant
differences in changes in the percentage of WOB explained by the interaction of time and
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FTSE Index for FTSE 100 and FTSE Small Cap firms prior to the Davies Review
announcement. The interaction effect of time and FTSE Small Cap from 2012 to 2016
yielded statistically significant p-values that ranged from .044 to less than .001 for
estimates that ranged from -2.68 for year 2012 to -5.55 for year 2016.
Results provided evidence that despite differences in percentages of WOB
explained by FTSE index, differences in the annual rate of change by FTSE index were
not statistically significant until after the announcement of the Davies Review. These
results suggest that prior to the announcement of the Davies Review, changes in gender
composition across all FTSE All Share organizations were similar and provide evidence
that variation in the increase of WOB is related to the Davies Review, as the effect was
statistically significantly higher for target organizations (i.e., FTSE 350) than for
organizations that were not targeted by the initiative (i.e., FTSE Small Cap).
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Table 32
Results of Panel Study to Estimate the Effect of Time and Index on the Pooled Sample
Variable
Fixed effects
Intercept
Time
Year2009
Year2010
Year2011
Year2012
Year2013
Year2014
Year2015
Year2016
Index
FTSE 250
FTSE Small Cap
Sector
Consumer Services
Energy
Financials
Health Care
Industrials
Materials
Technology
Telecommunications
Utilities
Board
Interaction Time: Index
Year2009: FTSE 250
Year2010: FTSE 250
Year2011: FTSE 250
Year2012: FTSE 250
Year2013: FTSE 250
Year2014: FTSE 250
Year2015: FTSE 250
Year2016: FTSE 250

Coefficient

SE

df

t-value

p-value

10.67

1.61

3121

6.643

0.000

0.50
1.65
3.30
6.39
8.03
11.44
13.91
14.35

0.59
0.78
0.89
0.97
1.03
1.07
1.10
1.12

3121
3121
3121
3121
3121
3121
3121
3121

0.849
2.123
3.699
6.568
7.802
10.685
12.634
12.771

0.396
0.034
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

-5.86
-5.90

1.13
1.29

383
383

-5.163
-4.583

0.000
0.000

1.53
-6.14
-1.24
-0.11
-2.23
-6.74
-0.39
-2.33
1.19
0.21

1.26
1.79
1.29
2.01
1.23
1.59
1.91
2.64
2.66
0.08

383
383
383
383
383
383
383
383
383
3121

1.216
-3.436
-0.957
-0.056
-1.818
-4.231
-0.203
-0.882
0.446
2.669

0.225
0.001
0.339
0.956
0.070
0.000
0.839
0.378
0.656
0.008

0.37
0.40
0.42
0.60
1.82
0.96
0.72
1.00

0.72
0.96
1.10
1.20
1.27
1.32
1.35
1.38

3121
3121
3121
3121
3121
3121
3121
3121

0.512
0.415
0.386
0.498
1.435
0.727
0.530
0.722

0.609
0.678
0.699
0.618
0.151
0.467
0.597
0.470

(continued)

269

Table 32
Results of Panel Study to Estimate the Effect of Time and Index on the Pooled Sample
(Continued)
Variable
Coefficient
SE
df
t-value p-value
Year2009:FTSE Small Cap
-0.09
0.80 3121
-0.115
0.909
Year2010:FTSE Small Cap
-0.73
1.06 3121
-0.694
0.488
Year2011:FTSE Small Cap
-1.06
1.22 3121
-0.868
0.386
Year2012:FTSE Small Cap
-2.68
1.33 3121
-2.019
0.044
Year2013:FTSE Small Cap
-3.05
1.41 3121
-2.167
0.030
Year2014:FTSE Small Cap
-5.53
1.46 3121
-3.784
0.000
Year2015:FTSE Small Cap
-6.55
1.50 3121
-4.354
0.000
Year2016:FTSE Small Cap
-5.55
1.53 3121
-3.620
0.000
Random Effects
Firm
2.85
Residual variance
8.17
n
3541
Note. Dependent variable=percentage of women on boards; n=sample size; SE=standard error;
df=degrees of freedom; Board=board size; Index=FTSE index.

Internal Validity Results for Phase I
Integrity of the assignment variable. To test the integrity of the assignment
variable, the McCrary density tests were performed to detect manipulation. Results of
the McCrary density tests that were performed on the pooled sample and on each
individual group are reported on Table 33. Due to the small sample size, there was not a
high concentration of observations around the cutoff; therefore, bandwidths for the FTSE
100 group was widened in order to find enough observations around the cutoff. Log
differences in height (theta) indicated a discontinuity at the cutoff point; however, those
estimates were not statistically significant. The p-values of the McCrary density tests
ranged from .083 to .397 indicating that there was no evidence of manipulation of the
assignment variable (McCrary, 2006). After satisfying the assumption of integrity of the
assignment variable, its continuity was tested.
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Table 33
Results of the McCrary Density Tests for Phase I Forcing Variable by Index
Index
Bin size
h
Theta
SE
z-value
p-value
FTSE All Share
0.91
4.70
4.807
2.773
1.734
0.0829
FTSE 350
1.04
3.00
5.534
4.846
1.142
0.2535
FTSE 100
1.71
9.20
3.931
2.179
1.804
0.0711
FTSE 250
1.30
6.77
0.532
0.629
0.847
0.3972
FTSE Small Cap
1.84
13.00
0.839
0.713
1.177
0.2391
Note. h=bandwidth; SE=standard error; Theta indicates log differences in height of the
distributions at each side of the cutoff point. Forcing variable=WOBPC2011

Continuity assumption. Following McEwan and Shapiro’s (2008)
recommendations, the continuity of the assignment variable assumption was tested by
regressing baseline covariates on the forcing variable and examining their smoothness
around the cutoff point. Table 34 reports estimates of the smoothness of baseline
covariates across groups. These tests estimated the probability of a discontinuous jump at
the cutoff related to the baseline covariates. Bandwidth selection was calculated using
the Imbens-Kalyanaraman (2012), which calculated an optimal bandwidth of 9.4 for the
FTSE 350 group. For consistency, the 9.4 bandwidth was used across groups. With the
exception of the variable WOB (number of female directors) for the FTSE Small Cap
group (p=.006), none of the tests were statistically significant at the .05 alpha level. The
p-values associated with the tests ranged from .276 to .901, which indicated that
observations in the regression lines to the left and right of the cutoff point were not
statistically significantly different from each other with respect to the variables tested. A
visual representation of the tests is presented on Figure 26 to Figure 29.

271

13
12
11
10
7

8

9

Board Size 2011 - FTSE 100

14

12
10
8
6

Board Size 2011 - FTSE 350

-20

-10

0

10

-20

Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 2011

0

10

12
10
8
4

6

Board Size 2011 - FTSE Small

12
10
8
6

Board Size 2011 - FTSE 250

-10

Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 2011

-20

-10

0

10

-20

-10

Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 2011

0

10

20

Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 2011

Figure 26. Smoothness of Phase I Baseline Covariate Board by Index

4
3
2
0

1

Number of WOB 2011 - FTSE 100

4
3
2
1
0

Number of WOB 2011 - FTSE 350

Note. Forcing variable=WOBPC2011; Board=board size

-20

-10

0

10

-20

Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 2011

0

10

4
3
2
0

1

Number of WOB - 2011

4
3
2
1
0

Number of WOB 2011 - FTSE 250

-10

Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 2011

-20

-10

0

10

-20

Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 2011

-10

0

10

Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 2011

Figure 27. Smoothness of Phase I Baseline Covariate WOB by Index
Note. Forcing variable=WOBPC2011; WOB=number of women on boards.

272

20

1.0
0.5
0.0

Female CEOs - FTSE 100

1.0
0.5
0.0

Female CEOs - FTSE 350

-0.5

-0.5

-20

-10

0

-20

10

0

10

1.0
0.5

Female CEOs - FTSE Small

0.0

0.4
0.2
0.0
-0.2

Female CEOs - FTSE 250

-10

Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 2011

Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 2011

-20

-10

0

-20

10

-10

0

10

20

Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 2011

Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB 2011

Figure 28. Smoothness of Phase I Baseline Covariate CEOGnd by Index
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Figure 29. Smoothness of Phase I Baseline Covariate Emp by Index
Note. Forcing variable=WOBPC2011; Emp=total number of employees.
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Table 34
Results of Tests of Smoothness of Phase I Baseline Covariates by Index
Non-balanced Gender-balanced
n
n
Estimate
SE
z-value
Pr(>|z|)
FTSE All Share
Board
98
39
0.477
0.846
0.564
0.573
WOB
98
39
0.221
0.203
1.088
0.276
CEOGnd
98
39
-0.063
0.105
-0.595
0.552
Emp
98
39
-36203
34675
-1.044
0.297
FTSE 350
Board
67
28
0.239
1.031
0.232
0.817
WOB
67
28
0.239
0.243
0.983
0.326
CEOGnd
67
28
0.163
0.264
0.616
0.538
Emp
67
28
20235
18896
1.071
0.284
FTSE 100
Board
30
13
0.404
1.928
0.209
0.834
WOB
30
13
0.066
0.448
0.147
0.883
CEOGnd
30
13
0.035
0.067
0.526
0.599
Emp
30
13
-36334
58783
-0.618
0.536
FTSE 250
Board
37
15
-1.016
1.224
-0.830
0.407
WOB
37
15
-0.171
0.276
-0.619
0.536
CEOGnd
37
15
-0.027
0.217
-0.013
0.901
Emp
37
15
-1493
8716
-0.171
0.864
FTSE Small Cap
Board
31
11
-0.065
0.151
-0.433
0.665
WOB
31
11
-0.230
0.083
-0.272
0.006
CEOGnd
31
11
-0.080
0.076
-1.054
0.292
Emp
31
11
-2315
3488
-0.664
0.507
Note. n=sample size; SE=standard error. Bandwidth size for every index= 9.4. Board=board size;
WOB=number of women on boards; CEOGnd=female CEO; Emp=number of employees.
Covariate

Internal Validity Results for Phase II
Integrity of the assignment variable. Results of the McCrary (2006) density
tests that were performed on the pooled sample using assignment variables WOBPC and
Increase are reported in Table 35. Log differences in height (theta) indicated a
discontinuity at the cutoff point (Figure 30); however, they were not statistically
significant at the .05 alpha level. The p-values for the forcing variables WOBPC
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(p=.052) and Increase (p=.065) indicated that there was no evidence of manipulation of
the assignment variable. Therefore, its continuity with baseline covariates was tested.
Table 35
Results of the McCrary Density Tests for Phase II Forcing Variables for the Pooled
Sample

0.00

0.00

0.02

0.04

0.04

0.06

0.08

0.08
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0.10

Forcing variable
Bin size
h
Theta
SE
z-value
p-value
WOBPC2016
1.80
6.00
5.85
3.009
1.944
0.052
Increase
1.10
6.62
0.48
0.258
1.845
0.065
Note. h=bandwidth; SE=standard error. Theta indicates log differences in height of the
distributions at each side of the cutoff point.
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Figure 30. McCrary Density Tests for Phase II Forcing Variables
Note. WOBPC2016 = percentage of women on boards in 2016 (left) and Increase = increase in the
percentage of women on boards (right).

Continuity assumption. As shown in Table 36, the smoothness of baseline
covariates tests for the forcing variable WOBPC returned p-values that ranged from .172
to .854, which provided support for the continuity of the assignment variable at the cutoff
point across the covariates tested. The RD plot in Figure 31 shows a smooth regression
at the 25% cutoff point for covariables WEmpPC, Critical, CEOGnd and ChairGnd.
Similarly, Figure 32 shows smooth regression lines for covariates Increase and WED.
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Table 36
Smoothness of Phase II Baseline Covariates for the Pooled Sample – Forcing variable
WOBPC2016

1.4
0.6
0.2

0.4

Female CEOs

0.8

1.0

1.2

60
50
40

0.0

30

Female Employees % - FTSE All Share

Non-compliant Compliant
Covariate
n
n
Estimate
SE
z-value
p-value
WEmpPC
102
129
-0.896
4.881
-0.184
0.854
Increase
102
129
2.687
2.214
1.214
0.225
Critical
102
129
-0.174
0.139
-1.252
0.210
WED
102
129
0.045
0.120
0.372
0.710
CEOGnd
102
129
-0.074
0.053
-1.367
0.172
ChairGnd
102
129
0.036
0.050
0.690
0.490
Note. n=sample size; SE=standard error. bandwidth size = 9.0; WEmpPC=percentage of female
employees; Increase=increase in percentage of WOB; Critical=[1=3+ women directors; 0=<3
women directors]; WED=women executive directors; CEOGnd=female CEO; ChairGnd=female
chairperson.
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Figure 31. Smoothness of Phase II Baseline Covariates for the Pooled Sample
Note. Covariates: WEmpPC=percentage of female employees, Critical=three or more women
directors, CEOGnd=female CEO, and ChairGnd=female chairperson; Forcing variable
=WOBPC2016.
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Figure 32. Smoothness of Phase II Baseline Covariates for the Pooled Sample
Note. Covariates=Increase and WED; Forcing variable=WOBPC

Table 37 reports the results of smoothness tests for forcing variable Increase
returned p-values that ranged from .066 to .906, which indicated that the regression lines
for the covariates tested did not have a statistically significant jump at the cutoff point.
However, it is noteworthy to point out that variable WExecPC was approaching statistical
significance (p=.066), which could suggest a competing explanation for the findings.
Figure 33 shows that the regression lines for covariates WOBPC, WEmpPC were
smooth threshold; however, covariates WExecPC and WSMPC show a discontinuous
jump at the threshold. The p-value for covariate WSMPC (p=.602) suggests that the
variable is not a cause of concern; conversely, the discontinuous jump shown on the
regression line of covariate WExecPC (p=.066) appears to be a competing explanation to
findings; therefore, it is further explored in the hypotheses testing section.
Figure 34 shows plots of smoothness tests for CEOGnd, ChairGnd, CEOTenure
and ChairTenure. Although the plots show a discontinuous jump at the threshold, they
do not represent a real discontinuity because it is caused by the very limited number of
observations around the cutoff, thus the p-values for those covariates range from .348
to .908, indicating that they are not statistically significantly different at the threshold.
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Table 37
Smoothness of Phase II Baseline Covariates for the Pooled Sample – Running variable
Increase
Small
n

Large
n

60
50
40
30
20
0

10

20
10

15

WOBPC

25

Female Employee Population %

30

Covariate
Estimate
SE
z-value
p-value
WOBPC
75
112
-2.018
1.649
-1.224
0.221
WExecPC
75
112
-8.227
4.482
-1.836
0.066
WSMPC
75
112
-1.819
3.485
-0.522
0.602
WEmpPC
75
112
2.541
4.206
0.604
0.546
CEOGnd
75
112
0.009
0.024
0.384
0.701
ChairGnd
75
112
0.034
0.058
0.577
0.564
CEOTenure
75
112
-0.015
0.126
-0.118
0.906
ChairTenure
75
112
0.366
0.390
0.938
0.348
Note. n=sample size; SE=standard error. Bandwidth size = 6.62.WOBPC=percentage of women
on boards; WExecPC=percentage of women executives; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior
management; WEmpPC=percentage of women employees; CEOGnd=female CEO;
ChairGnd=female chair; CEOTenure=number of years of female CEO in her position;
ChairTenure=number of years of chairperson in her position.
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Figure 33. Smoothness of Phase II Baseline Covariates for the Pooled Sample
Note. Covariates: WOBPC2016=percentage of women on boards; WExecPC=percentage of women
executives; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management; WEmpPC=percentage of
women employees. Forcing variable =Increase
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Figure 34. Smoothness of Phase II Baseline Covariates for the Pooled Sample
Note. Covariates: CEOGnd=female CEO; ChairGnd= female gender, CEOTenure=female CEO
tenure; ChairTenure= female chairperson tenure; Forcing variable= Increase

Hypotheses Test Results
Effects of Davies Review on Board Composition
Phase I of the study examined the effects of the Davies Review on board
composition of its target organizations. The hypotheses tested in this phase aim to test
the effects of the Davies Review at the micro (individual level).
Hypothesis H1a and H1b. These hypotheses predicted that Davies Review
would have a statistically significant (α =.05) increase in the percentage of WOB of nonbalanced FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 boards. Hypotheses H1a and H1b were tested using a
non-parametric sharp RD design. The Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) method for
optimal bandwidth selection calculation was used to estimate the best bandwidth for the
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FTSE 350 group. Literature suggests that when the choice of kernel has little impact to
the subsequent analyses, the preferred method for selecting bandwidth choice is using
triangular kernel, as theory has identified it as the preferred type (Lee and Lemieux,
2010); however, to avoid biased estimates it is a good practice to test different kernel
types to identify which one fits the data best. Therefore, different kernel types were tested.
Table 38
Estimates for Bandwidth Selection Based on Kernel Type
Kernel type

h

n

Estimate1

SE

p-value

R2

p-value2

Epanechnikov
8.753
95
-14.342
7.071
0.039 0.3005
0.043
Cosine
8.914
95
-14.139
7.070
0.039 0.3006
0.046
Triangular
9.403
95
-13.742
6.978
0.033 0.3055
0.049
Quartic
9.994
110
-13.749
6.897
0.006 0.3062
0.046
Tricube
10.087
110
-14.092
6.697
0.008 0.3018
0.044
Triweight
11.107
137
-13.476
6.680
0.000 0.3123
0.044
Rectangular
7.391
176
-3.777
3.608
0.000 0.2471
0.295
1
2
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. Listwise deletion used. p-value for Ftests.

Table 38 reports the estimated bandwidths for the group using different kernels.
With the exception of the rectangular kernel type, which produced a non-statistically
significant (p=.295) estimate of -3.77, all other kernel types resulted in statistical
significant results with p-values ranging from .043 to .049, for estimates that ranged from
-13.476 to -14.342. All kernel types with statistically significant results also returned
practically significant results, with R2 that ranged from .3005 to .3123.
Following recommendations for identifying the correct functional form of the
regression (Chambers, 2016; Jacob et al., 2012), higher order polynomials were tested in
addition to the linear regression function. Table 39 reports results of the linear, quadratic,
and cubic non-parametric RD tests on a calculated optimal bandwidth of 9.40. The

280

quadratic model’s p-value (p=.07) and its F-statistic’s p-value (p=.09) indicated that it
was the best functional form. Therefore, the full model with all identified baseline
covariates was performed using a quadratic functional form. Equation 18 describes the
linear regression model that predicts the Increase in the percentage of WOB for FTSE
350 boards.
0
45:/-.A- = () + (+ !"#$%0)++ + (0 B + (8 !"#$%0)++
+ (= #<./6

(18)
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Table 39
RD Test Results for Increase of WOBPC (H1a, H1b) – Unconditional Model
Functional form

Estimate

SE

p-value

F-statistic p-value

R2

R2 Adj.

Linear
-4.44
3.93
0.25
2.48
0.10
0.10
0.06
Quadratic
-9.98
5.53
0.07
2.40
0.09
0.12
0.07
Cubic
-10.07
6.04
0.09
1.98
0.15
0.12
0.06
Note. SE=standard error. Estimates used the optimal bandwidth = 9.40 (n=95). Dependent
variable=Increase

Table 40 reports the estimates of the regression discontinuity tests for four
different models. The first model tested was model M1, the non-parametric RD estimated
at an optimal bandwidth of 9.40. Model M1 used a heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
error estimation. Estimates for model M1 returned a statistically significant large
treatment effect of -13.69 (p=.05). Model M2 added cluster-robust standard error
estimation to model M1 by clustering the standard error by Index. Consistently,
estimates for the treatment effect and coefficients for model M2 were identical to model
M1, with the exception of the standard error for the model, which was reduced from 6.85
to 5.68. Model M3 narrowed the bandwidth of model M2 to 8.3 (n=89). Estimates in
model M3 returned a large statistically significant effect, -14.09 (p<.01). Model M4
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widened the bandwidth of the previous model to 11 (n=136). The model returned a
statistically significant large treatment effect of -12.59 (p=.08).
Table 40
RD Test Results for Increase of WOB (H1a, H1b) –Full Model Different Bandwidths
Model

h

n

Estimate

SE

p-value

F-statistic p-value

R2

R2 Adj.

M1
9.40
95
-13.69
6.85
0.05
1.99
0.04
0.30
0.15
M2
9.40
95
-13.69
5.68
0.02
1.99
0.04
0.30
0.15
M3
8.30
89
-14.09
4.28
0.00
2.00
0.00
0.32
0.16
M4
11.00
136
-12.59
7.28
0.08
2.94
0.00
0.30
0.20
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. Estimates were computed using a
triangular kernel. Dependent variable=Increase. Models M1 used a heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard error; models M2, M3 and M4 used a cluster-robust standard error by Index.

Although models M2 and M3 provided a good fit for the data, model M2 had a
smaller standard error for the treatment effect and was considered the optimal bandwidth
using the Imbens-Kalyanaraman calculation; therefore, model M2 is interpreted. Model
M2 was statistically significant, F(17,92)=1.99, p=.04, for a local average treatment
effect of -13.69 (p=.02) percentage points using the calculated optimal bandwidth of 9.40.
Results of this test provided support for Hypotheses H1a and H1b, which predicted that
the Davies Review would have a statistically significant effect on increasing the
percentage of WOB of non-balanced organizations. In the five-year duration of the
Davies Review, organizations that were below the gender-balance threshold for WOB set
by the Davies Review in 2011 had an average increase of 13.69 percentage points higher
than organizations that were already gender-balanced in 2011. With the exception of the
energy sector (p=.01), and telecommunications sector (p=.03), covariates included in the
regression were not statistically significant, with p-values that ranged from .23 to .94.
Equation 19 estimated the effect of the Davies Review targets on the increase of WOBPC
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as the difference in the mean increase of WOBPC between the observations 9.40 points to
the left and 9.40 points to the right of the cutoff point. Table 41 reports coefficients for
covariates included in the full model.
13.69 = lim 45:/-.A- ) |!"#$% − lim 45:/-.A- + |!"#$%
QRS↑)

QRS↓)

(19)

Figure 35 provides a visual representation of the effect of the Davies Review on
the Increase of WOB in FTSE 350 organizations. Although the discontinuous jump on
the regression line indicates that observations in the non-balanced group had a higher
increase of WOB than organizations that were already gender-balanced, the effect size
did not appear to be nearly as high as the estimated -13.69 points. Therefore, an
examination of the estimates The effective bandwidth size of 9.40 indicates that the
estimate only used observations up to 9.40 points to the left and up to 9.40 points to the
right of the cutoff. The total number of effective observations was 95, 67 to the left and
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Figure 35. RD Plot for Increase of WOB - FTSE 350.
Note. Discontinuity detected, LATE = -13.69 (p=.01); bandwidth=9.40 (n=95).
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Table 41
Parameter Estimates for Increase of WOBPC for FTSE 350 (H1a, H1b) – Full Model
Variable

Estimate
SE
t-value p-value Estimate
SE
t-value p-value Estimate
SE
t-value p-value
M2* - h=9.40 (n=95)
M3 - h = 8.30 (n=89)
M4 - h= 11 (n=136)
26.16
8.62
3.04
0.00
26.76
9.14
2.93
0.00
25.38
6.84
3.71
0.00
4.79
2.41
1.99
0.05
5.16
2.74
1.88
0.06
3.96
1.58
2.52
0.01
-2.50
1.46
-1.72
0.09
-2.70
1.60
-1.69
0.10
-2.15
1.10
-1.95
0.05
-13.69
5.22
-2.62
0.01
-14.09
5.46
-2.58
0.01
-12.59
4.07
-3.09
0.00
0.48
0.26
1.86
0.07
0.54
0.32
1.66
0.10
0.38
0.15
2.62
0.01
-4.42
4.46
-0.99
0.32
-4.11
4.78
-0.86
0.39
-5.20
3.53
-1.47
0.14
0.49
2.86
0.17
0.86
0.58
2.94
0.20
0.84
0.28
2.40
0.12
0.91
-8.47
7.65
-1.11
0.27
-8.95
7.84
-1.14
0.26
-7.82
6.42
-1.22
0.23

β0 - Intercept
β1 - WOBPCNon-balanced
β1 - WOBPCBalanced
β2 -Treatment
β3 - WOBPC2
β4 - Board
β5 - CEOGnd
β6 - ChairGnd
β7 - Sector
β7-1 Consumer Services
-0.24
3.29
-0.07
0.94
-0.45
3.36
-0.13
0.89
-0.04
2.74
-0.02
0.99
β7-2 Energy
-17.90
6.31
-2.84
0.01
-17.90
6.35
-2.82
0.01
-18.68
5.12
-3.65
0.00
β7-3 Financials
-0.26
3.45
-0.07
0.94
-0.36
3.55
-0.10
0.92
0.01
2.86
0.00
1.00
β7-4 Health Care
-1.00
4.85
-0.21
0.84
-1.26
4.98
-0.25
0.80
-0.78
4.06
-0.19
0.85
β7-5 Industrials
-4.43
3.65
-1.22
0.23
-4.59
3.73
-1.23
0.22
-3.93
3.01
-1.31
0.19
β7-6 Materials
-2.20
5.42
-0.41
0.69
-2.85
5.78
-0.49
0.62
-1.26
4.34
-0.29
0.77
β7-7 Technology
-6.86
5.34
-1.29
0.20
-7.78
5.53
-1.41
0.16
-6.91
4.24
-1.63
0.11
β7-8 Telecommunications -10.16
4.64
-2.19
0.03
-10.52
4.66
-2.26
0.03
-9.60
3.90
-2.47
0.02
β7-9 Utilities
-6.42
5.10
-1.26
0.21
-8.49
5.27
-1.61
0.11
-4.70
4.23
-1.11
0.27
β8 – IndexFTSE 250
-3.53
2.30
-1.53
0.13
-3.90
2.42
-1.61
0.11
-3.34
1.88
-1.78
0.08
Residual SE
0.84
0.86
0.69
R2 (Adjusted R2)
0.30 (0.15)
0.32 (0.16)
0.28 (0.18)
Note. n=sample size; SE=standard error; h=bandwidth. Dependent variable=Increase. WOBPC2011=percentage of women on boards; Board=board
size; CEOGnd=female CEO; ChairGnd=female chairperson.
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Robustness Tests
To strengthen their causal claim, following Ludwig and Miller’s (2007) example,
the predictors were regressed on pseudo outcomes. The pseudo outcomes Board and
Emp were tested at their calculated optimal bandwidth, as well as at the bandwidth 9.40,
to examine the treatment using the same number of observations of the tests for
hypotheses H1a and H1b. Four models for pseudo-outcome robustness tests were
performed. As reported on Table 42, the p-values of the four initial robustness tests
ranged from .29 to .63 indicating that none of the models were statistically significant.
Equation 20 describes the regression models for pseudo-outcome Board. Equation 21
describes the regression models for pseudo-outcome Emp.
!"#$% = () + (+ ,-!./ + (0 1 + (2 ,-!./ 0 + (3 !"#$% + (4 5678"$+9:

(20)

+ (; <=%6> + ?
@AB = () + (+ ,-!./ + (0 1 + (2 @AB + (3 5678"$+9: + (4 <=%6> + ?

(21)

Table 42
Robustness Tests - RD Test Results for Pseudo-Outcomes (H1a, H1b)
Model

h

n

Estimate

SE

p-value

Pseudo-Board 5.02
58
-1.44 1.67
0.38
Pseudo-Board 9.40
95
-0.44 0.92
0.63
Pseudo-Emp
13.41
166
2755 3762
0.46
Pseudo-Emp
9.40
95
6619 6276
0.29
Note. h=Bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error.

F-statistic p-value
6.26
10.84
665.10
370.40

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

R2

R2 Adj.

0.69
0.67
0.98
0.99

0.58
0.61
0.98
0.98

Pseudo-outcome 1. At a bandwidth of 5.02, the estimated -1.44 (p=.38) treatment
effect estimate for the pseudo-outcome board size was not statistically significant, F(15,
42)=6.26, p<.001. Another test was performed on the same pseudo-outcome, widening
the bandwidth to the 9.40 to use the same observations that provided support for
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hypotheses H1a and H1b. The results of the test returned a non-statistically significant
treatment effect of -.44 (p=.63) for the model, F(15, 79)=10.84, p<.001. Results for the
pseudo-outcome Board provided evidence that the Davies Review did not have an effect
on the treatment group causing a change in their number of board members at the
threshold. Figure 36 provides a visual representation of the RD test for the pseudooutcome Board, which confirms the absence of a discontinuous jump at the cutoff.
Coefficients of the regressions are reported in Table 43.
Table 43
Robustness Tests – Parameter Estimates for Pseudo-Outcome Board (H1a, H1b)
Variable

Coeff.

SE

t-value p-value

Coeff.

h=5.02 (n=58)

SE

t-value p-value

h=9.40 (n=95)

β0 - Intercept

8.24

2.65

3.11

0.00

6.58

1.51

4.37

0.00

β1 - WOBPCNon-balanced

1.33

1.32

1.00

0.32

-0.03

0.42

-0.06

0.95

β1 - WOBPCBalanced

-0.99

0.84

-1.19

0.24

0.09

0.24

0.38

0.71

Β2 -Treatment

-1.44

1.66

-0.87

0.39

-0.44

0.90

-0.49

0.63

Β3 - WOBPC2

0.34

0.27

1.27

0.21

-0.01

0.04

-0.18

0.86

β4 – Board*

0.49

0.13

3.74

0.00

0.51

0.08

6.43

0.00

-1.89
-2.94
-1.72
-0.29
-2.30
-0.87
-2.70
0.25
-2.09

0.74
1.40
0.77
1.22
0.81
1.27
1.32
0.91
1.12

-2.55
-2.10
-2.23
-0.24
-2.83
-0.68
-2.05
0.27
-1.87

0.01
0.04
0.03
0.81
0.01
0.50
0.05
0.79
0.07

-1.78
-2.70
-1.38
-0.61
-2.02
-1.05
-1.49
0.64
-2.10

0.58
1.11
0.61
0.85
0.64
0.95
0.94
0.81
0.90

-3.07
-2.43
-2.27
-0.72
-3.14
-1.10
-1.58
0.79
-2.33

0.00
0.02
0.03
0.47
0.00
0.27
0.12
0.43
0.02

β5 - Sector
β5-1 Consumer Services
β5-2 Energy
β5-3 Financials
β5-4 Health Care
β5-5 Industrials
β5-6 Materials
β5-7 Technology
β5-8 Telecomm.
β5-9 Utilities

β6 - FTSE 250
-1.12 0.57
-1.97
0.06
-1.03 0.40
-2.55
0.01
Residual SE
0.19
0.15
Note. n=sample size; SE=standard error; h=bandwidth. Dependent variable=Board2016. *The
variable Board that appears on the table as a covariate is the baseline covariate taken from the
2011 sample. WOBPC=percentage of women on boards in 2011.
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Pseudo-outcome 2. At the estimated optimal bandwidth of 13.41, the nonparametric RD on pseudo-outcome Emp estimated a non-statistically significant
treatment effect of 2755 (p=.46) (F[14,151]=665.1, p=.98). The second model for
pseudo-outcome Emp, F(14, 42)=626, p<.001, estimated the treatment effect for
observations in the 9.40 bandwidth. The p-value of the treatment effect indicated that the
treatment was not statistically significant, 6619 (p=.29). Results for the pseudo-outcome
Emp provided evidence that the Davies Review did not cause a change in the total
employee population at the threshold. Figure 37 provides a graphical depiction of the RD
test for the pseudo outcome Emp, which provides evidence of the absence of a
discontinuity at the cutoff. Coefficients of the regressions are reported in Table 44.
Table 44
Robustness Tests – Parameter Estimates for Pseudo-Outcome Employees (H1a, H1b)
Variable

Coeff.

SE
t-value p-value
h=13.41 (n=166)
1220 3670
0.33
0.74
-185
317
-0.58
0.56
-658
650
-1.01
0.31
2750 2770
0.99
0.32
0.91 0.01
83.47
0.00

Coeff.

SE t-value p-value
h=9.40 (n=95)
5870
-0.48
0.63
771
-1.00
0.32
1350
-1.65
0.10
4440
1.49
0.14
0.01 61.55
0.00

β0 - Intercept
-2830
β1 – WOBPCNon-balanced
-768
β1 - WOBPCBalanced
-2220
β2 -Treatment
6620
β3 – Emp*
0.91
β4 - Sector
Consumer Svcs
3460 2990
1.15
0.25
5150 4320
1.19
0.24
Energy
-1900 5310
-0.36
0.72
444 7960
0.06
0.96
Financials
-6190 3130
-1.98
0.05
-6330 4510
-1.40
0.16
Health Care
6760 4540
1.49
0.14
9480 6350
1.49
0.14
Industrials
1860 3270
0.57
0.57
3540 4830
0.73
0.47
Materials
-2790 4600
-0.61
0.55
736 7020
0.10
0.92
Technology
-597 4600
-0.13
0.90
-938 6780
-0.14
0.89
Telecom.
1440 4560
0.32
0.75
-777 6030
-0.13
0.90
Utilities
-1690 4790
-0.35
0.72
-1540 6780
-0.23
0.82
β5 - FTSE 250
-1220 1920
-0.64
0.52
328 2810
0.12
0.91
Residual SE
791.70
1110.00
Note. SE=standard error; h=bandwidth. Outcome=Emp (2016). *The variable Emp that appears
on the table as a covariate is the baseline covariate taken from the 2011 sample.
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Figure 36. RD plot for Pseudo-Outcome Board – FTSE 350
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Note. No discontinuity detected (p=.38). Board=board size.
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Figure 37. RD plot for Pseudo-Outcome Emp – FTSE 350.
Note. No discontinuity detected (p=.46). Emp=total number of employees.

Pseudo-cutoffs. Additionally, following recommendations in the literature for
robustness checks (e.g. Coviello & Marinello, 2014; Lee & Lemieux, 2010) the RD
model was tested using simulated thresholds above and below the true threshold. To that
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end, the model described in Equation 18 was tested using the 15% and 28% cutoff points
to split the sample into treatment and control groups. As shown in Table 45, the linear
model for cutoff 15 resulted in a larger F-statistic, lower p-value of the F-statistic, and a
smaller standard error than the quadratic model, indicating that the linear model was a
better fit. At a calculated optimal bandwidth of 8.10, the linear model, F(16,150)=1.43,
p=.27, estimated a non-statistically significant effect of -1.32 (p=.69). Figure 38 shows a
smooth regression line at the cutoff, which provides evidence of the absence of a
discontinuity.
Results of the non-parametric RD tests for cutoff 28 indicated based on the pvalues of the F-statistics, the quadratic (p=.003) and the linear (p=.01) regression models
fit the data. However, the smaller p-value of the linear model indicated that the linear
model had a more normal distribution for the observations in the bandwidth. An
inspection of the plotted regression lines, presented in Figure 39, provided evidence for a
curve within the bandwidth for the right side of the regression. That finding suggested
that the quadratic model would be a better fit for the data; therefore, results for the
quadratic model are interpreted.
At a bandwidth of 10.02, the quadratic regression model, F(17,54)=.2.84, p=.003,
returned a non-statistically significant effect of 4.01 (p=.58). Table 46 reports
coefficients for the best fitting models of the robustness tests at pseudo cutoffs 15 and 28.
Overall, results of the robustness tests provided strong support of a valid regression
discontinuity design and provided additional evidence of causality claims of the findings.
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Table 45
Robustness Tests – RD Test Results for Pseudo-Cutoffs (H1a, H1b)
Model

h

n

Estimate SE

p-value F-statistic p-value

R2

Cutoff 15 - Quadratic 8.10 167
-1.35 3.39
0.69
1.34
0.35 0.13
Cutoff 15 - Linear
8.10 167
-1.32 3.24
0.69
1.43
0.27 0.13
Cutoff 28 -Quadratic 10.02
71
4.01 7.31
0.58
2.84
0.00 0.48
Cutoff 28 - Linear 10.02
71
7.76 9.30
0.40
2.56
0.01 0.43
Name. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. Dependent variable=Increase

R2 Adj.
0.03
0.04
0.31
0.26

Table 46
Robustness Tests – Parameter Estimates for Pseudo-Cutoffs (H1a, H1b)
Variable

Coeff.

SE
t-value p-value Coeff.
SE. t-value p-value
Cutoff=15 (h=8.10)
Cutoff=28 (h=10.02)
(n=167)
(n=71)
8.57
3.01
2.85
0.01
24.04
8.05
2.99
0.00
-0.45
0.51
-0.89
0.38
3.39
1.92
1.77
0.08
-0.47
0.68
-0.69
0.49
-6.18
2.32 -2.66
0.01
-1.32
3.09
-0.43
0.67
4.01 10.18
0.39
0.70
0.40
0.19
2.14
0.04
-0.09
0.32
-0.29
0.77
-5.04
5.68 -0.89
0.38
1.43
3.70
0.38
0.70
-2.32
2.95 -0.79
0.43
9.45 15.19
0.62
0.54
-6.51
6.17 -1.05
0.30

β0 - Intercept
β1 - WOBPCNon-balanced
β1 - WOBPCBalanced
β2 -Treatment
β3 - WOBPC2
β4 - Board
β5 - CEOGnd
β6 - ChairGnd
β7 - Sector
β7-1 Consumer Svcs.
4.01
2.72
1.47
0.14
-6.30
3.30 -1.91
β7-2 Energy
-6.59
3.99
-1.65
0.10
-21.44
6.72 -3.19
β7-3 Financials
4.19
2.80
1.50
0.14
-3.95
3.77 -1.05
β7-4 Health Care
4.10
6.17
0.66
0.51
-8.92
3.98 -2.24
β7-5 Industrials
2.61
2.85
0.91
0.36
-10.75
3.88 -2.77
β7-6 Materials
1.02
3.83
0.27
0.79
-6.21
7.17 -0.87
β7-7 Technology
-0.67
3.89
-0.17
0.86
-13.39
6.44 -2.08
β7-8 Telecommunications -1.30
5.05
-0.26
0.80
-12.46
4.68 -2.66
β7-9 Utilities
5.23
4.20
1.25
0.21
-14.08
5.31 -2.65
β8 - FTSE 250
-1.51
1.66
-0.91
0.37
-4.75
2.80 -1.70
Residual SE
0.68
0.87
Note. n=sample size; h=bandwidth; SE=standard error; Dependent variable=Increase.
WOBPC=percentage of women on boards; Board=board size; CEOGnd=female CEO;
ChairGnd=female chairperson.
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Figure 38. RD Plot for Pseudo-Cutoff 15 – FTSE 350

20
10
0
-10
-20

Increase - Women on Boards

Note. No discontinuity detected (p=.69).
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Figure 39. RD Plot for Pseudo-Cutoff 28- FTSE 350
Note. No discontinuity detected (p=.58).
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10

Hypothesis H1c. predicted that the Davies Review not have a statistically
significant effect (α =.05) on the percentage WOB of non-balanced FTSE Small Cap
organizations. To test this hypothesis, a non-parametric RD approach was employed.
Results of the RD analyses for testing hypothesis H1c found support for the hypothesis.
First, regression tests were performed on the unconditional model to identify the
functional form of the RD tests for the full model. Table 47 reports results of the first
three models that were tested, linear, quadratic and cubic regression models. The pvalues for the treatment effect of the unconditional models ranged from .34 to .88
indicating that the regression lines to the left and right of the cutoff point were not
statistically significantly different. The linear model appeared to be the best fitting model,
based on the model’s p-value (p=.34), which was lower than the quadratic and cubic
models’ p-values. Additionally, the p-values for the quadratic (p=.22) and cubic (p=.73)
terms in their models indicated that the terms were not statistically significant. Therefore,
the linear regression model was used to test the full model. Equation 22 describes the
linear regression model for predicting the Increase of WOBPC in the duration of the
Davies Review (2011-2016) for FTSE Small Cap boards.
<=7$6#C6 = () + (+ ,-!./ + (0 1 + (2 !"#$% + (3 /@-D=% + (4 /ℎ#F$D=%

(22)

+ (; 5678"$+9: + ?

Table 47
RD Test Results for Increase of WOB (H1c) – Unconditional Model
Model

h

n

Estimate*

SE

p-value

F-statistic p-value

R2

R2 Adj.

Linear
11.85
45
-5.08
5.29
0.34
1.84
0.31
0.12
0.05
Quadratic 11.85
45
-0.71
4.70
0.88
1.80
0.30
0.15
0.07
Cubic
11.85
45
-3.04
7.87
0.70
1.43
0.23
0.16
0.05
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. *Estimates were computed using a
triangular kernel. Dependent variable=Increase.
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Using a linear regression model for testing the full model including identified
covariates, Table 48 provides test results at different bandwidths. Figure 40 shows the
graphical representation of the RD test for the optimal bandwidth of 11.85, which
returned a non-statistically significant treatment effect of -.14 (p=.99). Bandwidth size
was narrowed to 8.5 and widened to 20. Results for the narrow bandwidth, which
included 31 effective observations, returned a non-statistically significant effect of 1.74
(p=.85). Similarly, the wide bandwidth of 2, which included the entire sample, returned a
non-statistically significant effect of -.06 (p=.99). Results of the tests provided support
for hypothesis H1c that predicted a non-statistically significant treatment effect for FTSE
Small Cap boards. Table 49 presents coefficients for the model at different bandwidths.
Table 48
RD Test Results for Increase of WOB (H1c) – Full Model Different Bandwidths
Model

h

n

Estimate

SE

p-value F-statistic p-value

R2

0
-10
-20
-30
-40

Increase - Women on Boards

10

M1-Optimal 11.85
45
-0.14
8.12
0.99
1.55
0.31 0.39
M2-Narrow
8.50
39
1.74
9.26
0.85
1.23
0.63 0.39
M3-Wide
20.00 109
-0.06
5.63
0.99
4.77
0.00 0.42
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. Dependent variable=Increase
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Figure 40. RD Plot of Increase of WOBPC- FTSE Small Cap
Note. No discontinuity detected (p=.98). h=11.85.
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R2 Adj.
0.14
0.07
0.33

Table 49
Parameter Estimates for Increase of WOB (H1c) – Full Model
Variable

Coeff.

SE.

t-value

p-value Coeff.

*h=11.85 (n=45)
β0 - Intercept

SE

t-value

p-value Coeff.

h= 8.50 (n=30)

SE

t-value

p-value

h = 20 (n=109)

0.48

8.07

0.06

0.95

-2.78

9.02

-0.31

0.76

0.51

3.07

0.17

0.87

β1 - WOBPCNon-balanced

-0.48

1.46

-0.33

0.75

-1.35

1.75

-0.77

0.45

-0.54

0.23

-2.34

0.02

β1 - WOBPCBalanced

-1.17

1.44

-0.82

0.42

-0.81

2.67

-0.30

0.77

-1.42

0.47

-3.05

0.00

β2 -Treatment

-0.14

7.23

-0.02

0.98

1.74

8.34

0.21

0.84

-0.06

3.63

-0.02

0.99

1.18

2.04

0.58

0.57

0.63

2.42

0.26

0.80

0.66

0.72

0.92

0.36

β4 - CEOGnd

23.24

11.12

2.09

0.04

24.03

14.47

1.66

0.11

24.57

6.65

3.69

0.00

β5 - ChairGnd

7.97

5.86

1.36

0.18

7.49

5.90

1.27

0.22

5.02

3.76

1.34

0.19

β3 - Board

β6 - Sector
β6-1 Consumer Services 0.53
4.94
0.11
0.91
-0.71
5.53
-0.13
0.90
0.92
2.98
0.31
0.76
β6-2 Energy
-16.86
11.02
-1.53
0.14
-18.91
13.73
-1.38
0.18
-15.16
6.38
-2.38
0.02
β6-3 Financials
-1.72
5.95
-0.29
0.77
0.16
6.61
0.02
0.98
-0.91
3.66
-0.25
0.81
β6-4 Health Care
-5.31
10.82
-0.49
0.63
-7.52
23.52
-0.32
0.75
-3.48
5.45
-0.64
0.52
β6-5 Industrials
0.00
5.22
0.00
1.00
-0.09
5.90
-0.02
0.99
-0.49
3.11
-0.16
0.87
β6-6 Materials
16.72
9.68
1.73
0.09
15.68
10.24
1.53
0.14
13.12
6.11
2.15
0.03
β6-7 Technology
2.86
8.46
0.34
0.74
3.31
8.94
0.37
0.71
1.90
5.11
0.37
0.71
β6-8 Telecommunications
4.32
23.19
0.19
0.85
Residual SE
1.38
1.49
0.85
2
2
R (Adjusted R )
0.39 (0.14)
0.39(0.07)
0.42(0.33)
Note. n=sample size; SE=standard error; h=bandwidth. WOBPC=percentage of women on boards; Board=board size; CEOGnd=female CEO;
ChairGnd=female chairperson. Dependent variable=Increase.
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Hypotheses H2a, H2b, and H2c. These hypotheses predicted a statistically
significant increase in the proportion of non-executive directors in relation to the
proportion of executive directors for FTSE 100, FTSE 250 and FTSE Small Cap boards.
To test these hypotheses, a panel study was performed on the pooled sample to estimate
the effect of time on changes in the share of WEDPC and WNEDPC in the population of
WOB for the 2011 to 2016 period. Data from 2008 to 2010 were excluded from the
analyses. A total of 2370 observations nested within six years were analyzed in a series
of longitudinal regression models.
The variables WEDPC (percentage of female executive directors of the total of
WOB) and WNEDPC (percentage of female non-executive directors of the total WOB)
were the outcome variables. Although it may seem unnecessary to test both variables, as
WNEDPC is the difference between 100 and WEDPC, estimates for both outcome
variables were estimated and results are provided on Table 50 and Table 51. However,
only results for WEDPC are explained in detail and interpreted.
A total of eight models were tested for the WEDPC variable. The first model
tested, M0, was the unconditional growth model in which the variable Time was
regressed on the outcome WEDPC, using a random intercept for each subject. The second
model, M1, estimated the effect of time on the on the outcome adding a Time random
slope to model M0. The third model, M2, added the variable Index to model M1. The
fourth model, M3, added a quadratic term to the effect of time to model M2. The fifth
model, M4, was the first conditional model, which added the conditional effect of Index
as an interaction with Time. The sixth model, M5, removed the random slope and added
a temporal correlation to the previous model. Model M6 added the random slope for

295

Time that was removed in model M5. The final model, M7, extended the previous model
by allowing a different level 1 residual variance by Index to control for heteroscedastic
residuals. Results of the eight (including null) models are presented in Table 50. Across
the eight models tested, model M7 was the best fit for the data according to the deviance,
AIC and BIC statistics. Changes in deviance statistics from each model to the next were
statistically significant at the .05 alpha level, with the exceptions of models M1 to M2
and M3 to M4, that were not statistically significant, with p-values of p=.48 and p=.16,
respectively. Given that all fit indices indicated that model M7 provided the best fit for
the data, its results are interpreted.
!"#$% = '( + '* +,-. + '/ +,-.2 + '1 234.5 + '6 234.5 ∗ +,-. + 8

(23)

!"#$%9:;<1=( = 9.56 − 1.5 +,-. + 0.23 +,-. / + 8
!"#$%9:;<;FGHH = 9.56 − 1.5 +,-. + 0.23 +,-. / + 10.08 − 1.84(+,-.) + 8

Equation 23 indicates that at time 0 (2011), organizations in the FTSE 100 boards
had in average a 9.56% of WED of the total population of WOB. Organizations in the
FTSE 250 index were not statistically significantly different than those in the FTSE 100
(p=.42). However, organizations in the FTSE Small Cap index had an additional 10.08%
of WED compared to FTSE 100 boards (p=.03). In support of the study’s predictions,
Time had an effect of -1.50% on the outcome variable, indicating that the percentage of
WED in relation to the population of WOB decreased every year by 1.50 percentage
points. However, the statistical significance of the quadratic term coefficient (0.23) for
the Time variable (p=.03) indicates that the relationship of Time and the outcome is
curved rather than linear. Furthermore, the difference in the sign of the Time and Time2
coefficients indicates that the decrease gets smaller by .46% every year, and changes
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direction by the fifth year. The interaction effect between Time and Index yielded
negative coefficients for the FTSE 250, -.49 (p=.50) and FTSE Small Cap, -1.87 (p=.05);
however, the p-value for the Time and FTSE 250 interaction indicated that it was not
statistically significant. This suggested that over time, FTSE 250 boards did not decrease
their proportion of female executive directors in a different way than FTSE 100 boards.
The interaction coefficients indicated that boards in the FTSE Small Cap group decreased
their percentage of WED an additional 1.87% every year compared to FTSE 350 boards.
Therefore, hypothesis H2c was not supported. Overall, the tests performed found support
for hypotheses H2a, and H2b.
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Table 50
Results of Panel Study for WEDPC on FTSE All Share Boards

Model
Fixed effects

M0
Coeff.

SE

M1
p-value Coef.

SE

M2
p-value Coeff.

SE

M3
p-value Coeff.

SE

p-value

β0 – Intercept

12.58

1.27

0.00

12.03

1.57

0.00

10.42

2.42

0.00

11.39

2.46

0.00

β2 – Time

-0.92

0.19

0.01

-0.81

0.32

0.01

-0.81

0.32

0.01

-1.96

0.58

0.00

0.21

0.09

0.02

β3 – Time2
β4 – IndexFTSE 250

1.47

2.68

0.58

1.49

2.68

0.58

β4 – IndexFTSE Small

3.82

3.18

0.23

3.84

3.18

0.23

β4 – Time:FTSE 250
β4 – Time:FTSE Small
Random effects
Intercept
Time
Residual variance σ2
Fit indices
Deviance
AIC
BIC

448.39
NA
174.50

784.74
27.65
84.34

777.87
27.66
84.34

773.31
27.53
84.00

16086
16095
16117

15526
15538
15571

15524
15540
15585

15518
15537
15587

(continued)
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Table 50
Results of Panel Study for WEDPC on FTSE All Share Boards (Continued)
Model
Fixed effects

M4
Coef.

SE

M5
p-value Coef.

SE

M6
p-value Coef.

SE

M7
p-value Coef.

SE

p-value

9.85

2.97

0.00

10.36

2.63

0.00

9.87

3.03

0.00

9.56

2.85

0.00

β2 - Time

-1.52

0.75

0.04

-1.71

0.80

0.03

-1.45

0.81

0.07

-1.50

0.77

0.05

β3 - Time2

0.22

0.09

0.02

0.24

0.12

0.04

0.21

0.11

0.06

β4 – IndexFTSE 250

2.30

3.68

0.53

2.27

3.30

0.47

2.45

3.77

0.52

0.23
2.95

0.11
3.65

0.03
0.42

β4 – IndexFTSE Small

9.43

4.46

0.04

10.36

3.99

0.01

9.56

4.57

0.04

10.08

4.58

0.03

-0.24

0.74

0.74

-0.40
-2.02

0.66

0.54

-0.36
-1.71

0.73

0.62

-0.49

0.72

0.50

β0 - Intercept

β5 - Time:FTSE 250

-1.62
0.91
0.07
β5 - Time:FTSE Small
0.80
0.01
0.90
0.06
-1.84
0.94
0.05
Random effects
Intercept
769.46
72.03
664.39
632.99
Time
27.13
NA
17.10
18.73
Residual variance σ2
84.00
565.44
196.16
125.87
Fit indices
Deviance
15515
15432
15358
15296
AIC
15537
15452
15382
15324
BIC
15598
15507
15449
15402
Note. SE=standard error. Dependent variable=percentage of women executive directors. Includes year-observations from 2011 to 2016 (n=2370).
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Table 51
Results of Panel Study for WNEDPC on FTSE All Share Boards

Model
Fixed effects
β0 – Intercept
β2 – Time

M0
Coef.

SE

M1
p-value

Coef.

SE

M2
p-value

Coef.

SE

M3
p-value

Coef.

SE

p-value

87.40

1.27

0.00

87.90

1.57

0.00

89.50

2.42

0.00

88.57

2.46

0.00

0.90

0.19

0.00

0.80

0.32

0.01

0.80

0.32

0.01

1.90

0.59

0.00

-0.20

0.09

0.02

β3 – Time2
β4 – IndexFTSE 250

-1.40

2.67

0.60

-1.41

2.68

0.60

β4 – IndexFTSE Small

-3.70

3.18

0.24

-3.76

3.18

0.24

β4 – Time:FTSE 250
β4 – Time:FTSE Small
Random effects
Intercept
Time
Residual variance σ2
Fit indices
Deviance
AIC
BIC

448.00
176.00

783.30
27.50
86.10

776.60
27.50
86.10

772.34
27.40
85.77

16098
16106
16128

15550
15561
15595

15548
15564
15608

15544
15561
15611

(continued)
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Table 51
Results of Panel Study for WNEDPC on FTSE All Share Boards (Continued)
Model
Fixed effects

M4
Coef.

SE

M5
p-value

Coef.

SE

M6
p-value

Coef.

SE

M7
p-value

Coef.

SE

p-value

90.06

2.97

0.00

89.61

2.63

0.00

90.07

3.03

0.00

90.29

2.87

0.00

β2 - Time

1.47

0.76

0.05

1.67

0.81

0.04

1.41

0.81

0.08

1.44

0.78

0.06

β3 - Time2

-0.20

0.09

0.03

β4 – IndexFTSE 250

0.04

-9.89

4.57

0.03

0.22

0.74

0.77

0.08
0.53
0.04
0.63
0.06

0.46

4.46

0.11
3.77
4.57
0.73
0.90

3.66

-9.29

-0.20
-2.35
-9.47
0.35

-2.71

β4 – IndexFTSE Small

0.05
0.49
0.01
0.55
0.01

0.05

0.56

0.12
3.30
3.99
0.66
0.80

0.11

3.68

-0.24
-2.30
-10.31
0.39

-0.21

-2.14

0.44
1.81

0.72
0.93

0.54
0.05

β0 - Intercept

β5 - Time:FTSE 250

1.60
0.91
0.08
2.01
1.70
β5 - Time:FTSE Small
Random effects
Intercept
768.52
96.63
665.25
635.00
NA
Time
27.01
17.02
17.77
Residual variance σ2
85.78
540.71
194.63
136.71
Fit indices
Deviance
15540
15460
15388
15344
AIC
15562
15480
15411
15372
BIC
15623
15535
15478
15450
Note. SE=standard error. Dependent variable=percentage of women non-executive directors. Includes year-observations from 2011 to 2016
(n=2370).
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Hypotheses H3a, H3b, H3c, and H3d. The third set of hypotheses H3a, H3b,
and H3c predicted a statistically significant increase in the mean increase of CEOs as
compared to the increase of executive directors. To test these hypotheses, a t-test was
performed. Table 52 reports results for the t-tests, which provided support for hypotheses
H3a. In the duration of the Davies Review, FTSE 350 boards decreased their average
number of female CEOs from 4.2% in 2011, t(567.17) = -.20, p = .84; 95% CI(-0.04, 0.03), to 4.6% in 2016. Despite the lack of statistical significance, the mean difference of
0.35% was low compared to the 2.81% mean difference in the population of executive
directors. The average percentage of female executive directors in 2011 was 15.44% in
2011, t(560.06) = -.76, p = .45; 95% CI(-0.10, -0.04), compared to 18.25% in 2016.
Results of the tests also provided support for hypothesis H3b, the mean increase
in female chairpersons in FTSE 350 boards had a statistically significant increase from
1.05% in 2011, t(421.51) = 2.36, p = .02; 95% CI(-0.06, -0.01), to 4.21% in 2016.
However, the increase was significantly lower than the 94.74% increase of non-executive
directors, for which the average number in 2011 was .94, t533.22) = -11.73, p < .001;
95% CI(-1.11, -0.79), compared to 1.88 in 2016.
Predictions for the FTSE Small Cap boards also found support in the study’s tests,
in the duration of the Davies Review, FTSE Small Cap boards had a non-statistical
significant decrease of 0.91% in their share of female CEOs from 1.8% in 2011,
(t[196.68] =.58, p = .56; 95% CI[-0.02, 0.04]), to 0.9 % in 2016. The decrease was lower
than the 3.63% decrease of female executive directors in the same period, which
averaged 0.13 per board in 2011, t(217.61) =.80, p=.45; 95% CI(-0.05, -0.12), and .10 in
2016. In support of Hypotheses H3d, the number of female chairpersons for FTSE Small
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Cap boards did not change in the Davies Review period, the 3.64% population in 2011,
t(218) =0, p = 1; 95% CI(-0.05, 0.05), remained at 3.64% in 2016. Conversely, the
number of female non-executive directors in FTSE Small Cap boards had a statistically
significant mean increase of .46, resulting from an average .43 per board in 2011,
t(212.65) =-4.87, p < .001; 95% CI(-0.64, -0.27), to .88 in 2016.
To further understand the transformation of corporate boards in relation to the
increase of female CEOs in relation to female executive directors, and female
chairpersons in relation to female non-executive directors a series of longitudinal
regression models were performed using data from 2011 to 2016 for the pooled sample.
Table 53 reports the results of the five growth models that were performed to identify the
effects of time, FTSE index, and number of women executive directors on dependent
variable CEO. The first model, M0 was the unconditional growth model with a random
intercept by firm. Model M1 added a random slope to the previous model. Model M2
added the variables index and female executive directors to the previous model, which
conditioned the growth over time on the variable index. The fourth model, M3, added a
temporal correlation to the previous model. The fifth model, M4, conditioned the growth
of the dependent variable on the variable WED. Based on fit statistics, models M3 and
M4 provided the best fit for the data. However, estimates across all models were very
similar. The lower AIC and BIC fit statistic for Model M4 suggested that it provided the
best fit for the data; therefore, it is interpreted. The intercept for dependent variable CEO
was .036 (p=.03). The effect of time was near zero and non-statistically significant,
<.001 (p=.89), which indicated that in the 2011 to 2016 period, there was no growth in
the representation of female CEOs across the sample. The p-values for the variables in
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the model were not statistically significant, ranging from .23 to .89, which suggested the
FTSE 250 and FTSE Small Cap boards were not statistically significantly different from
FTSE 100 boards in their increase of female CEOs. Similarly, the increase of executive
directors, in the Davies Review period, did not have a statistically significant effect in
changing the population of female CEOs.
It is noteworthy to mention that, models M2 and M3, indicated that number of
female executive directors had a statistically significant effect on the variable CEO, .021
(ps=.03); which indicates that each additional executive director increases likelihood of
having a female CEO. However, that effect became non-statistically significant when the
variable WED was used to condition the growth overtime.
Similar models were computed for the dependent variable female chairperson.
Table 54 reports the results of the five growth models for the dependent variable female
chairperson. The first model, M0 was the unconditional growth model with a random
intercept. The second model, M1 allowed random slopes for time. Model M2 added
variables index and WNED directors to the previous model, and conditioned the growth
by FTSE index. Model M3 added a temporal correlation to the previous model. Model
M4 conditioned the annual growth of the dependent variable on the variable WNED. Fit
indices indicated that models M3 and M4 were the best fit for the data. However, Model
M4 is interpreted as it is of interest to see how the growth of female non-executive
directors impacted the female number of chairs.
The intercept for model M4 was approaching statistical significance, .027 (p=.06).
The model suggested that time had statistically significant effect on the dependent
variable, .007 (p=.01), indicating that the population of female chairpersons increased
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by .007 every year in the 2011 to 2016 period. The number of non-executive directors
had a statistically significant negative effect on the dependent variable, -.012 (p=.01);
however, the interaction of time and non-executive directors was not statistically
significant, .000 (p=.92). The p-values for the effect of index indicated that FTSE 250
(p=.79) and FTSE Small Cap (p=.61) boards were not statistically significantly different
than FTSE 100 boards in the observed relationships.
Table 52
Results of T-tests for Hypotheses H3a, H3b, H3c, and H3d
Variable

n

Mean
difference t-statistic p-value

df

FTSE 350
Fem. CEOs
285
0.004
-0.20 0.84
567.17
Fem. exec directors 285
0.028
-0.76 0.45
560.06
Fem. Chairperson
285
0.032
-2.36 0.02
421.51
Fem. Non-exec
directors
285
0.947
-11.73 0.00
553.22
FTSE Small Cap
Fem. CEOs
110
-0.009
0.58 0.56
196.68
Fem. exec directors 110
-0.036
0.80 0.45
217.61
Fem. Chairperson
110
0.000
0.00 1.00
218.00
Fem. Non-exec
directors
110
0.455
-4.87 0.00
213.85
Note. n=sample size; df=degrees of freedom; CI=confidence interval
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95% CI

Cohen’s d

-0.04, -0.03
-0.10, -0.04
-0.06, -0.01

-0.017
-0.063
-0.198

-1.11, -0.79

-0.983

-0.02, 0.04
-0.05, -0.12
-0.05, -0.05

0.078
0.108
<0.001

-0.64, -0.27

-0.657

Table 53
Results of Panel Study – Conditional Growth model for Female CEOs on FTSE All Share Boards – Hypotheses H3a and H3c
Model

M0

Fixed effects

Coef.

SE

β0 – Intercept

0.031

β1 – Time

0.003

M1
SE

0.01 <0.01

0.031

0.00

Coef.

SE

p

0.036

0.02

0.05

0.036

0.02

0.03

0.003

0.98

0.000

0.00

0.96

0.000

0.00

0.89

0.02

0.75

0.004

0.02

0.86

0.007

0.02

0.73

-0.024

0.02

0.31

-0.023

0.00

0.36

-0.026

0.02

0.23

β3 – WED

0.021

0.01

0.03

0.021

0.01

0.03

0.015

0.01

0.31

β4 – Time:FTSE 250

0.001

0.01

0.91

0.001

0.00

0.81

β4 – Time:FTSE Small Cap

-0.001

0.01

0.93

-0.001

0.01

0.79

0.80

p

Coef.

SE

p

0.01 <0.01

0.032

0.02

0.07

0.00

0.000

0.00

0.007

0.89

Coef.

M4
p

β2 – FTSE Small Cap

Coef.

M3
SE

β2 – FTSE 250

p

M2

Β5 – Time:WED
0.002
0.00 0.62
Random effects
Intercept
0.15
0.17
0.17
0.11
0.12
Time
NA
0.04
0.04
0.02
0.02
Residual variance
0.10
0.07
0.07
0.14
0.14
σ2
Fit indices
Deviance
3260
3967
3976
4268
4268
AIC
-3252
-3955
-3954
-4244
-4246
BIC
-3229
-3921
-3890
-4175
-4183
Note. SE=standard error. Dependent variable=female CEO; WED=women executive directors; Includes year-observations from 2011 to 2016
(n=2370).
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Table 54
Results of Panel Study – Conditional Growth model for Female Chairperson on FTSE All Share Boards – Hypotheses H3b and H3d
Model

M0

M1

M2

M3

M4

Fixed effects

Coef.

SE

p

Coef.

SE

p

Coef.

SE

p

Coef.

SE

p

Coef.

SE

p

β0 – Intercept

0.018

0.01

0.02

0.018

0.01

0.01

0.029

0.02

0.01

0.030

0.01

0.04

0.027

0.01

0.06

β1 – Time

0.005

0.00 <0.01

0.005

0.00

0.02

0.006

0.00

0.18

0.005

0.00

0.20

0.007

0.00

0.01

-0.009

0.02

0.64

-0.010

0.02

0.55

-0.004

0.02

0.79

0.015

0.02

0.46

0.012

0.02

0.52

0.010

0.02

0.61

0.00 <0.01

-0.013

0.00 <0.01

-0.012

0.02

0.01

0.000

0.00

0.92

β2 – FTSE 250
β2 – FTSE Small Cap
β3 – WNED
β4 – Time:FTSE 250
β4 – Time:FTSE Small Cap

-0.013
0.005

0.01

0.31

0.006

0.00

0.20

-0.005

0.01

0.41

-0.004

0.01

0.47

β5 – Time:WNED

Random effects
Intercept
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.05
0.04
Time
0.04
0.04
0.02
0.02
Residual
0.09
0.06
0.06
0.13
0.13
variance σ2
Fit indices
Deviance
3529
4564
4586
4839
4834
AIC
-3521
-4552
-4564
-4815
-4812
BIC
-3498
-4518
-4500
-4746
-4749
Note. SE=standard error. Dependent variable=female chairperson; WNED=women non-executive directors; Includes year-observations from 2011
to 2016 (n=2370).
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Effects of Davies Review on Opportunities for Women
Phase II of the study examined the effects of the Davies Review on opportunities
for other women in the organization and on the gender pay gap. For this phase,
observations in the sample were re-classified into treatment and comparison groups using
the percentages of WOB in 2016. Organizations that achieved the 25% target set by the
Davies Review were placed in the compliant (treatment) group, and organizations that
were below the 25% threshold were placed in the non-compliant (comparison) group.
Hypothesis H4a. Hypothesis H4a predicted that the Davies Review would result
in a statistically significant decrease in the percentage of women in executive boards in
FTSE All Share organizations compliant with the 25% WOB targets. Analyses were
performed on the pooled sample using two different methods for handling missing data,
listwise deletion and with data imputation. Following recommendations in the literature
(Frolich & Huber, 2017), prior to testing the model with the identified covariates, the
unconditional model was tested.
Table 55 reports the estimates of the RD tests for the unconditional models. The
linear model returned a statistically significant effect estimate of -7.56 (p=.05). Adding a
quadratic term of the forcing variable WOBPC to the linear model, the quadratic model
estimated a treatment effect of -11.47 (p=.01). Although the quadratic model was
statistically significant, the quadratic term’s p-value was not statistically significant
(p=.16). Similarly, adding a cubic term to the quadratic model, the cubic model
estimated a statistically significant treatment effect of -17.38 (p=.02); however, the cubic
term was not statistically significant (p=.36). After confirming that the unconditional
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model had a statistically significant treatment effect on the outcome, the linear model was
kept, identified covariates were added, and hypothesis tests were performed.
Table 55
RD Test Results for WExecPC (H4a) – Unconditional Model
Model

h

n

Estimate

SE p-value F-statistic p-value

R2

R2 Adj.

Linear
8.91
174
-7.56 3.94
0.05
2.41
0.14 0.04
0.02
Quadratic
8.91
174
-11.47 4.57
0.01
2.31
0.12 0.05
0.03
Cubic
8.91
174
-17.38 7.52
0.02
2.02
0.16 0.06
0.03
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. Dependent variable=percentage of women
executives.

To identify a discontinuous jump in the regression line at the cutoff, six virtually
identical non-parametric regression discontinuity linear models were computed. These six
models differed only in bandwidth selection and treatment of missing data. Models M1,
M2, and M3 tested hypothesis H4a using listwise deletion, and models M4, M5, and M6
used the values generated by the data imputation method described in the Missing Data
section. Equation 24 was used in the six models for predicting the percentage of women
in executive boards for the compliant and non-compliant groups based on the 25%
threshold set by the Davies Review.
!"#$%&' = *+ + *- !./&' + *0 1 + *2 34%5$67$ + *8 '59:9%6; + *< !"=

(24)

+ *> '".?4@ ∗ *B '".1$4C5$ + *D 'ℎ695?4@ ∗ *F 'ℎ6951$4C5$
+ *-+ !GH&' + *-- !"IJ&' + *-0 G$%:K5-LF + *-2 34@$#-L0 + M

Table 56 reports the LATE estimates for the six models. Model M1 used the
calculated optimal bandwidth for the WExecPC variable (h=8.34), which included 148
effective observations. Model M2 narrowed the bandwidth to 6.5 (110 effective
observations), and model M3 widened the bandwidth to 11.0 (168 effective observations).
Model M1 returned an estimated effect size of -10.25 that was statistically significant at
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the .10 alpha level (p=.06), and the R2 indicated a large effect size (R2=.37). Model M2
returned a statistically significant treatment effect of -13.85 (p=.05), and model 3 yielded
a non-statistically significant estimate of -5.79 (p=. 13).
Similar models were calculated using imputed values for missing data. At a
calculated bandwidth of 5.85, model M4 returned a statistically significant treatment
effect estimate of -10.57 (p=.05). Model M5 estimated a treatment effect of -13.55
(p=.02) at a 2.78 bandwidth, and model M6 estimated a treatment effect of -6.66 (p=.09).
All of the six models tested estimated a negative treatment effect of the Davies Review
on the percentage of women in executive boards, five of which were statistically
significant at the .10 alpha level. Estimates for the optimal bandwidth models, M1 and
M4, were very similar at different bandwidths. Including imputed data for missing values
made it possible to estimate the treatment effect at a much narrower bandwidth, which
provided more precise estimates.
Table 56
RD Test Results for WExecPC (H4a) – Full Model at Different Bandwidths
Model*

h

n

Estimate

SE

p-value F-statistic p-value

R2

R2 Adj.

M1 - Optimal
8.34 148
-10.25
5.55
0.07
3.14
0.00
0.37
0.25
M2 - Narrow
6.50 110
-13.85
7.06
0.05
2.35
0.00
0.39
0.22
M3 - Wide
11.00 168
-5.79
3.86
0.13
2.96
0.00
0.32
0.21
M4 - Optimal
5.85 162
-10.57
5.50
0.05
3.02
0.00
0.34
0.22
M5 - Narrow
4.85 126
-38.44 13.98
0.01
2.92
0.00
0.40
0.26
M6 - Wide
8.50 231
-6.66
4.01
0.09
4.04
0.00
0.31
0.23
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. Dependent variable=percentage of women
executives. *All models were calculated using variables in Equation 11. Models 1, 2 and 3 use
listwise deletion. Models 4, 5, and 6 use imputed values for missing data.
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Table 57
Parameter Estimates for WExecPC (H4a) – Full Model
Variable

Estimate

SE

t-value

p-value Estimate

M1 (h=8.34)
β0 - Intercept
β1 - WOBPCNon-compliant

SE

t-value p-value

M4 (h=5.85)

18.86

6.74

2.80

0.01

18.20

6.84

2.66

0.01

3.15

1.25

2.52

0.01

3.17

1.67

1.91

0.06

β1 - WOBPCCompliant
0.53
0.66
0.80
0.43
0.79
0.65
1.22
0.23
β2 -Treatment
-10.25
4.45
-2.31
0.02
-10.57
5.32 -1.99
0.05
β3 - Increase
-0.18
0.13
-1.43
0.16
-0.17
0.10 -1.67
0.10
β4 - Critical
-2.29
2.51
-0.92
0.36
-1.81
2.51 -0.72
0.47
β5 - WED
4.32
2.48
1.74
0.08
3.24
1.89
1.72
0.09
β6 - CEOGnd
66.11 25.36
2.61
0.01
7.03 21.34
0.33
0.74
β7 - CEOTenure
-5.22
2.58
-2.02
0.05
-0.47
2.38 -0.20
0.84
β8 - ChairGnd
-0.07
8.04
-0.01
0.99
-9.35
5.81 -1.61
0.11
β9 - ChairTenure
-2.97
2.61
-1.14
0.26
0.61
1.03
0.59
0.56
β10 - WSMPC
0.31
0.11
2.73
0.01
0.28
0.11
2.54
0.01
β11 - WEmpPC
-0.04
0.09
-0.47
0.64
0.06
0.08
0.78
0.44
β12 - Sector
β12 -1 Consumer Svcs. 1.74
4.06
0.43
0.67
0.70
3.34
0.21
0.83
β12 -2Energy
-1.60
5.89
-0.27
0.79
-6.76
5.34 -1.27
0.21
β12 -3Financials
5.63
3.59
1.57
0.12
2.63
3.20
0.82
0.41
β12 -4Health Care
-3.03
6.07
-0.50
0.62
-2.74
5.60 -0.49
0.63
β12 -5Industrials
0.51
3.39
0.15
0.88
-0.07
3.04 -0.02
0.98
β12 -6Materials
5.75
4.41
1.30
0.20
4.07
4.13
0.99
0.33
β12 -7Technology
-1.03
5.62
-0.18
0.85
-4.80
4.91 -0.98
0.33
β12 -8Telecom.
-1.92
8.21
-0.23
0.82
-1.05
6.38 -0.17
0.87
β12 -9Utilities
20.63
6.15
3.36
0.00
20.86
6.37
3.27
0.00
β13 - Index
FTSE 250
0.61
2.15
0.28
0.78
0.01
2.13
0.01
0.99
FTSE Small Cap
1.84
3.47
0.53
0.60
2.25
2.93
0.77
0.44
Residual SE
0.79
0.79
2
2
R (Adjusted R )
0.37 (0.25)
0.34 (0.22)
n
148
162
Note. n=sample size; SE=standard error; h=bandwidth. WOBPC=percentage of women on boards;
Critical=3 or more women directors; WED=women executive directors; CEOGnd=female CEO;
ChairGnd=female chairperson; CEOTenure=female CEO tenure; ChairTenure=female
chairperson tenure; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management; WEmpPC=percentage
of women employed; dependent variable=percentage of women executives.

311

A closer inspection at the coefficients for each of the variables included in the
models M1 and M4 (Table 57) suggested that the results were virtually identical despite
the 2.49 bandwidth difference. However, unlike model M1 (p=.07), the p-value for model
M4 was statistically significant (p=.05) The F-statistics for both models, M1, F(23,
124)=3.14, p<.001, and model M4, F(23,138)=3.02, p<.001, indicated that both models
were good fits for the data. The inspection of the coefficients of both models also hinted
the presence of multicollinearity due to the high R2 despite the high p-values for the
majority of coefficients. Therefore, following recommendations in the literature to assess
multicollinearity in the model (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010, p. 196-197),
variance inflation factors were calculated.
Table 58 reports the multicollinearity diagnostic results for the full model
described in Equation 24. Overall multicollinearity diagnostic measures indicated that
multicollinearity had been detected in the model. The determinant of the correlation
matrix was within recommended guidelines, greater than 0 and smaller than 1 (Farrar &
Gaubler, 1967). However, it was very close to zero (|X’X|=.0031), which suggested some
degree of multicollinearity (Cooley & Lohnes, 1971). The Farrar Chi-Square test statistic
was computed. As a rule of thumb, the value of the Farrar Chi-square should not be
higher than the critical value of Chi-square for the desired level of significance (Farrar &
Gaubler, 1967). The value Farrar c2value of 2265 was higher than the critical value
(c2=441.28, a=.05), which suggested the presence of significant multicollinearity in the
model specification. Therefore, multiple tests were performed to detect the location of the
multicollinearity.
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Table 58
Multicollinearity Diagnostic Test Results for Hypothesis H4a
Diagnostic

Determinant |X'X|
Farrar Chi Square
Red Indicator
Sum of Lambda Inverse

Full Model

Respecified Model

0.003
2265.41
0.27
30.58

0.031
1359.78
0.27
20.40

Note. Test performed on model for dependent variable=percentage of women executives.

Table 59 reports the results of the multicollinearity diagnostic tests for individual
variables in the model. Values for the variance inflation factor (VIF) statistic were above
1 indicating that variables were correlated; however, every value was below the
recommended threshold of 10 (Schumacker, 2008), and below the more stringent
threshold of 5 (Curto & Pinto, 2011), indicating that the test did not detect a high degree
multicollinearity. Similarly, tolerance values were within .24 and .82, indicating that
variables were correlated but a high degree of multicollinearity was not detected (Hair et
al., 2010, p. 197). Corrected variance inflation factor (CVIF) indices for the variables
WOBPC, CEOGnd, and ChairGnd were close to the threshold of 10 (Curto & Pinto,
2010), indicating the presence of multicollinearity. The variables CEOGnd and
ChairGnd were dummy variables, which multiplied by the Tenure result in the same
value as the variables CEOTenure and ChairTenure, thus, they could be removed without
impacting the outcome. The variable WOBPC being the main predictor could not be
removed; therefore, tests were run removing the variables CEOGnd and ChairGnd. After
removing those variables, multicollinearity indices improved and remained within the
aforementioned guidelines. Therefore, the regressions for the model were re-computed
without the predictors that were causing multicollinearity.
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Table 59
Multicollinearity Diagnostic Test Results for Hypothesis H4a Individual Parameters

Parameter

VIF

Full Model
Tolerance Leamer

CVIF

VIF

Respecified Model
Tolerance Leamer

WOBPC
4.14
0.24
0.49 11.96
4.10
0.24
Increase
1.76
0.57
0.75
5.09
1.76
0.57
Critical
2.00
0.50
0.71
5.77
2.00
0.50
WED
1.66
0.60
0.78
4.79
1.35
0.74
CEOGnd
3.21
0.31
0.56
9.25
CEOTenure
2.55
0.39
0.63
7.35
1.19
0.84
ChairGnd
3.17
0.32
0.56
9.13
ChairTenure
3.11
0.32
0.57
8.96
1.04
0.96
WSMPC
1.72
0.58
0.76
4.96
1.72
0.58
WEmpPC
1.92
0.52
0.72
5.54
1.92
0.52
Sector
1.21
0.82
0.91
3.50
1.21
0.83
Index
1.42
0.71
0.84
4.08
1.41
0.71
Treatment
2.72
0.37
0.61
7.85
2.71
0.37
Note. VIF=variance inflation factor. CVIF=corrected variance inflation factor.

CVIF

0.49
0.75
0.71
0.86

8.75
3.75
4.27
2.88

0.92

2.54

0.98
0.76
0.72
0.91
0.84
0.61

2.22
3.66
4.09
2.58
3.00
5.78

Table 60
RD Test Results for WExecPC (H4a) – Respecified Model
Model*

h

n

Estimate

SE

p-value F-statistic p-value

R2

R2 Adj.

M4 - Optimal
5.85 162
-10.57
5.50
0.05
3.02
0.00
0.34
0.22
Respecified
5.85 162
-11.56
5.28
0.03
3.17
0.00
0.32
0.22
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. *All models were calculated using
variables in Equation 11. Models 4 and 4a used imputed values for missing data.

Table 60 reports the results of the non-parametric RD tests for the adjusted model
compared to the re-stated results of the full model. The adjusted model removed the
variables that were causing significant multicollinearity in the full model. The smaller
standard error, smaller p-value, and larger F-statistic for the adjusted model indicated a
better fit, F(21,140)=3.17, p<.001. In support of the study’s predictions, the estimated
effect for the model was large and statistically significant, -11.56, p=.03. Coefficients for
the model are reported in Table 61.
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Table 61
Parameter Estimates for WExecPC (H4a) – Respecified Model
Variable
Estimate
SE
t-value
p-value
β0 – Intercept
19.44
6.80
2.86
0.00
β1 - WOBPCNon-compliant
3.34
1.67
2.00
0.05
β1 - WOBPCCompliant
0.87
0.64
1.36
0.18
β2 –Treatment
-11.56
5.30
-2.18
0.03
β3 – Increase
-0.18
0.10
-1.76
0.08
β4 – Critical
-1.74
2.51
-0.69
0.49
β5 – WED
3.43
1.88
1.82
0.07
β6 – CEOTenure
0.24
0.83
0.29
0.77
β7 – ChairTenure
-0.69
0.65
-1.07
0.29
β8 – WSMPC
0.28
0.11
2.56
0.01
β9 – WempPC
0.05
0.08
0.66
0.51
β10 – Sector
β10-1 Consumer Services
0.96
3.31
0.29
0.77
β10-2 Energy
-6.85
5.33
-1.29
0.20
β10-3 Financials
2.79
3.17
0.88
0.38
β10-4 Health Care
-2.87
5.34
-0.54
0.59
β10-5 Industrials
0.18
3.00
0.06
0.95
β10-6 Materials
2.68
4.02
0.67
0.51
β10-7 Technology
-4.72
4.89
-0.97
0.34
β10-8 Telecom.
-1.09
6.36
-0.17
0.86
β10-9 Utilities
20.92
6.35
3.30
0.00
β11 – Index
FTSE 250
-0.40
2.11
-0.19
0.85
FTSE Small Cap
1.84
2.91
0.63
0.53
Residual SE
0.75
R2 (Adjusted R2)
0.32 (0.22)
n
162
Note. n=sample size; SE=standard error; WOBPC=percentage of women on boards; Critical=3 or
more women; WED=women executive directors; CEOTenure=female CEO tenure;
ChairTenure=female chairperson tenure; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management;
dependent variable=percentage of women executives.
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Figure 41. RD Plot of WExecPC - FTSE All Share Boards.
Note. Discontinuity detected, LATE = 11.56 (p=.03). h=5.85. WExecPC=percentage of women
executives

Figure 41 provides a visual representation of the effect of Compliance to the 25%
target set by the Davies Review on the percentage of women on executive boards for the
adjusted model. The discontinuous jump on the regression line indicates that
observations to the right of the cutoff point, the compliant group, had a higher percentage
of WOB than observations to the left of the cutoff point, the non-compliant group.
Using a bandwidth of 5.85, the Davies Review had a statistically significant
treatment effect of -11.56 (p=.03) percentage points. This indicates that based on their
percentage of WOB in 2016, the group of organizations that lie within the 25 to 30.85
mark had in average a 11.56 percent fewer women in their executive boards than the
group of organizations within the 19.15 to 25 range on the running variable. The
percentage of women employed in the organization did not have a statistically significant
effect (p=.51) on the outcome; however, the variable WSMPC indicated that for each
percentage point of women in senior management, there was a positive effect on the
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outcome of 0.28 (p=.01). Industry sectors did not produce statistically significant
coefficients, with the exception of the utilities sector, which had a statistically significant
effect of 20.92 percentage points (p<.001). The p-values for Index indicated that FTSE
250 (p=.85) and FTSE Small Cap (p=.53) were not statistically significantly different
than the FTSE 100 group.
−11.56 =

lim !"#$%&' - |!./&' −

VWX↑0<

lim !"#$%&' + |!./&'

VWX↓0<

(25)

Equation 25 indicates that, controlling for sector, female CEO tenure, female
Chair tenure, number of women executive directors, and percentage of women in senior
management, percentage of women in the organization, and Index, the -11.56 estimated
effect of Davies Review on the WExecPC variable is calculated as the difference between
the mean effect on WExecPC in the non-compliant and compliant groups.
Robustness Tests
To strengthen the causal claim of the results, the effect of the forcing variable was
tested by changing the cutoff point that was used to assign participants to treatment and
comparison groups. To that end, the model for hypothesis H4a was tested at thresholds
20 and 30. Figure 42 shows the regression line for the test at the 20 cutoff point. Test
results, reported on Table 62, indicated that at a bandwidth of 7.61 (n=228), the estimated
treatment effect of 1.06 (p=.78) was not statistically significant. Figure 43 shows the
regression line for the test at the 30 cutoff point. Results for the test indicated that a
calculated optimal bandwidth of 9.04 (n=177), the estimated treatment effect of -1.50
(p=.69) was not statistically significant. Both robustness tests provided additional
evidence for the causality claim of the test results of hypothesis H4a. Table 63 reports
coefficients for both pseudo-cutoff models.
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Figure 42. RD Plot of WExecPC at Pseudo-Cutoff 20 - FTSE All Share.
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Note. No discontinuity detected. Non-statistically significant LATE (p=.79).
WExecPC=percentage of women executives.
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Figure 43. RD Plot of WExecPC at Pseudo-Cutoff 30 - FTSE All Share.
Note. No discontinuity detected. Non-statistically significant LATE (p=.84).
WExecPC=percentage of women executives.

Table 62
Robustness Tests – RD Test Results for Pseudo-Cutoffs (H4a)
Model

h

n

Cutoff 20

7.61

228

Estimate
0.98

SE
3.76

p-value F-statistic p-value
0.79

3.58

0.00

R2
0.27

R2 Adj.
0.19

Cutoff 30
9.04
177
-0.78
3.78
0.84
4.94
0.00
0.42
0.33
Note. n=sample size; h=bandwidth; SE=standard error. Dependent variable=percentage of women
executives.
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Table 63
Robustness Tests – Parameter Estimates for Pseudo-Cutoffs (H4a)
Estimate
SE t-value p-value Estimate
SE t-value p-value
1
Pseudo-cutoff=20
Pseudo-cutoff=303
5.11
4.35
1.18
0.24
8.07
5.82
1.39
0.17
-0.21
0.80 -0.27
0.79
0.37
0.56
0.66
0.51
0.75
0.45
1.67
0.10
0.05
0.81
0.06
0.95
0.98
3.49
0.28
0.78
-0.78
3.58
-0.22
0.83
0.05
0.08
0.66
0.51
-0.05
0.11
-0.49
0.63
-2.37
2.60 -0.91
0.36
-0.03
2.68
-0.01
0.99
0.82
2.04
0.41
0.69
8.19
1.93
4.23
0.00
0.53
0.66
0.80
0.42
2.51
0.85
2.96
0.00
-0.03
0.54 -0.05
0.96
0.54
0.49
1.10
0.28
0.18
0.10
1.88
0.06
0.41
0.11
3.85
0.00
0.16
0.07
2.37
0.02
-0.08
0.09
-0.90
0.37

Variable
β0 - Intercept
β1 - WOBPCNon-compliant
β1 - WOBPCCompliant
β2 -Treatment
β3 - Increase
β4 - Critical
β5 - WED
β6 - CEOTenure
β7 - ChairTenure
β8 - WSMPC
β9 - WEmpPC
β10 - Sector
Consumer Svcs.
-3.37
2.50 -1.35
0.18
5.87
4.15
1.42
0.16
Energy
-5.79
3.17 -1.82
0.07
-3.82
7.16
-0.53
0.59
Financials
-0.20
2.67 -0.07
0.94
4.06
3.94
1.03
0.30
Health Care
-4.75
6.70 -0.71
0.48
-3.24
5.26
-0.62
0.54
Industrials
-3.08
2.37 -1.30
0.20
0.11
3.82
0.03
0.98
Materials
-2.11
3.71 -0.57
0.57
3.51
4.99
0.70
0.48
Technology
-5.96
3.24 -1.84
0.07
-3.00
6.26
-0.48
0.63
Telecom.
2.07
4.64
0.45
0.66
-2.64
8.26
-0.32
0.75
Utilities
3.68
5.96
0.62
0.54
10.60
5.81
1.83
0.07
β11 - Index
FTSE 250
-2.88
1.76 -1.64
0.10
0.84
2.36
0.36
0.72
FTSE Small Cap
1.16
2.09
0.56
0.58
1.02
3.20
0.32
0.75
Residual SE
0.62
0.83
R2 (Adjusted R2)
0.27 (0.19)
0.40 (0.32)
n
148.00
162.00
Note. SE=standard error. 1Estimated using an optimal bandwidth of 7.61. 2Estimated using an optimal
bandwidth of 9.04.

Alternative hypothesis H4a. Taking into account that the variable Increase was
found to be significant, it cannot be discounted as an alternative explanation to the critical
mass of WOB hypotheses. Consequently, using the variable increase as the running
variable, the model was tested to identify if the effect of critical mass of WOB at 25%
could be explained by the increase.
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Table 64 reported the results of the unconditional model for alternative hypothesis
H4a using linear, quadratic and cubic functional forms. Results indicated that at an
optimal bandwidth of 8.77, the linear model was the best fit for the data, based on the
lowest p-value for the F-statistic for the three models. Following the identification of the
functional form of the regression, the full model described in Equation 26 was run at
several bandwidths.
!"#$%&' = *+ + *- 34%5$67$ + *0 1 + *2 /K65@ + *8 !GH&' + *< !"IJ&'

(26)

+ *> '".1$4C5$ ∗ *B 'ℎ6951$4C5$ + *D G$%:K5-LF ∗ *F 34@$#-L0
+M

Table 64
RD Test Results for WExecPC (Alternative H4a) – Unconditional Model
Model

h

n

Estimate

SE

p-value

Linear
8.77
221
-6.15
3.52
0.08
Quadratic
8.77
221
-6.68
3.65
0.07
Cubic
8.77
221
-9.19
4.89
0.06
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error.

F-statistic p-value
2.46
2.25
2.08

0.12
0.13
0.14

R2

R2 Adj.

0.03
0.04
0.05

0.02
0.02
0.02

The full model was tested at three different bandwidths. Estimates for the optimal
bandwidth of 7.03, a narrow bandwidth of 3.51, and a wide bandwidth of 14.06 are
reported on Table 65. All three models were statistically significant .05 alpha level.
Although the wide bandwidth model suggested that it was the best fit for the data, the
bandwidth was so wide that it represented almost the parametric form, which literature
advices against. Therefore, coefficients for the optimal and wide bandwidth models are
reported Table 66 for comparison purposes; however, the optimal bandwidth is
interpreted.
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Table 65
RD Test Results for WExecPC (Alternative H4a) – Full Model Different Bandwidths
Model

h

n

Estimate

SE

p-value F-statistic p-value

Optimal
7.03
192
-6.78
2.11
0.00
Narrow
3.51
133
-7.47
3.80
0.04
Wide
14.06
327
-4.90
0.58
0.00
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error.

5.05
4.82
7.12

0.00
0.00
0.00

R2
0.36
0.45
0.31

R2 Adj.
0.29
0.36
0.26

At an optimal bandwidth of 7.03, the LATE was statistically significant, -6.78
(p<.01), which indicates that organizations that had a large increase of WOB had 6.78
percentage points lower representation of women on their executive boards. The
percentage of women in senior management was statistically significant, indicating that
for each percentage point of women in senior management, the percentage of women on
executive boards increased by .48 (p=.01) of a percent. The statistical significance of the
variable CEOTenure indicated that for every year a female CEO was in her position, the
percentage of women on executive boards increased by 3.98 percentage points (p<.001).
Figure 44 presents a graphical representation of the discontinuity for the optimal
bandwidth model.
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Table 66
Parameter Estimates for WExecPC (Alternative H4a) - Full Model
Optimal (h=7.03)
Variable

Estimate

β0 – Intercept

SE

t-value

Wide (h=14.09)
p-value Estimate

SE

t-value

p-value

10.87

6.58

1.65

0.10

11.59

5.12

2.26

0.02

β1 - IncreaseSmall

1.85

0.90

2.06

0.04

0.40

0.26

1.57

0.12

β1 - IncreaseLarge

0.57

0.71

0.79

0.43

0.62

0.31

2.00

0.05

β2 -Treatment

-6.78

2.75

-2.46

0.01

-4.90

2.00

-2.45

0.01

β3 - Board

-0.06

0.50

-0.12

0.90

-0.37

0.37

-0.99

0.32

β4 - WSMPC

0.48

0.09

5.12

0.00

0.43

0.08

5.64

0.00

β5 - WEmpPC

-0.04

0.07

-0.49

0.62

0.04

0.06

0.66

0.51

β6 - CEOTenure

3.98

1.12

3.57

0.00

2.54

0.72

3.52

0.00

β7 - ChairTenure

0.28

0.46

0.61

0.54

0.32

0.42

0.77

0.44

0.34
-5.19
3.67
6.30
0.00
-2.17
-5.18
8.30
13.63

3.29
4.33
3.35
5.27
3.09
3.82
5.54
7.56
7.31

0.10
-1.20
1.10
1.20
0.00
-0.57
-0.93
1.10
1.87

0.92
0.23
0.27
0.23
1.00
0.57
0.35
0.27
0.06

0.50
-4.01
1.60
1.75
-1.09
-1.59
-5.53
4.47
6.10

2.49
3.35
2.52
4.11
2.34
2.93
3.88
5.50
5.10

0.20
-1.20
0.63
0.43
-0.47
-0.54
-1.43
0.81
1.20

0.84
0.23
0.53
0.67
0.64
0.59
0.16
0.42
0.23

β8 - Sector
β8-1 Consumer Svcs
β8-2 Energy
β8-3 Financials
β8-4 Health Care
β8-5 Industrials
β8-6 Materials
β8-7 Technology
β8-8 Telecom.
β8-9 Utilities

Β9 - Index
FTSE 250
-2.49
2.10
-1.18
0.24
-3.89
1.66
-2.35
0.02
FTSE Small Cap
1.42
2.77
0.51
0.61
0.45
2.21
0.20
0.84
Residual SE
0.74
0.59
2
2
R (Adjusted R )
0.36 (0.29)
0.31 (.026)
n
192
327
Note. n=sample size; h=bandwidth; SE=standard error; Increase=increase in percentage of
women on boards; Board=board size; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management;
WEmpPC=percentage of women employed; CEOTenure=female CEO tenure;
ChairTenure=female chairperson tenure. Dependent variable=percentage of women executives.
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Figure 44. RD Plot of WExecPC by Increase - FTSE All Share.
Note. Discontinuity detected. LATE=-6.78 (p<.01). WExecPC=percentage of women executives.

Hypothesis H4b. Hypothesis H4b predicted that the Davies Review would result
in a statistically significant decrease in the percentage of women in senior management in
FTSE All Share organizations compliant with the 25% WOB targets. Analyses were
performed on the pooled sample using two different methods for handling missing data,
listwise deletion and with data imputation. Following recommendations in the literature
(Frolich & Huber, 2017), prior to testing the model with the identified covariates, the
unconditional model was tested.
Table 67
RD Test Results for WSMPC (H4b) – Unconditional Model
Model

h

n

Estimate

SE

p-value F-statistic p-value

R2

R2 Adj.

Linear
7.42
149
0.74
3.72
0.84
2.20
0.18
0.04
0.02
Quadratic
7.42
149
-2.08
5.53
0.71
1.71
0.30
0.05
0.02
Cubic
7.42
149
-2.50
8.10
0.76
1.36
0.48
0.04
0.01
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. Dependent variable=percentage of women
in senior management.
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Table 67 reports the LATE estimates for the unconditional models tested at a
calculated optimal bandwidth of 7.42. The linear model estimated a non-statistically
significant treatment effect of 0.74 (p=.84). Adding a quadratic term for the predictor
WOBPC to the linear model, the quadratic model estimated a non-statistically significant
treatment effect of -2.08 (p=.71). The cubic model added a cubic term of the variable
WOBPC to the quadratic model, which returned a non-statistically significant treatment
effect of -2.50 (p=.76). Standard errors and p-values of the F-statistic got larger with the
added higher-order polynomials; therefore, despite the lack of statistical significance, the
linear model was kept for further testing.
The lack of statistical significance of the unconditional model indicated there was
not much variance between the Compliant and Non-compliant group that could be
explained by the treatment (compliance to the 25% WOB), which suggested that no
further testing was needed. However, in order to understand how the identified
covariates may influence the outcome, the linear model was tested at different
bandwidths. Equation 27 was used to predict the percentage of women in senior
management for the Compliant and Non-compliant groups based on the 25% threshold
set by the Davies Review.
!GH&' = *+ + *- !./&' + *0 1 + *2 34%5$67$ + *8 '59:9%6; + *< !"=

(27)

+ *> '".1$4C5$ + *B 'ℎ6951$4C5$ + *D !"#$%&' + *F !"IJ&'
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In a similar way than the previous hypothesis tests, six models were initially
tested. Highly correlated predictors CEOGnd and ChairGnd were removed, as they were
already included as interactions with variables CEOTenure and ChairTenure. First the
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optimal bandwidth calculation indicated that the optimal bandwidth for the listwise
deletion model for the WSMPC variable was 8.98 (148 observations). The bandwidth
was widened to 12 (170 observations) and narrowed to 4.5 (88 observations) to estimate
the effect. A similar process was employed for the analyses using data imputation for
missing values. The optimal bandwidth resulting from the imputed dataset was 6.42 (162
observations), which was narrowed to 3.21 (96 observations) and widened to 9 (231
observations). Table 68 reports the effect estimates for the six models. The p-values of
the six models ranged from .24 to .89, indicating that the regression lines for the
Compliant and Non-compliant groups were not statistically significantly different from
each other. Figure 45 provides a graphical representation of the regression, which
provides evidence of the absence of a discontinuous jump at the threshold. Therefore,
hypothesis H4b was not supported. Coefficients for the optimal bandwidth models M1
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and M4 are reported on Table 69.
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Figure 45. RD Plot for WSMPC - FTSE All Share.
Note. No discontinuity detected. Non-statistically significant LATE (p=.29). WSMPC=percentage
of women in senior management.
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Table 68
RD Test Results for WSMPC (H4b) – Full Model Different Bandwidths
Model

h

n

Estimate

SE

p-value

F

p-value

R2

R2 Adj.

M1 - Optimal
8.98 148.00
1.49
3.19
0.64
6.22
0.00
0.51
0.43
M2 - Narrow
4.50
88.00
5.33 12.26
0.66
2.75
0.00
0.47
0.30
M3 - Wide
12.00 170.00
1.43
2.54
0.57
7.21
0.00
0.51
0.44
M4 - Optimal
6.42 162.00
3.82
3.25
0.24
6.91
0.00
0.51
0.44
M5 - Narrow
3.21
96.00
2.47 17.27
0.89
4.00
0.00
0.53
0.40
M6 - Wide
9.00 231.00
2.61
2.31
0.26
10.20
0.00
0.51
0.46
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. Models M1, M2, and M3 used listwise
deletion; models M4, M5, and M6 used imputed data. Dependent variable=percentage of women
in senior management.
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Table 69
Parameter Estimates for WSMPC (H4b) – Full Model
Coeff.
Variable
β0 - Intercept

SE

t-value p-value Coeff.

M1 (h=8.98)

SE

t-value p-value

M4 (h=6.42)

3.40

4.80

0.71

0.48

2.44

5.01

0.49

0.63

β1 - WOBPCNon-compliant

-0.53

0.79

-0.68

0.50

-1.31

1.12

-1.17

0.25

β1 - WOBPCCompliant
β2 -Treatment
β3 - Increase
β4 - Critical
β5 - WED
β6 - CEOTenure
β7 - ChairTenure
β8 - WExecPC

0.73
1.49
0.01
0.81
-0.89
-0.05
-0.52
0.17

0.42
3.06
0.10
1.89
1.84
0.61
0.86
0.06

1.75
0.49
0.12
0.43
-0.48
-0.09
-0.60
2.68

0.08
0.63
0.91
0.67
0.63
0.93
0.55
0.01

1.04
3.82
0.00
0.44
0.78
0.51
-0.19
0.16

0.46
3.77
0.08
1.88
1.45
0.62
0.48
0.06

2.25
1.02
0.01
0.23
0.53
0.82
-0.39
2.60

0.03
0.31
1.00
0.82
0.59
0.41
0.70
0.01
<0.0
1

β9 - WEmpPC
0.36
0.06
5.72 <0.01
0.37
0.05
7.07
β10 - Sector
β10-1 Consumer Services
-0.89
3.03 -0.29 0.77
-2.22
2.49 -0.90
0.37
β10-2 Energy
-0.35
4.47 -0.08 0.94
-1.71
3.91 -0.44
0.66
β10-3 Financials
-1.75
2.74 -0.64 0.52
-4.51
2.37 -1.90
0.06
β10-4 Health Care
8.30
4.43
1.87 0.06
5.17
4.01
1.29
0.20
β10-5 Industrials
-2.58
2.55 -1.01 0.31
-2.98
2.25 -1.33
0.19
β10-6 Materials
0.70
3.24
0.22 0.83
1.12
3.05
0.37
0.71
β10-7 Technology
1.73
4.30
0.40 0.69
-1.45
3.64 -0.40
0.69
β10-8 Telecommunications
7.24
5.91
1.23 0.22
-0.70
4.88 -0.14
0.89
β10-9 Utilities
-0.81
4.82 -0.17 0.87
-3.72
5.03 -0.74
0.46
β11 - Index
FTSE 250
0.21
1.64
0.13 0.90
-0.45
1.57 -0.29
0.78
FTSE Small Cap
1.28
2.55
0.50 0.62
0.26
2.17
0.12
0.91
Residual SE
0.61
0.56
2
2
R (Adjusted R )
0.51 (0.43)
0.51 (0.44)
n
148
162
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. Model M1 estimated using listwise
deletion; Model M4 estimated with data imputation for missing values. WOBPC=percentage of
women on boards; Increase=increase in percentage of women on boards; Critical=3 or more
women on boards; Board=board size; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management;
WExecPC=percentage of women executives; WEmpPC=percentage of women employed;
CEOTenure=female CEO tenure; ChairTenure=female chairperson tenure. Dependent
variable=percentage of women in senior management.
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Alternative hypothesis H4b. Despite not finding any indication of an effect of
critical mass of WOB, the statistical significance of the increase of WOB indicated that it
may provide an alternative explanation for the hypothesized relationships; therefore,
using the variable increase as the forcing variable. Table 70 presents the results of the
unconditional model in the linear, quadratic, and cubic regression functional forms. The
smaller standard error and larger F-statistic indicated that the linear model was the best fit
for the data, therefore, the linear model described in Equation 28 was used tested at
different bandwidths.
!GH&' = *+ + *- 34%5$67$ + *0 1 + *2 /K65@ + *8 "#$%H&' + *< !"IJ&'
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Table 70
RD Test Results for WSMPC (Alternative H4b) – Unconditional Model
Model

h

n

Estimate

SE

p-value F-statistic

p-value

R2

R2 Adj.

Linear
6.85
188
-1.77
3.33
0.60
1.04
0.76
0.02
0.00
Quadratic
6.85
188
-1.94
3.43
0.57
0.83
0.99
0.02
0.00
Cubic
6.85
188
-2.33
4.65
0.62
0.67
0.71
0.02
0.01
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. Running variable=Increase; dependent
variable=percentage of women in senior management.

The full model was tested at three different bandwidths. Estimates for the optimal
bandwidth of 6.85, a narrow bandwidth of 3.43, and a wide bandwidth of 13.71 are
reported on Table 71 None of the models were statistically significant .05 alpha level.
Consistent with the hypothesis test that indicated that the percentage of WOB did not
have an effect on the percentage of women in senior management, this test indicated that
the increase of WOB did not have an effect on the percentage of women in senior
management. Coefficients for the optimal bandwidth model are presented on Table 72.
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A graphical representation of the regression showing the non-statistically significant
discontinuity is presented in Figure 46.
Table 71
RD Test Results for WSMPC (Alternative H4b) – Full Model Different Bandwidths
Model

h

n

Estimate

SE

p-value

F-statistic p-value

R2

R2 Adj.

30
25
20
15

Percentage of Women in Senior Management

Optimal
6.85
188
0.28
2.50
0.91
7.82
0.00
0.47
0.41
Narrow
3.43
133
1.24
4.01
0.76
5.19
0.00
0.47
0.38
Wide
13.71
326
-0.13
3.69
0.97
14.50
0.00
0.47
0.44
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. Forcing variable=Increase; dependent
variable=percentage of women in senior management.
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Figure 46. RD Plot for WSMPC by Increase – FTSE All Share
Note. Non-statistically significant discontinuity at cutoff for alternative hypothesis H4b;
WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management.
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Table 72
Parameter Estimates for WSMPC (Alternative H4b) – Full Model
Variable
β0 - Intercept

Estimate

SE

t-value

p-value

6.60

5.11

1.29

0.20

β1 - IncreaseSmall

-0.41

0.72

-0.56

0.57

β1 - IncreaseLarge

-0.17

0.56

-0.30

0.77

0.28

2.17

0.13

0.90

-0.08

0.38

-0.21

0.84

β4 - WExecPC

0.28

0.06

5.07

0.00

β5 - WEmpPC

0.31

0.05

5.95

0.00

β6 - CEOTenure

-0.94

0.89

-1.05

0.29

β7 - ChairTenure

-0.17

0.35

-0.49

0.63

β8 - Sector
β8-1 Consumer Services
β8-2 Energy
β8-3 Financials
β8-4 Health Care
β8-5 Industrials
β8-6 Materials
β8-7 Technology
β8-8 Telecommunications
β8-9 Utilities

1.82
0.73
0.27
2.33
-2.96
1.82
0.12
-6.93
-1.93

2.54
3.36
2.61
4.09
2.38
2.95
4.33
5.83
5.74

0.72
0.22
0.10
0.57
-1.24
0.62
0.03
-1.19
-0.34

0.48
0.83
0.92
0.57
0.22
0.54
0.98
0.24
0.74

β2 -Treatment
β3 - Board

β9 - Index
β9-1 FTSE 250
2.46
1.62
1.52
0.13
β9-1 FTSE Small Cap
1.22
2.13
0.57
0.57
Residual SE
0.57
2
2
R (Adjusted R )
0.47 (0.41)
n
188
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. WOBPC=percentage of women on boards;
Board=board size; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management; WExecPC=percentage
of women executives; WEmpPC=percentage of women employed; CEOTenure=female CEO
tenure; ChairTenure=female chairperson tenure. Dependent variable=percentage of women in
senior management.
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Hypothesis H4c. Hypothesis H4c predicted that the Davies Review would not
have a statistically significant effect on the percentage of women employed in FTSE All
Share organizations compliant with the 25% WOB targets. To test this hypothesis, a nonparametric RD analysis was performed on the pooled dataset. Prior to testing the full
model including covariates, the unconditional model was tested.
Table 73 reports the estimates of the RD tests for the unconditional model, at a
calculated optimal bandwidth of 8.59. The linear model returned a non-statistically
significant effect estimate of -1.29 (p=.80). Adding a quadratic term of the forcing
variable WOBPC to the linear model, the quadratic model estimated a treatment effect of
-8.61 (p=.15). The quadratic model considerably reduced the standard error, p-value of
the treatment effect, and p-value of the F-statistic (p=.16). Therefore, a cubic term to the
quadratic model was added to test if model fit would continue to improve. The cubic
model estimated a non-statistically significant treatment effect of -11.49 (p=.23). The
quadratic model was the best fit for the data based on the lower p-value associated with
the F-statistic and smaller standard error for the estimates. Therefore, the quadratic term
was added to the hypothesized equation in subsequent tests.
Table 73
RD Test Results for WEmpPC (H4c) – Unconditional Model
Model

h

n

Estimate

SE

p-value F-statistic p-value

R2

R2 Adj.

Linear
8.59
231
-1.29
5.19
0.80
1.74
0.32
0.02
0.01
Quadratic
8.59
231
-8.61
6.01
0.15
2.10
0.16
0.04
0.02
Cubic
8.59
231
-11.49
9.48
0.23
1.70
0.27
0.04
0.01
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. Forcing variable=Increase; dependent
variable=percentage of women employed.
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Although the p-values associated with the unconditional models tested indicated
that the treatment was not statistically significant, scholars indicate that the inclusion of
covariates in RD specifications could increase precision of estimates (Calonico, Cattaneo,
Farrell, & Titiunik, 2016). Therefore, the full model including all covariates was tested.
Using the guidelines for assessing the strength of correlations (Evans, 1996),
correlations performed for the study’s phase II variables (Table 25 and Table 26)
indicated that the outcome variable, WEmpPC, had a strong correlation with the variable
WSMPC (r=.63), and weak correlations with the variables sector (r=-.38), and WExecPC
(r=.37). Although, the potential issue of multicollinearity arose when considering the
inclusion of highly correlated variables in the analyses, a finding that they are statistically
significant covariates in the regression may provide competing explanations to the
treatment effect. Therefore, those variables were included in the full model.
Table 74 reports results of non-parametric RD analyses at the calculated optimal
bandwidth, as well as narrow and wide bandwidths, which were tested using listwise
deletion and data imputation methods for observations with missing values. Equation 29
includes all the covariates used in the prediction of the WEmpPC variable.
!"IJ&' = *+ + *- !./&' + *0 1 + *2 34%5$67$ + *8 '59:9%6; +
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The Imbens-Kalyanaraman calculation indicated that the optimal bandwidth for
the model was 6.02, which included 110 effective observations. When model M1 was run,
coefficients indicated a deficient fit for the quadratic model. The treatment estimate was
-4.90, with a large standard error of 8.58. The p-value for the intercept coefficient
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(p=.97) and the p-value of the quadratic term coefficient (p=.97) indicated that the
quadratic term did not fit the narrower bandwidth. It was likely that the curve that caused
the quadratic model to provide a better fit for the unconditional model was outside the
limit of the 6.02 bandwidth. Therefore, regression lines were plotted to confirm that
assumption. Figure 47 confirmed that at a wider bandwidth, the quadratic model
provided a better fit; however, the narrower bandwidth favored the linear model.
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Therefore, multiple models were run to find the best fitting model for the data.
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Figure 47. RD Plot for Unconditional Model of WEmpPC - FTSE All Share.
Note. No discontinuity detected. Non-statistically significant LATE (p=.15); h=8.59; forcing
variable=WOBPC2016; WEmpPC=percentage of women employed.

Model M2 removed the quadratic term from model M1, and returned a nonstatistically significant treatment effect of -4.60 (p=.43). Although the smaller standard
error and p-values indicated that model M2 fit the data better than model M1, an
inspection of the coefficients for the variables included in the model indicated that there
were several variables that were not statistically significant. Model M3 was the first
model that included imputed values for missing data generated from the data imputation
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process. The inclusion of the full set of observations in the bandwidth resulted in a
smaller standard error and p-value for the estimate-7.33, Z=1.57, p=.12. The larger
statistically significant F-statistic suggested a better fit for model M3, F(22,139)=11.49,
p<.001. Model M4 widened the bandwidth model M3 to 8.59, which was the optimal
bandwidth for the data. The estimated treatment effect of model M4 was not statistically
significant, -4.84, Z=1.42, p=.16; however, the F-statistic indicated that the model was a
better a fit for the data, F(20,210)=17.93, p<.001. Model M5 narrowed the bandwidth of
model M4 to 5.00, resulting in a non-statistically significant, worse-fitting model, F(20,
105)=9.52, p<.001.
Table 74
RD Test Results for WEmpPC (H4c) – Full Model Different Bandwidths
Model

h

n

Estimate

SE

p-value F-statistic p-value

R2

R2 Adj.

M1 -Quadratic
6.02 110
-4.33
8.48
0.61
9.36
0.00 0.70
0.62
M2 -Linear
6.02 110
-3.86
5.88
0.51
9.94
0.00 0.69
0.62
M3 –Linear – Imp. 6.02 162
-7.01
4.61
0.13
12.65
0.00 0.64
0.59
M4 -Wide
8.59 231
-4.84
3.41
0.16
17.93
0.00 0.63
0.60
M5 -Narrow
5.00 126
7.73 14.18
0.59
9.52
0.00 0.64
0.58
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error; forcing variable=WOBPC2016; dependent
variable=percentage of women employed. Models M1 and M2 used listwise deletion; models M3,
M4, and M5 used imputed data.

The p-values for the five models ranged from .13 to .61 indicating that none of the
models were statistically significant; thus providing support for hypothesis H4c. Table 75
provides coefficients for all the variables included in models M3 and M4. Although the
models were not statistically significant, sectors consumer services (p<.001), financials
(p<.001), and materials (p=.01) were statistically significant; which suggests that that the
variance in women’s representation in organizations is better explained by sector than
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percentage of WOB. Those findings are consistent with total female employee
population for those particular sectors nation-wide (Office for National Statistics, 2018).
Figure 48 shows visual representation of the regression, which confirmed that there were
no discontinuities at the threshold.
Table 75
Parameter Estimates for WEmpPC (H4c) – Full Model
Coeff.

SE t-value p-value Coeff.
M3 (h=6.02)
6.76
3.93
0.00 24.84
1.67
1.70
0.09
2.10
0.64 -1.56
0.12 -0.69
5.42 -1.29
0.20 -4.84
0.11 -0.21
0.83 -0.05
2.55 -0.79
0.43 -1.99
0.84 -0.47
0.64 -0.40
0.67
0.11
0.91 -0.08
0.09
0.62
0.54
0.06
0.10
7.12
0.00
0.70

SE t-value p-value
M4 (h=8.59)
4.47
5.56
0.00
0.81
2.61
0.01
0.46 -1.49
0.14
3.30 -1.47
0.14
0.09 -0.58
0.56
2.06 -0.96
0.34
0.67 -0.60
0.55
0.53 -0.15
0.88
0.07
0.80
0.42
0.08
8.42
0.00

Variable
β0 - Intercept
26.52
β1 - WOBPCNon-compliant
2.83
β1 - WOBPCCompliant
-1.00
β2 -Treatment
-7.01
β3 - Increase
-0.02
β4 - Critical
-2.00
β 5 - CEOTenure
-0.39
β 6 - ChairTenure
0.08
β 7 - WExecPC
0.05
β 8 - WSMPC
0.72
β 9 - Sector
β9-1 Consumer Services 14.02
3.23
4.34
0.00 13.39 2.68
5.00
0.00
β9-2 Energy
1.58
5.52
0.29
0.78
2.53 4.14
0.61
0.54
β9-3 Financials
12.82
3.13
4.10
0.00 12.97 2.62
4.95
0.00
β9-4 Health Care
6.01
5.55
1.08
0.28
6.47 4.66
1.39
0.17
β9-5 Industrials
-0.84
3.10 -0.27
0.79 -0.67 2.60 -0.26
0.80
β9-6 Materials
-11.64
4.09 -2.84
0.01 -11.53 3.48 -3.31
0.00
β9-7 Technology
-0.72
5.05 -0.14
0.89 -1.77 4.06 -0.44
0.66
β9-8 Telecommunications -1.07
6.67 -0.16
0.87 -0.22 5.55 -0.04
0.97
β9-9 Utilities
-1.60
6.89 -0.23
0.82 -2.50 5.66 -0.44
0.66
β10 - Index
β10-1 FTSE 250
-1.37
2.19 -0.63
0.53 -1.24 1.76 -0.71
0.48
β10-2 FTSE Small Cap
-0.31
2.96 -0.11
0.92 -0.21 2.38 -0.09
0.93
Residual SE
0.62
0.64
R2 (Adjusted R2)
0.64 (0.59)
0.63 (0.60)
n
162
231
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. WOBPC=percentage of women on boards;
Board=board size; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management; Increase=increase of
WOB; Critical=3 or more women directors; CEOTenure=female CEO tenure;
ChairTenure=female chairperson tenure; WExecPC=percentage of women executives;
WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management. Dependent variable=percentage of women
employed.
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Figure 48. RD Plot for WEmpPC – FTSE All Share
Note. No discontinuity detected at cutoff (c=25). Non-statistically significant LATE (p=.16);
h=8.59. Forcing variable=WOBPC2016; WEmpPC=percentage of women employed.

Alternative hypothesis H4c. Despite not finding any indication of an effect of
critical mass of WOB, the statistical significance of the increase of WOB indicated that it
may provide an alternative explanation for the hypothesized relationships; therefore,
using the variable increase as the forcing variable. Table 76 presents the results of the
unconditional model in the linear, quadratic, and cubic regression functional forms. The
smaller standard error and larger F-statistic indicated that the linear model was the best fit
for the data, therefore, the linear model described in Equation 30 was used tested at
different bandwidths.
!"IJ&' = *+ + *- 34%5$67$ + *0 1 + *2 /K65@ + *8 "#$%H&' + *< !GH&'
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Table 76
RD Test Results for WEmpPC (Alternative H4c) – Unconditional Model
Model

h

n

Estimate

SE

p-value

Linear
6.81
188
2.52
4.25
0.55
Quadratic
6.81
188
2.23
4.22
0.60
Cubic
6.81
188
1.72
5.40
0.75
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error.

F-statistic p-value
0.67
0.59
0.47

0.86
0.65
0.41

R2

R2 Adj.

0.01
0.01
0.01

0.00
0.00
0.00

The full model was tested at three different bandwidths. Estimates for the optimal
bandwidth of 6.81, a narrow bandwidth of 3.41, and a wide bandwidth of 13.62 are
reported on Table 77. None of the models were statistically significant .05 alpha level.
Consistent with the hypothesis test that indicated that the percentage of WOB did not
have an effect on the percentage of women in senior management, this test indicated that
the increase of WOB did not have an effect on the percentage of women in senior
management. Coefficients for the optimal bandwidth model are presented on Table 78.
A graphical representation of the regression showing the non-statistically significant
discontinuity is presented in Figure 49.
Table 77
RD Test Results for WEmpPC (Alternative H4c) – Full Model Different Bandwidths
Model

h

n

Estimate

SE

p-value F-statistic p-value R2

R2 Adj.

M1 -Optimal
6.81
188
4.72
3.01
0.12
10.39
0.00 0.54
0.49
M2 -Narrow
3.41
133
3.20
4.32
0.46
6.39
0.00 0.52
0.44
M3 -Wide
13.62
324
2.30
2.17
0.29
20.75
0.00 0.56
0.54
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error; forcing variable=Increase; dependent
variable=percentage of women employed.
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Table 78
Parameter Estimates for WEmpPC (Alternative H4c) – Full Model
Variable

Coeff.

SE

t-value

p-value

β0 - Intercept

14.91

6.78

2.20

0.03

β1 - IncreaseSmall

-0.89

0.97

-0.92

0.36

β1 - IncreaseLarge

-0.24

0.75

-0.32

0.75

β2 -Treatment

4.72

2.89

1.63

0.10

β3 - Board

0.49

0.51

0.96

0.34

β4 - WExecPC

0.05

1.20

0.04

0.97

β5 - WSMPC

-0.26

0.47

-0.55

0.58

β6 - CEOTenure

-0.04

0.08

-0.56

0.57

β7 - ChairTenure

0.56

0.09

5.95

0.00

8.42
-11.08
8.41
4.05
-0.21
-13.12
-8.71
4.02
1.66

3.35
4.43
3.43
5.47
3.21
3.83
5.77
7.83
7.69

2.51
-2.50
2.45
0.74
-0.07
-3.43
-1.51
0.51
0.22

0.01
0.01
0.02
0.46
0.95
0.00
0.13
0.61
0.83

β8 - Sector
β8-1 Consumer Services
β8-2 Energy
β8-3 Financials
β8-4 Health Care
β8-5 Industrials
β8-6 Materials
β8-7 Technology
β8-8 Telecommunications
β8-9 Utilities

β9 - Index
β9-1 FTSE 250
-1.72
2.18
-0.79
0.43
β9-2 FTSE Small Cap
-0.51
2.86
-0.18
0.86
Residual SE
0.76
2
2
R (Adjusted R )
0.54 (0.49)
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. Increase=increase in percentage of WOB;
Board=board size; CEOTenure=female CEO tenure; ChairTenure=female chairperson tenure;
WExecPC=percentage of women executives; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior
management; dependent variable=percentage of women employed.
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Figure 49. RD Plot for WEmpPC by Increase – FTSE All Share
Note. No discontinuity detected at cutoff (c=12). Non-statistically significant LATE (p=.12).
Forcing variable=Increase; WEmpPC=percentage of women employed.

Effects of Davies Review on Gender Pay Gap
Hypothesis H5a. Hypothesis H5a predicted that the Davies Review would not
significantly decrease the gender pay gap median in FTSE All Share organizations
compliant with the 25% WOB targets. To test this hypothesis, a non-parametric RD
analysis was performed. First, the unconditional model was estimated. Table 79 reports
the results of the unconditional model to identify the correct functional form of the
regression. Linear, quadratic and cubic forms were tested. At a calculated optimal
bandwidth of 8.49 (n=204), the linear model appeared to be the best fit for the data. As
shown on Figure 50, a visual inspection of the regression provided evidence of no
discontinuities at the cutoff. Despite no evidence of an effect at the cutoff on the
unconditional model, the three functional forms of the regression were compared.
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Although the cubic model seemed to be the best fit for the data, literature advices
against using anything higher than a quadratic model in practice (Gelman & Imbens,
2018). Therefore, taking into account that when testing the full model, the bandwidth
may change, which may eliminate the need for a cubic model, the second best option was
selected, the linear model. Equation 31 was used to predict the gender pay gap mean for
organizations compliant with the 25% of WOB set by the Davies Review.
&6\?6JH$64 = *+ + *- !./&' + *0 1 + *2 34%5$67$ + *8 '59:9%6;
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Figure 50. RD Plot for Unconditional Model of PayGapMean – FTSE All Share
Note. No discontinuity detected at cutoff (c=25). Non-statistically significant LATE=2.57 (p=.62).
Forcing variable=WOBPC2016; dependent variable=gender pay gap mean.

Table 79
RD Tests for PayGapMean (H5a) – Unconditional Model
Model

h

n

Estimate

SE

p-value F-statistic p-value

R2

R2 Adj.

Linear
8.49 204
2.57
5.25
0.62
0.36
0.44
0.01
0.00
Quadratic
8.49 204
1.41
6.64
0.83
0.29
0.23
0.01
0.00
Cubic
8.49 204
5.78
9.75
0.55
0.29
0.17
0.01
0.00
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. Forcing variable=WOBPC2016; dependent
variable=gender pay gap mean.
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Imputed values for the predicted outcome were not used. The missing data
pattern analyses indicated that data for the PayGapMean and PayGapMedian variables
were missing not at random (MNAR); therefore, results of data imputation process are
not testable against the observed data. For that reason, and to ensure that the estimates
from the non-parametric RD analyses were are as unquestionable as possible, only
observed values for the gender pay gap variables were used. Imputed values for the
WExecPC and WSMPC were used, as they satisfied the assumptions for MAR imputation.
The regression model described in Equation 31 was used on a non-parametric RD
test for the pooled sample. Three models were tested. First, the optimal bandwidth, M1,
and two additional models narrowing and widening the bandwidth. Table 80 reports
results for the three models. The non-parametric RD test indicated that at a calculated
optimal bandwidth of 8.49 (n=204), results for model M1 detected a non-statistically
significant effect, 4.76, Z=1.10, p=.26. Figure 51 shows that the tests did not result in a
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Figure 51. RD Plot for PayGapMean – FTSE All Share
Note. No discontinuity detected at cutoff (c=25). Non-statistically significant LATE (p=.24);
h=8.49. Forcing variable=WOBPC2016; PayGapMean=gender pay gap mean
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The bandwidth was narrowed to 5.9 for model M2. Tests for model M2 did not
produce statistical significant treatment effect, 6.08, Z=1.06, p=.29. Model M3 widened
the bandwidth to 13. Model M3 produced a non-statistically significant treatment effect
of 4.74, Z=1.56, p=.12. It is noteworthy to mention that despite the lack of statistical
significance, the effect sizes found in models M1, M2, and M3 ranged from 4.91 to 6.08
percentage points, which represent large effects. Due to the large standard errors
associated with the estimates in the models, a large effect on increasing the gender pay
gap resulting from compliance to the Davies Review cannot be ruled out. Therefore,
hypothesis H5a was supported. However, in an effort to understand how the different
covariates in the model impacted the outcome, a closer examination of the coefficients
was performed.
Table 80
RD Test Results for PayGapMean (H5a) – Full Model Different Bandwidths
Model

h

n

Estimate

SE

p-value F-statistic p-value

R2

R2 Adj.

M1 – Optimal
8.49 204
4.91
4.47
0.28
5.58
0.00
0.39
0.32
M2 – Narrow
5.90 143
6.08
5.73
0.29
4.12
0.00
0.42
0.32
M3 – Wide
13.00 262
4.74
3.03
0.12
6.54
0.00
0.36
0.31
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error; forcing variable=WOBPC2016; dependent
variable=gender pay gap mean.

Table 81 reports coefficients for all the predictors in the model M1 and alternative
model M1a. Model M1a, modified model M1 by removing covariates that were highly
correlated with the forcing variable WOBPC. The variables Critical (r=.55) and Increase
(r=.62) were strongly correlated with the predictor WOBPC. Those strong correlations
made logical sense because the dummy variable Critical indicates the presence of three
or more female directors, and the variable Increase represents the increase in the
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percentage of WOB. Those variables were removed from the model and estimates were
re-computed. Although removing the correlated predictors improved model fit, the
model was not statistically significant. Consequently, hypothesis H5a was supported.
Table 81
Parameter Estimates for PayGapMean (H5a) – Full Model
Coeff.
SE t-value p-value Coeff.
SE t-value p-value
Variable
M1 (h=8.49)
M1a (h=8.49)
β0 - Intercept
7.60
6.44
1.18
0.24
7.86 5.80
1.35
0.18
β1 - WOBPCNon-compliant
-0.82
1.12
-0.73
0.46
-0.79 1.09 -0.72
0.47
β1 - WOBPCCompliant
0.19
0.62
0.31
0.75
0.21 0.56
0.39
0.70
β2 -Treatment
4.91
4.49
1.09
0.28
4.76 4.41
1.08
0.28
β3 - Increase
-0.01
0.12
-0.12
0.91
β4 - Critical
0.47
2.59
0.18
0.86
β5 - CEOTenure
1.74
0.81
2.14
0.03
1.73 0.79
2.19
0.03
β6 - ChairTenure
-0.14
0.71
-0.20
0.85
-0.16 0.70 -0.23
0.82
β7 - WExecPC
-0.15
0.09
-1.71
0.09
-0.15 0.09 -1.72
0.09
β8 - WSMPC
-0.36
0.13
-2.90
0.00
-0.36 0.12 -2.91
0.00
β9 - WEmpPC
0.36
0.09
4.01
0.00
0.35 0.09
4.03
0.00
β10 - Sector
β10-1 Consumer Services
4.03
3.59
1.12
0.26
4.04 3.56
1.14
0.26
β10-2 Energy
16.98
5.56
3.05
0.00
16.87 5.50
3.07
0.00
β10-3 Financials
18.70
3.66
5.11
0.00
18.78 3.61
5.20
0.00
β10-4 Health Care
-2.26
5.72
-0.40
0.69
-2.08 5.58 -0.37
0.71
β10-5 Industrials
6.21
3.31
1.88
0.06
6.06 3.22
1.88
0.06
β10-6 Materials
12.47
4.74
2.63
0.01
12.34 4.67
2.64
0.01
β10-7 Technology
13.19
5.34
2.47
0.01
13.10 5.17
2.54
0.01
β10-8 Telecommunications
3.46
6.81
0.51
0.61
3.68 6.70
0.55
0.58
β10-9 Utilities
-0.81
6.95
-0.12
0.91
-0.90 6.88 -0.13
0.90
β11 - Index
β11-1 FTSE 250
-1.54
2.20
-0.70
0.49
-1.79 1.89 -0.94
0.35
β11-2 FTSE Small Cap
-5.58
3.26
-1.71
0.09
-5.77 3.01 -1.92
0.06
Residual SE
0.82
0.81
R2 (Adjusted R2)
0.39 (0.32)
0.39 (0.33)
n
204
204
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. WOBPC=percentage of WOB;
Increase=increase in percentage of WOB; Critical=3 or more women directors;
CEOTenure=female CEO tenure; ChairTenure=female chairperson tenure; WExecPC=percentage
of women executives; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management;
WEmpPC=percentage of women employed; dependent variable=gender pay gap mean.
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Hypothesis H5b. Hypothesis H5b predicted that the Davies Review would not
significantly decrease the gender pay gap median in FTSE All Share organizations
compliant with the 25% WOB targets. To test this hypothesis, a non-parametric RD
analysis was performed. First, the unconditional model was estimated.
Table 82 reports the results of the unconditional model to identify the correct
functional form of the regression. Linear, quadratic and cubic forms were tested. The
quadratic term in the quadratic model was not statistically significant (p=.87). Similarly,
the p-values of the quadratic (p=.75) and cubic terms (p=.76) in the cubic model were not
statistically significant. At a calculated optimal bandwidth of 9.33, the linear model
appeared to be the best fit for the data. Therefore, the linear model was kept for further
analyses. Equation 32 was used to predict PayGapMedian for the sample.
&6\?6JH$@964

(32)

= *+ + *- !./&' + *0 1 + *< '".1$4C5$ + *> 'ℎ6951$4C5$
+ *B !"#$%&' + *D !GH&' + *F !"IJ&' + *-+ G$%:K5-LF
+ *-- 34@$#-L0 + M

Table 82
RD Test Results for PayGapMedian (H5b) – Unconditional Model
Model

h

n

Estimate

SE

p-value

F-statistic p-value

R2

R2 Adj.

Linear
9.33 204
1.52
4.83
0.75
0.06
0.04
0.00
0.00
Quadratic
9.33 204
2.03
5.69
0.72
0.05
0.01
0.00
0.00
Cubic
9.33 204
4.21 10.09
0.68
0.06
0.00
0.00
0.00
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error; forcing variable=WOBPC2016; dependent
variable=gender pay gap median.

Three full models were tested using the pooled FTSE All Share sample. The
optimal bandwidth model, M1, and two additional models narrowing and widening the
bandwidth. Table 83 reports results for the three models. The non-parametric RD test
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indicated that at a calculated optimal bandwidth of 9.33, results did not yield a
statistically significant effect, 4.32, Z=1.11, p=.27. Figure 52 plots the results of model
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Gender Pay Gap Median

M1. The smooth line at the cutoff indicates that a treatment effect was not detected.
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Figure 52. RD Plot for PayGapMedian – FTSE All Share
Note. No discontinuity detected at cutoff (c=25). Non-statistically significant LATE (p=.27);
h=9.33 Forcing Variable=WOBPC2016; dependent variable=gender pay gap median.

The bandwidth was narrowed to 6 for model M2. Tests for model M2 did not
produce a statistical significant treatment effect, 3.76, Z=.65, p=.52. Model M3 widened
the bandwidth to 13. Model M3 produced a non-statistically significant treatment effect
of 4.75, Z=1.50, p=.13. Therefore, hypothesis H5b was supported. It should be noted that
despite the lack of statistical significance, the effect sizes found in models M1, M2, and
M3 ranged from 3.76 to 4.75 percentage points, which represent large effects. Due to the
large standard errors associated with the estimates, an effect on the gender pay gap
median resulting from compliance to the Davies Review cannot be ruled out. Coefficients
for the full model were reported in Table 84. The p-values of sectors energy, financials,
materials, technology and telecommunications ranged from <.001 to .04, indicating that
the gender pay gap can be better explained by sector than by critical mass of WOB.
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Table 83
RD Test Results for PayGapMedian (H5b) – Full Model Different Bandwidths
Model

h

n

Estimate

SE

p-value F-statistic p-value

R2

R2 Adj.

M1
9.33 204
4.32
3.90
0.27
5.48
0.00
0.36
0.30
M2
6.00 143
3.76
5.79
0.52
4.27
0.00
0.40
0.30
M3
13.00 262
4.75
3.16
0.13
6.34
0.00
0.33
0.28
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error; forcing variable=WOBPC2016;
dependent variable=gender pay gap median.

Table 84
Parameter Estimates for PayGapMedian (H5b) – Full Model
Variable
Coeff.
SE
t-value
p-value
β0 - Intercept
4.71
5.51
0.86
0.39
β1 - WOBPCNon-compliant
-0.94
0.87
-1.08
0.28
β1 - WOBPCCompliant
0.17
0.48
0.35
0.72
β2 -Treatment
4.32
4.00
1.08
0.28
β3 - CEOTenure
1.18
0.82
1.45
0.15
β4 - ChairTenure
0.32
0.70
0.46
0.65
β5 - WExecPC
-0.03
0.09
-0.31
0.76
β6 - WSMPC
-0.26
0.13
-2.07
0.04
β7 - WEmpPC
0.23
0.09
2.57
0.01
β8 - Sector
β8-1 Consumer Services
2.46
3.63
0.68
0.50
β8-2 Energy
24.20
5.62
4.30
0.00
β8-3 Financials
18.88
3.71
5.09
0.00
β8-4 Health Care
0.27
5.73
0.05
0.96
β8-5 Industrials
5.73
3.31
1.73
0.09
β8-6 Materials
13.67
4.82
2.84
0.01
β8-7 Technology
15.12
5.25
2.88
0.00
β8-8 Telecommunications
13.52
6.77
2.00
0.05
β8-9 Utilities
0.85
6.80
0.13
0.90
β9 - Index
β9-1 FTSE 250
-3.05
1.95
-1.56
0.12
β9-2 FTSE Small Cap
-5.57
3.04
-1.83
0.07
Residual SE
0.84
R2 (Adjusted R2)
0.36 (0.30)
n
204
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. WOBPC=percentage of WOB;
CEOTenure=female CEO tenure; ChairTenure=female chairperson tenure; WExecPC=percentage
of women executives; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management;
WEmpPC=percentage of women employed; dependent variable=gender pay gap median.
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Hypothesis H5c. Hypothesis H5c predicted that an increase of more than 12% in
the percentage of WOB in the duration of the Davies Review would result in a
statistically and practically significant increase in the gender pay gap median in FTSE All
Share organizations. To test this hypothesis, the increase in the percentage of WOB in
the 2011 to 2016 period was used as the forcing variable. Using 12% increase as the
cutoff point, organizations that were above the cutoff were placed into the Large increase
(treatment) group, and organizations that were below the cutoff were placed into the
Small increase (comparison) group.
First, the unconditional model was run starting with the linear model and adding
higher degree polynomials to identify the best functional form for the RD analyses.
Results of the unconditional models are reported on Table 85. The p-values for the three
models were statistically significant. The linear model estimated a large treatment effect,
9.27, Z=2.27, p=.02). The quadratic model estimated a large statistically significant, 9.34,
Z=2.29, p=.02; however, the p-value for the quadratic term was not statistically
significant (p=.84). The cubic model returned a statistically significant effect, 11.22,
Z=2.15, p=.03; however, estimates for the quadratic (p=.54) and cubic (p=.56)
coefficients were not statistically significant. The p-value of the F statistic in the linear
model was smaller; therefore, the linear model was kept as the best model for further
testing.
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Table 85
RD Test Results for PayGapMedian (H5c) – Unconditional Model
Model

h

n

Estimate

SE

p-value F-statistic p-value

R2

R2 Adj.

Linear
6.62 155
9.27
4.08
0.02
1.76
0.31
0.03
0.01
Quadratic
6.62 155
9.34
4.08
0.02
1.32
0.53
0.03
0.01
Cubic
6.62 155
11.22
5.22
0.03
1.12
0.70
0.04
0.00
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error; forcing variable=Increase; dependent
variable=gender pay gap median.

A similar linear regression model than the one used for hypothesis H5b was used
to test hypothesis H5c. The tests were performed on the pooled sample using the linear
regression equation for the full model presented in Equation 33. Four models were tested.
The first model, M1, used the calculated optimal bandwidth of 6.62. The second model,
M2, added cluster-robust standard error estimation. The third model, M3, narrowed the
bandwidth of model M2 to 4.2. The fourth model, M4, doubled the bandwidth of model
M3 to 8.4.
Literature indicates that when a regressor is correlated with a group, which in this
case is Index, the model systematically could over predict or underpredict the outcome in
that given group (Cameron & Miller, 2015). Therefore, taking into account that results of
the first set of hypotheses indicated that the increase of WOB was predicted by FTSE
index, a cluster-robust error estimation was included in the equation.
&6\?6JH$@964

(33)

= *+ + *- 34%5$67$ + *0 1 + *2 !./&' + *8 !"#$%&'
+ *< !GH&' + *> !"IJ&' ∗ *B '".1$4C5$ + *D 'ℎ6951$4C5$
+ *F '59:9%6; + *-+ G$%:K5-LF + M
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Table 86 reports the non-parametric RD treatment estimates for the four models.
Model M1 was the full model using a heteroscedasticity-consistent standard error type
estimation, which is recommended for small sample sizes (Long & Ervin, 2000). Model
M1 estimated a statistically and practically significant treatment effect of 7.88, Z=1.95,
p=.05. Model M2’s cluster-robust estimation produced a similar estimate to model M1;
however, the p-value decreased from .05 to .01 and standard error decreased from 4.04 to
2.92; however, the effect size remained unchanged, 7.88, Z=2.70, p=.01. Using 123
observations within a 4.2 bandwidth, model M3 estimated a statistically and practically
significant effect of a large increase of WOB on increasing the gender pay gap median,
9.27, Z=2.29, p=.02. Doubling the bandwidth of model M3, model M4 estimated a
statistically and practically significant effect, 5.10 Z=1.97, p=.05. Although all models
were statistically significant, model M2, the optimal bandwidth model, had the lowest pvalue and had a small standard error for the estimate. Model M2 was the best fitting
model, therefore, its results are interpreted. Table 87 reports coefficients for all the
variables of the model. The model can be expressed as follows:
7.88 =

lim

-0L-D.>0

&6\?6JH$@_64`abcd − lim &6\?6JH$@_64 efagg
<.2DL-0

&6\?6JH$@964`abcd
= 12.65 − .89 34%5$67$ + 7.88 − .13 !./&'
+ .10 !"#$%&' − .53 !GH&' . 28 !"IJ&'
+ 4.33 '".1$4C5$ + .78('ℎ6951$4C5$) + 2.59('59:9%6;)
+ *-+ G$%:K5 + M
&6\?6JH$@964

efagg

= 12.65 − 2.08 34%5$67$ − .13 !./&' + .10 !"#$%&'
− .53 !GH&' . 28 !"IJ&' + 4.33 '".1$4C5$
+ .78('ℎ6951$4C5$) + 2.59('59:9%6;) + *-+ G$%:K5 + M
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Figure 53. RD Plot for PayGapMedian by Increase – FTSE All Share
Note. Discontinuity detected at cutoff (c= 12). Statistically and practically significant LATE=7.88
(p=.01); h=6.62. Forcing variable=Increase; PayGapMedian=gender pay gap median

Table 86
RD Estimates for PayGapMedian (H5c) – Full Model at Different Bandwidths
Model

h

n

Estimate

SE

p-value

F-stat

p-value

R2

R2 Adj.

M1
6.62
155
7.88
4.04
0.05
3.64
0.00
0.34
0.25
M2
6.62
155
7.88
2.92
0.01
3.64
0.00
0.34
0.25
M3
4.20
123
9.27
4.06
0.02
3.01
0.00
0.36
0.24
M4
8.40
182
5.10
2.59
0.05
4.04
0.00
0.32
0.24
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error; forcing variable=Increase; dependent
variable=gender pay gap median.
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Table 87
Parameter Estimates for PayGapMedian (H5c) – Full Model
Variable

Coeff.

SE

t-value

p-value

M2 (h=6.62)
12.65
-2.08
-0.89
7.88
-0.14
0.10
-0.53
0.28
4.33
0.78
2.59

β0 - Intercept
6.92
1.83
0.07
β1 - IncreaseSmall
1.30
-1.60
0.11
β1 - IncreaseLarge
1.03
-0.87
0.39
β2 -Treatment
3.76
2.10
0.04
β3 - WOBPC
0.19
-0.71
0.48
β4 - WExecPC
0.11
0.95
0.35
β5 - WSMPC
0.14
-3.83
0.00
β6 - WEmpPC
0.10
2.75
0.01
β7 - CEOTenure
2.14
2.02
0.05
β8 - ChairTenure
0.79
0.98
0.33
β9 - Critical
3.42
0.76
0.45
β10 - Sector
β10-1 Consumer Services
0.21
4.21
0.05
0.96
β10-2 Energy
19.99
5.92
3.38
0.00
β10-3 Financials
11.83
4.44
2.66
0.01
β10-4 Health Care
5.16
7.07
0.73
0.47
β10-5 Industrials
-0.11
3.97
-0.03
0.98
β10-6 Materials
5.84
5.64
1.04
0.30
β10-7 Technology
4.52
7.40
0.61
0.54
β10-8 Telecommunications
8.61
9.52
0.91
0.37
β10-9 Utilities
2.03
9.18
0.22
0.83
Residual SE
1.01
2
2
R (Adjusted R )
0.34 (0.25)
n
155
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. WOBPC=percentage of WOB;
CEOTenure=female CEO tenure; ChairTenure=female chairperson tenure; WExecPC=percentage
of women executives; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management;
WEmpPC=percentage of women employed; dependent variable=gender pay gap median.

Results of the model indicate that organizations that increased their percentage of
WOB by more than 12% had an average gender pay gap 7.88 percentage points higher
than organizations that increased their percentage of WOB by less than 12%. In addition
to a statistically significant treatment effect, coefficients for the WSMPC, and WEmpPC,
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CEOTenure, and sector were statistically significant. The p-values for the coefficients
for the variables WOBPC (p=.48) and WExecPC (p=.35) indicated that those variables
did not have a statistically significant effect on the gender pay gap. The variable WSMPC
had a negative effect of -.53 (p<.001) percentage points on the gender pay gap, indicating
that for each percentage point in the representation of women in senior management the
gender pay gap decreases by half of a percent. Conversely, the variable WEmpPC had a
positive effect of .27 (p=.01) on the gender pay gap, indicating that for each percent point
of female employees in the organization, the pay gap increases by .27 points of a percent.
Similarly, the variable CEOTenure had a positive effect of 4.33 (p=.05) on the gender
pay gap, indicating that compared to organizations with male CEOs, in organizations
with a female CEO, the gender pay gap increases by 4.33 percentage points every year
she is in that position. The p-values for the coefficients of the variables ChairTenure
(p=.33) and Critical (p=.45) were not statistically significant.
The industry sectors Energy and Financials had a statistically significant positive
effect on the gender pay gap. Organizations in the Energy sector had a median pay gap
19.99 (p<.001) percentage points higher than other industries. Similarly, the Financials
sector had a median pay gap 11.83 (p=.01) percentage points higher than other industries.
The p-values for the estimates of other industry sectors ranged from .30 to .98, indicating
that were not statistically significantly different than the reference group. Figure 53 plots
the discontinuous regression line at the cutoff, which provides a graphical representation
of the large effect that a large increase of the percentage of WOB had on the gender pay
gap median. Consequently, hypothesis H5c was supported.
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Robustness Test
To strengthen the causal claim of the results, the threshold of the forcing variable
was changed to 8 and 16. Participants were assigned to treatment and comparison groups
based on those thresholds to test if discontinuities were identified at those cutoff points.
To that end, the same regression used on the model used for testing hypothesis H5c was
performed. Results for the test indicated that at a bandwidth of 8.49, which included 207
observations, the estimated treatment effect of the Cutoff 8 model, 4.39, Z=1.14, p=.38,
was not statistically significant. Similarly, results for the test at the 16% cutoff point
indicated that at a calculated optimal bandwidth of 5.72, including 131 observations, the
estimated treatment effect was not statistically significant, -1.75, Z=-3.25, p=.76). Table
88 reports the results of the robustness tests, which provided additional evidence for the
causality claim of the test results. Coefficients are reported on Table 89.
Table 88
Robustness Tests – RD Test Results for Pseudo-Cutoffs (H5c)
Model

h

n

Estimate

SE

p-value F-statistic

p-value

R2

R2 Adj.

Cutoff 8
8.49 207
4.39
4.99
0.38
4.34
0.00
0.31
0.24
Cutoff 16
5.72 131
-1.75
5.70
0.76
2.97
0.00
0.34
0.22
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error; forcing variable=Increase; dependent
variable= gender pay gap median.
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Table 89
Robustness Tests – Parameter Estimates for Pseudo-Cutoffs (H5c)
Coeff.
Variable
β0 - Intercept

SE

t-value p-value Coeff.

h=8

SE

t-value p-value

h=16

12.81

6.27

2.04

0.04

17.03

7.03

2.42

0.02

β1 - IncreaseSmall

0.43

0.74

0.58

0.56

0.14

1.21

0.12

0.91

β1 - IncreaseLarge

-0.67

0.62

-1.08

0.28

-0.71

1.60

-0.45

0.66

β2 -Treatment

4.39

3.71

1.18

0.24

-1.75

4.51

-0.39

0.70

β3 - WOBPC

-0.11

0.18

-0.62

0.54

-0.25

0.22

-1.17

0.24

β4 - WExecPC

2.71

0.99

2.74

0.01

3.05

5.97

0.51

0.61

β5 - WSMPC

4.66

2.84

1.64

0.10

-0.51

3.52

-0.14

0.89

β6 - WEmpPC

0.25

0.91

0.28

0.78

0.40

0.86

0.47

0.64

β7 - CEOTenure

-0.07

0.09

-0.75

0.45

0.06

0.13

0.50

0.62

β8 - ChairTenure

-0.50

0.12

-4.03

0.00

-0.36

0.17

-2.11

0.04

0.30

0.10

3.07

0.00

0.31

0.11

2.80

0.01

β9 - Critical

β10 - Sector
β10-1 Consumer Services
2.74
3.53
0.78 0.44
-0.54
4.50 -0.12
0.90
β10-2 Energy
23.58
5.07
4.65 0.00
20.29
7.15 2.84
0.01
β10-3 Financials
14.74
3.80
3.88 0.00
13.41
4.62 2.91
0.00
β10-4 Health Care
5.90
5.42
1.09 0.28
2.03 12.81 0.16
0.87
β10-5 Industrials
6.89
3.37
2.04 0.04
0.48
4.07 0.12
0.91
β10-6 Materials
11.59
4.91
2.36 0.02
4.58
6.42 0.71
0.48
β10-7 Technology
13.03
6.47
2.02 0.05
11.72
6.00 1.95
0.05
β10-8Telecommunications
11.22
6.73
1.67 0.10
18.89 11.48 1.65
0.10
β10-9Utilities
-2.73
6.97 -0.39 0.70
8.89
8.66 1.03
0.31
Residual SE
0.90
1.08
2
2
R (Adjusted R )
0.31 (0.24)
0.34 (0.22)
n
207
131
Note. h=bandwidth; n=sample size; SE=standard error. WOBPC=percentage of WOB;
CEOTenure=female CEO tenure; ChairTenure=female chairperson tenure; Critical=3 or more
female directors; WExecPC=percentage of women executives; WSMPC=percentage of women in
senior management; WEmpPC=percentage of women employed; dependent variable=gender pay
gap median.
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Hypothesis Summary
A total of 16 hypotheses, contained within five sets, were tested. Overall 14 of the
16 hypotheses were supported, and two hypotheses were not supported. The quasiexperimental RD analyses provided evidence of a causal effect of the Davies Review on
board composition, opportunities for women, and the gender pay gap. The hypotheses
and testing results are summarized in Table 90.
Hypotheses H1a – H2c hypothesized that the Davies Review would change the
composition of FTSE 350 boards. Hypotheses H1a and H1b predicted a causal effect of
the Davies Review on increasing the percentage of WOB of non-balanced FTSE 350
boards. The results of the non-parametric RD tests provided evidence a statistically
significant treatment effect of 13.72 (p=.04) on non-balanced boards compared to genderbalanced boards, F(17,92)=2.384, p=.004. Robustness tests performed on the pseudooutcome Board Size and at different cutoffs provided additional evidence of the causal
claim of the results. Hypothesis H1c hypothesized that the Davies Review would not
have a statistically significant effect on increasing the percentage of WOB of FTSE Small
Groups. Results of the non-parametric RD tests provided support for the hypothesis by
returning p-values that ranged from .53 to .88, indicating that, at different bandwidths, the
treatment effect on FTSE Small Cap boards was not statistically significant.
Hypotheses H2a and H2b predicted that in the duration of the Davies Review,
there would be statistically significant increase of female non-executive directors
compared to the increase of non-executive directors for FTSE 350 boards. Conversely,
H2c predicted that the increase would not be statistically significant for FTSE Small Cap
boards. Results of a mixed-effects time series regression analysis provided support for
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hypotheses H2a, H2b, and H2c. In the duration of the Davies Review, Time had a
statistically significant effect of -3 (p=.01) percentage points per year on the percentage
of female executive directors as a proportion of the total population of female directors.
However, the statistically significant quadratic effect of Time of .23 (p=.01) indicated that
there was acceleration and deceleration in the linear rate of change. The change in sign
indicated that the initial decrease on the percentage of female executive directors slowed
down every year at a rate of .46 percentage points, which suggested that the curve would
reach a turning point. The interaction effect of Time and FTSE 250 indicated that the
FTSE 250 boards were decreasing their percentage of female executive directors at a rate
that was not statistically significantly different than FTSE 100 boards. Therefore,
hypotheses H2a and H2b were supported.
Although the interaction effect of Time and FTSE Small Cap was not statistically
significant at the .05 alpha level, the p-value for the coefficient was approaching
statistical significance -1.28 (p=.08). However, counter to the study’s prediction, the
coefficient indicated that FTSE Small Cap boards were decreasing their percentage of
female executive directors at a faster rate than organizations in the FTSE 350 group.
Therefore, hypothesis H2c was not supported.
Hypotheses H3a-H3d predicted a statistically significant disproportionate increase
in the share of female executive directors compared to the increase in the share of CEOs,
and a disproportionate increase in the share of female non-executive directors compared
to female chairpersons in FTSE 350 boards. Conversely the prediction for FTSE Small
Cap boards was that the tests would not find statistically significant differences. Results
of the t-tests and growth models provided support for hypotheses H3c and H3d.
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Hypotheses H4a-H4c predicted the effect of Compliance to the Davies Review on
opportunities for other women at the executive board, senior management, and companywide levels. Results of the non-parametric RD tests on the pooled sample provided
support for the hypothesis H4a. Organizations that had more than 25% of WOB had a
statistically significant lower proportion of women on their executive boards, 10.62
(p=.02) percentage points lower than organizations that had less than 25% of WOB.
Hypothesis H4b predicted that compliance with the Davies Review would decrease the
percentage of women in senior management. The p-values for RD tests at different
bandwidths, using listwise and data imputation methods for missing data, ranged
from .22 to .85, indicating that the treatment was not statistically significant. Therefore,
hypothesis H4b was not supported. Hypothesis H4c predicted a non-statistically
significant effect of compliance with the Davies Review on the increase of the population
of women employed in the organization. Results of the RD tests provided support for the
hypothesis. The p-values of the multiple models tested ranged from .16 to .57,
demonstrating that the Davies Review did not have a statistically significant effect on
increasing employment opportunities for women in FTSE All Share organizations.
The final set of hypotheses, H5a, H5b, and H5c tested the effects of the Davies
Review on the gender pay gap. Hypothesis H5a and H5b predicted that compliance with
the 25% of WOB set by the Davies Review would not have an effect on the gender pay
gap mean and median. The hypotheses were tested using a non-parametric RD approach
on the pooled sample. Results of the RD tests at different bandwidths provided support
for both hypotheses. At different bandwidths, the p-values for the treatment effect ranged
from .11 to .24, indicating that the treatment was not statistically significant. Hypothesis
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H5c examined the effect of a large increase on the percentage of WOB resulting from the
Davies Review on the gender pay gap median. Results of the RD tests indicated that
organizations that had a large increase in their percentage of WOB (>12%) had a
statistically significantly higher pay gap median. The treatment effect was 7.88 (p=.001)
percentage points. Therefore, hypothesis H5c was supported. Robustness tests tested the
relationship of the variables in the H5c model using different cutoffs; however, they were
not statistically significant, which provided evidence of the causal claim of the findings.
Summary of the Chapter
Chapter 4 presented the results for the study. The chapter was organized in five
distinct sections. The first section provided a description of the collected data,
participants of the study, group comparisons, and correlations. The second section
presented a description of the treatment of missing data, identification of the missing data
mechanism and data imputation process. The third section reported the results of the
tests of statistical assumptions and internal validity. The fourth section reported the
hypotheses test results and robustness tests for the validity of causal claims. The fifth
section provided a hypotheses summary and chapter summary. The upcoming Chapter 5
of the document provides a discussion of findings, a set of recommendations for future
research, and implications for practice.
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Table 90
Results of Predicted Hypotheses
Hypothesis
Description
Effects of Davies Review on board composition
H1a
Increase WOBPC (2011-2016)
H1b
Increase WOBPC (2011-2016)
H1c
No effect on WOBPC (2011-2016)

Population
FTSE 100
FTSE 250
FTSE Small Cap

H2a

Increase of WNED vs NED (2011-2016)

FTSE 100

H2b

Increase of WNED vs NED (2011-2016)

FTSE 250

Test
Non-parametric RD
Non-parametric RD
Non-parametric RD
Panel - longitudinal
regression
Panel – longitudinal
regression
Panel - longitudinal
regression
T-test, panel
T-test, panel
T-test, panel
T-test, panel

Supported?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

H2c
No effect on WNED vs NED (2011-2016)
FTSE Small Cap
No
H3a
Increase of WED vs Female CEOs (2011-2016)
FTSE 350
No
H3b
Increase of WNED vs Female Chairs (2011-2016)
FTSE 350
No
H3c
Increase of WED vs Female CEOs (2011-2016)
FTSE Small Cap
Yes
H3d
Increase of WNED vs Female Chairs (2011-2016)
FTSE Small Cap
Yes
Effects of Compliance to Davies Review on Opportunities for Women
H4a
Decrease WExecPC
FTSE All Share
Non-parametric RD
Yes
H4b
Decrease WSMPC
FTSE All Share
Non-parametric RD
No
H4c
No effect on WEmpPC
FTSE All Share
Non-parametric RD
Yes
Effects of Compliance to Davies Review on Gender Pay Gap
H5a
No effect on PayGapMean
FTSE All Share
Non-parametric RD
Yes
H5b
No effect on PayGapMedian
FTSE All Share
Non-parametric RD
Yes
H5c
Increase of PayGapMedian
FTSE All Share
Non-parametric RD
Yes
Note. WOBPC=percentage of WOB; WNED=women non-executive directors; WED=women executive directors; WExecPC=percentage of women
executives; WSMPC=percentage of women in senior management; WEmpPC=percentage of women employed; PaygapMean=gender pay gap
mean; PayGapMedian=gender pay gap median.
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Chapter 5 - Discussion
Introduction
This chapter contains five sections. The first section presents a discussion of the
results from Chapter 4 and the relationships to relevant literature. The second section
discusses implications for research, theory, policy, and practice. The third section
describes the limitations of the study. The fourth section provides recommendations for
future research. The chapter concludes with a summary.
Discussion of the Results
This section provides a discussion of the results of the study’s research
hypotheses. In line with the study’s hypotheses, this section is divided into three parts (a)
effects of Davies Review on board composition (H1a – H3d), (b) effects of the Davies
Review on opportunities for women (H4a, H4b, H4c), and (c) effects of the Davies
Review on the gender pay gap (H5a, H5b, H5c). Each section compares the study’s
findings to the existing literature, and discusses their similarities and differences.
Effects of Davies Review on Board Composition
The first set of hypotheses predicted a causal effect of the Davies Review
initiative on increasing the percentage of female directors on the boards of FTSE 350
organizations that were below the compliance threshold. Given the extensive worldwide
debate related to the implementation of quotas for increasing female representation on
corporate boards (Reding, 2012), scholars have examined the effectiveness of the
multiple approaches for achieving gender parity on boards. Prior literature has shown that
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government initiatives are effective ways for increasing female representation on
corporate boards (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Fortin et al., 2017). However, most of the
literature (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Bozhinov et al., 2017; Matsa & Miller, 2013; Tinsley
et al., 2017) had mainly focused on the effects of hard law approaches (i.e. quotas). The
current study contributes by extending literature focused on soft law initiatives by
providing evidence of the effects of the comply or explain approach in the United
Kingdom, that is, the Davies Review. However, the special circumstances around the
Davies Review that made the achievement of its targets feasible were that as an EU
member state, the United Kingdom was faced with the imposition of gender quotas if the
comply or explain approach was not successful. Consequently, the threat of much larger
imposed quotas may have acted as a deterrent to non-compliance in produced effects
more similar to gender quotas.
In line with those previous findings of the effects of government initiatives as a
way to increase female representation on corporate boards, this study’s findings
confirmed that the Davies Review initiative caused an increase in the proportion of
women on FTSE 350 boards. Adams and Kirchmaier (2013) provided evidence that,
compared to organizational, industry, or country-level factors, government-led initiatives
generate the most significant change with regard to increasing the proportion of WOB.
Similarly, Fortin and colleagues (2017) found that, compared with countries that did not
implement any type of initiative for increasing WOB, legislative quotas and comply or
explain approaches resulted in increases of 5.48 and 2.31 percentage points, respectively.
However, prior to the introduction of the Davies Review, female membership in
FTSE boards was increasing. Studies that examined gender composition of FTSE 100

361

boards prior to the Davies Review initiative indicated that although slow, there was an
upward trend in the appointment of female directors (Adams & Kirchmaier, 2013;
Grosvold et al., 2007). When the Davies Review was rolled out (Davies, 2011, p. 3), Lord
Davies indicated that women made up only 12.5% of the members of FTSE 100 boards,
which was an increase from 9.4% in 2004. Therefore, despite the slow pace, the
increasing rate of female membership in FTSE boards suggests that the total increase
cannot be attributed to the Davies Review.
This study found that in the 2011 to 2016 period, the Davies Review accelerated
the rate of increase of female participation on corporate boards for FTSE 350 firms by
5.55 percentage points compared with FTSE Small Cap firms in the same period.
Findings of the study’s longitudinal regression using data from 2008 to 2016 for the
pooled sample revealed that prior to the Davies Review there was a statistically and
practically significant upwards trend across organizations in the FTSE All Share sample.
To isolate the effect of the Davies Review, the longitudinal analysis examined annual
variation pre and post announcement of the initiative. The increase of WOB from 2008
to 2011 was 3.3 percentage points (p<.001). From that point forward, the differences in
the increase of the percentage of WOB in FTSE 350 boards compared to FTSE Small
Cap boards were statistically and practically significant. In the 2011 to 2016 period,
FTSE 350 boards increased their percentage of WOB by 11.02 percentage points
(p<.001) and FTSE Small Cap boards increased their percentage of WOB by 5.47
percentage points (p<.001). These differences are practically significant due to the large
differences in the rate of increase after the Davies Review, which caused FTSE 350
boards to double the rate of increase compared to FTSE Small Cap boards.
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Results of this study’s hypotheses tests also revealed that there was a
discontinuity in the increase of WOB at the threshold set by the Davies Review, which
indicated that organizations that were above the Davies Review threshold did not have
the same rate of increase as organizations that were below the threshold. Results of the
quasi-experimental RD approach provided evidence of a statistically significant treatment
effect of 13.69 (p=.04) on FTSE 350 boards that were below the threshold set by the
Davies Review. The multiple robustness tests performed using pseudo-outcomes and
pseudo-cutoffs provided additional evidence of the causal claim of the results. More
conservative estimates of the unconditional model, indicated that the Davies Review had
a negative effect of 9.98 (p=.07) percentage points on the increase of WOB of
organizations that were over the threshold.
These findings indicate that the Davies Review had an effect on increasing the
percentage of WOB on its targeted organizations only to the compliance levels
established by the initiative. Furthermore, the compliance effect of the initiative was
confirmed by testing the model on the FTSE Small Cap group. Findings provided
evidence of a smooth regression line without discontinuities, which indicated that the
treatment effect on FTSE Small Cap boards was not significant statistically or
practically, .14 (p=.99). Those findings suggested that the Davies Review had a treatment
effect on the intended population as a compliance initiative. Findings also indicate that
the initiative negatively impacted board opportunities for women in organizations that
were above the threshold established by the Davies Review, which is discussed in the
section of effects of the Davies review on opportunities for other women.
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The second and third sets of hypotheses predicted disproportionate appointments
of female directors to non-executive positions compared to executive positions, and fewer
appointments of women to CEO and chairperson positions. Results of the panel study
revealed changes on the type of board membership for the increased population of female
directors, which confirmed that gender composition was not the only change FTSE
boards experienced in the Davies Review duration. Ferreira (2015) stated that studies
related to the effects of board legislation and policies for WOB were not mentioning
changes in board independence. Therefore, this study tested the effects of the Davies
Review on board independence. Previous studies have found that board independence
increases when female board membership increases through government initiatives
(Adams & Kirchmaier, 2013; Bohren & Staubo, 2013). In line with those findings, this
study found that board independence in FTSE firms increased in the Davies Review
period.
The conditional growth model used to estimate the annual variance in the type of
director positions occupied by women provided evidence of a statistically significant
increase in the proportion of women non-executive (independent) directors compared to
executive directors. The model indicated that the proportion of women executive
directors of the total population of WOB in FTSE All Share boards decreased at an
annual rate of 1.50% (p=.05). Additionally, the statistically significant quadratic effect of
Time of .23 (p=.01) indicated that the decrease on the percentage of female executive
directors slowed down every year at a rate of .46%.
Although the results provide support for the study’s hypotheses, it is unclear if
these changes were caused by the Davies Review because FTSE Small Cap boards
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experienced an additional annual decrease of 1.84% (p=.05) in their population of women
executive directors. These findings indicate that the majority of appointments of female
directors to FTSE All Share boards is to non-executive positions. This finding is in line
with previous studies that found that female directors are appointed to less influential
positions (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Bozhinov et al., 2017; Bohren & Staubo, 2013).
Previous studies have found that women are less likely to sit on executive committees
(Peterson & Philpot, 2007); however, they did not find evidence of a systematic bias.
Consistent with studies that found that organizations are less likely to appoint
women to executive committees, it is the interpretation of this study, through a resource
dependence lens, that boards appointed women to non-executive positions because that
was enough for compliance. While this study found evidence of a disproportionate
appointment of women to non-executive positions, a causal relationship of the Davies
Review and biased assignment to non-executive positions cannot be confirmed. The
confounding effect of the U.K. corporate governance reform of 2012, which stated that
boards of public firms were required to have at least 50% of board independence makes
the examination of a causal link between the Davies Review and board independence
problematic. However, in the duration of the Davies Review women’s appointment to
non-executive roles considerably increased, FTSE boards reduced their percentage of
female executive directors by 3 percentage points, the percentage of female nonexecutive directors increased by 10 percentage points.
Additionally, consistent with findings of studies that evaluated the effects of
quotas for WOB that indicated that gender quotas did not have an effect on increasing the
proportion of female CEOs (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012), and female chairpersons (Seirstad
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& Opshal, 2011). The findings of this study provided evidence that despite doubling the
number and proportion of women on FTSE boards, the proportion of female CEOs did
not increase in the 2011 to 2016 period. However, taking into account that CEOs are part
of the executive committee, the growth in the population of CEOs was compared to the
growth of the population of executive directors. Findings indicated a very small positive
effect of the increase of executive directors on the number of CEOs, 0.002 (p=.62);
however, it was not statistically, nor practically significant. Similarly, the population of
female chairpersons was compared to the population of non-executive directors over the
2011 to 2016 period. Findings indicated that over time, there the growth rate of the
proportion of female chairpersons was very small, 0.007 (p=.06). However, the effect of
appointments of female non-executive directors over the duration of the Davies Review
was near zero and not statistically significant, <.001 (p=.92).
Although it has been suggested that WOB will open doors for other women, this
study did not find evidence to support that claim. While WOB do not always have
influence in the selection of members of the executive board, or senior management,
members of the board are responsible for selecting the organization’s CEO.
Consequently, failure to increase the number of female CEOs on corporate boards
indicates that despite considerable increase in the percentage of WOB, the distribution of
power on boards remains unchanged. A competing explanation for that finding would be
that the Davies Review resulted in a reduced supply of female executive directors who
can take on CEO roles. Counter to existing literature that indicated that the likelihood of
appointing a female CEO increased as the percentage of WOB increased (Elsaid & Ursel,
2015), this study found no evidence to support those findings. Findings of this study
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were more in line with findings from the Norway quota law (Ahern & Dittmar, 2011), in
which despite the increase of WOB, appointment of women to CEO roles remained
stagnant.
Effects of the Davies Review on Opportunities for Other Women
The fourth set of hypotheses tested the effects of WOB on opportunities for other
women. This study’s findings provided evidence of the effects of compliance to Davies
Review WOB on opportunities for women in executive boards and senior management.
Although this study does not explicitly or implicitly suggest that it is the responsibility of
WOB to advocate on other women’s behalf, it suggests that the assumption deserves to
be tested. Multiple studies have found a positive association of women in leadership and
increased opportunities for women in lower ranks (Kurtulus & Tomaskovic-Devey, 2012;
Matsa & Miller, 2011; Skaggs et al., 2012; Stainback et al., 2016). However, as Adams
and Kirchmaier (2014) indicated that literature often ignores that female directors who
are appointed to boards as the result of a government initiative may be different than
those appointed to boards without an external intervention.
Scholars (Bierema, 2017) have indicated that that while it is important to
understand women’s standing in the world, it takes more than knowing the statistics to
change it. Changing requires further examination to understand the factors contributing
to the gender gap. To that end, this study’s examination of the effects of the Davies
Review on opportunities aimed to increase the understanding of the effects of WOB
beyond the numerical measure of female participation at the board level, which is one
used by policy-makers to evaluate the success of WOB initiatives.
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Previous research (Ahmed & Swan, 2006) had identified the potential risks to the
achievement of equality when diversity and equality are transformed into a performance
measure. One of the risks is that inequality can be concealed behind that measure if it
represents good performance. Although the Davies Review promoted gender diversity on
boards, women’s numerical representation on boards does not necessarily indicate
equality. However, in multiple instances gender equality seems to have been replaced by
the indicator of female representation on boards (Davies, 2015, p. 27). Furthermore, the
interest that the WOB initiative has had in the British media may also be transforming
WOB into a public relations issue rather than an inequality issue, as companies are
praised for “leading the way” (Hampton-Alexander, 2016) or shamed for staying in the
“dark ages” (Parliament, 2018) in terms of their board gender diversity metrics. This
superficial assessment of gender equality in organizations may threaten its achievement.
The promotion of the business case for WOB has contributed to the numerous
studies that examined the relationship of WOB and organizational and financial
performance. Conversely, despite being a gender equality effort, outcomes related to
gender equality have very seldom been evaluated. In fact, only a handful of studies have
examined the effects of legislation and initiatives for the promotion of WOB on gender
equality outcomes. Scholars have suggested that there is a belief that women in top
leadership positions will reduce gender inequality in lower levels (Ferreira, 2015; Skaggs
et al., 2012). This belief is founded on the assumption that inequality is perpetuated by
men but not women; thus, the expectation that women in leadership will help their juniors
(Derks et al., 2016). Consequently, the promotion of WOB initiatives as gender equality
efforts are rarely challenged.
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One of the objectives of the study was to discover if 25% of WOB constituted
critical mass, in a sense that it would allow women to influence a board and result in
improved opportunities for other women in their organizations. Studies that examined
the effects of quota laws found that in France, the quota law amplified gender segregation
(Reberioux & Roudaut, 2016) and did not increase management opportunities for women
other than at the board level (Fortin et al., 2017). In line with those findings, this study
found no evidence of critical mass at the 25% of WOB set by the Davies Review on
opportunities for women in executive leadership, senior management, or company-wide.
Testing the assumption that WOB initiatives result in improved opportunities for
other women, this study found the negative effect of compliance to the Davies Review on
opportunities for other women at the executive (C-suite) board level. Results of the nonparametric RD tests on the pooled FTSE sample provided evidence of the negative effect
of compliance to the 25% WOB target set by the Davies Review on opportunities for
women at the executive level. The treatment effect was -11.56 (p=.03) percentage points.
Considering that the mean percentage of women in executive boards for the pooled
sample was 15.79%, the treatment effect was very large. The treatment effect was
significant on the unconditional model and the full model including a number of
covariates. Two of the covariates included in the full model were statistically significant,
percentage of women in senior management and the industry sector Utilities. However,
they did not provide a competing explanation for the discontinuous jump at the threshold
because the robustness tests were performed using the same model at different thresholds,
and there were no discontinuities detected at the threshold.
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Although the findings of the study were robust and provided strong evidence of a
decrease in opportunities for women on executive boards resulting from compliance to
the Davies Review, findings do not imply that WOB are blocking the advancement of
other women to executive roles. This finding could be interpreted as WOB are not in a
position to impact the selection of candidates to executive boards. Consistent with the
decline of women in executive director roles, this finding could be related to changes in
board independence, which suggest that the majority of WOB are independent board
members and therefore not responsible for the operation. This finding suggests the
existence of a gap in the development of women that may be eligible for taking on roles
of more responsibility, like CEO. This is a very significant finding as it provides
evidence of a very important issue that may contribute to the pervasiveness of a gender
disparity on boards. This finding also indicates that the focus of diversity efforts on
corporate boards may be threatening the achievement of sustainable gender parity at the
board level.
A non-statistically significant finding would have provided evidence that 25% of
female board membership did not constitute critical mass. However, counter to the
assumption that at some point in the representation spectrum, a minority percentage of
WOB will improve opportunities for other women in the workplace, this study provided
robust causal evidence of the negative effect of targeting corporate boards to promote
opportunities for other women in the organization.
Robustness tests provided strong evidence of the causal claim. One of the pseudocutoffs used on the robustness checks was 30%, which according to existing literature
constitutes critical mass. However, at 30% of female membership on FTSE boards, the
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effect on opportunities for women at the executive level was not statistically significant (.78, p=.84). Counter to previous findings in the literature that suggested that critical mass
for WOB was reached at 30% (Isidro & Sobral, 2014; Joecks et al., 2013) and that a
higher proportion of WOB was associated with a higher proportion of female executives
(Matsa & Miller, 2011). The present study found no evidence of critical mass at three
WOB either (Kramer et al., 2007). Although these findings do not indicate that female
directors hindered opportunities for other women at the executive level, they indicate that
achieving the target set by the comply or explain approach caused a lower proportion of
women at the executive level.
This study predicted the negative effect of compliance to the Davies Review on
opportunities for women in senior management. This hypothesis was developed based on
the assumption that the focus on diversity efforts at the board level would negatively
impact senior management. however, this hypothesis was not supported. Previous
empirical evidence had examined the relationship of WOB and women in senior
management at the country level. Countries with higher presence of WOB were more
likely to have women in senior management and equal ratios of male to female pay
(Terjesen & Singh, 2008). This study examined a direct relationship of those variables
by examining the effect of higher female representation on corporate boards that resulted
from the Davies Review on the percentage of women in senior management. Contrary to
existing literature that suggested that a higher presence of WOB increased managerial
representation (Skaggs et al., 2012), this study found no evidence to support that at 25%
representation, the increased proportion of WOB had a 3.82 percentage points effect on
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the proportion of women in senior management; however, the effect was not statistically
or practically significant, 3.82, Z=1.18, p=.24.
To confirm the findings, robustness tests were performed at 30% and 33% of
female board membership. Findings did not find support for the effect of critical mass of
WOB at 30% on the percentage of women in senior management. At 30% of female
participation on corporate boards, a decrease of 1.29 percentage points on the population
of women in senior management was found, 1.29, Z=-.42, p=67. At 33%, the new target
set by the Hampton-Alexander Review (2016), a decrease of 4.58 percentage points on
the population of women in senior management was found; however, they were neither
statistically, nor practically significant, -4.58, Z=-.82, p=.41.
In support of the study’s predictions related to the effects of compliance to the
25% of WOB set by the Davies Review, findings provided no evidence of an effect on the
percentage of women in the organization, indicating that there were no differences
between organizations that were compliant to the targets and organizations that were not.
The study’s prediction that the 25% of WOB not would have a statistically significant
effect on the percentage of women employed in the organizations of the pooled sample,
served as a falsification test for other hypotheses related to opportunities for women in
the organization. Compliance to the Davies Review was not expected to increase the total
percentage of women employed in the organization as there is no theoretical or empirical
link that associates WOB and female employment. Women and men have had similar
participation in the workforce (Office for National Statistics, 2018); therefore, an effect
from the increase of WOB was not hypothesized.
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Effects of Davies Review on the Gender Pay Gap
The promotion of the business case for WOB creates an expectation of higher
profitability from gender-diverse boards. Coupling that expectation with the board’s duty
of generating value for shareholders results in the performance of WOB to be assessed
primarily in function of their contribution to the bottom line. In order to distribute as
much as possible to shareholders, the board, collectively, makes decisions that keep costs
down and increase profits. However, pay equality involves raising wages, and raising
wages raises costs, it does not reduce them (Acker, 2006). In fact, previous research in
the United Kingdom (Bell & Machin, 2016; Draca, Machin, & Van Reenen, 2008) found
that firm profitability and firm value, were significantly reduced by the increase of wages.
Therefore, WOB are caught in this paradox, challenged with achieving two conflicting
tasks, increase profits and promote pay equity. Consequently, the expectation that WOB
will improve pay equity for other women is perhaps less than reasonable and fair.
The fifth set of hypotheses predicted that compliance to the 25% of WOB set by
the Davies Review would not decrease the gender pay gap mean and median. Multiple
studies have examined the link between women leaders and the pay gap for other women
(Cohen & Huffman, 2007; Flabbi et al., 2014; Srivastava & Sherman, 2015). However,
research that evaluates the effects of the gender pay gap that results from WOB initiatives
is very scarce. Among the studies that have examined the effects of WOB initiatives on
pay differentials by gender (Adams & Kirchmaier, 2013; Bertrand et al., 2014; Roberioux
& Roudaut, 2015), findings have been consistent in that they have not been able to
support the assumption that WOB initiatives reduce the gender pay gap. In line with
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those findings, this study provided additional evidence of the limitations of WOB policies
on reducing the gender pay gap.
Additionally, the way in which the Davies Review treated compliance to the
WOB targets may have created an illusion of gender neutrality or good diversity
performance. The Davies Review ranked organizations in function to their percentage of
WOB and publicly praised the exemplars as “leading the way” in gender equality efforts.
The superficial level of treatment in the celebration of diversity efforts of some
organizations, without much regard to what lies beneath the surface (Prasad & Mills,
1997), indicated that compliance to the Davies Review became the measure of good
diversity performance. Therefore, by uncovering the effects of the compliance to the
Davies Review targets as a measure of diversity performance on the gender pay gap, this
study provides evidence of how the same measure can become the mechanism for
concealment and reproduction of inequality (Deem & Morley, 2006).
At 25% female representation on FTSE boards, a non-statistically significant
effect of 4.76 percentage points on the gender pay gap mean was found, 4.76, Z=1.14,
p=.26. Similarly, at 25% female representation on FTSE boards, a non-statistically
significant effect of 4.32 percentage points on the gender pay gap median was found,
4.32, Z=1.11, p=.27. However, despite the lack of statistical significance, the standard
errors for the pay gap mean and median models were large enough that a significant
adverse effect on the female population could not be ruled out.
The study tested examined differences between organizations that had increased
their percentage of WOB more aggressively and those who did not have large increases.
Tests were performed using the pay gap median rather than the pay gap mean to ensure

374

that findings are not impacted by high earners in the upper layers, which are still male
dominated. Consistent with findings of the effects of gender quotas for corporate French
boards on the gender pay gap (Reberioux & Roudaut, 2016), the findings of this study
provided evidence of significantly different pay gaps for both group, Z=2.70, p=.01.
Organizations that increased their percentage of WOB more aggressively (i.e. an increase
greater than 12%) had a statistically significant gender pay gap of 7.88 percentage points
higher than organizations that had smaller increases in their female board representation
during the Davies Review. Considering that at the threshold the pay gap was 12.65, and
for organizations to the right of the regression line the average effect was 20.53, the
effect was very large. The study’s robustness tests provided evidence of the causal claim
of the treatment.
These findings do not imply that the women who were appointed to corporate
boards are the ones causing the pay gap for other women. Findings indicated that a large
increase of WOB had an effect on the gender pay gap, which may suggest that the results
were likely caused by the focus on increasing gender diversity at the board level. As
literature has previously indicated, the adding and stirring strategy is not likely to
produce results due to the fact that organizational structures remain unchanged (Bierema,
2017). Previous research had found that when diversity is replaced by a measure of
performance, inequalities can remain hidden. Findings also indicate that organizations
that were farther from the target prior to the Davies Review; may not have prioritized
gender equality in their organizational strategy. Consequently, as the Davies Review set
targets exclusively for WOB, everything else remained intact; thus, their gender pay gap
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continues to show their low commitment to diversity. These findings provide evidence of
the limitations of top-down approaches to gender diversity.
Notably, for every year of tenure of a CEO the pay gap increased by 4.33
percentage points, t=2.02, p=.05. However, these findings should be taken with caution
because the sample of female CEOs was very small (n=14). Nonetheless it was
statistically and practically significant, which may have several interpretations as
described below.
Focus on financial performance. Literature suggests that women who rise to
positions of power are the object of continuous scrutiny (Fitzsimmons, Callan, & Paulsen,
2013). Consequently, it would make logical sense that their focus is profitability, which is
how their performance is measured. Furthermore, at those levels women tend to be more
agentic than men (Luckerath-Rovers et al., 2013) which coupled with the scrutiny placed
on their performance may cause them to prioritize other organizational outcomes rather
than the advocacy of equality. This could also explain the increase in the gender pay gap
every year a woman is in a CEO position. Pay equality for men and women would
involve raising women’s wages, which would increase costs. Therefore, promoting pay
equality would be counter to their primary goal of maintaining or increasing profitability.
Denial of inequality. The study’s historical review provided evidence that at the
highest decision-making levels, women have not always helped other women. In fact, in
the highest political position in the United Kingdom, Ms. Thatcher denied the existence
of discrimination against women (Campbell & Heath, 2017) and did not advocate on
women’s behalf. Denial of the existence of discrimination and the barriers that women
face in the workplace hinder women’s advancement in society (Stephens & Levine,
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2011). Research has demonstrated that gender consciousness level is critical; however,
not all women acknowledge the existence of discrimination (Crosby, 2017). Denial of
the barriers that women face is dependent on women’s own experiences (Radke, Hornsey,
& Barlow, 2016). The experiences that WOB may be very distinct from the experiences
of the majority of women in the workforce (Stroebe, Ellemers, Barreto, & Mummendey,
2009).
Stronger identification with a different social group. Interaction with people
from different social groups has been associated with reducing prejudice (Pettigrew &
Tropp, 2006); however, it also reduces group identification of members of the historically
disadvantaged group, as well as their perceptions of injustice and hinder their collective
action (Dixon, Levine, Reicher, & Durrheim, 2012; Wright & Lubensky, 2009). Scholars
(Ferreira, 2015) have suggested that to a great degree, directors are not representative of
the population. Furthermore, occupational roles are more salient and override gender
roles (Eagly & Wood, 2011), which results in men and women leaders’ behavior to be
more similar than different (Keshet, Kark, Pomerantz-Zorin, Koslowsky, & Schwarzwald,
2006). Consequently, it is plausible that WOB interaction with other members, their
similarities in position and behavior, may increase their identification with other
members of the board than with other women in the organization. This in turn, would
reduce their perception of discrimination against women, causing them to not advocate
on their behalf.
Legitimacy of inequality. Scholars (Ahmed & Swan, 2006) have indicated that
the legitimacy of inequality differs in function of the situation of the observer. In that
regard, despite their gender, WOB have other advantages that most women in the
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workforce do not have. This is particularly true in positions of high power, in which
individuals need to believe that their accomplishments are based on their merit.
Therefore, their rationalization that their advantage is fair and deserved causes them to
see inequality as legitimate (McCoy & Major, 2005). When WOB believe that the
organization’s merit system is fair; they may rationalize that women’s lower standing in
the workforce is deserved, as they could have accomplished success in the same way they
did.
Existing literature has provided evidence of successful women’s tendency to have
more gender-biased perceptions of other women’s commitment to their careers (Ellemers
et al., 2004; Faniko et al., 2016), and their tendency to differentiate themselves from
other women (Stroebe et al., 2017). Therefore, their differentiation from other women
caused by their belief that women’s lower position in the workforce is legitimate, can
help them justify inaction in addressing gender inequality despite being able to act on it.
In fact, research found that in developed societies, the gender pay gap exists because both
men and women find lower earnings for women to be fair (Auspurg, Hinz, & Sauer,
2017).
Intersectionality versus gender. Another issue in targeting WOB to address
gender inequality and the gender pay gap is that despite the communal traits associated
with egalitarianism, other more significant predictors have been identified in the literature
and may be better predictors of pay differentials by gender. This study provided
evidence that the gender of directors did not have an effect on the gender pay gap.
Empirical research had demonstrated that compared to men, women tend to have
attitudes that favor values-driven and egalitarian practices such as environmentalism
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(Dietz, Kalof, Stern, 2002) conservative moral issues (Clawson & Oxley, 2012), and
benevolence (Schwartz & Rubel-Lifschitz, 2009). However, when it comes to women’s
issues, including views of men and women having an equal role in business, government,
and industry, women and men’s opinions were found to be quite similar (Clawson &
Oxley, 2012, p. 205).
Research on intersectionality has found that the intersections of multiple identities
of an individual (e.g. gender, race, class, sexual orientation, religion, etc.) can explain
oppression and opportunity, disadvantage and privilege (Shields, 2008). For example,
although the female directors of British FTSE boards are disadvantaged on the basis of
gender; however, they are privileged in their class and race (white majority) social groups.
With regard to advocacy, literature (Campbell, Childs, & Lovenduski, 2010; Kittlison,
2006; Lovenduski & Norris, 2003; Norris, 1986) has found that political party appeared
to be more important than gender. However, data for political affiliation of board
members was not available. Also, racial and ethnic minorities have been shown to have
more egalitarian attitudes (Clawson & Oxley, 2012). However, the racial homogeneity of
the sample was not conducive to an analysis of the intersection of gender and race.
Implications
The implications of this study’s findings are categorized into the following
sections: implications to research, implications to theory, implications to policy, and
implication to practice.
Implications to Research
This had four implications to research. First, this study fills a considerable
shortcoming in the literature by examining the effects of the British comply or explain
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approach for WOB gender equality indicators. It is known in business that the
examination of the effectiveness of an initiative is done in function of its objectives,
therefore, the theoretical framework that links an intervention or program to the outcome
should not be ignored (Michie & Prestwich, 2010). However, the promotion of the WOB
initiatives simultaneously using arguments that are antithetical with each other had made
their evaluation challenging. Despite the fact that WOB initiatives have been promoted as
part of the equalities agendas across countries (CA, Senate Bill, No. 826; HM
Government, 2010), and advocates of these initiatives promote them as gender equality
efforts (California Senate, 2017). There had been a disconnect between the rationale to
promote them, the agenda they are part of, and their evaluation. Consequently, despite
the abundant literature focused on examining the effects of WOB on financial measures,
examinations on gender-equality related outcomes had been overlooked. This study
provided evidence that despite the apparent success of WOB initiatives, an examination
could uncover unintended consequences.
Second, the study tested critical mass theory by exploring what constitutes critical
mass of WOB in relation to improved opportunities for other women in the organization.
Although policy and legislation for WOB usually cites critical mass and minimum targets
of female representation are implemented, critical mass of WOB had not been tested in
relation to the assumption that WOB would improve opportunities for other women. This
study fills that gap. This study explored what percentage of WOB constitute critical mass
by testing the effects of 20%, 25%, and 30% of WOB on opportunities for women in the
organization. Findings did not provide support for critical mass of WOB at any of the
thresholds tested.

380

In examining diversity initiatives, success cannot be associated with one singular
measure of performance. In the case of WOB initiatives, it may seem counterintuitive to
question the appropriateness of the initiative when the pre-determined thresholds are
being met. However, research should not ignore that the problem that causes women’s
underrepresentation on boards is caused by other problems that need solutions as well.
Inequality issues are so entwined with the fabric of society that solutions are complex.
What may be fixing something on the surface, may be allowing the growth of the
problem that lies beneath. To find those problems, research should continue to evaluate,
examine, and challenge the solutions that aim to fix the problem. Although this study
contributes to the literature using the context of the United Kingdom, multiple other
contexts have implemented similar initiatives that remain unexamined.
This is the first study that provides evidence of a causal effect of changes in board
composition caused by the Davies Review on opportunities for other women in the
organization, and the gender pay gap. The Norway quota reform played a major role in
putting gender inequality on corporate boards in the political agendas in European
countries, and is now spreading across the globe. Scholars (Ferreira, 2015) have
expressed their skepticism with regard to top-down approaches to gender equality in the
workplace. This study contributes to the gender on corporate boards body of research by
providing evidence that top-down approaches for achieving gender equality in
organizations only contribute to the increase of women’s numbers at the top and do not
produce equality at any level.
This study contributes to research of critical mass of WOB and its impact on
gender equality in organizations. One of the key premises of this study was that
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representation in numbers ignores the influence of status and power associated with
gender. The focus on increasing the numbers of women on corporate boards as a way to
reduce discrimination on lower layers ignores the gender differences and asymmetrical
power relations that a simple increase in numbers does not resolve. Evidence of previous
studies related to critical mass of WOB examined women’s influence on organizational
performance; however, critical mass of WOB in relation to their advocacy for women’s
issues and gender equality had not been explored in the context of the Davies Review.

Third, the study tested the effects of compliance to the Davies Review on the
gender pay gap with rigorous research methodology that allows claims of causality. The
rigor in the study allowed a thorough examination of the effects of the Davies Review on
changes in board composition. Although different institutions have been tracking
changes in board composition of publicly listed organizations in the United Kingdom,
this study went beyond the surface to uncovered the effects that the top-down approach to
gender equality. The causal effects uncovered by the study design were further tested
using robustness tests of pseudo-outcomes, and pseudo-cutoffs, to strengthen the causal
claim. This is the first study that tests the effects of the British comply or explain
initiative for WOB with this kind of rigor.
Similarly, the effects of the increase of WOB on the gender pay gap had not been
examined with rigorous methodologies, as the only other existing study available is a
report from Cranfield (2018); however, the report only listed the top and bottom ten
organizations and their gender pay gaps, which is informative but does not contribute to
the understanding of a relationship between the two variables. This study filled that
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shortcoming in the literature and provided evidence that despite increased representation
of WOB, the gender pay gap is not likely to decrease.
Fourth, this study used the most rigorous methods to arrive at its conclusions,
which are described throughout this paper in such detail that allow for this study to serve
as a template for replicability in the multiple contexts in which WOB initiatives have
been implemented. The data collection process used multiple sources to ensure accuracy
and re-calculated figures that had been erroneously reported. For example, organizations
that reported the company secretary in their percentage of WOB would not allow a fair
comparison with other boards. Therefore, to ensure that the study compared “apples to
apples”, figures were re-calculated based on accurate data. The database (available upon
request) that resulted from the data collection process allowed the most accurate findings
possible. The syntax used in the study’s analyses is provided in Appendix E.
Implications to Theory
The findings of this study contribute to the critical mass theory, which was
essential to this study. The introduction of gender quotas and initiatives for increasing the
representation of WOB has contributed to the growing body of literature that examined
the effects of critical mass of WOB on a number of outcomes, including: information
sharing and perceived influence (Elstad & Ladegard, 2010), firm innovation (Torchia et
al., 2011), firm performance (Joecks et al., 2013), firm reputation (Bear et al., 2010),
sustainability (Galbreath, 2011), and sustainability reporting (Fernandez-Feijoo, Romero,
& Ruiz-Blanco, 2014). However, the relationship of critical mass of WOB and
opportunities for other women had not been explored, despite their assumed relationship.
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This study filled that gap in the literature by testing critical mass of WOB on
opportunities for women in FTSE organizations.
Findings of this study’s tests of critical mass at 20%, 25%, and 30%
representation did not provide support for the relationship of WOB and increased
opportunities for women. On the contrary, at 25% of female representation, this study
found negative effect of WOB on female representation at the executive level. This
finding is of particular significance because it suggests that in a context of WOB, critical
mass needs to be refined in relation to three important assumptions behind it that may be
erroneous. First, that the idea behind numerical representation ignores differences in
power and status that favor men in leadership roles. Second, the idea of strength in
numbers implies solidarity and advocacy, which may negatively impact a woman’s career.
Third, that as whole individuals, WOB have multiple social identities for which gender
may not always be the most salient.
Numerical representation, power and status. The assumption behind numerical
representation as a way to overcome disadvantages overlooks the additional barriers that
women who are appointed to boards as a result quotas or government-led initiatives that
promote equality must overcome. Numerical minority representation of WOB ignores
differences in power and status associated with women. Counting women does not
necessarily mean that women count. Women appointed as a result of an external
initiative may be seen as outsiders, which could reduce their influence and voice. In that
context, even at high levels of representation, women may not want to bring up issues
related to their gender.
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One of the fundamental flaws of Kanter’s (1977) liberal feminist perspective is
that it ignores that organizations are socially situated practices in which gendered
relations are deeply rooted and continually enacted (Halford, Savage, & Witz, 1997).
Consequently, critical mass’ focus on numerical representation, overlooks the existence
of a gender bias that favors masculinity and masculine traits in leadership positions,
which previous literature has identified (Eagly & Karau, 2002). Moreover, critical mass
ignores that numerical representation does not equate with equality due to social and
cultural factors that have historically privileged men (Childs & Krook, 2008; Gustafson,
2008).
Strength in numbers. The idea behind strength in numbers implies solidarity,
which is an assumption that has been disputed (Ellemers et al., 2004; Mavin, 2008).
Existing research has demonstrated that equal opportunity strategy causes women’s
performance to be highly scrutinized. As members of the board, WOB’s performance is
measured in function to how much value they generate for the organization’s
shareholders, which may be contradictory to advocacy for other women, particularly in
relation to the gender pay gap. Therefore, despite numerical representation, women who
are appointed as a result of quotas or targets may not want to be seen as advocates of
women because it is not in their best interest. Previous research has indicated that for
different reasons, women who have risen to positions of power differentiate themselves
from other women. Rather than being seen as members of a group, they others to focus
on their individual contributions (Ellemers et al., 2004; Faniko et al., 2016).
Social identities. An overlooked assumption of critical mass of WOB as it relates
to outcomes for other women is that it would require gender identification. However,
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previous research has demonstrated that gender identification varies and that it can be
overridden by a more salient identity, such as race, ethnicity, or occupational identity.
This study tested critical mass of WOB at 20%, 25% and 30% and found no evidence that
women improved outcomes for other women. The majority of female directors of FTSE
boards were white and graduates from elite schools, similar to their male counterparts.
The experiences of women of color, or women of lower socio-economic
backgrounds may differ from the experiences of the women who occupy board seats.
Therefore, their perceptions of fairness of the gender system may differ based on the
intersection of their multiple identities that provide privileges and disadvantages to each
person. For example, Sheryl Sandberg, a prominent female leader has shared her thoughts
on what she believes is the problem for women in the workforce. Sandberg has stated
that women’s subordinate position in the workforce can be explained by their lack of
assertiveness. Academic literature, similarly, has provided evidence that demonstrates
women in positions of power tend to legitimize the inequality. In this case, the privileges
that race and class allow an individual may not be recognized as privileges, instead, they
may be perceived as well-deserved and help individuals rationalize injustice systems.
Previous literature has indicated that in relation to egalitarian attitudes, race is a better
predictor than gender. Consequently, in refining critical mass, the intersectionality of
identities must not be overlooked.
Implications to Policy
One of the major contributions of this study is that it provides evidence of the
effects of an initiative that is widely discussed by policy-makers across the world and
may inform future policy. The assumptions behind the increase of women’s board
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representation as a way to increase gender equality are rarely challenged. Based on the
study’s findings, it is likely that the promotion of policies and legislation for WOB, as a
stand-alone gender equality effort, will negatively impact gender equality in
organizations. Although WOB initiatives are effective tools for increasing women’s
participation on corporate boards, it does not solve the problem of gender inequality in
the workplace.
This study provided evidence that increasing gender diversity in the boardroom
does not increase women’s participation in executive positions or senior management.
Consequently, while removing barriers for women to top leadership roles is the right
thing to do, it is not enough. Theoretical (Eagly & Wood, 2000) and empirical evidence
provide support for the need for role models in the long-run as role structures and
behavioral expectations are malleable. However, role structures take time to change;
therefore, in conjunction with WOB initiatives, other measures must be implemented in
order reduce discrimination, uphold women’s rights, and contribute to a better, more
egalitarian society.
This study argues that it may be better to address the underlying problems that
create the gender gap on corporate boards. After Norway implemented the quota law for
corporate boards, the success of their initiative on increasing opportunities for women at
the top layers of business had a diffusion effect. However, despite the apparent success
of Norway’s quota law, Norway’s corporate leadership is still male-dominated, and their
pay gap statistics are similar to countries that do not have quota laws. Consequently, the
assumption that WOB initiatives will result in gender equality does not make logical
sense, as even in the context where quotas were first implemented, trickle down effects
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have not been observed. While it is early to see the full impact of the Davies Review on
gender equality in organizations, the findings of this study were consistent with findings
of the Norwegian quota law. Consequently, in the absence of evidence that would support
a top-down approach, it is more reasonable to explore the implementation of different or
additional approaches.
The way in which initiatives are communicated and implemented will impact
their outcome. The arguments used for promoting WOB, business case and the equality
case, are grounded on two opposing moral perspectives (van Dijk et al., 2012). Equality
is a universal principle; therefore, it cannot be supported by a conditional argument based
on financial gain. Moreover, an unsubstantiated conditional argument, that provides
moral justification for discrimination. If the objective of increasing the proportion of
WOB is the business case, that is, increased profitability and financial performance, the
initiative should not be part of an equalities agenda (HM Government, 2010), nor should
it be advertised as having the potential banish inequality in the workforce.
Promoting WOB initiatives with support of the business case creates the
expectation of increased financial performance and increases scrutiny on the performance
of WOB. The promotion of WOB initiatives should not rely on the business case.
Although this study does not challenge the legitimacy of initiatives through their potential
benefit to the bottom line, it argues that the potential financial benefit of WOB initiatives
has not been compellingly established. The most methodologically rigorous studies have
provided evidence that the relationship of WOB and measures of financial performance
are near zero. However, instead of promoting rigorous research and advertise that
women are just as capable as men at the highest positions of leadership, advocates
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continue to promote the idea that more WOB increase profits, which is untrue. Scholars
(Eagly, 2016) have indicated that in pursuit of their goals, advocates sometimes
misinterpret findings and ignore scientific research.
Policy-makers should take into account that the promotion of WOB initiatives
through the business case is misleading, unethical, and more importantly, it threatens the
achievement of equality, as it opens the door to the perpetuation of discrimination against
women. If the business case continues to be used to promote WOB initiatives, opponents
of WOB initiatives may use evidence of negative financial performance to justify
discrimination, and they would be morally justified to do so, as the business case is an
equality argument with a contingency on financial performance.
Policy should stop relying on correlational studies related to women and financial
performance, irrespective of how favorable they may seem for the promotion of diversity
initiatives, because they are misleading and distract the focus from the real benefits of
diversity. The promotion of WOB initiatives should be done honestly, citing the real
benefits of equality to society, acknowledging that women’s standing is the result of
discrimination, and upholding women’s rights. Ignoring that women’s lower status and
position in society and the workplace are the result of discrimination does not help create
awareness and does not help improve women’s future standing. Failing to see that
women’s different experiences related to their gender gives them a different perspective
that would be beneficial to the organization will not contribute to seeing gender diversity
as an asset.
This study has demonstrated that initiatives for WOB do not produce gender
equality; therefore, initiatives for WOB should not be introduced with the expectation
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that they will improve opportunities for other women in the organization or that they will
help close the gender pay gap. Removing barriers for women is not be the responsibility
of women but of society as a whole. The sole expectation that gender issues should be
fixed by women is sexist and will not contribute to the achievement of equality because it
removes half of the population responsible and able to contribute to fixing the problem.
Throughout history, there have been men that have used their influence, power and voice
to help women in the fight toward the achievement of equality. Those alliances are
critical and should not be overlooked. A problem associated with women championing
gender-related issues in the organization is that women already embody diversity;
therefore, if they bring up a gender issue, others may not see it, as their sole presence may
weaken the argument. Equality and diversity work should be equally distributed in an
organization.
Although the examination of perceptions of WOB was out of the scope of this
study; findings that indicated that women executive directors had decreased during the
Davies Review period and that there had not been an increase in the appointment of
female CEOs provides some evidence that despite the increase in numbers on corporate
boards, women’s status and asymmetrical power remain intact. Consequently, policy
makers should be aware that while providing women with equal opportunity to board
positions is the right thing to do, as it upholds women’s human rights; it may not result in
equality for women in the organization or even at the board level, as numerical
representation at the board level is only part of the problem.
Legislation should not only consider numerical representation. In addition to
numerical representation, policy could set minimum limits for executive and non-
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executive female board members. Although it is important that women are offered
opportunities as non-executive directors, those women are usually already serving on
other boards or are in executive boards in some organization. Therefore, opportunities
are not truly being created for women, but the same elite group of women get more
opportunities. Setting minimum limits for executive committees would act as an
incentive for organizations to include women in the pipeline for those roles, and to
include them in succession plans.
Transparency and standardization of reporting are fundamental to the examination
of an initiative. In the preparation of the database for the present study, it became
apparent that when an initiative is rolled out, a definition of the metrics to be reported
should be included in the documentation that details the initiative. When reporting their
board metrics, some organizations included the corporate secretary when calculating the
percentage female participation. When reporting senior management metrics, some
organizations considered senior management to be anyone in management, others
considered only their executive board, and others anyone above director levels.
Consistently, some organizations reported more than 20% of their population in senior
management, and others included only 1% of their population as senior management.
Although, this study separated each hierarchical level and re-calculated their metrics,
standardization in reporting would facilitate the evaluation and examination of WOB
initiatives.
One final implication to policy from this study is that as the findings of this study
have demonstrated, WOB are not the solution to the problem. Although opportunities for
WOB are just and fair, boards only represent a very small number of opportunities.
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Advocating for the rights of a few while ignoring the existing inequality for millions of
women in the workforce does not serve the vast majority of constituents of a society and
do not adhere to the world’s commitment to universal ideals of human dignity.
Acknowledging that WOB will not improve opportunities for other women, policymakers should look into ways to address inequalities in opportunity and participation.
Implications to Practice
The following section describes the implications that the study’s findings suggest
for practice within organizations affected by initiatives for WOB, the broader business
context, and for HRD.
In business, instrumental aspects cannot be dismissed, as organizations have a
responsibility to their shareholders. Consequently, this study does not challenge the
legitimacy of examining the effects of WOB initiatives on the bottom line. However, the
value that women bring to organizations is not directly related to the financial value of
the firm. In fact, recent studies have found that the relationship of WOB and financialrelated outcomes is near zero. Practitioners should promote that women as just as good
as men when it comes to generating value for the organization. Misleading claims of
superior profitability are not only untrue, but they place high scrutiny on women’s
performance. Additionally, diversity work should focus on the value that everyone brings
to an organization, not in creating a competitive environment in which one is recognized
as superior to the other.
Gender diversity as a resource that brings value to an organization should not be
overlooked. Women, and minorities, bring different experiences to an organization that
add value that goes beyond the bottom line. Therefore, organizations that appoint women
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to boards should keep their expectations of financial outcomes resulting from increased
female board representation realistic and conservative.
Practitioners should be aware that claims that indicate that adding women to a
board causes organizations to outperform others may alienate board male members and
male executives. Consequently, as organizations prepare to appoint female board
members, HRD practitioners should prepare the organization and foster awareness of the
benefits of having women on boards. One of those benefits is that it moves the
organization and society toward a fairer, more egalitarian system, in which men and
women have equal access and opportunities to contribute. Creating a gender diverse
workforce at every level is the right thing to do because it contributes to the achievement
of equality, which is a basic human right. A society in which everyone’s rights are
respected is a better society for all.
Although it has been argued that women will open doors for other women;
support for those claims is not strong. This study’s findings provided conflicting
evidence to that claim. Although women who aspire to board roles may have those
intentions going in, the extreme scrutiny on their performance, coupled with the
unrealistic promises resulting from misinterpreted data (e.g. 42% higher returns on sales,
Davies, 2011; 45% higher earnings per share, CA Senate Bill 862), may cause them to
put their advocacy aside in order to perform to the unrealistic standards that were
promised.
This study found that that an increase in opportunities for WOB are not
necessarily related in increased for opportunities for other women in the organization.
Research has previously suggested that the belief that organizational practices are gender
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neutral can have negative implications for women. With respect to the population of
organizations in the context of this study, special attention may be warranted, as the
visibility on these organizations’ WOB efforts may give the appearance of gender
equality. Practitioners should be aware that this could create blindness around genderissues and negatively impact other women in the organization. Although increasing
opportunities for women on corporate boards is important, this study did not find
evidence that supports the notion that targeting boards will have trickle down effects and
improve opportunities at other levels of the organization.
Furthermore, this study found a causal relationship of the increased proportion of
WOB and decreased opportunities for women on executive boards. This finding suggests
that the long-term success of gender diversity on corporate boards could be threatened by
a decreased supply of women in executive levels. HRD professionals should be aware
the visibility of corporate boards could create an illusion of gender neutral practices. In
order to eliminate discrimination in the workplace, women at every level should be
developed in the same proportion as men.
Findings of this study indicated compliance to the targets set by the Davies
Review decreased the proportion of women in the executive board. Although that finding
does not necessarily indicate that female directors hinder other women’s advancement, it
would be misleading to rule that as a possibility. In fact, previous studies have indicated
that in different contexts some women do have gender-biases, and actively prevent the
career progression of women. Discrimination is not perpetuated only by men. Vilifying
men and blaming them for women’s situation would ignore that many men have been
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women’s allies and continuously fight alongside women for the achievement of more
egalitarian society.
Much of the recent media coverage related to gender and power has put a negative
light on the relationship of men and women in the workplace. Practitioners should be
aware that men may be more cautious about mentoring female juniors. This study found
a lower supply of women on executive boards as a result of the increase of WOB. The
lower supply of female executives may widen the gap of women that go up the career
pipeline as they may not be able to take on multiple junior women to mentor them in how
to develop their careers. Practitioners should come up with creative solutions to this
problem if it is found in their organizations. Online mentoring sessions may be an
alternative to face-to-face sessions. In large organizations, mentor/mentee relationships
can be matched across the globe. That may increase the likelihood of executives to
accept female mentees.
Fostering awareness of the systematic biases that have put women in a
subordinate position should be done throughout the organization, not only at the highest
levels. Research has shown that gender-based gaps in the workplace start at the time
individuals enter the workforce. This indicates the existence of conscious or
subconscious gender biases that should be discussed in organizations that are truly
committed to achieving gender equality. Exercises for creating awareness of existing
subconscious biases can be the first step in moving an organization closer to gender
equality.
Some argue that increasing gender diversity on corporate boards should be based
on merit rather than quotas or targets; however, organizations are not the meritocracies
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we would like to believe they are (Castilla & Benard, 2010). In fact, scholars have found
that all things being equal, gender has been found to cause the variance in the disparities
in leadership positions (Bosak & Sczesny, 2011). Merit appears to be the word that
organizations use to justify unfair practices or perhaps their implicit bias. Therefore,
when designing initiatives to address gender inequality, policy-makers should be aware
of the inclination organizations have for citing merit when they are not meeting their
targets. Furthermore, it should be noted that women can also have those beliefs
(Ellemers, Van Den Heuvel, Gilder, Maass, & Bonvini, 2004; Mavin, 2008) and may be
unwilling to promote measures to support other women (Faniko, Ellemers, & Derks,
2016). Therefore, adding women to leadership roles does not solve the problem for other
women.
When developing an intervention for the creation of awareness of gendered
practices, practitioners should take into account men and women have biases against
women that they may not be aware of. For example, female managers who spend long
hours in the workplace may link their time spent at work with commitment to
differentiate themselves from other women and justify their higher position. Genderneutral practices require an evaluation of the practices that put women at a disadvantage.
The study’s findings also indicated that an increase in the percentage of WOB
increased the gender pay gap, which suggests that efforts for increasing women’s
participation on corporate boards are taking a forefront in the diversity efforts. The
gender pay gap impacts every employee in the organization, therefore, it cannot be
ignored. Practitioners should evaluate their organizational gender pay gaps and develop a
strategy to close them. The United Kingdom’s example to evaluate the organization’s
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gender pay gap and make the information public is an example to follow. Research has
suggested that accountability can help reduce gender bias (Foschi, 1996), and it can help
reduce discriminatory behavior (Castilla, 2008). However, organizations that are not
subject to the pay gap disclosure requirement should rely in their HRD professionals to
keep the organization accountable and honest with regard to their equal pay practices.
Limitations
Seven limitations should be contemplated when considering the contributions
found in this study. First, this study limited the sample of participants to organizations
that were indexed in the FTSE All Share from 2011 to 2016; any organizations that
entered or exited the index in that time frame were not included in the study. This
precludes from generalizing the results outside the publicly listed British organizations.
However, findings in this study should inform policy in countries with similar corporate
governance systems (e.g. United States, Canada and Australia). The particular
circumstances at the time of the Davies Review, including the potential imposition of
higher gender quotas to member states of the EU, made compliance to the initiative more
likely than non-compliance; therefore, it may not allow generalizations of the findings to
comply or explain approaches. The environment around the time of initiative may make
it more similar to quotas than comply or explain approaches; therefore, findings should
be used taking that into account.
Second, the study was not able to include organizational characteristics related to
diversity strategies and diversity policies that may have an impact in future gender
equality outcomes. Multiple scholars have suggested that the relationship of women in
leadership and their contribution to the organization is moderated by organizational
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characteristics. Ellemers and colleagues (2012) indicated that women’s perceptions of
gendered leadership beliefs in their organizations can cause them to distance themselves
from other women. Bierema (2017) argued that initiatives that focus on adding women to
positions previously unavailable to them is not effective because the organizational
hierarchy and structure remains unchanged. Considering the importance of the
organizational structure, and strategy with regard to the impact WOB could have on the
organization, the absence of organizational characteristics variables in this study
represents a limitation.
The third limitation of this study is that it does not examine the intersections of
gender, race, ethnicity, and class (socio-economic background).

Although race and

ethnicity data were collected for each female director, the sample was very homogenous,
with about 95% being reported as white. Perhaps a contributing factor to that
demographic was that in the United Kingdom, the population is predominantly white,
accounting for 86% of the total population according to the latest census of 2011, which
was a decrease from 91.3% in 2001 (Office for National Statistics, 2011). Therefore, the
homogeneous racial characteristics do not seem to deviate much from the population,
suggesting that due to the sample characteristics, it is a limitation of this study. However,
studies done in other contexts in which populations are more racially diverse should
include the variable in their studies, as literature has identified a bias against racial and
ethnic minorities (Carton & Rosette, 2011; Rosette et al., 2011). Therefore, the
intersection of the gender and race may impact the influence women of color have on the
board, which may hinder their ability to advocate for equality causes.
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Socio-economic background was not one of the individual characteristics of
directors used in this study. Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) upper echelons theory
provided the framework for the link between managers’ socioeconomic background and
approach to management. Their conceptualization of the organization as a reflection of its
leaders may be used to provide some understanding of what characteristics may
contribute to differences in WOB. Nevertheless, this study did not collect data for those
variables, which may limit the understanding of the findings. Basing that assumption on
the fact the majority of directors attended the same elite universities, the sample of
female directors collected for this study appeared to be socioeconomically homogeneous.
However, assuming that directors come from a particular socioeconomic background
based on the university they attended is perhaps not the best way to measure
socioeconomic background; therefore, it is a limitation of this study.
The fourth limitation of this study was that it did not include the political
affiliation of the directors included in the sample. Political affiliation has been found to
been found to explain more than gender on policies related to social justice and equality
causes for women in politics (Campbell, Childs, & Lovenduski, 2010; Kittlison, 2006;
Lloren, 2015; Lovenduski & Norris, 2003; Norris, 1986). Research has identified that
liberalism is strongly associated with advocacy for women’s rights (Cramer-Walsh, 2002,
p. 177). Although an effort was made to identify the political affiliation of the directors
in the study’s sample, attempts were not successful; therefore, it is a limitation of this
study.
The fifth limitation of this study is that it did not collect data related to the
organization’s merit policy for the full sample. Multiple organizations stated that the
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reasons they were not more gender diverse was that they had a merit policy. However,
fairness and merit have been identified as the most salient counter-argument to WOB
initiatives (Leszczynska, 2017; Storvik & Teigen, 2010). Therefore, an analysis of
organizations that believe, and explicitly announce, that their appointments are based on
merit, may provide some insight into a gap in the organizational understanding of and
acknowledgement of the disadvantages that women face, which in turn may be
contributing to the gender gap.
The sixth limitation of this study is related to the reliance on the quality of data
supplied by FTSE organizations on their annual reports. In building the study’s database,
the possibility of a systematic bias in reporting was found. During the data collection
process, it was noted that multiple organizations included the corporate secretary in their
board gender metrics, when the corporate secretary was a woman. Similarly,
organizations reported incorrect percentages. Percentages for this study were
recalculated to include board metrics including only board members; however, in
retrospect, analyzing the characteristics of organizations in relation to the quality of their
reporting may provide some insight to the relationship of governance and business ethics
(Labelle, Gargouri, & Francoeur, 2010). Although every effort was made to ensure the
accuracy of data, the findings of this study are limited to the truthfulness of metrics
reported by FTSE organizations.
The final limitation of this study is that although it used a data imputation method
to avoid the bias associated with listwise deletion, hypotheses tests related to the gender
pay gap did not use imputed data, which suggests that the full magnitude of the effect of
WOB on the gender pay gap is not completely understood.
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Recommendations for Future Research
This study creates five directions for future research. First, organizational culture
has been associated with policies that promote gender equality and aid women’s career
progression. Depending on the organizational culture, some women directors may not
want to raise issues that impact other women. Ellemers and colleagues (2012) found that
in organizations with gendered leadership expectations, women leaders chose to distance
themselves from other women. Therefore, future research should evaluate the impact of
organizational culture on the impact of WOB and their advocacy of gender-related causes.
Future research should include socio-economic background of directors. Previous
studies have suggested that interaction with people from different social groups reduces
prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) and also reduces identification with members of a
historically disadvantaged group (Dixon et al., 2012). Consequently, women who have
been members of a privileged socio-economic group may not identify with women as
much as they identify with the men of their same socio-economic background.
Furthermore, women who have not faced the same barriers other women have faced may
find it difficult to identify with them (Stroebe et al., 2009). Women leaders who do not
acknowledge the disadvantages others face may not be willing to promote policies to help
other women (Faniko et al., 2016). Previous studies have found that directors of
corporate boards were not representative of the general population (Ferreira, 2015),
moreover, they appear to be a very homogeneous group. Therefore, exploring the effects
of socio-economic background of directors of corporate boards on gender equality may
increase the understanding of the personal characteristics of WOB that may impact
gender equality.
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The third recommendation for future research is including the political affiliation
of board members. There is significant body of research that indicates that political
affiliation is more related to social justice and equality advocacy than gender (Campbell,
Childs, & Lovenduski, 2010; Kittlison, 2006; Lloren, 2015; Lovenduski & Norris, 2003;
Norris, 1986). Liberal political inclination is strongly associated with advocacy for
women’s rights (Cramer-Walsh, 2002, p. 177). Therefore, including political affiliation
in the relationship of WOB and gender equality in the organization may provide a better
understanding of what type of woman on corporate boards would have the biggest impact
in promoting gender equality in their organizations.
The fourth recommendation for future research relates to the identification of
systematic bias in reporting. Multiple organizations report their gender metrics with
errors and several have failed to report their gender pay gap. Previous research has
identified that the quality of reporting may be related to business ethics (Labelle et al.,
2010). Therefore, an examination of mistakes and omissions in the reporting of gender
metrics may provide some insights as to the characteristics of organizations ethics and
commitment to diversity.
The fifth recommendation for future research relates to the examination of WOB
initiatives in other contexts. Hard law and soft law approaches for WOB have been
implemented in multiple countries. This study serves as a template for examining the
effects of WOB initiatives in other contexts. Although this study tested the concept of
critical mass, more research is needed to see under which conditions critical mass of
WOB may be reached. Non-profit organizations may also be a good context for future
research, as the nature of non-profit institutions is advocate for a social cause; therefore,
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with the profit contingency aside, the effect of gender in the WOB and opportunities for
women relationship may be easier to isolate.
Summary of the Chapter
This chapter contained five sections. The first section presented a discussion of
the results from Chapter 4 and the relationships to relevant literature. The second section
discussed implications for theory, policy, and HRD practice. The third section described
the limitations of the study. The fourth section provided recommendations for future
research. The chapter concluded with a summary.
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Appendix A. Initiatives for increasing WOB by Country
Country
UK

Type
Comply or
explain

Regulating body/code
Corporate governance
code

Sanctions
Threat of
legislation

Date
2011

Target
2015

2016

2020

Norway

Legislation

The Norwegian Public
Limited Liability
Companies Act

Dissolution

2003

2008

U.S.

Comply or
explain

The US Securities and
Exchange commission
diversity reporting
requirements February
2010.

No

2010

None

Spain

Legislation, with
comply or
explain
requirement.

Spain’s financial
securities regulator,
CNMV.

Noncompliance
will impact
public
contracts

2007

2020

Target organizations
Publicly listed FTSE 350

All public listed Companies
and state-owned enterprises,
intermunicipal companies,
large cooperatives, and
companies that are more
than two-thirds municipally
owned.
Public listed companies

Both listed and non-listed
companies. 2014 Act.

Description
FTSE 100 targets - 25% WOB,
FTSE 250, around 20%
33% WOB, 33% Executive
Committee
40% WOB

California: In 2018 CA Senate
Bill 826 was passed. Minimum 1,
3 for boards of 9+
Massachusetts: 2015 resolution
calling for companies with boards
of 9. Minimum 3.
Illinois: 2015 target to have at
least three women directors in the
following 3 years. Minimum 1, 2
for boards 5-9.
Pennsylvania: Set a 30% target for
women representation on boards
by 2020.
30% WOB

(continued)
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Appendix A. Initiatives for increasing WOB by Country (Continued)
Country
Germany

Type
Legislation for
executives

Regulating body/code
Act of parliament

Sanctions
Women
will fill
vacant
seats

Date
2015

Target
2016

Target organizations
Private and public listed
companies as well as state
owned enterprises.

Description
30% WOB executive positions

Italy

Legislation
(Limited to first
three board
terms)

Fines

2011

By 3rd
board
renewal.

All listed companies and
public companies

20% WOB for first term to target
of 33% WOB after 3 terms

Canada

There are no
gender quotas in
Canada for
women on the
boards of public
companies
Comply or
explain

The prime minister and
the minister for equal
opportunities oversee
compliance with the
law for public
companies. Italian
securities commission
CONSUB
Government legislation
for government owner
enterprises.

No

2016

2019

Government owned
enterprises and public
owned not for profit
enterprises

ASX corporate
governance council,
Corporate governance
principals and
recommendations.

No

2015

2018

ASX 200 companies

The Province of Ontario 40%
WOB by 2019
A 50 % gender quota for boards
came into effect in 2011 for
government-owned enterprises in
Quebec.
The Australian Institute of
directors recommended a target
of 30% WOB.

Australia

Iceland

Legislation

Act on equal status of
men and women

Yes

2010

2013

All companies with more
than 50 employees

Belgium

Legislation

The Gender Act 2007

Yes

2011

2017/2019

Listed companies and some
federal state owned
companies

40% WOB. Boards consisting of
three members must have both
sexes represented.
33% WOB

(continued)
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Appendix A. Initiatives for increasing WOB by Country (Continued)
Country
The
Netherlands

Type
The Dutch
Management
and Supervisory
Act1 comply or
explain quota

Regulating body/code
Corporate governance
code

Sanctions
Threat of
legislation

Date
2013

Target
2017
extended
from
2016

Target organizations
Listed companies

Description
30% WOB

France

Legislation

The Quota Law of
2011

Yes

2011

2017

40% WOB

Sweden

Comply or
explain

Corporate governance
code

No

2010

None

Corporate boards of
publicly listed
companies, public bodies,
public administration,
territorial collectivities, and
several civil
society institutions
Private and public listed
companies
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An equal distribution among the
sexes shall be the goal.

Appendix B. Examples of Diversity Statements
Man Group, Annual Report 2016, p. 28:

Bodycote, Annual Report 2016, p. 39:
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Fidessa Group, Annual Report 2016, p. 46:

Fresnillo, 2016, p. 126:

GKN, Annual Report 2016, p.72:

Morgan Advanced Materials, 2016, p. 69:

482

Unite Group, Annual Report 2016, p. 65:
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Appendix C. Data License Documentation
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Appendix A: Support for building database
Appendix Examples
D. Examples of Mistakes
Inconsistencies
Found
in DaviesUsed
Reviews andfor
Annual
Reports
ofandErrors
on
Data
Davies
Reports
168+28=196 ≠ 189

143/781 = 18.3%
20/305=6.6%
163/1086=15%

Davies report (2015)

485

Reckitt Benckiser

Verified on Company’s
House website.

10/14/18

31

Davies report (2013). p. 16

486

Home Retail Group

%WOB = 28.57

10/14/18

32

487

2742-1076
=1666

10/14/18

2742-1076
=1966

33

Davies report (2011) p. 11

488

Board size is 11 for 2016 (4 women). 9 for
2017 and 2018 (3 women).

Nat. Grid. Board size increased to 12 with the
appointment of one WNEDon July 2016.
Pearson. Only 3 NED in the years 2014-2017

10/14/18

34

Hampton-Alexander report (2016) p. 39

489

Severn Trent
WOB% 36.36
≠ 44.4

10/14/18

35

490

National Grid
WOB% 33.33
≠ 36.4

10/14/18

36

491

Pearson
WOB% 30
≠ 36.4

10/14/18

37

492

Example of the need for validating
discrepancies in annual reports using official
data from Company’s House database.

10/14/18

38

493

Whitbread (2015) reported that 36% of female
directors. 4/10= 40%.

Examples of the need for recalculating
percentages for each board.

Fuller & Smith (2015)
reported that 11% of
directors are female.
1/10 = 10%

U & I (2015) reported that 12.5%
of directors are female.
2 / 9 = 22.22%
10/14/18

39
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Appendix E. R Syntax for Analyses Replication
###Load necessary packages and install libraries
library(doBy)
library("rddtools")
library(plm)
library(tseries) # for `adf.test()`
library(dynlm) #for function `dynlm()`
library(vars) # for function `VAR()`
library(nlWaldTest) # for the `nlWaldtest()` function
library(lmtest) #for `coeftest()` and `bptest()`.
library(broom) #for `glance(`) and `tidy()`
library(PoEdata) #for PoE4 datasets
library(car) #for `hccm()` robust standard errors
library(sandwich)
library(knitr) #for `kable()`
library(forecast)
library(systemfit)
library(AER)
library(xtable)
library(MASS)
library(cowplot)
library(ggpmisc)
library(ggplot2)
require("ggplot2")
library(ggpubr)
library(rdd)
library(base)
library(nlme)
require("dummies")
library(lsr)
library(car)
library(plotly)
library(easyGgplot2)
library(gridExtra)
library("gvlma")
library(dplyr)
library(lattice)
library(rdlocrand)
#install.packages("MVN")
#devtools::install_github('selcukorkmaz/MVN')
library(rdrobust)
library("VIM")
library(mice)
library(corrplot)
library(psych)
library(spidade)
library(nlme)
library(mice)
library(miceadds)
library(micemd)
library(GGally)
##Set working directory
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setwd("/users/ /desktop/Datasets/")
#Read data - This file has complete data before data imputation - NAs
in 2008 =10, NAs in 2009=4
d<-read.csv("WOB Dataset - Vertical.csv")
#Set to data frame and identify factors and levels
d <- data.frame(d)
d$Year<-as.factor(d$Year)
#Compare baseline variables for Phase I
d2011<-subset(d,Year=="2011")
#Identify treatment and control groups based on thresholds on the
forcing variable
d2011$Women<-ifelse(d2011$Index=="FTSE 100"& (d2011$WOBPC<25),
"Yes", ifelse(d2011$Index=="FTSE 250"& (d2011$WOBPC<22), "Yes",
ifelse(d2011$Index=="FTSE Small Cap"& (d2011$WOBPC<19), "Yes",
"No")))
#Alternatively, data laid out in vertical form can be used and may be
easier for several analyses. Everitt (2005) explains how to rearrange
data from horizontal to vertical format (p. 179), each arrangement's
use depends on the analysis. Follow those steps or use this format:
#Read data
ds<-read.csv("WOB Dataset - Horizontal.csv")
ds <- data.frame(ds)
summary(ds)
#Using 2011 as baseline, we start creating and centering variables
ds$Increase<-(ds$X2016WOBPC-ds$X2011WOBPC) #percentage points of
increase in the Davies period
ds$Index2011<-as.factor(ds$Index2011)
ds$WOB2011<-ds$X2011WOBPC
ds$Post16<-ds$X2016WOBPC
ds$Critical<-ifelse(ds$X2016WOB<3,"No", "Yes")
ds$Critical<-as.factor(ds$Critical)
#For Testing pseudo outcomes
ds$BoardInc<-(ds$X2016Board-ds$X2011Board)
#Subset data by group
d100<-subset(ds, ds$Index2011 == "FTSE 100")
d250<-subset(ds, ds$Index2011 == "FTSE 250")
dSmall<-subset(ds, ds$Index2011 == "FTSE Small Cap")
#Center at Target by group
d100$Pre<-scale(d100$X2011WOBPC, center=25, scale=FALSE)
d100$Pre2<-(d100$Pre^2)
d100$Pre3<-(d100$Pre^3)
d100$Pre4<-(d100$Pre^4)
d250$Pre<-scale(d250$X2011WOBPC, center=22, scale=FALSE)
d250$Pre2<-(d250$Pre^2)
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d250$Pre3<-(d250$Pre^3)
d250$Pre4<-(d250$Pre^4)
dSmall$Pre<-scale(dSmall$X2011WOBPC, center=19, scale=FALSE)
estimated IF they were following Davies recommendations
dSmall$Pre2<-(dSmall$Pre^2)
dSmall$Pre3<-(dSmall$Pre^3)
dSmall$Pre4<-(dSmall$Pre^4)

#

#Bind into a dataset
dsT<-rbind(d100,d250,dSmall)
d350<-rbind(d100,d250)
d350$Treatment<-ifelse(d350$Pre<0,0,1)
d350$Index2011<-as.factor(d350$Index2011)
dsT$Index2011<-as.factor(dsT$Index2011)

#Group Differences by Industry sector for pooled sample
Sector<-table(d2011$Sector, d2011$Women)
#Fisher's test is more precise than chi-square in small samples. It
takes longer than chi square, if workspace is not big enough, increase
workspace using "fisher.test(d2011, workspace=2e8)". If it still takes
too long to return a result, simulate the p-value by including
"simulate.p.value", which is the logic for computing p-values by monte
carlo simulations, "B" is the number of replicates. The default is 2000,
but it can be set to whatever you need it to be.
fisher.test(Sector, simulate.p.value=TRUE,B=1e7)
chisq.test(Sector)
cramersV(Sector)
#Group Differences by FTSE for pooled sample
Index<-table(d2011$Index, d2011$Women)
fisher.test(Index)
chisq.test(Index)
cramersV(Index)
#Group Differences by CEO for pooled sample
CEO<-table(d2011$CEOGnd, d2011$Women)
fisher.test(CEO)
chisq.test(CEO)
cramersV(CEO)
#Group Differences by Chair for pooled sample
Chair<-table(d2011$ChairGnd, d2011$Women)
fisher.test(Chair)
chisq.test(Chair)
cramersV(Chair)
#Any variable can be compared using the logic above. To test the exact
difference in the likelihood of organizations being in one particular
sector compared to all other sectors, a matrix can be used with the
results of the Sector test that done before
#See the table that splits the sample by sector and treatment/control
group
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Sector
##Use those results to test each sector's likelihood of being in an
organization more than the others. These results are computed using a
2X2 matrix; therefore, the odds ratio is also computed.
CG<-as.matrix(c(30,315,7,43))
dim(CG)<-c(2,2)
fisher.test(CG)
chisq.test(CG)
cramersV(CG)
CS<-as.matrix(c(70,275,15,35))
dim(CS)<-c(2,2)
fisher.test(CS)
chisq.test(CS)
cramersV(CS)
En<-as.matrix(c(20,325,0,50))
dim(En)<-c(2,2)
fisher.test(En)
chisq.test(En)
cramersV(En)
Fin<-as.matrix(c(67,278,7,43))
dim(Fin)<-c(2,2)
fisher.test(Fin)
chisq.test(Fin)
cramersV(Fin)
HC<-as.matrix(c(10,335,4,46))
dim(HC)<-c(2,2)
fisher.test(HC)
chisq.test(HC)
cramersV(HC)
Ind<-as.matrix(c(97,248,9,41))
dim(Ind)<-c(2,2)
fisher.test(Ind)
chisq.test(Ind)
cramersV(Ind)
Mat<-as.matrix(c(27,318,2,48))
dim(Mat)<-c(2,2)
fisher.test(Mat)
chisq.test(Mat)
cramersV(Mat)
Tec<-as.matrix(c(13,332,3,47))
dim(Tec)<-c(2,2)
fisher.test(Tec)
chisq.test(Tec)
cramersV(Tec)
TC<-as.matrix(c(5,340,2,48))
dim(TC)<-c(2,2)
fisher.test(TC)
chisq.test(TC)
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cramersV(TC)
Uti<-as.matrix(c(6,339,1,49))
dim(Uti)<-c(2,2)
fisher.test(Uti)
chisq.test(Uti)
cramersV(Uti)
#Correlations should be done by group. Compute within and between
correlations including the probability of between group correlations,
and intraclass correlations to see how different the groups are. For
this test, it is easy to use the vertical format of the dataset because
it uses the computed value for Increase, which is the difference
between 2016 and 2011.
#I run correlations prior to data imputation to observe the strength of
the bivariate relationships, which should help for the data imputation
process. Run correlations again after data imputation.
#Correlations Phase 1 - with baseline covariates
Correlations1<-dsT1[,c("SectorN","Increase", "X2011Board",
"X2011WOBPC", "X2011WOB","X2011WED", "X2011WNED","X2011Total",
"X2011CEOGnd","X2011ChairGnd", "Index2011", "TreatPhase1" )]
CorPhase1<- statsBy(Correlations1,c("Index2011"),cor=TRUE,
cors=TRUE)
#group by one or two grouping variables. For the
longitudinal sample use "c("Year", "Index")
print(CorPhase1,short=FALSE)
lowerMat(CorPhase1$pbg) #get the probability values for betweenthe lowerMat function makes it look nicer showing only the lower
part of the matrix
lowerMat(CorPhase1$pwg) #get the probability values for within
lowerMat(CorPhase1$ICC2) #get the probability values
round(CorPhase1$etawg)
#show means by groups
round(CorPhase1$etabg, 2)
round(CorPhase1$etawg, 2)
round(CorPhase1$mean, 2)
round(CorPhase1$sd, 2)
#show intraclass correlation - total variance associated with
grouping variable
round(CorPhase1$ICC1, 2)
#show intraclass correlation - how much groups differ
round(CorPhase1$ICC2, 2)
round(CorPhase1$r,2)
round(CorPhase1$n,2)
round(CorPhase1$F, 2)
#Correlations Phase 2
dsT1$TreatPhase2<-ifelse(dsT1$X2016WOBPC<25, 0, 1)
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Correlations2<-dsT1[,c("SectorN", "Index2011", "Increase",
"X2016Board","X2016WOBPC","WExecPCImp", "WSMPCImp", "X2016WEmpPC",
"X2016CEOGnd","CEOTenure", "X2016ChairGnd", "ChairTenure",
"Critical", "TreatPhase2", "PayGapMean", "PayGapMedian")]
names(Correlations2)<-c("Sector", "Index", "Increase",
"Board16","WOBPC16","WExecPC16", "WSMPC16", "WEmpPC16",
"CEOGnd","CEOTenure", "ChairGnd", "ChairTenure", "Critical",
"Treatment", "PayGapMean", "PayGapMedian")
CorPhase2<- statsBy(Correlations2,c("Index"),cor=TRUE, cors=TRUE,
method="pearson")
#group by grouping variables
print(CorPhase2,short=FALSE)
lowerMat(CorPhase2$pbg) #get the probability values
lowerMat(CorPhase2$rwg) #pooled correlations values
lowerMat(CorPhase2$r) #pooled correlations values
round(CorPhase2$mean,2)
round(CorPhase2$sd,2)
CorPhase2$ci1
CorPhase2$ci2
CorPhase2$F
CorPhase2$n
CorPhase2$rwg
CorPhase2$etawg
CorPhase2$etabg
#show intraclass correlation - total variance associated with
grouping variable
round(CorPhase1$ICC1, 2)
#show intraclass correlation - how much groups differ
round(CorPhase1$ICC2, 2)
###Check for spurious correlations using female director
characteristics
#Data imputation - This can be done one variable at a time or all at
the same time.
#Datasets with too many variables do not do well. Select no more than
15-20 variables that can help predict the outcome. Use results of
correlations and run regressions to choose the best predictors.
Frame<-dsT[,c("Firm", "X2016WOBPC", "X2016WSMPC",
"X2016WExecPC","X2016CEOGnd", "X2016WEmpPC", "SectorN", "Group",
"X2016WED", "Increase", "Critical", "X2016ChairGnd", "CEOTenure",
"ChairTenure", "Sector", "Index2011", "PayGapMean",
"PayGapMedian")]
#Look at the missingness pattern
md.pattern(Frame)
p<-md.pairs(Frame)
#Observe marginplots to try identify the missingness mechanism - This
should be done qualitavely based on existing literature and using
researcher's judgement. Marginplots are a helpful supplement.
marginplot(Frame[, c("X2016WOBPC", "X2016WSMPC")])
marginplot(Frame[, c("X2016WExecPC", "X2016WSMPC")])
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marginplot(Frame[, c("X2016WEmpPC", "X2016WSMPC")])
marginplot(Frame[, c("PayGapMedian", "X2016WSMPC")])
#Test using multiple methods. 2l.norm for level 1 heteroscedastic
variance using Bayesian regression, 2l.pan for homoscedastic variance.
2l.pmm for 2level predictive mean matching
## Use -2 for grouping variable, 2 for random effects (2 includes
random AND fixed), 1 is for fixed effects, and 0 for variables that are
in the dataset but are not predictors in the imputation.
ini<-mice(Frame, maxit=0)
pred<-ini$pred
meth<-ini$meth
meth["X2016WSMPC"]<-"2l.pmm"
meth["X2016WExecPC"]<-"2l.pmm"
meth["PayGapMean"]<-"2l.norm"
meth["PayGapMedian"]<-"2l.norm"
pred[c("X2016WSMPC", "X2016WExecPC", "PayGapMean",
"PayGapMedian"), "Group"]<--2
pred[c("X2016WSMPC", "X2016WExecPC", "PayGapMean"),
"Sector"]<-0
pred[c("X2016WSMPC", "X2016WExecPC", "PayGapMean",
"PayGapMedian"), "Firm"]<-0
pred[c("X2016WSMPC", "X2016WExecPC", "PayGapMean",
"PayGapMedian"), "X2016WOBPC"]<-2
pred[c("X2016WSMPC", "X2016WExecPC", "PayGapMean",
"PayGapMedian"), "SectorN"]<-1
pred[c("X2016WExecPC", "PayGapMean", "PayGapMedian"),
"Increase"]<-2
pred[c("X2016WSMPC"), "Increase"]<-0
pred[c("X2016WSMPC", "PayGapMean", "PayGapMedian"),
"X2016WEmpPC"]<-2
pred[c("X2016WSMPC", "X2016WExecPC", "PayGapMean"),
"X2016CEOGnd"]<-1
pred[c("X2016WSMPC","PayGapMean", "PayGapMedian"),
"X2016WED"]<-0
pred[c("X2016WExecPC"), "X2016WED"]<-2
pred[c("PayGapMedian"), "X2016WExecPC"]<-0
pred[c("X2016WExecPC"), "X2016WSMPC"]<-2
pred[c("X2016WExecPC"), "X2016WEmpPC"]<-0
pred[c("X2016WExecPC", "X2016WSMPC"), "PayGapMean"]<-0
pred[c("X2016WExecPC", "X2016WSMPC"), "PayGapMedian"]<-0
pred[c("X2016WExecPC", "PayGapMean"), "Critical"]<-1
pred[c("PayGapMedian"), "Critical"]<-0
pred[c("X2016WSMPC", "PayGapMean"), "X2016WExecPC"]<-2
pred[c("PayGapMean"), "X2016WSMPC"]<-2
pred[c("PayGapMean"), "PayGapMedian"]<-2
pred[c("PayGapMedian"), "PayGapMean"]<-2
ini<-mice(Frame, pred=pred, meth=meth, seed=35922,
maxit=20)
ini1<-mice(Frame, pred=pred, meth=meth, seed=35922,
maxit=1)
a<-runif(10)

501

ini2<-mice.mids(ini1, maxit=3, print=FALSE)
all(ini$ini$X2016WExecPC==ini2$ini$X2016WExecPC)
#Visualize your imputations
stripplot(ini, pch=20, cex=1.2)
bwplot(ini)
densityplot(ini, scales=list(x=list(relation="free")),
layout=c(2,2))
densityplot(imp, scales=list(x=list(relation="free")),
layout=c(2,2))
plot(ini, c("X2016WExecPC", "X2016WSMPC", "PayGapMean",
"PayGapMedian"), layout=c(2,4))
##Testing with additional imputations to visualize convergence
imp40 <- mice.mids(ini, maxit=35, print=F)
plot(imp40, c("X2016WExecPC", "X2016WSMPC", "PayGapMean",
"PayGapMedian"), layout=c(2,4))
#Post-processing imputation - If 2l.norm or 2l.pan are used, it is
possible that imputed data will need post-processing. In this case,
data for the percentage of female executives had negative numbers,
indicating that adjustments were needed as it exceeded the range of 0
to 100. Similar adjustments can be done for MNAR data.
Frame2<-cbind(Frame, X2016WExecPC2=NA)
ini<-mice(Frame2, max=0, print=FALSE)
meth<-ini$meth
meth[c("X2016WExecPC2", "X2016WExecPC")]<c("~log(X2016WExecPC)", "norm")
pred<-ini$pred
pred[c("Firm", "Sector", "Index2011","X2016WOBPC",
"X2016WExecPC", "X2016WEmpPC", "SectorN", "Group",
"X2016WED", "Critical", "X2016ChairGnd", "CEOTenure",
"ChairTenure", "PayGapMean", "PayGapMedian"),
"X2016WExecPC2"]<-0
pred["X2016WSMPC", "X2016WExecPC"]<-0
post<-ini$post
post["X2016WExecPC"]<- "imp[[j]][,i]<-squeeze(imp[[j]][,i],
c(0,100))"
imp<-mice(Frame2, meth=meth, pred=pred, post=post,
seed=25922, maxit=10, print=FALSE)
imp$imp$X2016WEmpPC
#Testing fit of the regression
fit<-with(ini,
lm(X2016WExecPC~Increase+X2016WOBPC+SectorN+Index2011))
print(pool(fit))
round(summary(pool(fit)), 2)
T1<-lm(X2016WExecPC~Increase+X2016WOBPC+ SectorN+Index2011,
data=dsT)
summary(T1)
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test<-lm(X2016WSMPC~X2016WOBPC+X2016WExecPC, data=dsT)
summary(test)
fit1<-with(ini,
lm(X2016WSMPC~X2016WOBPC+X2016WExecPC+Index2011))
print(pool(fit1))
round(summary(pool(fit1)), 2)
###Kenda's Tau
m=5
T<-20
ini.kendall<-mice(Frame, m=m, meth=ini$meth, pred=ini$pred,
maxit=0, print=FALSE)
tau<-matrix(NA, nrow=T, ncol=m)
for (i in 1:T){ if (i==1)set.seed(9212)
ini.kendall<-mice.mids(ini, maxit=1, print=FALSE)
x<-complete(ini.kendall, "repeated")[, paste("Increase",
1:m, sep=".")]
y<-complete(ini.kendall, "repeated")[, paste("X2016WExecPC",
1:m, sep=".")]
xn<-as.data.frame(lapply(x, as.numeric))
yn<-as.data.frame(lapply(y, as.numeric))
tau[i,]<-diag(cor(xn, yn, method="kendall"))}
##Propensity scores
Exec.na<-is.na(Frame$X2016WExecPC)
fit.Exec<-with(ini,
glm(Exec.na~Increase+X2016WSMPC+X2016WOBPC+SectorN+Index201
1, family=binomial))
ps<-rep(rowMeans(sapply(fit.Exec$analyses, fitted.values)),
6)
Exec<-complete(imp, "long", TRUE)$X2016WExecPC
fit<-lm(Exec~poly(ps,4))
densityplot(~residuals(fit), group=Exec.na,
plot.points=FALSE,
ref=TRUE, scales=list(y=list(draw=FALSE)),
par.settings=simpleTheme(col.line=rep(mdc(1:2))),
xlab="Residuals of regression of WExecPC on propensity
score", lwd=2)
#Extract all 5 imputations into 1 file
Com<-complete(ini, "long", include=TRUE)
summary(Com)
write.csv(Com, "Com 10 imputationsALL.csv")
###Statistical assumptions
##Assuming file has already been uploaded and all.
###Observe density/distributions of the assignment variable - WOBPC16
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Den1<-ggplot2.density(data=dsT1, xName='WOBPC16',
groupName='Index2011', mainTitle="FTSE All Share - By
Group",
legendPosition=c(0.75,0.8), alpha=0.05,
fillGroupDensity=TRUE, addMeanLine=TRUE,
backgroundColor="gray98", gridColor="darkgray")
Den2<-ggplot2.density(data=d100, xName='WOBPC16',
mainTitle="FTSE 100", fillGroupDensity=TRUE,
addMeanLine=TRUE,
backgroundColor="gray98", gridColor="darkgray")
Den3<-ggplot2.density(data=d250, xName='WOBPC16',
mainTitle="FTSE 250", fillGroupDensity=TRUE,
addMeanLine=TRUE,
backgroundColor="gray98", gridColor="darkgray")
Den4<-ggplot2.density(data=dSmall, xName='WOBPC16',
mainTitle="FTSE Small Cap", fillGroupDensity=TRUE,
addMeanLine=TRUE,
backgroundColor="gray98", gridColor="darkgray")
grid.arrange(Den1, Den2, Den3, Den4, ncol=2, nrow=2,
top="Assignment Variable Distribution")
###Observe density/distributions of the assignment variable Increase
Den1<-ggplot2.density(data=dsT1, xName='Increase',
groupName='Index2011', mainTitle="FTSE All Share - By
Group",
legendPosition=c(0.75,0.8), alpha=0.05,
fillGroupDensity=TRUE, addMeanLine=TRUE,
backgroundColor="gray98", gridColor="darkgray")
Den2<-ggplot2.density(data=d100, xName='Increase',
mainTitle="FTSE 100", fillGroupDensity=TRUE,
addMeanLine=TRUE,
backgroundColor="gray98", gridColor="darkgray")
Den3<-ggplot2.density(data=d250, xName='Increase',
mainTitle="FTSE 250", fillGroupDensity=TRUE,
addMeanLine=TRUE,
backgroundColor="gray98", gridColor="darkgray")
Den4<-ggplot2.density(data=dSmall, xName='Increase',
mainTitle="FTSE Small Cap", fillGroupDensity=TRUE,
addMeanLine=TRUE, backgroundColor="gray98",
gridColor="darkgray")
grid.arrange(Den1, Den2, Den3, Den4, ncol=2, nrow=2,
top="Assignment Variable Distribution")
###Normality Tests for the All Share pooled sample and individual
indices
mod0<-lm(PayGapMedian~X2016WOBPC+
WExecPCImp+WSMPCImp+X2016WEmpPC+CEOTenure+ChairTenure+Secto
r+Index2011, data=dsT1)
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par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot(mod0)
gvlma::gvlma(mod0)
mod0<-lm(WSMPCImp~X2016WOBPC+
Increase+X2016Board+WExecPCImp+X2016WEmpPC+CEOTenure+ChairT
enure+Sector, data=dsT1)
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot(mod0)
gvlma::gvlma(mod0)
mod0<-lm(WExecPCImp~X2016WOB+
X2016WOBPC+X2016Board+WSMPCImp+X2016WEmpPC+CEOTenure+ChairT
enure+Sector, data=dsT1100)
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot(mod0)
gvlma::gvlma(mod0)
#Final for EmpPC
mod0<-lm(X2016WEmpPC~X2016WOBPC+
X2016Board+WExecPCImp+WSMPCImp+CEOTenure+ChairTenure+Sector
+Index2011, data=dsT1)
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot(mod0)
gvlma::gvlma(mod0)
#Final for EmpPC by Index
mod0<-lm(X2016WEmpPC~X2016WOBPC+
X2016Board+WExecPCImp+WSMPCImp+CEOTenure+ChairTenure+Sector,
data=dsT1Small)
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot(mod0)
gvlma::gvlma(mod0)
###Normality tests for running variable Increase
###Normality tests for Increase
###Normality Tests for the All Share pooled sample and individual
indices
mod0<-lm(PayGapMedian~Increase+
X2016WOBPC+WExecPCImp+WSMPCImp+CEOTenure+ChairTenure+Sector
+Index2011, data=dsT1)
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot(mod0)
gvlma::gvlma(mod0)
###Normality Tests for the All Share pooled sample and individual
indices
mod1<-lm(PayGapMedian~Increase+
X2016WOBPC+WExecPCImp+WSMPCImp+CEOTenure+ChairTenure+Sector,
data=subset(dsT1, dsT1$Index2011=="FTSE 250")
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot(mod1)
gvlma::gvlma(mod1)
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dsT1100<-subset(dsT1, dsT1$Index2011=="FTSE 100")
mod2<-lm(PayGapMedian~Increase+
X2016WOBPC+WExecPCImp+WSMPCImp+CEOTenure+ChairTenure+Sector,
data=dsT1100)
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot(mod2)
gvlma::gvlma(mod2)
dsT1250<-subset(dsT1, dsT1$Index2011=="FTSE 250")
mod3<-lm(PayGapMedian~Increase+
X2016WOBPC+WExecPCImp+WSMPCImp+CEOTenure+ChairTenure+Sector,
data=dsT1250)
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot(mod3)
gvlma::gvlma(mod3)
dsT1Small<-subset(dsT1, dsT1$Index2011=="FTSE Small Cap")
mod4<-lm(PayGapMedian~Increase+
X2016WOBPC+WExecPCImp+WSMPCImp+CEOTenure+ChairTenure+Sector,
data=dsT1Small)
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot(mod4)
gvlma::gvlma(mod4)
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###Visualizing the linear relationship of the forcing variable and the
outcome
a<-ggplot(dsT1, aes(Increase, PayGapMedian, factor=Index2011))
R1<-(a+ geom_point(aes(color=Index2011))+
geom_smooth(method="lm", aes(color=Index2011, fill=Index2011))+
theme(legend.position=c(.8,.9))+
theme(legend.text=element_text(size=rel(0.5)))
+theme(legend.title=element_blank())+ggtitle("FTSE All Share"))
b<-ggplot(dsT1100, aes(Increase, PayGapMedian))
R2<-(b+ geom_point()+
geom_smooth(method="lm")+ggtitle("FTSE 100"))
c<-ggplot(dsT1250, aes(Increase, PayGapMedian))
R3<-(c+ geom_point()+
geom_smooth(method="lm")+ggtitle("FTSE 250"))
d<-ggplot(dsT1Small, aes(Increase, PayGapMedian))
R4<-(d+ geom_point()+
geom_smooth(method="lm")+ggtitle("FTSE Small Cap"))
grid.arrange(R1,R2,R3,R4, ncol=2, nrow=2, top="Linear Regressions
of PayGapMedian by Increase")
#Same test with loess lines
a2<-ggplot(dsT1, aes(Increase, PayGapMedian, factor=Index2011))
R1b<-(a2+ geom_point(aes(color=Index2011))+
geom_smooth(method="loess", se=FALSE, span=.8,
aes(color=Index2011, fill=Index2011))+
theme(legend.position=c(.9,.9))+
theme(legend.text=element_text(size=rel(0.5)))
+theme(legend.title=element_blank())+ggtitle("FTSE All Share"))
b2<-ggplot(dsT1100, aes(Increase, PayGapMedian))
R2b<-(b2+ geom_point()+
geom_smooth(method="loess", se=FALSE, span=.8)+ggtitle("FTSE
100"))
c2<-ggplot(dsT1250, aes(Increase, PayGapMedian))
R3b<-(c2+ geom_point()+
geom_smooth(method="loess", se=FALSE, span=.8)+ggtitle("FTSE
250"))
d2<-ggplot(dsT1Small, aes(Increase, PayGapMedian))
R4b<-(d2+ geom_point()+
geom_smooth(method="loess", se=FALSE, span=.8)+ggtitle("FTSE
Small Cap"))
grid.arrange(R1b,R2b,R3b,R4b, ncol=2, nrow=2, top="Regressions of
PayGapMedian by Increase by FTSE Group")
### Look at their residuals
dsT1$R1 <- residuals(mod1)
RP1<-(ggplot(dsT1, aes(x=Increase,y=R1)) +
geom_point(alpha=0.3) + stat_smooth(method="lm", se=FALSE,
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span=0.4, method.args=list(degree=1))+ ggtitle("FTSE All
Share - Pooled"))
dsT100$R1 <- residuals(mod2)
RP2<-(ggplot(dsT1100, aes(x=Increase,y=R1)) +
geom_point(alpha=0.3) +
stat_smooth(method="lm", se=FALSE, span=0.4,
method.args=list(degree=1))+ ggtitle("FTSE 100"))
dsT1250$R1 <- residuals(mod3)
RP3<-(ggplot(dsT1250, aes(x=Increase,y=R1)) +
geom_point(alpha=0.3) + stat_smooth(method="lm", se=FALSE,
span=0.4,
method.args=list(degree=1))+ ggtitle("FTSE 250"))
dsT1Small$R1 <- residuals(mod4)
RP4<-(ggplot(dsT1Small, aes(x=Increase,y=R1)) +
geom_point(alpha=0.3) + stat_smooth(method="lm", se=FALSE,
span=0.4, method.args=list(degree=1))+ ggtitle("FTSE
Small"))
grid.arrange(RP1,RP2,RP3,RP4, ncol=2, nrow=2,
top="Residuals by FTSE Group")
#Observe the relationship of X and Y - By WOBPC
### Observe linear relationship of X&Y
#Regression Lines by Group
a<-ggplot(dsT1, aes(WOBPC16, WExecPCImp, factor=Index2011))
R1<-(a+ geom_point(aes(color=Index2011))+
geom_smooth(method="lm", aes(color=Index2011, fill=Index2011))+
theme(legend.position=c(.8,.9))+
theme(legend.text=element_text(size=rel(0.5)))
+theme(legend.title=element_blank())+ggtitle("FTSE All Share"))
b<-ggplot(dsT1100, aes(WOBPC16, WExecPCImp))
R2<-(b+ geom_point()+
geom_smooth(method="lm")+ggtitle("FTSE 100"))
c<-ggplot(dsT1250, aes(WOBPC16, WExecPCImp))
R3<-(c+ geom_point()+
geom_smooth(method="lm")+ggtitle("FTSE 250"))
d<-ggplot(dsT1Small, aes(WOBPC16, WExecPCImp))
R4<-(d+ geom_point()+
geom_smooth(method="lm")+ggtitle("FTSE Small Cap"))
grid.arrange(R1,R2,R3,R4, ncol=2, nrow=2, top="Linear Regressions
of WExecPC by WOBPC")
##For SMPC
a<-ggplot(dsT1, aes(WOBPC16, WSMPCImp, factor=Index2011))
R1<-(a+ geom_point(aes(color=Index2011))+
geom_smooth(method="lm", aes(color=Index2011, fill=Index2011))+
theme(legend.position=c(.8,.9))+
theme(legend.text=element_text(size=rel(0.5)))
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+theme(legend.title=element_blank())+ggtitle("FTSE All Share"))
b<-ggplot(dsT1100, aes(WOBPC16, WSMPCImp))
R2<-(b+ geom_point()+
geom_smooth(method="lm")+ggtitle("FTSE 100"))
c<-ggplot(dsT1250, aes(WOBPC16, WSMPCImp))
R3<-(c+ geom_point()+
geom_smooth(method="lm")+ggtitle("FTSE 250"))
d<-ggplot(dsT1Small, aes(WOBPC16, WSMPCImp))
R4<-(d+ geom_point()+
geom_smooth(method="lm")+ggtitle("FTSE Small Cap"))
grid.arrange(R1,R2,R3,R4, ncol=2, nrow=2, top="Linear Regressions
of WSMPC by WOBPC")
##For WEmpPC
a<-ggplot(dsT1, aes(WOBPC16, X2016WEmpPC, factor=Index2011))
R1<-(a+ geom_point(aes(color=Index2011))+
geom_smooth(method="lm", aes(color=Index2011, fill=Index2011))+
theme(legend.position=c(.8,.9))+
theme(legend.text=element_text(size=rel(0.5)))
+theme(legend.title=element_blank())+ggtitle("FTSE All Share"))
b<-ggplot(dsT1100, aes(WOBPC16, X2016WEmpPC))
R2<-(b+ geom_point()+
geom_smooth(method="lm")+ggtitle("FTSE 100"))
c<-ggplot(dsT1250, aes(WOBPC16, X2016WEmpPC))
R3<-(c+ geom_point()+
geom_smooth(method="lm")+ggtitle("FTSE 250"))
d<-ggplot(dsT1Small, aes(WOBPC16, X2016WEmpPC))
R4<-(d+ geom_point()+
geom_smooth(method="lm")+ggtitle("FTSE Small Cap"))
grid.arrange(R1,R2,R3,R4, ncol=2, nrow=2, top="Linear Regressions
of WEmpPC by WOBPC")
##For PayGapMean
a<-ggplot(dsT1, aes(WOBPC16, PayGapMean, factor=Index2011))
R1<-(a+ geom_point(aes(color=Index2011))+
geom_smooth(method="lm", aes(color=Index2011, fill=Index2011))+
theme(legend.position=c(.8,.9))+
theme(legend.text=element_text(size=rel(0.5)))
+theme(legend.title=element_blank())+ggtitle("FTSE All Share"))
b<-ggplot(dsT1100, aes(WOBPC16, PayGapMean))
R2<-(b+ geom_point()+
geom_smooth(method="lm")+ggtitle("FTSE 100"))
c<-ggplot(dsT1250, aes(WOBPC16, PayGapMean))
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R3<-(c+ geom_point()+
geom_smooth(method="lm")+ggtitle("FTSE 250"))
d<-ggplot(dsT1Small, aes(WOBPC16, PayGapMean))
R4<-(d+ geom_point()+
geom_smooth(method="lm")+ggtitle("FTSE Small Cap"))
grid.arrange(R1,R2,R3,R4, ncol=2, nrow=2, top="Linear Regressions
of PayGapMean WOBPC")
#Density tests - McCrary - If not enough observations, change bandwidth
size
DCdensity(dsT$Pre, bw=4.7, bin = NULL, verbose = TRUE,
plot = TRUE, ext.out = FALSE, htest = FALSE)
DCdensity(d350$Pre, bw=3, bin = NULL, verbose = TRUE,
plot = TRUE, ext.out = FALSE, htest = FALSE)
DCdensity(d100$Pre, bw=9.2, bin = NULL, verbose = TRUE,
plot = TRUE, ext.out = FALSE, htest = FALSE)
DCdensity(d250$Pre, bin = NULL, verbose = TRUE,
plot = TRUE, ext.out = FALSE, htest = FALSE)
DCdensity(dSmall$Pre, bw=13, bin = NULL, verbose = TRUE,
plot = TRUE, ext.out = FALSE, htest = FALSE)
#Testing smoothness of baseline covariates
###WOB
rd350<-RDestimate(X2011WOB~Pre+Index2011,
data=d350, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE)
summary(rd350)
plot(rd350)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB
2011", ylab="Number of WOB 2011 - FTSE 350")
rd100<-RDestimate(X2011WOB~Pre,bw=9.4,
data=d100, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(rd100)
plot(rd100)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB
2011", ylab="Number of WOB 2011 - FTSE 100")
rd250<-RDestimate(X2011WOB~Pre,
data=d250, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE)
summary(rd250)
plot(rd250)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB
2011", ylab="Number of WOB 2011 - FTSE 250")
rdSmall<-RDestimate(X2011WOB~Pre,
data=dSmall, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE)
summary(rdSmall)
plot(rdSmall)

510

title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB
2011", ylab="Number of WOB - 2011")
rdT<-RDestimate(X2011WOB~Pre+Index2011,
data=dsT, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE)
summary(rdT)
plot(rdT)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB
2011", ylab="Number of WOB 2011 - FTSE 350")
###Identify the effects of time in the percentage of WOB
#Create a variable so that time is in 1 unit increments.
Reference group is 0, the first year of observations.
d$Time<-(d$Year - 2008)
d$Index<-as.factor(d$Index)
d$Year<-as.factor(d$Year)
#Run null model - Random intercept model
mod0<-lme(WOBPC~Year+Index+Sector+Board, random=~+1|Firm,
data=d, method="ML", na.action="na.omit")
summary(mod0)
#Run random intercept with interaction Year*Index effects
mod1<-lme(WOBPC~Year*Index+Sector+Board, random=~+1|Firm,
data=d, method="ML", na.action="na.omit")
summary(mod1)
#Run random intercept with interaction effects and temporal
correlation - Best model based on fit indices from the
ANOVA below
mod2<-lme(WOBPC~Year*Index+Sector+Board, random=~+1|Firm,
cor=corAR1(), data=d, method="ML", na.action="na.omit")
summary(mod2)
#Run random intercept with interaction effects and temporal
correlation
mod2a<-lme(WOBPC~Year*Index+Sector+Board*Index,
random=~+1|Firm, cor=corAR1(), data=d, method="ML",
na.action="na.omit")
summary(mod2a)
#Run random intercept and random slope model
mod3<-lme(WOBPC~Year*Index+Sector+Board,
random=~1|Index/Firm, data=d, method="ML",
na.action="na.omit")
summary(mod3)
#Run random intercept and random slope model
mod3<-lme(WOBPC~Year*Index+Sector+Board,
random=~1|Index/Firm, data=d, method="ML",
na.action="na.omit")
summary(mod3)
#Run random intercept and random slope model
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mod4<-lme(WOBPC~Year*Index+Sector+Board,
random=~1|Index/Firm, cor=corAR1(), data=d, method="ML",
na.action="na.omit")
summary(mod4)
#Run random intercept and random slope model
mod5<-lme(WOBPC~Year*Index+Sector+Board,
random=~1|Year/Index/Firm, cor=corAR1(), data=d,
method="ML", na.action="na.omit")
summary(mod5)
#Compare models
anova(mod0, mod1, mod2, mod3, mod4, mod5)
###Internal validity - Smoothness of covariates
#Testing smoothness of baseline covariates
###WOB
rd350<-RDestimate(X2011WOB~Pre+Index2011,
data=d350, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE)
summary(rd350)
plot(rd350)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB
2011", ylab="Number of WOB 2011 - FTSE 350")
rd100<-RDestimate(X2011WOB~Pre,bw=9.4,
data=d100, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(rd100)
plot(rd100)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB
2011", ylab="Number of WOB 2011 - FTSE 100")
rd250<-RDestimate(X2011WOB~Pre,
data=d250, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE)
summary(rd250)
plot(rd250)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB
2011", ylab="Number of WOB 2011 - FTSE 250")
rdSmall<-RDestimate(X2011WOB~Pre,
data=dSmall, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE)
summary(rdSmall)
plot(rdSmall)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB
2011", ylab="Number of WOB - 2011")
rdT<-RDestimate(X2011WOB~Pre+Index2011,
data=dsT, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE)
summary(rdT)
plot(rdT)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB
2011", ylab="Number of WOB 2011 - FTSE 350")
### Testing smoothness of covariates using rdrobust with all estimates
summary(rdrobust(y=d350$X2011WOB, x=d350$Pre, h=9.4,
all=TRUE))
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summary(rdrobust(y=d100$X2011WOB, x=d100$Pre, h=9.4,
all=TRUE))
summary(rdrobust(y=d250$X2011WOB, x=d250$Pre, h=9.4,
all=TRUE))
summary(rdrobust(y=dSmall$X2011WOB, x=dSmall$Pre, h=9.4,
all=TRUE))
summary(rdrobust(y=dsT$X2011WOB, x=dsT$Pre, h=9.4,
all=TRUE))
###Boards
rd350<-RDestimate(X2011Board~Pre+Index2011,
data=d350, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE)
summary(rd350)
plot(rd350)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB
2011", ylab="Board Size 2011 - FTSE 350")
rd100<-RDestimate(X2011Board~Pre,bw=9.4,
data=d100, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(rd100)
plot(rd100)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB
2011", ylab="Board Size 2011 - FTSE 100")
rd250<-RDestimate(X2011Board~Pre,
data=d250, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE)
summary(rd250)
plot(rd250)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB
2011", ylab="Board Size 2011 - FTSE 250")
rdSmall<-RDestimate(X2011Board~Pre,
data=dSmall, verbose = TRUE, bw=13, model=TRUE)
summary(rdSmall)
plot(rdSmall)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB
2011", ylab="Board Size 2011 - FTSE Small")
rdT<-RDestimate(X2011Board~Pre+Index2011,
data=dsT, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE)
summary(rdT)
plot(rdT)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB
2011", ylab="Board Size - FTSE 350")
### Testing smoothness of covariates using rdrobust with all estimates
summary(rdrobust(y=d350$X2011Board, x=d350$Pre, h=9.4,
all=TRUE))
summary(rdrobust(y=d100$X2011Board, x=d100$Pre, h=9.4,
all=TRUE))
summary(rdrobust(y=d250$X2011Board, x=d250$Pre, h=9.4,
all=TRUE))
summary(rdrobust(y=dSmall$X2011Board, x=dSmall$Pre, h=9.4,
all=TRUE))
summary(rdrobust(y=dsT$X2011Board, x=dsT$Pre, h=9.4,
all=TRUE))
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###CEO
rd350<-RDestimate(X2011CEOGnd~Pre+Index2011,
data=d350, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE)
summary(rd350)
plot(rd350)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB
2011", ylab="Female CEOs - FTSE 350")
rd100<-RDestimate(X2011CEOGnd~Pre,bw=9.4,
data=d100, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(rd100)
plot(rd100)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB
2011", ylab="Female CEOs - FTSE 100")
rd250<-RDestimate(X2011CEOGnd~Pre,
data=d250, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE)
summary(rd250)
plot(rd250)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB
2011", ylab="Female CEOs - FTSE 250")
rdSmall<-RDestimate(X2011CEOGnd~Pre,
data=dSmall, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE)
summary(rdSmall)
plot(rdSmall)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB
2011", ylab="Female CEOs - FTSE Small")
rdT<-RDestimate(X2011CEOGnd~Pre+Index2011,
data=dsT, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE)
summary(rdT)
plot(rdT)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB
2011", ylab="Female CEOs - FTSE All Share")
### Testing smoothness of covariates using rdrobust with all estimates
summary(rdrobust(y=d350$X2011CEOGnd, x=d350$Pre, h=9.4,
all=TRUE))
summary(rdrobust(y=d100$X2011CEOGnd, x=d100$Pre, h=9.4,
all=TRUE))
summary(rdrobust(y=d250$X2011CEOGnd, x=d250$Pre, h=9.4,
all=TRUE))
summary(rdrobust(y=dSmall$X2011CEOGnd, x=dSmall$Pre, h=9.4,
all=TRUE))
summary(rdrobust(y=dsT$X2011CEOGnd, x=dsT$Pre, h=9.4,
all=TRUE))
###Employees
rd350<-RDestimate(X2011Total~Pre+Index2011,
data=d350, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE)
summary(rd350)
plot(rd350)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB
2011", ylab="Number of Employees - FTSE 350")
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rd100<-RDestimate(X2011Total~Pre,bw=9.4,
data=d100, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(rd100)
plot(rd100)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB
2011", ylab="Number of Employees - FTSE 100")
rd250<-RDestimate(X2011Total~Pre,
data=d250, verbose = TRUE, bw=22, model=TRUE)
summary(rd250)
plot(rd250)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB
2011", ylab="Number of Employees - FTSE 250")
rdSmall<-RDestimate(X2011Total~Pre,
data=dSmall, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE)
summary(rdSmall)
plot(rdSmall)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB
2011", ylab="Number of Employees - FTSE Small")
rdT<-RDestimate(X2011Total~Pre+Index2011,
data=dsT, verbose = TRUE, bw=9.4, model=TRUE)
summary(rdT)
plot(rdT)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Target - WOB
2011", ylab="Number of Employees - FTSE All Share")
### Testing smoothness of covariates using rdrobust with all estimates
summary(rdrobust(y=d350$X2011Total, x=d350$Pre, h=9.4,
all=TRUE))
summary(rdrobust(y=d100$X2011Total, x=d100$Pre, h=9.4,
all=TRUE))
summary(rdrobust(y=d250$X2011Total, x=d250$Pre, h=9.4,
all=TRUE))
summary(rdrobust(y=dSmall$X2011Total, x=dSmall$Pre, h=9.4,
all=TRUE))
summary(rdrobust(y=dsT$X2011Total, x=dsT$Pre, h=9.4,
all=TRUE))
##Bandwidth selection by kernel type
##Calculate bandwidth using Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth
model
IKbandwidth(d350$Pre, d350$Increase, verbose=FALSE,
kernel="triangular")
##Calculate bandwidth using Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth
model
IKbandwidth(d350$Pre, d350$Increase, verbose=FALSE,
kernel="quartic")
##Calculate bandwidth using Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth
model
IKbandwidth(d350$Pre, d350$Increase, verbose=FALSE,
kernel="cosine")
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##Hypotheses tests
#Hypotheses H1a and H1b
##No covariates by index for FTSE 350
H1abUn<-RDestimate(Increase~Pre|Pre2+Index2011,
data=d350, kernel="triangular", verbose = FALSE,
model=TRUE)
summary(H1abUn)
plot(H1abUn)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Compliance
Threshold", ylab="Increase - Women on Boards")
##Quadratic with baseline covariates for FTSE 350
H1ab<-RDestimate(Increase~Pre|Pre2+
X2011Board+X2011CEOGnd+X2011ChairGnd+Sector+Index2011,
data=d350, verbose = FALSE, model=TRUE)
summary(H1ab)
plot(H1ab, range=c(-15,15))
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Compliance
Threshold", ylab="Increase - Women on Boards")
##Quadratic with baseline covariates for FTSE 350 - clustered SE
clustervar=d350$Index2011
H1ab<-RDestimate(Increase~Pre|Pre2+
X2011Board+X2011CEOGnd+X2011ChairGnd+Sector+Index2011,
data=d350, cluster=clustervar, verbose = FALSE,
model=TRUE)
summary(H1ab)
plot(H1ab, range=c(-15,15))
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Compliance
Threshold", ylab="Increase - Women on Boards")
##Quadratic with baseline covariates for FTSE 350 - clustered SE Narrow bandwidth
H1ab<-RDestimate(Increase~Pre|Pre2+
X2011Board+X2011CEOGnd+X2011ChairGnd+Sector+Index2011,
data=d350, cluster=clustervar, bw=8.3, verbose =
FALSE, model=TRUE)
summary(H1ab)
plot(H1ab, range=c(-15,15))
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Compliance
Threshold", ylab="Increase - Women on Boards")
##Quadratic with baseline covariates for FTSE 350 - clustered SE Narrow bandwidth
H1ab<-RDestimate(Increase~Pre|Pre2+
X2011Board+X2011CEOGnd+X2011ChairGnd+Sector+Index2011,
data=d350, cluster=clustervar, bw=8.3, verbose =
FALSE, model=TRUE)
summary(H1ab)
plot(H1ab, range=c(-15,15))
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Compliance
Threshold", ylab="Increase - Women on Boards")
##Robustness tests for Pseudo-outcomes
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# Simple RD estimate - Sharp - Pooled FTSE 350 - Pseudo outcome
Board
Pseudo350<-RDestimate(X2016Board~Pre|Pre2+
X2011Board+Sector+Index2011,
data=d350, kernel="triangular",verbose = TRUE,
model=TRUE)
summary(Pseudo350)
plot(Pseudo350)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Compliance
Threshold", ylab="Pseudo outcome - Board Size")
# Simple RD estimate - Sharp - Pooled FTSE 350 - pseudooutcome
Emp
Pseudo350<-RDestimate(X2016Total~Pre|
X2011Total+Sector+Index2011,
data=d350, kernel="triangular", verbose = TRUE,
model=TRUE)
summary(Pseudo350)
plot(Pseudo350)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Compliance
Threshold", ylab="Pseudo outcome - Total Employee
Population")
# Simple RD estimate - Sharp - Pooled FTSE 350 - Pseudo outcome
total
Pseudo350<-RDestimate(X2016Total~Pre|
X2011Total+Sector+Index2011, bw=9.4
data=d350, kernel="triangular", verbose = TRUE,
model=TRUE)
summary(Pseudo350)
plot(Pseudo350)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Compliance
Threshold", ylab="Pseudo outcome - Total Employee
Population")
###Robustness tests - Pseudo-cutoffs
d350$Board11C<-scale(d350$X2011Board, center=TRUE,
scale=FALSE)
d350$Pseudo28<-scale(d350$X2011WOBPC, center=28,
scale=FALSE)
d350$Pseudo15<-scale(d350$X2011WOBPC, center=15,
scale=FALSE)
d350$Pseudo282<-d350$Pseudo28^2
d350$Pseudo283<-d350$Pseudo28^3
d350$Pseudo152<-d350$Pseudo15^2
# Simple RD estimate - Sharp - Pooled FTSE 350 - Another pseudo outcome
at different cutpoints - Test 15 and 20
rd350<-RDestimate(Increase~Pseudo28| Pseudo282+Board11C +
X2011CEOGnd+ X2011ChairGnd + Sector+Index2011,
data=d350, kernel="triangular", verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(rd350)
plot(rd350)
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title(xlab="Distance from Compliance Threshold - Cutoff
Centered at 28", ylab="Increase - Women on Boards")
# Simple RD estimate - Sharp - Pooled FTSE 350 - Another pseudo outcome
at different cutpoints - Test 15 and 20
rd350<-RDestimate(Increase~Pseudo15|Pseudo152+Board11C +
X2011CEOGnd+ X2011ChairGnd + Sector+Index2011,
data=d350, kernel="triangular", verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(rd350)
plot(rd350)
title(xlab="Distance from Compliance Threshold - Cutoff
Centered at 28", ylab="Increase - Women on Boards")
###Hypothesis test H1c
###H1c
- First unconditional
# Simple RD estimate - Sharp - FTSE Small
rdSmall<-RDestimate(Increase~Pre|Pre2+Pre3,
data=dSmall, kernel="triangular", verbose = TRUE,
model=TRUE)
summary(rdSmall)
plot(rdSmall)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Compliance
Threshold", ylab="Increase - Women on Boards")
###H1c

- Full model - Optimal bw
# Simple RD estimate - Sharp - FTSE Small
rdSmall<-RDestimate(Increase~Pre|
Board11C+X2011CEOGnd+X2011ChairGnd+Sector,
data=dSmall, kernel="triangular", verbose = TRUE,
model=TRUE)
summary(rdSmall)
plot(rdSmall)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Compliance
Threshold", ylab="Increase - Women on Boards")

###H1c

- Full model - Narrow bw
# Simple RD estimate - Sharp - FTSE Small
rdSmall<-RDestimate(Increase~Pre|Board11C+
X2011CEOGnd+X2011ChairGnd+Sector,
data=dSmall, kernel="triangular", bw=8.5, verbose = TRUE,
model=TRUE)
summary(rdSmall)
plot(rdSmall)
title(xlab="Distance from Davies Review Compliance
Threshold", ylab="Increase - Women on Boards")

#Use the vertical version of the dataset
#Read data - This file has complete data before data imputation - NAs
in 2008 =10, 2009=4
d<-read.csv("Panel database for testing9.csv")
###Hypotheses tests - H2
H2<-d
summary(H2)
H2$Year<-as.numeric(H2$Year)
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#Get time in 1 increment units and subset the data from 2011 to
2016
H2$Time<-(H2$Year - 2011)
H2$Index<-as.factor(H2$Index)
H2Test<-subset(H2, H2$Year>=2011)
summary(H2Test)
#Calculate the proportion of executive eirectors and Non-executive
directors
H2Test$WEDRatio<-H2Test$WED/H2Test$WOB*100
H2Test$WNEDRatio<-H2Test$WNED/H2Test$WOB*100
H2Test$Time2<-(H2Test$Time^2)
summary(H2Test)
#Unconditional Growth Model - Random intercept
m0<-lme(WEDRatio~Time, random=~1|Firm,data=H2Test,
method="ML", na.action="na.omit")
summary(m0)
vc<-VarCorr(m0)
vcov<-getVarCov(m0)
#Unconditional Growth Model - Random intercept and slope
m1<-lme(WEDRatio~Time, random=~Time|Firm,data=H2Test,
method="ML", na.action="na.omit")
summary(m1)
vc<-VarCorr(m1)
vcov<-getVarCov(m1)
#Conditional Growth model
m2<-lme(WEDRatio~Time+Index, random=~Time|Firm,data=H2Test,
method="ML", na.action="na.omit")
summary(m2)
vc<-VarCorr(m2)
vcov<-getVarCov(m2)
#Conditional Growth model
m3<-lme(WEDRatio~Time+Time2+Index,
random=~Time|Firm,data=H2Test, method="ML",
na.action="na.omit")
summary(m3)
vc<-VarCorr(m3)
vcov<-getVarCov(m3)
#Conditional Growth Model with Quadratic Time Effect and
Interaction
m4<-lme(WEDRatio~Time*Index+Time2,
random=~Time|Firm,data=H2Test,method="ML",
na.action="na.omit")
summary(m4) #Best model
vc<-VarCorr(m4)
vcov<-getVarCov(m4)
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#Conditional Growth Model with Quadratic Time Effect and
Interaction - Random intercept
m5<-lme(WEDRatio~Time*Index+Time2, random=~1|Firm,
data=H2Test, method="ML", cor=corAR1(),
na.action="na.omit")
summary(m5)
vc<-VarCorr(m5)
vcov<-getVarCov(m5)
#Conditional Growth Model with Quadratic Time Effect and
Interaction + Temporal correlation
m6<-lme(WEDRatio~Time*Index+Time2, random=~Time|Firm,
data=H2Test,method="ML", cor=corAR1(), na.action="na.omit")
summary(m6)
vc<-VarCorr(m6)
vcov<-getVarCov(m6)
#Conditional Growth Model with Quadratic Time Effect and
Interaction + Temporal correlation
## controling for Heteroscedasticity at level 1
m7<-lme(WEDRatio~Time*Index+Time2, random=~Time|Firm,
weights=varIdent(form=~1|Index), cor=corAR1(), data=H2Test,
method="ML", na.action="na.omit")
summary(m7) #Best model
vc<-VarCorr(m7)
vcov<-getVarCov(m7)
anova(m0, m1, m2, m3, m4, m5, m6, m7)
### Same models for WNED
#Unconditional Growth Model - Random intercept
m0<-lme(WNEDRatio~Time,
random=~1|Firm,data=H2Test,method="ML",
na.action="na.omit")
summary(m0)
vc<-VarCorr(m0)
vcov<-getVarCov(m0)
#Unconditional Growth Model - Random intercept and slope
m1<-lme(WNEDRatio~Time,
random=~Time|Firm,data=H2Test,method="ML",
na.action="na.omit")
summary(m1)
vc<-VarCorr(m1)
vcov<-getVarCov(m1)
#Conditional Growth model
m2<-lme(WNEDRatio~Time+Index,
random=~Time|Firm,data=H2Test,method="ML",
na.action="na.omit")
summary(m2)
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vc<-VarCorr(m2)
vcov<-getVarCov(m2)
#Conditional Growth model
m3<-lme(WNEDRatio~Time+Time2+Index,
random=~Time|Firm,data=H2Test,method="ML",
na.action="na.omit")
summary(m3)
vc<-VarCorr(m3)
vcov<-getVarCov(m3)
#Conditional Growth Model with Quadratic Time Effect and
Interaction
m4<-lme(WNEDRatio~Time*Index+Time2,
random=~Time|Firm,data=H2Test,method="ML",
na.action="na.omit")
summary(m4)
vc<-VarCorr(m4)
vcov<-getVarCov(m4)
#Conditional Growth Model with Quadratic Time Effect and
Interaction - Random intercept
m5<-lme(WNEDRatio~Time*Index+Time2, random=~1|Firm,
data=H2Test,method="ML", cor=corAR1(), na.action="na.omit")
summary(m5)
vc<-VarCorr(m5)
vcov<-getVarCov(m5)
#Conditional Growth Model with Quadratic Time Effect and
Interaction + Temporal correlation
m6<-lme(WNEDRatio~Time*Index+Time2, random=~Time|Firm,
data=H2Test,method="ML", cor=corAR1(), na.action="na.omit")
summary(m6
vc<-VarCorr(m6)
vcov<-getVarCov(m6)
#Conditional Growth Model with Quadratic Time Effect and
Interaction + Temporal correlation
## controling for Heteroscedasticity at level 1
m7<-lme(WNEDRatio~Time*Index+Time2, random=~Time|Firm,
weights=varIdent(form=~1|Index), cor=corAR1(), data=H2Test,
method="ML", na.action="na.omit")
summary(m7) #Best model
vc<-VarCorr(m7)
vcov<-getVarCov(m7)
anova(m0, m1, m2, m3, m4, m5, m6, m7)
##Hypotheses Tests H3
d2011<-subset(d, Year==2011)
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d2016<-subset(d, Year==2016)
dH3<-rbind(d2011, d2016)
dH3350<-subset(dH3, dH3$Index!="FTSE Small Cap")
dHSmall<-subset(dH3, dH3$Index=="FTSE Small Cap")
dH3350$Year<-as.factor(dH3350$Year)
dHSmall$Year<-as.factor(dHSmall$Year)
#Testing statistical significance in mean differences H3a
t.test(CEOGnd~Year, data=dH3350)
t.test(WED~Year, data=dH3350)
cohen.d(CEOGnd~Year, data=dH3350)
cohen.d(WED~Year, data=dH3350)
#Testing statistical significance in mean differences H3b
t.test(ChairGnd~Year, data=dH3350)
t.test(WNED~Year, data=dH3350)
cohen.d(ChairGnd~Year, data=dH3350)
cohen.d(WNED~Year, data=dH3350)
#Testing H3 in FTSE Small Cap
t.test(CEOGnd~Year, data=dHSmall)
t.test(WED~Year, data=dHSmall)
cohen.d(CEOGnd~Year, data=dHSmall)
cohen.d(WED~Year, data=dHSmall)
t.test(ChairGnd~Year, data=dHSmall)
t.test(WNED~Year, data=dHSmall)
cohen.d(ChairGnd~Year, data=dHSmall)
cohen.d(WNED~Year, data=dHSmall)
##Growth models - To see if the change of directors has an effect
on changes in CEO and chair
dH3<-H2Test
#Since the CEO is an executive director and the Chair a nonexecutive, for this hypotheses, I remove them from the total or
they inflate the numbers
dH3$WNEDAdj<-(dH3$WNED-dH3$ChairGnd)
dH3$WEDAdj<-(dH3$WED-dH3$CEOGnd)
#Optimization method for lme
ctrl <- lmeControl(opt='optim')
#For FTSE All share
#Unconditional Growth Model
m0<-lme(ChairGnd~Time, random=~1|Firm,data=dH3,method="ML",
na.action="na.omit")
summary(m0)
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m1<-lme(ChairGnd~Time,
random=~Time|Firm,data=dH3,method="ML",
na.action="na.omit")
summary(m1)
#Unconditional Growth Model
m2<-lme(ChairGnd~Time*Index+WNEDAdj,
random=~Time|Firm,data=dH3,method="ML",
na.action="na.omit")
summary(m2)
#Unconditional Growth Model
m3<-lme(ChairGnd~Time+Index+WNEDAdj,
random=~Time|Firm,data=dH3,method="ML", cor=corAR1(),
control=ctrl, na.action="na.omit")
summary(m3)
#Unconditional Growth Model
m3<-lme(ChairGnd~Time*Index+WNEDAdj,
random=~Time|Firm,data=dH3,method="ML", cor=corAR1(),
control=ctrl, na.action="na.omit")
summary(m3)
#Unconditional Growth Model
m4<-lme(ChairGnd~Time*WNEDAdj,
random=~Time|Index,data=dH3,method="ML", cor=corAR1(),
control=ctrl, na.action="na.omit")
summary(m4)
#Unconditional Growth Model
m4<-lme(ChairGnd~Time*WNEDAdj+Index,
random=~Time|Firm,data=dH3,method="ML", cor=corAR1(),
control=ctrl, na.action="na.omit")
summary(m4)
#Unconditional Growth Model
m4<-lme(ChairGnd~Time*WNEDAdj+Index,
random=~Time|Firm,data=dH3,method="ML", cor=corAR1(),
control=ctrl, na.action="na.omit")
summary(m4)
anova(m0, m1,m2,m3,m4)
#Unconditional Growth Model - Random intercept
m0<-lme(CEOGnd~Time, random=~1|Firm,data=dH3,method="ML",
na.action="na.omit")
summary(m0)
#Unconditional growth model - random slope and intercept
m1<-lme(CEOGnd~Time, random=~Time|Firm,data=dH3,method="ML",
na.action="na.omit")
summary(m1)
#Conditional growth model
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m2<-lme(CEOGnd~Time*Index+WEDAdj,
random=~Time|Firm,data=dH3,method="ML",
na.action="na.omit")
summary(m2)
#conditional growth model plus temporal correlation
m3<-lme(CEOGnd~Time*Index+WEDAdj,
random=~Time|Firm,data=dH3,method="ML", cor=corAR1(),
na.action="na.omit")
summary(m3)
#Unconditional Growth Model
m4<-lme(CEOGnd~Time+WEDAdj,
random=~Time|Firm,data=dH3,method="ML", cor=corAR1(),
na.action="na.omit")
summary(m4)
#conditional growth model plus temporal correlation
m5<-lme(CEOGnd~Time*WEDAdj+Index,
random=~Time|Firm,data=dH3,method="ML", cor=corAR1(),
na.action="na.omit")
summary(m5)
anova(m0,m1,m2,m3,m5)
#Hypotheses 4
#Create variables for clustering and for testing quadratic and
cubic functional regression forms
clustervar=dsT1$Index2011
dsT1$Increase2<-dsT1$Increase^2
dsT1$Increase3<-dsT1$Increase^3
dsT1$WOBPC162<-dsT1$X2016WOBPC^2
dsT1$WOBPC163<-dsT1$X2016WOBPC^3
##Unconditional models
#Unconditional model - Linear
H4a2<-RDestimate(X2016WExecPC~X2016WOBPC,
cutpoint=25,data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4a2)
plot(H4a2)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
on Executive Boards")
#Unconditional model - Quadratic
H4a2<-RDestimate(X2016WExecPC~X2016WOBPC|WOBPC162,
cutpoint=25,data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4a2)
plot(H4a2)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
on Executive Boards")
#Unconditional model - Cubic
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H4a2<-RDestimate(X2016WExecPC~X2016WOBPC|WOBPC162+WOBPC163,
cutpoint=25,data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4a2)
plot(H4a2)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
on Executive Boards")
###Model M1 - H4a - Optimal
H4a<-RDestimate(X2016WExecPC~X2016WOBPC|
Increase+Critical+X2016WED+
X2016CEOGnd+CEOTenure+X2016ChairGnd+ChairTenure+X2016WSMPC+
X2016WEmpPC+Sector+Index2011,
cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4a)
plot(H4a)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
on Executive Boards")
###Model M2 - H4a - Narrow
H4a<-RDestimate(X2016WExecPC~X2016WOBPC|
Increase+Critical+X2016WED+
X2016CEOGnd+CEOTenure+X2016ChairGnd+
ChairTenure+X2016WSMPC+X2016WEmpPC+Sector+Index2011, bw=6.5,
cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4a)
plot(H4a)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
on Executive Boards")
###Model M3 - H4a - Wide
H4a<-RDestimate(X2016WExecPC~X2016WOBPC|
Increase+Critical+X2016WED+
X2016CEOGnd+CEOTenure+X2016ChairGnd+ChairTenure+X2016WSMPC+
X2016WEmpPC+Sector+Index2011, bw=6.5, cutpoint=25,
data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4a)
plot(H4a)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
on Executive Boards")
###Model M4 - H4a - Optimal
H4a<-RDestimate(WExecPCImp~X2016WOBPC|
Increase+Critical+X2016WED+
X2016CEOGnd+CEOTenure+X2016ChairGnd+ChairTenure+WSMPCImp+X2
016WEmpPC+Sector+Index2011, cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose
= TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4a)
plot(H4a)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
on Executive Boards")
###Model M4 - H4a - Narrow
H4a<-RDestimate(WExecPCImp~X2016WOBPC|
Increase+Critical+X2016WED+
X2016CEOGnd+CEOTenure+X2016ChairGnd+ChairTenure+WSMPCImp+X2
016WEmpPC+Sector+Index2011, bw=4.85,cutpoint=25, data=dsT1,
verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
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summary(H4a)
plot(H4a)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
on Executive Boards")
###Model M4 - H4a - Wide
H4a<-RDestimate(WExecPCImp~X2016WOBPC|
Increase+Critical+X2016WED+
X2016CEOGnd+CEOTenure+X2016ChairGnd+ChairTenure+WSMPCImp+X2
016WEmpPC+Sector+Index2011, bw=8.5,cutpoint=25, data=dsT1,
verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4a)
plot(H4a)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
on Executive Boards")
###Coefficients do not look right. Few coefficients are
significant but R2 is large. Check multicollinearity
dsT1$Treat1<-ifelse(d2011$Index=="FTSE 100"&
(d2011$WOBPC<25), "Yes", ifelse(d2011$Index=="FTSE 250"&
(d2011$WOBPC<22), "Yes", ifelse(d2011$Index=="FTSE Small
Cap"& (d2011$WOBPC<19), "1", "0")))
dsT1$Treat2<-ifelse(dsT1$X2016WOBPC>=25, "1","0")
dsT1$Treat3<-ifelse(dsT1$Increase>=12, "1","0")
##Test multicollinearity
X<-dsT1[,c("X2016WOBPC", "Increase", "Critical", "X2016WED",
"X2016CEOGnd","CEOTenure",
"X2016ChairGnd","ChairTenure","WSMPCImp",
"X2016WEmpPC","SectorN","Group", "Treat2")]
X<-data.frame(X)
Y<-dsT1$WExecPCImp
omcdiag(X, Y, na.rm=TRUE, Inter=TRUE)
imcdiag(X, Y, corr=TRUE)
mctest(X, Y)
#Removing highly correlated predictors
X<-dsT1[,c("X2016WOBPC", "Increase", "Critical16",
"X2016WED","CEOTenure", "ChairTenure","WSMPCImp",
"X2016WEmpPC","SectorN","Group", "TreatPhase2")]
Y<-dsT1$WExecPCImp
omcdiag(X, Y)
imcdiag(X, Y, corr=TRUE)
mctest(X,Y)
mc.plot(X,Y)
eigprop(covariates)
#Model M4a
H4a<-RDestimate(WExecPCImp~X2016WOBPC|
Increase+Critical+X2016WED+
CEOTenure+ChairTenure+WSMPCImp+X2016WEmpPC+Sector+Index2011,
cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4a)
plot(H4a, range=c(15, 35))
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title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
on Executive Boards")
###Competing explanation - Forcing variable = Increase
##Unconditional linear
H4a<-RDestimate(WExecPCImp~Increase, cutpoint=12, data=dsT1,
verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4a)
plot(H4a, range=c(0,30))
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
on Executive Boards")
##Unconditional quadratic
H4a<-RDestimate(WExecPCImp~Increase|Increase2,
cutpoint=12, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4a)
plot(H4a, range=c(0,30))
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
on Executive Boards")
##Unconditional cubic
H4a<-RDestimate(WExecPCImp~Increase| Increase2+Increase3,
cutpoint=12, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4a)
plot(H4a, range=c(0,30))
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
on Executive Boards")
#Model M4a - Competing Optimal
H4a<-RDestimate(WExecPCImp~Increase|X2016Board+
CEOTenure+ChairTenure+WSMPCImp+X2016WEmpPC+Sector+Index2011,
cutpoint=12, bw=7.028, cluster=clustervar, data=dsT1,
verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4a)
plot(H4a, range=c(-5, 30))
title(xlab="Increase of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women on
Executive Boards")
#Testing Hypothesis 4b
###H4b - Senior management
- Not significant
#Testing with Observed data - Unconditional - Linear
H4b<-RDestimate(X2016WSMPC~X2016WOBPC,
cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4b)
plot(H4b)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
Senior Management")
#Testing with Observed data - Unconditional - Quadratic
H4b<-RDestimate(X2016WSMPC~X2016WOBPC|WOBPC162,
cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4b)
plot(H4b)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
Senior Management")
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#Testing with Observed data - Unconditional - Quadratic
H4b<-RDestimate(X2016WSMPC~X2016WOBPC|WOBPC162+WOBPC163,
cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4b)
plot(H4b)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
Senior Management")
##Full model with Observed data
###Model M1 - Optimal
H4b<-RDestimate(X2016WSMPC~X2016WOBPC|
Increase+Critical+X2016WED+
CEOTenure+ChairTenure+X2016WExecPC+X2016WEmpPC+Sector+Index
2011, cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4b)
plot(H4b)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
Senior Management")
###Model M2 - Narrow
H4b<-RDestimate(X2016WSMPC~X2016WOBPC|
Increase+Critical+X2016WED+
CEOTenure+ChairTenure+X2016WExecPC+X2016WEmpPC+Sector+Index
2011, bw=4.5, cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE,
model=TRUE)
summary(H4b)
plot(H4b)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
Senior Management")
###Model M3 - Wide
H4b<-RDestimate(X2016WSMPC~X2016WOBPC|
Increase+Critical+X2016WED+
CEOTenure+ChairTenure+X2016WExecPC+X2016WEmpPC+Sector+Index
2011, bw=12, cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE,
model=TRUE)
summary(H4b)
plot(H4b)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
Senior Management")
##Model M4 - Full model with data from imputation method Optimal
H4b2<RDestimate(WSMPCImp~X2016WOBPC|Increase+Critical+X2016WED+
CEOTenure+ChairTenure+WExecPCImp+X2016WEmpPC+Sector+Index20
11, cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4b2)
plot(H4b2)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
in Senior Management")
##Full model with data from imputation method - Narrow
H4b2<-RDestimate(WSMPCImp~X2016WOBPC|
Increase+Critical+X2016WED+
CEOTenure+ChairTenure+WExecPCImp+X2016WEmpPC+Sector+Index20
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11, bw=3.21, cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE,
model=TRUE)
summary(H4b2)
plot(H4b2)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
in Senior Management")
##Full model with data from imputation method - Wide
H4b2<-RDestimate(WSMPCImp~X2016WOBPC|
Increase+Critical+X2016WED+
CEOTenure+ChairTenure+WExecPCImp+X2016WEmpPC+Sector+Index20
11, bw=9, cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE,
model=TRUE)
summary(H4b2)
plot(H4b2)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
in Senior Management")
### Competing explanation - Hypothesis H4b - Forcing variable
Increase
#Unconditional models
#Testing Unconditional - Optimal - Linear
H4bAltU<-RDestimate(WSMPCImp~Increase, cutpoint=12,
data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4bAltU)
plot(H4bAltU)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
in Senior Management")
#Testing Unconditional - Optimal - Quadratic
H4bAltU<-RDestimate(WSMPCImp~Increase|Increase2,
cutpoint=12, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4bAltU)
plot(H4bAltU)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
in Senior Management")
#Testing Unconditional - Optimal - Cubic
H4bAltU<-RDestimate(WSMPCImp~Increase|Increase2+Increase3,
cutpoint=12, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4bAltU)
plot(H4bAltU)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
in Senior Management")
#Testing at different cutoff with Imputed data - Optimal
H4bAlt<-RDestimate(WSMPCImp~Increase| X2016Board+
CEOTenure+ChairTenure+WExecPCImp+X2016WEmpPC+Sector+Index20
11, cutpoint=12, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4bAlt)
plot(H4bAlt)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
in Senior Management")
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#Testing at different cutoff with Imputed data - Narrow
H4bAlt<-RDestimate(WSMPCImp~Increase|
X2016Board+CEOTenure+ChairTenure+WExecPCImp+X2016WEmpPC+Sec
tor+Index2011, bw=3.43, cutpoint=12, data=dsT1, verbose =
TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4bAlt)
plot(H4bAlt)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
in Senior Management")
#Testing at different cutoff with Imputed data - Wide
H4bAlt<-RDestimate(WSMPCImp~Increase| X2016Board+
CEOTenure+ChairTenure+ WExecPCImp+X2016WEmpPC+
Sector+Index2011, bw=13.71, cutpoint=12, data=dsT1, verbose
= TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4bAlt)
plot(H4bAlt)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
in Senior Management")
#Testing Hypothesis H4c
###H4c - Women employed - Unconditional - Linear
H4c<-RDestimate(X2016WEmpPC~X2016WOBPC, cutpoint=25,
data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4c)
plot(H4c)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
Employed")
###H4c - Women employed - Unconditional - Quadratic
H4c<-RDestimate(X2016WEmpPC~X2016WOBPC|WOBPC162,
cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4c)
plot(H4c)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
Employed")
###H4c - Women employed - Unconditional - Linear
H4c<-RDestimate(X2016WEmpPC~X2016WOBPC| WOBPC162+WOBPC163,
cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4c)
plot(H4c)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
Employed")
#H4c - Full model - Quadratic
H4cL<-RDestimate(X2016WEmpPC~X2016WOBPC| WOBPC162+
Increase+Critical+ CEOTenure+ChairTenure+
X2016WExecPC+X2016WSMPC+Sector+Index2011, cutpoint=25,
data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4cL)
plot(H4cL)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
Employed")
#H4c - Full model removing quadratic term -
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H4cL<-RDestimate(X2016WEmpPC~X2016WOBPC| Increase+Critical+
CEOTenure+ChairTenure+ X2016WExecPC+X2016WSMPC+
Sector+Index2011, cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE,
model=TRUE)
summary(H4cL)
plot(H4cL)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
Employed")
#H4c - Full model removing quadratic term - Imputed data Optimal
H4cL<-RDestimate(X2016WEmpPC~X2016WOBPC| Increase+Critical+
CEOTenure+ChairTenure+ WExecPCImp+WSMPCImp+
Sector+Index2011, cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE,
model=TRUE)
summary(H4cL)
plot(H4cL)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
Employed")
#H4c - Full model removing quadratic term - Imputed data - Wide
H4cL<-RDestimate(X2016WEmpPC~X2016WOBPC| Increase+Critical+
CEOTenure+ChairTenure+ WExecPCImp+WSMPCImp+Sector+Index2011,
cutpoint=25, bw=8.59,data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4cL)
plot(H4cL)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
Employed")
#H4c - Full model removing quadratic term - Imputed data - Narrow
H4cL<-RDestimate(X2016WEmpPC~X2016WOBPC| Increase+Critical+
CEOTenure+ ChairTenure+
WExecPCImp+WSMPCImp+Sector+Index2011, cutpoint=25, bw=5,
data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4cL)
plot(H4cL)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
Employed")
###H4c - Competing Explanation Women employed
H4cI<-RDestimate(X2016WEmpPC~Increase| CEOTenure+
ChairTenure+ WExecPCImp+WSMPCImp+Sector+Index2011,
cutpoint=12, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H4cI)
plot(H4cI, range=c(10, 40))
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Percentage of Women
Employed")
### Hypotheses 5
#Hypothesis H5a - Paygap mean
#H5a unconditional - Linear
H5a2<-RDestimate(PayGapMean~X2016WOBPC, cutpoint=25,
data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H5a2)
plot(H5a2)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap Mean")
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#H5a unconditional - Quadratic
H5a2<-RDestimate(PayGapMean~X2016WOBPC| WOBPC162,
cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H5a2)
plot(H5a2)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap Mean")
#H5a unconditional - Cubic
H5a2<-RDestimate(PayGapMean~X2016WOBPC|WOBPC162+WOBPC163,
cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H5a2)
plot(H5a2)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap Mean")
#H5a full model - Optimal
H5a<-RDestimate(PayGapMean~X2016WOBPC|
Increase+Critical+CEOTenure+
ChairTenure+WExecPCImp+WSMPCImp+X2016WEmpPC+Sector+Index201
1, cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H5a)
plot(H5a)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap Mean")
#H5a full model - Narrow
H5a<-RDestimate(PayGapMean~X2016WOBPC|
Increase+Critical+CEOTenure+
ChairTenure+WExecPCImp+WSMPCImp+X2016WEmpPC+Sector+Index201
1, cutpoint=25, bw=5.9, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE,
model=TRUE)
summary(H5a)
plot(H5a)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap Mean")
#H5a full model - Wide
H5a<-RDestimate(PayGapMean~X2016WOBPC|
Increase+Critical+CEOTenure+
ChairTenure+WExecPCImp+WSMPCImp+X2016WEmpPC+Sector+Index201
1, cutpoint=25, bw=13, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE,
model=TRUE)
summary(H5a)
plot(H5a)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap Mean")
### Hypotheses 5
#Hypothesis H5b - Paygap median
#H5a unconditional - Linear
H5b2<-RDestimate(PayGapMedian~X2016WOBPC, cutpoint=25,
data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H5b2)
plot(H5b2)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap
Median")
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#H5b unconditional - Quadratic
H5b2<-RDestimate(PayGapMedian~X2016WOBPC| WOBPC162,
cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H5b2)
plot(H5b2)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap
Median")
#H5b unconditional - Cubic
H5b2<-RDestimate(PayGapMedian~X2016WOBPC|WOBPC162+WOBPC163,
cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H5b2)
plot(Hba2)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap
Median")
#H5b full model - Optimal
H5b<-RDestimate(PayGapMedian~X2016WOBPC| CEOTenure+
ChairTenure+WExecPCImp+WSMPCImp+X2016WEmpPC+Sector+Index201
1, cutpoint=25, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H5b)
plot(H5b)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap
Median")
#H5b full model - Narrow
H5b<-RDestimate(PayGapMedian~X2016WOBPC| CEOTenure+
ChairTenure+WExecPCImp+WSMPCImp+
X2016WEmpPC+Sector+Index2011, cutpoint=25, bw=5.9,
data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H5b)
plot(H5b)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap
Median")
#H5b full model - Wide
H5b<-RDestimate(PayGapMedian~X2016WOBPC|
CEOTenure+ChairTenure+WExecPCImp+
WSMPCImp+X2016WEmpPC+Sector+Index2011, cutpoint=25, bw=13,
data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H5b)
plot(H5b)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap
Median")
###Hypothesis H5c
#Unconditional model - Linear
H5c<-RDestimate(PayGapMedian~Increase, cutpoint=12,
data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H5c)
plot(H5c)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap
Median")
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#Unconditional model - Quadratic
H5c<-RDestimate(PayGapMedian~Increase| Increase2,
cutpoint=12, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H5c)
plot(H5c)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap
Median")
#Unconditional model - Cubic
H5c<-RDestimate(PayGapMedian~Increase| Increase2+Increase3,
cutpoint=12, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H5c)
plot(H5c)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap
Median")
#Full model - Optimal
H5c<-RDestimate(PayGapMedian~Increase|
X2016WOBPC+WExecPCImp+WSMPCImp+X2016WEmpPC+
CEOTenure+ChairTenure+Critical+Sector, cutpoint=12,
data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H5c)
plot(H5c)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap
Median")
#Full model - Optimal - cluster-robust error
H5c<-RDestimate(PayGapMedian~Increase|
X2016WOBPC+WExecPCImp+WSMPCImp+X2016WEmpPC+
CEOTenure+ChairTenure+Critical+Sector, cluster=clustervar,
cutpoint=12, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H5c)
plot(H5c)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap
Median")
#Full model - Narrow - cluster-robust error
H5c<-RDestimate(PayGapMedian~Increase|
X2016WOBPC+WExecPCImp+WSMPCImp+X2016WEmpPC+
CEOTenure+ChairTenure+Critical+Sector, cluster=clustervar,
cutpoint=12, data=dsT1, bw=4.2, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H5c)
plot(H5c)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap
Median")
#Full model - Wide - cluster-robust error
H5c<-RDestimate(PayGapMedian~Increase|
X2016WOBPC+WExecPCImp+WSMPCImp+X2016WEmpPC+
CEOTenure+ChairTenure+Critical+Sector, cluster=clustervar,
cutpoint=12, data=dsT1, bw=8.4, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H5c)
plot(H5c)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap
Median")
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#Full model - Optimal - cluster-robust error - Pseudo cutoff 8
H5c<-RDestimate(PayGapMedian~Increase|
X2016WOBPC+WExecPCImp+WSMPCImp+X2016WEmpPC+
CEOTenure+ChairTenure+Critical+Sector, cluster=clustervar,
cutpoint=8, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H5c)
plot(H5c)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap
Median")
#Full model - Optimal - cluster-robust error - Pseudo cutoff 12
H5c<-RDestimate(PayGapMedian~Increase|
X2016WOBPC+WExecPCImp+WSMPCImp+X2016WEmpPC+
CEOTenure+ChairTenure+Critical+Sector, cluster=clustervar,
cutpoint=16, data=dsT1, verbose = TRUE, model=TRUE)
summary(H5c)
plot(H5c)
title(xlab="Percentage of WOB", ylab="Gender Pay Gap
Median")
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